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Abstract 
In recent years a number of scholars (most notably Anne Peters, Christian Tomuschat, Ruti 
Teitel and Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade) have identified an ongoing process of change 
in the international legal system’s relationship with individuals and groups of individuals.  
That change has been referred to as a humanisation of international law.  This thesis 
contributes to that area of study by offering an account of the deep level changes to the 
foundations of the international legal system, which it argues are both driving and are 
recursively driven by changes in substantive international law.  It finds the explanation for 
these changes in the idea of the self-determination of the individual, and it argues that this 
concept has now become a structural principle (a term borrowed from Giddens, 1984) of the 
international legal system. 
The thesis takes a twin methodological approach to the question, using both an analysis of the 
history of ideas and a sociological lens (particularly Giddens’s theory of structuration) to 
demonstrate that the foundations of the international legal order have changed through time, 
and that the operation and scope of the system’s basic concepts has altered concomitantly.  It 
argues that the institution of a principle of self-determination as the structural principle of the 
system is another such change, and one that will produce the kind of changes in the substance 
and operation of international law that have been identified by Peters and others.  Its finding 
that the interests of individuals and of communities are now embedded in international law at 
the structural level strongly supports the conclusion that Peters and others have drawn from 
the examination of substantive international law, that there is a process of humanisation 
occurring, and that the humanisation process is occurring at all levels within the system.
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 1 
 
Introduction 
No permanence is ours; we are a wave 
That flows to fit whatever form it finds: 
Through day or night, cathedral or cave 
We pass forever, craving form that binds.1 
Contrary to the oft-heard pleas for stability in international affairs, the international legal 
system has not been—and, likely, is not—stable.2  In his seminal The Epochs of International 
Law Grewe identifies at least six phases in the development of what is sometimes called 
“modern” international law: the Middle Ages; the Spanish, French and English ages, the inter-
war period, and the United Nations era.3  These epochs were characterised not merely by 
changes in the dominant participants and the substantive rules of the system, but also of the 
system foundations themselves.  Other scholars have similarly periodised the history of 
international law by means of its theoretical foundations, noting the dominance of cannon law, 
sacred and then secular (or semi-secular) natural law, and positivism as the underpinning 
                                                     
1 Hermann Hesse, The Glass Bead Game (Richard Winston and Clara Winston trs, Henry Holt and Company 2002) 
429. 
2 See e.g. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process:  International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 1995) 
56; Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations 
(Oxford University Press 1963) 104; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th 
edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 439; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2014) 155; Charles De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (Percy Ellwood Corbett 
ed, revised, Princeton University Press 2015) 200.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also referred to 
the need to maintain stability on a number of occasions, most notably in relation to boundary delimitation:  Case 
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June (1962), ICJ 
Reports 6, 34; Agean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, (1978) ICJ Reports 3, 36; Territorial Dispute (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment (1994) ICJ Reports 6, [72]; and also in relation to the formation of boundaries 
of post-colonial States: Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, (1986) ICJ Reports 554, 
[20, 25]; and in relation to treaty relations: Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 
(1997) ICJ Reports 7, [104].  Stability was also cited in the context of the need to maintain stability of judgments 
in the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Yusuf and others in the Preliminary Objections phase of the 
Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia Beyond 200 Nautical 
Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v Colombia) of 17th March 2016.  Stability is also cited as being 
‘necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations’ in Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations:  
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed 24 October 1945, in force 
24 October 1945. 
3 Wilhelm G Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Michael Byers tr, Walter de Gruyter 2000). 
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ideology of the international legal idea in different periods,4 and it may be—as Peters argues—
that we have now stepped beyond the positivist era into a form of post-positivism (which she 
calls “neo-naturalism”).5 
This thesis will more precisely identify and discuss that neo-natural shift.  As Peters and others 
have described (discussed further below), international law is undergoing a series of changes 
which have far-reaching implications, and which have been described as a process of 
humanisation.  This thesis will argue that those changes are not confined to the substantive 
international law, but rather are reflections of a deeper shift in the foundations of the system, 
which is both caused by and is recursively causing the reorientation of international law 
towards the human.  That shift takes the form of a change in the international legal system’s 
structural principles6—or the deepest level concepts of the system, which ground and give 
shape to the concepts which rest upon them—and it will be argued that the self-determination 
of the individual is now a structural principle of the international legal order. 
In order to assess that claim, the thesis adopts a two-part structure.  In part one, two chapters 
are devoted to an examination of the development of self-determination as a substantive 
concept in international law, and to a determination of its current status.  It will be argued that, 
in contrast to the unitary or binary conception of self-determination common in the literature, 
the idea of self-determination is composed of four different claims, each of which has a 
                                                     
4 Oliver Digglemann, ‘The Periodization of the History of International Law’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 1001–02; Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘A History of International Law Histories’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012); Bardo Fassbender and Anne 
Peters, ‘Introduction:  Towards a Global History of International Law’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012). 
5 Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights:  The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (Jonathan Huston 
tr, Cambridge University Press 2016) 25. 
6 The term is Giddens’s, and is discussed further below p.21 et seq. 
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different status in international law.  One of these claims, that referred to as political self-
determination, will be found to have attained a high status and a central position in the modern 
international legal system. 
The second part of the thesis develops those conclusions through a discussion of the theory of 
international law and, in particular, the role individual and political self-determination play in 
influencing and shaping the development of five concepts which are identified as the 
structural properties of international law: sovereignty, obligation, statehood, personality, and 
ius cogens.7  It argues that the modern incarnations of these concepts find their roots in the 
self-determination and dignity of the individual (in some cases via political self-
determination), and that the scope and operation of each is defined by that relationship.  This 
finding that the interests of individuals and of communities are now embedded in international 
law at the structural level supports the conclusion that Peters and others have drawn from the 
examination of substantive international law, that there is a process of humanisation occurring 
at all levels within the system. 
1. Towards a Human-Centred International Law 
In his 1999 Hague lecture, Tomuschat noted a shift in the international legal system.  It could 
no longer be said, he claimed, to be ‘based exclusively on State sovereignty.’8  Rather, certain 
basic values of the system had attained a protected status ‘derived from the notion that States 
are no more than instruments whose inherent function it is to serve the interests of their citizens 
as legally expressed in human rights.’9  These themes were foreshadowed in 1994 in Simma’s 
                                                     
7 See below p.23-25. 
8 Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Law:  Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’ (1999) 
281 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 9, 161. 
9 ibid 162. 
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lectures for the Hague Academy, in which he argued that the shift from bilateralism to 
community interests—including the interests of human beings—is producing significant 
changes in international law,10 and the years that followed saw three further Hague Courses 
dedicated to the notion of human-centred international law, with Meron (in 2003) arguing that 
the international acceptance of human rights is producing a shift from State- to individual-
centralism,11 Cançado Trindade (in 2005) finding evidence of an ongoing humanisation of 
international law and enthusiastically supporting the notion;12 and Hafner (in 2013) doubting 
that such a transformation is truly occurring.13  These views are representative of a wider split 
in the literature, with some authors supportive of the idea,14 while others have queried its 
applicability,15 or its usefulness.16 
The humanisation of international law, it is argued by its proponents, is driven by changes in 
the ways in which the legal system at large reacts to the individual.  For Tomuschat these 
changes are attributable to ‘a crawling process […] through which human rights have steadily 
                                                     
10 Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250 Collected Courses 
of the Hague Academy of International Law 217. 
11 Theodor Meron, ‘International Law in the Age of Human Rights’ (2003) 301 Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law 1. 
12 Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, ‘International Law for Humankind:  Towards a New Jus Genitum (I)’ 
(2005) 316 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 9. 
13 Gerhard Hafner, ‘The Emancipation of the Individual from the State under International Law’ (2013) 358 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 263. 
14 See, e.g. John King Gamble and others, ‘Human-Centric International Law:  A Model and a Search for Empirical 
Indicators’ (2005–06) 14 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 61; PK Menon, ‘The Legal 
Personality of Individuals’ (1994) 6 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 127; Antonio Cassese, The Human 
Dimension of International Law:  Selected Papers (Oxford University Press 2008); Andrea Bianchi, ‘Immunity 
versus Human Rights:  The Pinochet Case’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 237, 270–76. 
15 See e.g. Emma Dunlop, ‘Reply to Anne Peters’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 556. 
16  Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, ‘Bridge of Varvarin’ (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law 86, 91. 
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increased their weight, gaining momentum in comparison with State sovereignty’.17  Teitel 
casts a slightly wider net, arguing that in the post-Cold war period a triptych of factors—
humanitarian, human rights, and international criminal law—has resulted in a deep structural 
change.18 
The idea of the humanisation of international law has found perhaps its widest reaching and 
(in the present author’s opinion) a highly convincing expression in the work of Anne Peters.  
Peters’s scholarship on this subject is in two (main) parts, the first of which considered the 
impact of the idea of humanity (drawn more broadly than Tomuschat’s or Meron’s focus on 
human rights, but which retains human rights as a vital, central aspect) on sovereignty,19 and 
the second of which looked beyond both sovereignty and human rights in order to cast light 
on the many other areas of international law which show an increasing regard for individuals.20  
Peters describes an international legal system in which the individual is acknowledged as the 
“original” or “true” international legal subject,21 a position she recognises is inherently 
controversial,22 and most closely associated with a ‘neo-natural law paradigm’.23  
Understanding, however, that the invocation of natural law ‘hardly satisfies today’s standards 
of intersubjective comprehensibility’ she states her methodological intention to 
‘supplement[]’ that paradigm with a rigorous treatment of the positive law.24  She therefore 
                                                     
17 Tomuschat (n 8) 162.  Meron also attributes the ongoing humanisation of international law primarily to the 
influence of human rights:  Meron (n 11) 22 et seq. 
18 Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 4.  [Footnotes omitted]. 
19 Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the Α and Ω of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 513. 
20 Peters (n 5). 
21 ibid 23–25, 408–35. 
22 ibid 33–34. 
23 ibid 25. 
24 ibid. 
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conducts an extensive examination of international law practice and doctrine in order to 
support the contention that the role individuals play in international law is dramatically 
expanding, finding support in the ability of individuals to bear primary (substantive) 
obligations,25 their ability to bear secondary (procedural) obligations,26 and the ability of 
international norms to generate correlative rights for individuals;27 as well as from a number 
of substantive areas of law: humanitarian law,28 investment law,29 consular law,30 diplomatic 
protection,31 in the legal status of victims of crime,32 and in the protection of the individual 
from disasters.33   
In the author’s opinion, Beyond Human Rights is a remarkable book, and one that makes a 
significant contribution to international law scholarship.  Peters’s study is impressive in its 
breadth, and its conclusions, overall, are highly convincing: although different strands of 
international law take account of the individual to different extents and in differing ways, 
individuals are now relevant persons in a great many fields of international law, without the 
mediating presence of the State.  Although some will be inclined to dismiss her conclusions 
as utopian or failing to take account of the central legislative power (still) wielded by States,34 
overall Peters presents a compelling argument that the role of the individual in international 
                                                     
25 ibid 60 et seq. 
26 ibid 115 et seq. 
27 ibid 167 et seq. 
28 ibid 194 et seq. 
29 ibid 282 et seq. 
30 ibid 348 et seq. 
31 ibid 388 et seq. 
32 ibid 255 et seq. 
33 ibid 233 et seq. 
34 Dunlop (n 15) 558. 
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law has significantly altered in a relatively short period of time.  Peters’s project is not 
complete, however, and in particular a theoretical explanation of the causes or the mechanism 
for the humanisation of international law which she identifies is conspicuous by its absence.  
It would however be unreasonable to criticise Peters for this omission, not least because its 
addition would have added considerably to an already very sizable project, but most 
particularly because it is consistent with her stated intention to identify whether and where a 
humanising trend may be observed in positive international law. 
It is that question—the explanation of the causes and mechanisms of the humanising trend in 
the theory of international law—that this thesis will address.  It will be argued that the trend 
that has been identified by Peters and others can be explained by a shift in the structural 
principles35 which underpin the international legal system and which condition other concepts, 
and it will examine the proposition that self-determination is now a structural principle of 
international law.  In seeking the source of the humanising tendency in international law at the 
theoretical level it will contribute to the development of scholarship in the field of human-
centred international law, aiming to complement and build upon the analysis of the positive 
international law that has already been conducted. 
2. The Idea of Self-Determination 
In the course of the discussion this thesis makes use of certain key concepts, most notably self-
determination, a form of which it argues is the driver of the humanisation process. 
Self-determination is a concept which has a variety of different meanings in different contexts.  
The label is employed to assert a pre-constitutional right of the populations of States to 
                                                     
35 This term is discussed below, p.21-25. 
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determine basic principles of their shared socio-political life (sometimes called popular 
sovereignty),36 the right of States to govern themselves without outside interference,37 to 
require the grant of independence to peoples under colonial rule,38 and to justify the rights of 
groups to break away from a State.39  This thesis presumes that although these forms of self-
determination are separate and distinct (see chapter one40), they nevertheless share a common 
root in a fifth homonym: personal self-determination.  It will be argued that it is this idea—
together with its collectivised expression of political self-determination—that is the structural 
principle of the international legal system, which shapes the structural properties and the 
subsidiary concepts that flow from it. 
Personal self-determination may be defined as the contention that all individual human agents 
should have the opportunity (that is to say, the actualised right) to decide upon and to pursue 
their individual conception of the good.41  In other words, because human beings are ‘capable 
of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived’, they 
should have the opportunity to live whatever form of life seems best to them.42 
                                                     
36 See, for example, American Declaration of Independence (1776), and discussion below p.41-45. 
37 See, for example, Declaration on Friendly Relations, annexed to UNGA Res 2526(XXV), 24 October 1970 and 
discussion below p.87-91. 
38 See, for example, UNGA Res 1514(XV), 20 December 1960 and discussion below p.83-85. 
39 See, for example, the examples of Norway and Quebec, discussed below p.52-62 and p.107-110 respectively. 
40 See below p.31 et seq. 
41 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd 2005) 272–73; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, 
State and Utopia (Basil Blackwell 1974) ix; Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’ in The Authority of 
Law:  Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979) 220. 
42 Dworkin (n 41) 272–73. 
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That contention is inherently social, and is so for two reasons.  It is, first, a concept which has 
application only in a social setting: a lone individual has no right to self-determination.  
Indeed, their self-determination is a meaningless concept, given that their capacity of action 
is both free from the constraint of any other will, and that it is vastly limited by the necessities 
of survival.  This second is implicated, too, in the second social aspect of self-determination: 
that many of the goods which provide the individual the security of person and the freedom 
from need necessary to enable self-determination are best achieved socially, whether it be 
protection from the actions of others, or the pursuit of higher living standards though collective 
endeavour.43  Social and political communities, therefore, whether formed incidentally to 
these needs or (pace Hobbes) in pursuit of them,44 are themselves vehicles for the expression 
of individual self-determination. 
The presence of the individual in a social setting gives meaning to the idea of self-
determination, but it also presents challenges.  Hobbes’s famous warning that absent the 
regulation of violence human life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ presents 
a very bleak picture of humans, but one that is all too believable.45  Although the idea of 
consistency (most authoritatively formulated, perhaps, by Kant in his categorical 
imperative46) requires that each individual recognise and concede the same rights to others as 
they claim for themselves, it would be both naïve and contrary to historical experience to 
expect this principle of internal consistency alone to provide an adequate degree of assurance 
                                                     
43 Richard E Leakey, The Making of Mankind (Book Club Associates 1981) 211.  A similar observation can be 
seen in Durkheim, who notes that ‘[i]t is to society that we owe the[] varied benefits of civilisation […] Man is 
human only because he is socialised’:  Emile Durkheim, ‘Religion and Ritual’ in Anthony Giddens (ed), Emile 
Durkheim:  Selected Writings (Cambridge University Press 1972) 232. 
44 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck ed, Cambridge University Press 1991). 
45 ibid §62. 
46 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Thomas E Hill Jr. and Arnulf Zweig eds, Arnulf 
Zweig tr, Oxford University Press 2002) 217; see also Christine M Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity 
(Onora O’Neill ed, Cambridge University Press 1996) 136 et seq. 
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of the rights of individuals.  Some form of social regulation and ordering—perhaps in the form 
of law, law-making and law enforcing institutions—may be posited, therefore, and that in turn 
implies a concept of jurisdiction.47  In other words, the idea of social constraint implies and 
requires that it be possible to determine to whom the obligations of the system apply, and how 
and where an individual is entitled to claim the protection of them.  It is to this idea that Kelsen 
refers in his description of law as a social technique: law applies to a particular society, and 
therefore requires an understanding of membership of a society – of who is, and who is not, a 
part of it.48 
The laws and socio-political institutions of a society are specific techniques whereby the 
freedom and well-being of individuals—that is to say, their self-determination—are preserved, 
maintained, and enhanced.  The form that these institutions, and the wider social and political 
structures of the society, will take is dependent on the context and the particular needs of the 
individuals who comprise that society, and is the product of an ongoing process of choice of 
the form of socio-political organisation that best serves their needs.  The self-determination of 
the individuals who compose a society—its members—is implicated in its forms and 
structures both in that it exists for and in order to protect them and their rights, and to the 
extent that the forms and structures of socio-political organisation that are in place are the 
expression of an ongoing collective choice.49  It follows that to impose from outside a society 
a different choice (or to restrict its freedom of choice) would be to substitute the competence 
                                                     
47 Jurisdiction is not, here, intended to convey the sense of jurisdiction over territory, but rather is used in the more 
nebulous sense of sphere of application. 
48 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State (Anders Wedberg tr, Lawbook Exchange 1999) 19. 
49 That conclusion need not imply a democratic form of social order.  As Waldron observes, the self-determination 
decision of ‘whether to have a democracy around here, and if so, what sort of democracy to have’ is necessarily 
prior to any particular form of social order:  Jeremy Waldron, ‘Two Conceptions of Self-Determination’ in 
Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 
408. 
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of the members of society for that of non-members, and thus to sever the link between the 
society and the self-determination of its members. 
In this way the self-determination rights of the individuals in a society aggregate and accrete 
to give rise to something of a different kind: a right of the society as a whole to pursue its 
internal socio-political life without the interference of those external to it.50  In other words, it 
produces a right of the society to self-determine, which may be referred to as political self-
determination.  In its internal aspect this principle stands for the proposition (sometimes called 
popular sovereignty) that individuals are the source of legitimacy in a political constitution.  
In its external aspect it stands for the principle of non-interference; that it is for the community 
to determine and pursue its conception of the good, and that external interference is antithetical 
to that self-determination right. 
As will be argued in Part One, this concept of political self-determination has been deeply 
embedded in the international legal system, particularly in the post-Charter era.  It is this 
concept which, together with its root of personal self-determination, this thesis will argue 
should now be regarded as among the structural principles which shape the international legal 
system.  These are not isolated concepts, however, and they form part of a broader “genus” of 
self-determination concepts, all of which find their root either directly, or via the idea of 
political self-determination, in personal self-determination.  At least three further forms can 
be identified, all of which have relevance to the international legal system, and which have 
been accepted by the system to varying degrees: remedial, colonial, and secessionary self-
                                                     
50 This is understood here as a moral right.  For a discussion of the transposition of this moral into a legal right see 
chapter 3, p.172-183. 
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determination.  These forms and their relative legal statuses are discussed further in chapter 
one.51 
3. Methodology 
The task of the social sciences, according to Max Weber, is ‘the interpretive understanding of 
social action in order thereby to arrive at a [causal] explanation of its course and effects.’52  In 
order to undertake such an examination of the trend towards humanisation this thesis will 
adopt a twin methodological approach, employing both an historical analysis—and most 
particularly a Begriffsgeschichte (or “concept-history”) in Koskenniemi’s terms53—and a 
sociological lens, most particularly Giddens’s theory of structuration.  These techniques share 
a number of concerns.  First, both are centrally concerned with agency, and seek to locate the 
actions, intentions and beliefs of agents within the study of social systems.54  Each seeks, to 
use Weber’s terminology, sinnhafte Adäquanz (“adequacy on the level of meaning”);55 or an 
understanding of what agents themselves recognise as the ‘“typical” complex of meaning’ 
which attaches to actions and concepts in relevant social contexts.56  This context is as vital in 
law as it is in any other social scientific setting.  As Unger has reminded us, social institutions 
and structures like law are ‘made and imagined’,57 a ‘frozen politics’,58 created by, for, and 
                                                     
51 See below p.31 et seq. 
52 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (AM Henderson and Talcott Parsons trs, Free 
Press 1947) 88.  A typographical error (or so I presume) in this edition renders the phrase ‘a casual explanation’. 
53 Koskenniemi (n 4) 968. 
54 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Polity Press 1984) xx–
xxi; Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ (1969) 8 History and Theory 3, 50–
52. 
55 Weber (n 52) translators’ note 20. 
56 ibid 99. 
57 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561, 665. 
58 ibid 649. 
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through the actions of social agents,59 and its understanding therefore depends on adequately 
contextualising both the actions of agents in the past, and the ways in which the social and 
historical effects contemporary action. 
Secondly, both highlight one element in particular; that of change.  It was noted above that the 
international legal system has not remained stable through time.  On the contrary, it has passed 
through at least six distinct epochs, in each of which the international legal system had a 
different structure, and was built upon different foundations.60  Another such change is 
suggested here: the shift from positivism to “post-positivism”, “neo-naturalism”, or “human-
centred international law”.  The history of concepts is employed to understand the background 
to that shift, and why and how the ideas and concepts which are employed and discussed have 
come to bear their meanings and to occupy their positions in modern international law.  
Structuration theory is then applied in order to understand the mechanics of the changes which 
are occurring, and the theory also provides a background understanding of the international 
legal system as a social order which is subject to change. 
The key benefit of the twin methodological approach adopted here is that it facilitates (and 
requires) a re-examination of certain orthodox positions through a re-reading of their history 
and social context.  It shows that these concepts, in the form in which they are actually 
deployed in modern international law, have a far greater degree of complexity than is generally 
attributed to them, and it emphasises foundations as necessary socio-intellectual contexts 
within which concepts are seated.  As foundations change so do concepts, and those 
                                                     
59 This claim is defended in particular by Giddens, for which see discussion below at p.21-23. 
60 Grewe (n 3); see also Digglemann (n 4); Koskenniemi (n 4). 
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conceptual shifts can be used as mirrors to examine foundational change in action.  It is that 
task that will be attempted here. 
2.1 Historical 
‘There is,’ Korhonen argues, ‘no way to understand and agree in the present without having 
some kind of narrative for how the present conditions and circumstances have come about.’61  
History is a vital context in which the modern legal world is situated.  This thesis seeks that 
contextualisation primarily in an examination of the history of the concepts of international 
law – a Begriffsgeschichte. 
2.1.1 Begriffsgeschichte 
Historical scholars of the Cambridge school have questioned the extent to which conceptual 
history can cross the temporal divide and generate insights into modern usages from historical 
applications of ideas and doctrines,62 but the study of legal history requires an exception to be 
made to the general condemnation of anachronism.  While Skinner argues that history must 
live scrupulously within its own context—he declares that an examination of historical texts 
cannot provide us with answers to ‘our questions […] but only with their own’63—law’s 
character as a conceptual science, and one that is inherently backward-looking in its search 
for authority, has been highlighted by Orford as producing different needs.64  Law’s concern 
with concepts which carry with them an intellectual history which is consciously or 
unconsciously invoked when the concept is applied requires a focus not only on historical 
                                                     
61 Outi Korhonen, ‘International Lawyer:  Towards Conceptualization of the Changing World and Practice’ (2000) 
2 European Journal of Law Reform 545, 555. 
62 See generally Skinner (n 54) esp. 50. 
63 ibid 50. 
64 Anne Orford, ‘On International Legal Method’ (2013) 1 London Review of International Law 166, 170 et seq. 
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meaning—Skinner’s primary concern—but with received meaning.’65  Koskenniemi also 
appears to recognise this necessary anachronism is his call for a Begriffsgeschichte, or a 
conceptual history, of law.  He argues that such an approach should 
[T]ake the legal vocabularies and institutions as open-ended platforms on which 
contrasting meanings are to be projected at different periods, each complete in 
themselves, each devised so as to reach to some problem in the surrounding world.  
Its interest lies in meaning formation (“how does a particular concept receive this 
meaning?”) rather than the contents of any stable meaning per se.66 
Conceptual history of law not only facilitates understanding of the kinds of claims made by 
modern agents in their invocation of deep-rooted concepts, but it also focuses attention on 
change of meaning.  To that extent, it is perhaps closer to the concerns of the Cambridge 
school than it might have at first appeared.  Although it to some extent commits the ‘sin’ of 
producing ‘genealogic history from present to past [which] leads to anachronistic 
interpretations of historical phenomena,’67 it nevertheless succeeds in highlighting that ‘those 
features of our own arrangements which we may be disposed to accept as traditional or even 
“timeless” truths may in fact be the merest contingencies of our peculiar history and social 
structure.’68  Indeed, it is particularly well suited to that task, and will be employed here for 
that purpose. 
More specific to the study of law still is the imperative recourse to history imposed by the 
structure of legal argument.  Law is inherently a backward-looking enterprise which seeks 
authority for the regulation in imposes on its subjects in past acts, an aspect of its internal 
structure which may be seen particularly clearly in the concepts of enactment and precedent.  
The injunction that “like cases should be treated alike” and the conviction that retroactive 
                                                     
65 ibid 175. 
66 Koskenniemi (n 4) 969. 
67 Randall Lesaffer, ‘International Law and Its History:  The Story of an Unrequited Love’ in Matthew Craven and 
others (eds), Time, History and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 34. 
68 Skinner (n 54) 52–53.  [Footnotes omitted]. 
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application of legal standards is (at least in normal cases) abusive—both cited as key elements 
of the rule of law, for example by Fuller69—go beyond explicit appeal to past acts as 
justification for present action, and argue that law’s legitimacy is inherently historical.  In the 
international legal world, the (at least partial) lack of constitutional, democratic or textual 
foundations creates a still-stronger pressure towards history as authority for current law.  This 
is ‘a discipline in which judges, advocates, scholars and students all look to past texts precisely 
to discover the nature of present obligations’,70 and as a result ‘[t]he past, far from being gone, 
is constantly being revived as a source or rationalisation for present obligation.’71  The key 
understanding here is not only that the necessary (if anachronic) task of the legal historian is 
to contextualise the concepts of the present in their (perhaps dis-)continuous intellectual 
history, but also the contextualisation of the endeavour itself.  As lawyers studying history our 
concern is not, as Orford correctly notes, ‘with the past as history but with the past as law.’72 
2.1.2 Painted History 
Nevertheless, that the task at hand is the study of the past as law does not free the enterprise 
from the dangers of subjectivism and reductionism that beset the study of history more 
broadly.73  Seemingly innocuous decisions about the manner in which historical study is 
conducted can impose the subjectivity of the author onto the enterprise, and the truth of that 
observation can be seen even in the characterisation of historical time itself.  As Digglemann 
notes, although the ‘division of historical time into periods is indispensable for any 
                                                     
69 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 46–49, 51–63. 
70 Orford (n 64) 171. 
71 ibid 175. 
72 ibid 177. 
73 And, indeed, as Bianchi highlights, other scholarly undertakings:  Andrea Bianchi, ‘Reflexive Butterfly 
Catching:  Insights from a Situated Catcher’ in Joost Pauwelyn and others (eds), Informal International 
Lawmaking (Oxford University Press 2012) 203–05. 
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historiographical work’,74 it remains an inescapable truth that ‘[p]eriods are not facts.’75  
Rather, they are ‘interpretations of facts’.76  Although they serve the necessary function of 
breaking the sweep of historical time into cognisable and intelligible sets of facts, events, and 
ideas with a (purported, at least) relevance to each other—of making ‘historical facts 
“thinkable”’77—defining historical periods is never value-neutral.78  The choice of the 
historian to work within a framework of international law ancient, medieval and modern, for 
example, or of the Spanish, French and British eras of international law (both of which 
Digglemann describes as “conventional” periodisations of international law)79 inevitably 
colours the enquiry: it represents a choice as to what is and is not relevant in relation to the 
subject matter to be examined.80 
Like the division of history into units, the choice of approach to history is almost never 
unproblematic.  While a realist history (or a history which focuses on the successive influences 
of different hegemonies) ‘dismisses religions, cultures and ideologies as well as the autonomy 
of legal institutions’,81 Koskenniemi argues, an Ideengeschichte (a history which takes as its 
reference points individual writers or approaches) ‘leaves untreated the history of “law” as the 
development of legal concepts, principles and institutions’.82  Both are reductive, the former 
overemphasising the hegemonic, and the second giving excessive weight to certain luminary 
                                                     
74 Digglemann (n 4) 997. 
75 ibid 999. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid 997, quoting Krzysztof Pomian, L’ordre Du Temps (Gallimard 1984) 162. 
78 Digglemann (n 4) 1001; Koskenniemi (n 4) 962 et seq. 
79 Digglemann (n 4) 1001–02. 
80 ibid 999–1001; Koskenniemi (n 4) 961–68. 
81 Koskenniemi (n 4) 962. 
82 ibid 968. 
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thinkers; and both consequently can have a tendency to be unduly homogenising, erasing 
dissenting voices.  It is in this vein that Koskenniemi calls as an alternative for the 
Begriffsgeschichte—‘a conceptual history that examines changes in the meaning of legal 
concepts […] or institutions’— discussed above, and it is this approach that is adopted here.83  
Nevertheless, such an approach is not without problems of its own.  First, Koskenniemi 
observes that it must avoid the temptation to treat the evolution of a concept as being 
directional or having a destination.  It must not ‘take[] the present concept or institution as a 
given and […] reduce all prior history into the role of its “primitive” precursor.’84 
Secondly, it is important to remember that such a history is not free from the reductive and 
homogenising tendencies of the realist and doctrinal approaches.  Like these, the selection of 
individual meanings for a concept cannot help but erase to some extent periods of transition 
between meanings, definitional uncertainty, regional variation, and meanings which (perhaps 
because they were short-lived, were contested, or were geographically limited) are deemed 
less important.  Furthermore, it should be remembered that the search for meaning inevitably 
implicates realist (in the practice and opinio iuris of States and empires) and doctrinal 
approaches to some degree, and both in the balance between these approaches and in the 
examples selected choices must necessarily be made as to the relevant factors for assessing 
the meaning of the concept in time. 
Korhonen has put forward a five-part critique of history, which she regards as having a 
‘totalizing-tendency’ which ‘produce[s] manipulated appearances of reality while, in fact, 
                                                     
83 See p.15. 
84 Koskenniemi (n 4) 969.  This injunction certainly applies to self-determination.  As Chadwick’s recent work has 
highlighted, the concept is still developing and, as she says, ‘more chapters will no doubt be added to [its] 
chronology’:  Elizabeth Chadwick, Self-Determination in the Post-9/11 Era (Routledge 2011) 3.   
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alienating the observer and simplifying the links between motives, causes stakes and 
outcomes.’85 
First, it employs a number of techniques by which it creates “an effect” that it is 
the reality that it recounts not just a story about it.  Second, it offers itself as the 
neutral “reality check.”  Third, it externalises the past from the people whose past 
it is.  Fourth, it persuades us not to look inside but outside ourselves for answers.  
Fifth, it presents the events of the world as snapshots which follow each other in 
an orderly fashion:  to produce an historical account is to clean up the mess of 
convoluted and simultaneous “happenings.”86 
Nor, she argues, is the move from the comprehensive to the particular as the focus of 
international legal history a “cure” for the fallibilities of the undertaking.87 
There are, then, a number of apparently inescapable problems associated with the writing of 
history.  Although scholars may strive to create a balanced and value-neutral account of the 
development of international law and international legal concepts, the ‘unavoidable 
subjectivity’ of the choices the author makes surrounding periodisation, delineation, in- or 
exclusion, and approach will inevitably skew the enterprise in ways which may be more or 
less obvious.88  These concerns may not be “cure-able”, and they therefore pose the question 
of what the well-meaning scholar of international law should do.  Should we—as Korhonen 
poses the question—‘trash all history in and of international law?’89 
                                                     
85 Outi Korhonen, ‘The Role of History in International Law’ (2000) 94 Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law 45, 46. 
86 ibid. 
87 ibid. 
88 Digglemann (n 4) 1001. 
89 Korhonen (n 85) 46. 
20 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTERED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
She answers that we should not:  we must have recourse to history.90  It is precisely the 
simplifying and totalising aspects of history which—though problematic—‘are the means of 
making sense, finding a meaning, a red thread in the open and complex system that the world 
is.  Without them we cannot reconcile past acts, arrive at conventions, or produce forgiveness, 
which law should do.’91  In this, Korhonen must be correct.  It should be of no surprise that 
history—like all other methodological approaches—is unable to transcend its limitations, but 
it nevertheless remains a powerful tool for understanding and contextualising the modern 
world; so long as the “truth” of its conclusions are treated with a proper degree of scepticism.  
‘No-one’, to use Korhonen’s apt phrase, ‘is a photographer of history’:92  rather when 
projecting an image of history our subjective starting-points and decisions will determine the 
contours of the product.  If a photograph is an accurate record, the painting says as much about 
the artist as it does about the scenery. 
What is left, then, is to have recourse to history, but to do so with the eyes wide open.  
Digglemann argues that the ‘diligent intellectual has to admit the unavoidable subjectivity of 
[their] periodization decisions’,93 and this injunction is interpreted here in the active form: that 
it is preferable for the writer of history baldly to express the approach they have taken to the 
enterprise, and the purpose for which they have done so.  For this reason these will be briefly 
set out at the major points where a historical methodology is employed. 
                                                     
90 Korhonen (n 61) 555. 
91 Korhonen (n 85) 46. 
92 Korhonen (n 61) 555. 
93 Digglemann (n 4) 1001. 
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2.2 Sociological 
In parallel with its use of history, this thesis will also look to sociology in order to show the 
interactions between self-determination and the key concepts of international law, and in 
particular will employ Anthony Giddens’s theory of structuration. 
2.2.1 Structuration Theory 
The theory of structuration is given its fullest expression in Giddens’s 1984 monograph The 
Constitution of Society.  There Giddens seeks to reconcile ‘the conceptual divide between 
subject and social object’, and to recast that ‘dualism’ as a ‘duality’.94  In contrast both to 
schools of thought which cast societies as structures which have effects on individuals, and 
approaches which reduce all of social life to individual interaction, Giddens locates human 
agency at the heart of social ordering, and in so doing he emphasises the two-way, or recursive, 
relationship that exists between social form and social action.95 
Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive.  
That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually 
recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors.  
In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these 
activities possible.96 
In so doing, the theory of structuration has drawn attention to the malleability of social 
systems,97 and it criticises in particular the tendency of social theory to ‘think in terms of 
physical imagery […] like the walls of a building or the skeleton of a body.  This is misleading 
because it implies too static or unchanging an image of what societies are like’.98 
                                                     
94 Giddens (n 54) xx–xxi. 
95 ibid xxiii. 
96 ibid 2.  [My emphasis]. 
97 Giddens (n 54). 
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It is for this reason that Giddens criticises “structure” as a metaphor for societies and social 
phenomena.99  These metaphors imply a permanence and a rigidity that he regards as 
unwarranted, as well as a skeletal function whereby the patterns of social life are constrained 
by forms without any reverse interaction.  Nevertheless, structuration theory does not dispense 
with the idea of structure altogether. 
In analysing social relations we have to acknowledge both a syntagmatic 
dimension, the patterning of social relations in time-space involving the 
reproduction of situated practices, and a paradigmatic dimension, involving a 
virtual order of “modes of structuring” recursively implicated in such 
reproduction.  […]  Structure thus refers, in social analysis, to the structuring 
properties allowing the “binding” of time-space in social systems, the properties 
of which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across 
varying spans of time and space and which lend them “systemic” form.100 
Giddens refers to the ‘most deeply embedded structural properties’ of a given social system 
as structural principles.101 
Structural properties, then—and the most basic of them, the structural principles—are the 
concepts, ideas and functions which give shape to social systems and which create patterns of 
social behaviour.  They are, though, still themselves shaped by that behaviour in the process 
of recursive creation and recreation Giddens describes.  Far from thinking about the study of 
social systems as the exploration of a house—where we may find and unlock the door that 
leads to the foundations, thence to “discover” the “true” basis of the system—we need rather 
to be aware that ‘social systems are like buildings that are at every moment constantly being 
reconstructed by the very bricks that compose them.’102  That change does not, however, take 
place in any directed sense; the recreation of social structures is not (by and large) subject to 
                                                     
99 Giddens (n 54) 16. 
100 ibid 17.  [My emphasis]. 
101 ibid 17, 180–93. 
102 Giddens (n 98) 14.  [Emphasis removed]. 
 INTRODUCTION 23 
 
 
a controlling influence or will.  Rather it responds to the expectations of reality that individuals 
in and interacting with the system hold. 
It is this malleability that gives study of the structural principles and structural properties of 
social systems power as an explanatory framework for analysis of social change.  Although 
their “embeddedness” means that change in the system principles and properties would 
generally be expected to take place slowly and incrementally, there nevertheless remains the 
potential for a shift in behaviours and—crucially—in actors’ expectations of what the social 
reality is to effect much more dramatic changes.  That these changes are recursive, too, means 
that such changes would be expected to have effects felt throughout the system:  while 
behaviours, actions and the operation of system concepts shape the social structures, so social 
structures shape those behaviours, actions and concepts in parallel.  It is a change of this kind, 
in the structural principles of international law, that has been referred to above.  This thesis 
will argue that self-determination is now one of those structural principles, and that its 
influence in shaping and conditioning the structural properties and the other concepts of the 
international legal system is a major driver in the ongoing process of humanisation of 
international law. 
2.2.2 The Structural Properties of the International Legal System 
The identification of the structural properties which shape international society and (in 
particular) international law is a potentially never-ending task.  Unger argues that it is not 
possible ever fully to capture ‘a definitive structure because no arrangement of society and of 
culture can ever do justice to who we are, to our powers of experience, of insight, of 
production, of association.’103  Although this is very likely true—social systems in their vast 
                                                     
103 Nigel Warburton, Interview with Roberto Mangabeira Unger, ‘Roberto Mangaberia Unger on What is Wrong 
with the Social Sciences Today - SocialScienceBites’ (January 2014). 
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and ever-changing complexity would perhaps render even an exhaustive account reductive—
law is perhaps the form of social interaction that is, to the greatest extent, institutionalised.  
Unger describes institutional structures in society as ‘a kind of frozen politics’, and legal 
systems could be argued, then, to be those social systems in the deepest freeze.104  Although 
such an account will only ever be schematic, it is nevertheless worth the effort of attempting, 
and will be undertaken here by means of a thought experiment. 
Let us attempt to derive the international legal system as it currently exists from scratch.  Such 
a task is, of course, impossible:  as the methodological discussion above indicates, the present 
author begins from the presumption that the international legal system is a historical 
contingency—one which has arisen primarily as a result of historical dominance of European 
nation-States and of the imposition through the colonial experience of the ideas which sustain 
them onto the rest of the world105—constructed as a result of the conscious and unconscious 
actions of individuals and groups, and that the forms and structures of integration which may 
be found therein are not (or, perhaps more accurately, are not necessarily) expressions of 
necessity, inevitability, morality or transcendentalism.  For that reason, one would need a vast 
amount of information about the historical and current orderings of the international 
community, the relative positions of States and peoples, the great events which have shaped 
the consciousness of the world, and the values held by individuals and States at different points 
in time in order even to attempt it.  The task can be simplified, however:  leave aside all 
substantive rules and institutional organisation, and let us attempt to arrive merely at the 
structural elements of the system.  Although this, too, is a daunting task, unlike the first it is 
suggested that it would be possible to arrive at something which at least approximates the 
                                                     
104 ibid. 
105 On the influence of colonialism on the development of international law see, in particular, Antony Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2004); Lauren 
Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order:  The British Empire and the Origins of International Law 1800-1850 
(Harvard University Press 2016). 
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structure of the international legal system as it currently exists if given a select few postulated 
propositions.  This position is not intended to deny that the form of the system is historically 
contingent, and still less to suggest that the system’s postulates are inevitable, necessary, right, 
or immutable.  On the contrary, ‘the arrangements of society – the regime of society – is not 
a natural phenomenon; it is made and imagined.’106  Rather a descriptive point is made:  it is 
submitted that certain system postulates, once they are instituted by social and historical 
forces, dictate the subsequent shape of the system, and that given an adequate understanding 
of these core concepts, therefore, a schematic outline of the modern international legal system 
may be drawn.  Those concepts are sovereignty, obligation, statehood, personality, and ius 
cogens. 
These are, I submit, (at least some of) the structural properties of modern international law.  
In other words, these are ‘[i]nstitutionalized features of [the] social system, stretching across 
time and space’, which serve to condition and shape the system as a whole.107  It is to these 
concepts that this thesis will refer in the course of the argument, in order to demonstrate that 
self-determination now occupies the position of a structural principle of the international legal 
system, and that its influence is resulting in a refocusing of these concepts and the wider 
system.  A human-centred international law is emerging. 
4. The Argument 
Structural principles are not immune from change.  Indeed, far from it:  that is a vital aspect 
of Giddens’s thesis.108  They may evolve and shift in response to the perceptions and 
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expectations of reality of the individuals within the system, in a process Giddens describes as 
recursive social activity.  But because structural principles are so deeply embedded in the 
fabric of the social order, their evolution or the migration of one structural principle to another 
can entail significant changes to the structure of the system as a whole.  Although it will not 
seek to pin down the moment—if such there be—at which this change occurred, this thesis 
will seek to show that the structural principles on which the international legal order is based 
have shifted, and that self-determination now sits among them. 
The argument that the humanising trend is explicable by a shift in the system principles faces, 
of course, a challenge, in that the principles of the international legal system are not 
immediately accessible for inspection.  Rather, those principles must be sought indirectly, in 
the effects that are produced in other areas and, in particular, in its structural properties – the 
second order concepts of the international legal system.  This thesis will therefore take the 
form of the proposition and examination of a hypothesis:  that the idea of self-determination 
(meaning, in particular, the closely connected concepts of personal and political self-
determination) has grown to be deeply embedded in the structure of the international legal 
system—and especially so in the post-Charter era—and that it is a structural principle of the 
international legal system.109  In other words, it is the hypothesis of this thesis that self-
determination sits at a high level within the conceptual hierarchy of the international legal 
order, and that it shapes and conditions the concepts that sit below it in that hierarchy.  The 
humanisation of international law is both driving and being driven by that foundational 
change. 
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In order to test that hypothesis, this thesis will examine certain of the vital concepts—the 
structural properties—of the international legal system:  sovereignty, obligation, statehood, 
personality, and ius cogens.110  It will argue that these concepts, in their modern form, are 
conditioned by and structured according to self-determination, both in themselves and in the 
ways in which they interact.  If the hypothesis is borne out, the treatment of these concepts in 
everyday international law questions will need to be reassessed.  In particular, scholars, jurists 
and practitioners will need to be aware that the 19th and 20th century incarnations of these ideas 
may no longer be appropriate.  There will have been, in Kuhn’s terms, a shift in paradigm 
towards a human-centred international legal system.111 
The argument of the thesis is divided into two parts.  In part one the position of self-
determination in substantive international law is examined in order to demonstrate, in 
particular, the central importance modern international law places upon the collectivised 
expression of self-determination by socio-political communities, which is referred to here as 
political self-determination.  Chapter one of the thesis traces the development of self-
determination as a substantive norm through its most significant historical instances to the 
documentary practice of the United Nations.  It distinguishes between four forms of the 
concept—political, colonial, remedial and secessionary self-determination—and argues that 
they have to differing degrees been accepted by international law.  Chapter two continues this 
examination through the judicial treatments of self-determination, primarily in international 
courts.  These chapters will show that political self-determination is a deeply embedded 
principle of the post-charter legal order.  Colonial self-determination, too, has come to be 
accepted in international law, although its acceptance is based primarily on the political 
conviction that colonial rule can no longer be accepted as justified or justifiable.  Remedial 
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111 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd edn, University of Chicago Press 2009). 
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and secessionary self-determination, by contrast, are far more controversial, raising as they do 
the spectre of territorially concentrated minorities seeking to break away from established 
States.  It will be argued, however, that although secessionary self-determination remains a 
political demand rather than a legal right under international law, that remedial self-
determination has attained at least a measure of acceptance, largely as a result of its necessary 
connection to the idea of political self-determination. 
In part two the thesis begins the task of analysing the central concepts of international law, in 
order to determine whether these concepts have a connection to self-determination.  Chapter 
three begins by examining sovereignty and obligation.  The story of international law has been 
one of attempting to balance these two (apparently) irreconcilable concepts.  After all, if a 
State is sovereign (meaning that no power sits above it), then it cannot be compelled to comply 
with the rules of international law – up to and including the rule pacta sunt servanda.  The 
histories of these concepts will be explored, in order to ascertain how this conflict was viewed 
under different international legal frameworks before turning to a theoretical analysis of the 
role they play in the modern legal order.  It will be argued that the modern incarnations of both 
concepts find their roots in self-determination, and that they do not (or perhaps that they no 
longer) conflict. 
Chapter four examines another pair of closely connected concepts: statehood and personality.  
These will be examined with a particular emphasis on the personality of States, in order to 
demonstrate that States, far from being the “sole”, “original”, or “natural” persons of 
international law are given life by individuals, and exist as “true” persons only insofar as they 
express a collective personality of the individuals who comprise them.  It will be argued that 
the process of State creation should be regarded as two stages, each involving elements of 
self-determination.  In the first stage a group of individuals combines into a political 
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community, which is referred to here as the State(Polity).  In the second stage a State(Polity) 
develops the institutional mechanisms necessary for it to exist as an entity in itself on the 
international plane.  This second coextensive entity is referred to here as the State(Person). 
Chapter five examines the concept of ius cogens.  Here, too, it will be argued that there is a 
vital and necessary connection to self-determination, and it will be argued that both the 
overarching concept and (albeit less directly) the substantive content of the norms themselves 
are expressions of the necessity of protecting the personal and collectivised self-determination 
of the individuals who sit at the heart of the international legal system.  The link between self-
determination and the substantive provisions of ius cogens is not straightforward, however, 
and will be examined by means of a test case, the prohibition of impoverishment; a norm the 
peremptory status of which would amply be justified by its connection to self-determination, 
but which does not appear to have received international recognition as a ius cogens 
prohibition.  It will be concluded that although the concept is grounded in self-determination 
and that self-determination concerns are predominantly those expressed in the substantive 
norms which attain ius cogens status, the grant of peremptory status is still mitigated by the 
positive law and that self-determination concerns do not, therefore, automatically or directly 
result in the recognition of a peremptory norm. 
Finally, the conclusion will draw together the threads from these chapters, and will examine 
to what extent it may be said that the hypothesis has been sustained.  It will be concluded that 
the deep connections shown between the concepts examined and self-determination indicate 
that self-determination now occupies a position in international law which would be consistent 
with the hypothesis given here, and that its influence is reorienting international law towards 
the human. 
  
 
Part One  
Part one of the thesis begins the process of examining the hypothesis that self-determination 
has been instituted as the structural principle of international law by examining the position 
of the concept in substantive international law.  In chapter one, the international law concept 
is sub-divided into four norms; political, colonial, remedial and secessionary self-
determination.  These are characterised as not being aspects or facets of a single concept, but 
rather as a genus of connected but distinct ideas.  That typology is employed in the chapter in 
order to clarify the development of self-determination through its major invocations, a process 
which demonstrates that the four-part taxonomy is more successful at clarifying the status of 
the concept than the standard internal/external dichotomy.  Chapter two then considers the 
implementation and development of the four norms of self-determination in judicial fora.  A 
line of cases from the International Court of Justice is considered, together with the decision 
of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Katanga, and the Opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec.  The chapter concludes with an extended discussion of 
the Kosovo Advisory Opinion of the ICJ. 
Taken together, these chapters show self-determination to be a composite of four ideas of 
different legal status, and the four-part taxonomy of self-determination is employed to explain 
the significantly different treatment of these close homonyms by international law.  Of most 
significance for this thesis, however, they reveal political self-determination—the form of the 
norm associated with the rights of political communities to independence and non-
interference—has achieved a high status in international law and has been embedded in the 
international legal system.  Part two then considers whether it can be said to have been 
instituted as the structural principle of the system. 
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One 
Self-Determination I:  Evolution 
and Taxonomy of a Genus 
Granted, there is always much that is hidden, and we must 
not forget that the writing of history—however dryly it is 
done and however sincere the desire for objectivity—
remains literature.  History’s third dimension is always 
fiction.1 
1. Introduction 
Self-determination is an idea of undeniable power.  To proponents of its application and 
extension it is an emancipatory principle: a tool with the potential to realise self-rule, political 
empowerment, and the application of human rights standards.2  For others it is a dangerous 
concept: a centrifuge with the potential to pull apart the international system and the relative 
peace that is built upon it.  Suggestions that its application be extended attract apocalyptic 
predictions for affected populations and international legal order.3  Its violent history cannot 
be denied; Duursma has observed that ‘practically all’ armed conflicts relate to the exercise 
                                                     
1 Hermann Hesse, The Glass Bead Game (Richard Winston and Clara Winston trs, Henry Holt and Company 2002) 
48. 
2 See e.g. Guyora Binder, ‘The Case for Self-Determination’ in Robert McCorquodale (ed), Self-Determination in 
International Law (Ashgate Dartmouth 2000) 141 et seq; Daniel Philpott, ‘In Defense of Self-Determination’ 
(1995) 105(2) Ethics 352; Daniel Philpott, ‘Self-Determination in Practice’ in Margaret Moore (ed), National 
Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press 1998); David Copp, ‘Democracy and Communal 
Self-Determination’ in Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim (eds), The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford University 
Press 1997); Fernando R Tesón, ‘Introduction:  The Conundrum of Self-Determination’ in Fernando R Tesón 
(ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press 2016) 8 et seq; Dov Ronen, The Quest for 
Self-Determination (Yale University Press 1979). 
3  See e.g. Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United 
Nations (Oxford University Press 1963) 104; Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples:  A Legal 
Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press 1995) 328; Lee Buchheit, Secession:  The Legitimacy of Self-
Determination (Yale University Press 1978) passim; Allen Buchanan, ‘Democracy and Secession’ in Margaret 
Moore (ed), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press 1998) 14 et seq. 
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of self-determination.4  Despite this, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has declared the 
right of peoples to self-determination ‘one of the essential principles of international law’, that 
it is a norm of erga omnes character, and that it is ‘one of the essential principles of 
contemporary international law.’5  Cassese goes further, concluding that self-determination 
has acquired ius cogens status.6 
The “Jekyll and Hyde” character of self-determination is just one of the intriguing questions 
bound up with this complex concept.7  Few other principles in international legal affairs are 
so uncertain or contested.8  There is a continuing and significant disconnection between the 
right of self-determination as commonly understood by those invoking the idea (often in 
pursuit of secession), and the panoply of references in legal texts and judicial decisions to the 
                                                     
4 Jorri Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States:  Self-Determination and 
Statehood (Cambridge University Press 1996) 1; see also Philpott, ‘Self-Determination in Practice’ (n 2) 79; 
Tesón (n 2) 8. 
5 East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, (1995) ICJ Reports 90, [29]. 
6 Cassese (n 3) 140; see also Alain Pellet, ‘Kosovo - The Questions Not Asked:  Self-Determination, Secession, 
and Recognition’ in Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015) 272; Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 51–53; Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in 
International Law:  Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status (Finnish Lawyers Publishing Company 
1988) 381–84. 
7 Mégret, for example, describes ‘[i]nternational law’s attitude to self-determination [as having] oscillated in the 
last century between the temptation of encouraging group aspirations to forms of political and territorial power 
and a recoiling at the possible consequences for international order and stability.’  Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Right 
to Self-Determination:  Earned, Not Inherent’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination 
(Cambridge University Press 2016) 48. 
8 Tesón declares that ‘[n]o other area of international law is more indeterminate, incoherent, and unprincipled than 
the law of self-determination.’  Tesón (n 2) 1. 
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‘right’ of self-determination (mainly references to “internal” self-determination).9  The result 
is a legal norm of self-determination of uncertain scope, application, and result.10 
This chapter will distinguish between four forms of the concept of self-determination—
political, colonial, remedial and secessionary—each of which is ultimately derived from the 
individual right of personal self-determination, but which are sufficiently different to each 
other in their historical and ideational foundations to be considered distinct species within a 
self-determination genus, and not different applications of the same legal norm.  It will trace 
the development of the self-determination idea through its major applications to show that 
self-determination claims can usually be characterised as referring to one or other of these 
forms, and that the different forms have been accepted by international law to differing 
degrees.  It will be argued that while secessionary self-determination has not been generally 
accepted in international law, other forms have been more favourably received:  colonial self-
determination has been widely recognised and implemented—few now would deny the right 
of colonial peoples freely to choose whether or not to remain subject to colonial sovereignty—
and there are some indications that the remedial form may increasingly be seen as acceptable.  
Most significantly, it is clear that the political form of self-determination is now deeply 
embedded in the international legal system, and is widely seen as one of the international legal 
order’s most fundamental principles. 
This chapter will trace the development of the various forms of self-determination from their 
first international appearances (in the American and French revolutions of 1776 and 1789) to 
                                                     
9 See, e.g. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, (1971) ICJ Reports 16; Western 
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, (1975) ICJ Reports 12; East Timor (n 5); Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, (2004) ICJ Reports 136. 
10 Tesón (n 2) 1–2. 
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the decolonisation practice of the League of Nations and the United Nations, and the broader 
development of the idea in the practice of the General Assembly.  Chapter two will then look 
at the judicial treatment of self-determination in the United Nations era, and will discuss recent 
developments. 
1.1 The Self-Determination Genus:  Definitions 
Many of self-determination’s contradictions can be attributed to problems of definition.  In 
international law self-determination is often understood to be a unitary concept.11  By contrast 
it will be argued here that this conflates its forms, and thus impedes their analysis.  Such a 
view of self-determination produces (even to a greater extent than is warranted) histories 
                                                     
11 See, e.g. Cassese (n 3) 11–33; Jens David Ohlin, ‘The Right to Exist and the Right to Resist’ in Fernando R 
Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press 2016) passim; Patrick Macklem, 
‘Self-Determination in Three Movements’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination 
(Cambridge University Press 2016) 95; Elizabeth Rodríguez-Santiago, ‘The Evolution of Self-Determination of 
Peoples in International Law’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge 
University Press 2016); Duncan French, ‘Introduction’ in Duncan French (ed), Statehood and Self-
Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 
11; Jure Vidmar, ‘Unilateral Declarations of Independence in International Law’ in Duncan French (ed), 
Statehood and Self-Determination:  Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 71–73; Katherine del Mar, ‘The Myth of Remedial Secession’ in Duncan French (ed), 
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Foundations for the Future’ (1992) 3 Irish Studies in International Affairs 25; Snežana Trifunovska, ‘One Theme 
in Two Variations - Self-Determination for Minorities and Indigenous Groups’ (1997) 5 International Journal 
on Minority and Group Rights 175; Patrick Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-
Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism’ in Christian Tomuschat (ed), The Modern Law of Self-
Determination (Martinus Nijhoff 1993); James Crawford, ‘Outside the Colonial Context’ in WJ Allan Macartney 
(ed), Self-Determination in the Commonwealth (Aberdeen University Press 1988) 13; Elizabeth Chadwick, Self-
Determination in the Post-9/11 Era (Routledge 2011) 7–8; Christian Walter and Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, 
‘Introduction:  Self-Determination and Secession in International Law—Perspectives and Trends with Particular 
Focus on the Commonwealth of Independent States’ in Christian Walter and others (eds), Self-Determination 
and Secession in International Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 2; Philpott, ‘Self-Determination in Practice’ 
(n 2) 85–86; Rupert Emerson, ‘Self-Determination’ (1971) 65 American Journal of International Law 459; 
Nathaniel Berman, ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance:  Self-Determination and International Law’ (1988) 7 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 51; Binder (n 2); Hurst Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ (1993) 34 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 1. 
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which show its development to have been chaotic, and legal analyses which show its status to 
be at best indeterminate.12 
Many modern discussions of self-determination use the vocabulary “external” and “internal” 
in describing the concept.13  Summers argues that this vocabulary is ‘now almost standard 
practice in the academic literature,14 even if (a fact which calls into question its usefulness) 
there is no universal agreement on to what the terms refer.15  In general, these terms seem to 
be taken to refer, on the one hand, to the determination by the whole populations of existing 
                                                     
12 There are other, and more potentially serious, consequences of this false conflation, too, than its impediment of 
academic understanding of the idea.  As Mégret notes, the endorsement by the international community of self-
determination in the colonial context was seen by some as an affirmation of a broader right to secede, and ‘[t]hose 
who took the principle too literally, from Katanga to Biafra, learned their lesson painfully.’  Mégret (n 7) 50. 
13 See e.g. James Summers, ‘The Internal and External Aspects of Self-Determination Reconsidered’ in Duncan 
French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination:  Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) passim; Cassese (n 3); Salvatore Senese, ‘External and Internal Self-
Determination’ (1989) 16 Social Justice 19; Duursma (n 4); Rodríguez-Santiago (n 11) 202 et seq; Vidmar (n 
11) 71–73; del Mar (n 11) 79 et seq; David Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 226–307; Robert McCorquodale, ‘Self-Determination:  A Human Rights Approach’ (1994) 
43 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 857; Margaret Moore, ‘Introduction:  The Self-
Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession’ in Margaret Moore (ed), National Self-Determination and 
Secession (Oxford University Press 1998); Helen Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-
Determination’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 537; Jan Klabbers, ‘The Right to Be 
Taken Seriously:  Self-Determination in International Law’ (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 186; Howard R 
Berman and others, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Self-Determination’ (1993) 87 Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 190; David B Knight, ‘Territory and People or 
People and Territory?  Thoughts on Postcolonial Self-Determination’ (1985) 6 International Political Science 
Review 248; Whelan (n 11); Emerson (n 11) 465–66; Kelly Strathopoulou, ‘Self-Determination, Peacemaking 
and Peace-Building:  Recent Trends in African Intrastate Peace Agreements’ in Duncan French (ed), Statehood 
and Self-Determination:  Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 283–85; Trifunovska (n 11).; Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: historical and current 
development of the basis of United Nations Instruments, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, p.5, 
passim.  The internal/external classification was also discussed in some detail and employed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in its decision in Reference Re Secession of Quebec.  See Reference Re Secession of Quebec 
[1998] 2 SCR 217, [126] et seq, and discussion in chapter two. 
14 Summers (n 13) 230. 
15 “Internal” and “external” do not appear to bear the same meanings in the work of all authors.  Compare, for 
example, Whelan, who uses the term “external” to mean “non-intervention” (Whelan (n 11) 37), with 
McCorquodale, who uses the term to refer to secessions (McCorquodale (n 13) 863–64).  This section takes 
“internal” to mean self-determination by the whole people of a State within its established borders, and “external” 
to mean the secession of a sub-State unit, which appear to be the modal usages of these terms. 
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States of their political systems (“internal”),16 and on the other to the autonomy or secession 
demands of sub-State national groups (“external”).17  Yet although these are very different 
ideas (“internal” speaks of the legitimacy of governments,18 “external” of the legitimacy of 
borders;19 “internal” is often portrayed as progressive and democratic,20 while “external” is 
seen as nationalistic and parochial21) they are often understood to be two sides of the same 
unitary idea.22  Viewed in this way, self-determination is a single norm which has different 
effects and outcomes depending on the circumstances in which it is applied.23 
Such a view of self-determination is oversimplified and constrictive.  As Waldron has 
observed, the two forms of self-determination he identifies (which he names ‘territorial self-
determination’ and ‘identity-based self-determination’, although they align closely with 
“internal” and “external” as commonly used elsewhere)24 apply to different groups, and make 
entirely different claims.25  Territorial self-determination takes place within pre-drawn 
boundaries, and relates to the freedom of the people of a State to decide the form of their 
government without external interference, while the identity-based form relates to the 
                                                     
16 Summers (n 13) 253–242; Klabbers (n 13). 
17 Trifunovska (n 11); McCorquodale (n 13) 863–64. 
18 Allan Rosas, ‘Internal Self-Determination’ in Christian Tomuschat (ed), Modern Law of Self-Determination 
(Kluwer Law International 1993) 230; Thornberry (n 11) 101; Duursma (n 4) 7; Cassese (n 3) 5. 
19 Raič (n 13) 181; Cassese (n 3) 5. 
20 Klabbers (n 13); Cassese (n 3) 350. 
21 Buchheit (n 3) 28–31; Tesón (n 2) 8 et seq; Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Evils of Self-Determination’ (1992–93) 89 
Foreign Policy 21, passim. 
22 Senese, for example, describes them as ‘two inseparable aspects of the same principle’:  Senese (n 13) 19; see 
also Duursma (n 4) 78–80; Trifunovska (n 11); Tesón (n 2) 8–11. 
23 Duursma (n 4) 78–80. 
24 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Two Conceptions of Self-Determination’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The 
Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 397–98. 
25 ibid 401–13. 
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determination by a ‘people’ (howsoever defined) whether or not to remain a part of a larger 
entity.  The former is a political ideal similar to (although distinct from) democracy.26  The 
latter is a right to secede.  Far from being aspects of the same overarching idea, however, he 
argues that it would be possible to ‘abandon’ entirely the latter and yet preserve (and perhaps 
even strengthen) the former.27 
It will be argued here that Waldron is correct in that assessment, but that further discrimination 
is necessary if self-determination is to be adequately understood.  Not only should the so-
called “internal” and “external” forms be supplemented with additional categories (discussed 
further below), the standard vocabulary of “internal” and “external” self-determination is of 
limited use.  So-called “internal” self-determination has both inward-facing and outward-
facing aspects:  “internal” self-determination goes to the legitimacy of governments and 
political systems (inward-facing aspect),28 and it guarantees the principles of sovereign 
equality and non-interference (outward-facing aspect).29  In other words, the “internal” form 
of self-determination posits two distinct principles: it asserts, first, that the form of government 
is legitimate only if in accordance with the wishes of the people to which the government 
applies;30 and, secondly, that the form and functioning of their government is a matter for the 
people of the polity alone, and that interference by a foreign power or people is thus 
                                                     
26 ibid 408.  Buchanan, on entirely different grounds, also contests the equation of democracy and self-
determination: Buchanan (n 2) 16 et seq. 
27 Waldron (n 24) 406 et seq. 
28 Patten calls this the “democratic” idea of self-determination:  Alan Patten, ‘Self-Determination for National 
Minorities’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press 2016).  
See contra Waldron (n 24) 408, quoted at n 30, below. 
29 Patten calls this the “statist” idea.  Patten (n 28). 
30 That is not to say, however, that the Government must accord with the wishes of the population, nor that the 
Government must be democratic.  On the contrary, as Waldron has observed, ‘[i]t is important, however, not to 
identify self-determination and democracy.  The right of self-determination is prior to democracy, for it includes 
the right to decide whether to have a democracy around here, and if so, what sort of democracy to have.  Self-
determination is violated when we forcibly impose democracy on a country from the outside.’  (Waldron (n 24) 
408.) 
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illegitimate.31  “Internal” therefore appears to be something of a misnomer, and it is perhaps 
for this reason that Waldron prefers the sobriquet “territorial”.  The term political self-
determination will be used here to capture much the same idea; determination of the nature 
and form of a society and the political structures that apply to it by the members of a socio-
political community.32 
The “external” form, meanwhile, is often defined according to its effects.  Here it is the 
displacement of sovereignty which is considered to be the hallmark of the category,33 leading 
to a conflation of different kinds of claims.  It encompasses not only the claim by a minority 
group of a right to independence purely as a function of its identity qua minority (that part of 
the norm Waldron calls “identity-based”, and Patten “nationalist” self-determination), but also 
the claim of a politically excluded group or a group subject to discrimination to secede as a 
remedy of last resort,34 and the claim of a colonised people subject to the rule of a foreign 
power to independence and self-government.35  As the historical experience will show, these 
forms have different ideational foundations and have received different legal treatment, and 
                                                     
31 Bas van der Vossen, ‘Self-Determination and Moral Variation’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-
Determination (Cambridge University Press 2016) 13–14. 
32 This term is preferred to “territorial” because, as will be argued in chapter three and chapter four, a socio-political 
community of this kind need not necessarily be territorially defined, notwithstanding that all or virtually all or 
those communities that exist today to which the term would apply are defined along territorial lines. 
33
 Cassese (n 3) 19; Mégret (n 7) 45–46. 
34 Ohlin characterises this as a combination of the right to exist and the right to resist:  Ohlin (n 11). 
35 Cassese (n 3) 71–99. 
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as such will be treated separately, under the headings of colonial self-determination,36 
secessionary self-determination, and remedial self-determination.37 
1.2 Self-Determination and History 
It was noted in the introduction that where a historical methodology is employed the approach 
and purpose for which it is used should be explained, in order that the author’s subjective 
decisions are made known to the reader.38  This chapter seeks a greater understanding of self-
determination in the various historical usages of and appeals to the concept.  A focus on the 
ways in which self-determination has been claimed is intended to show that various different 
understandings of the concept have been used both at different points through history, and also 
within different historical periods (and even within single theatres or documents).   
As Rodríguez-Santiago notes, this task is complicated (and is made more vulnerable to 
subjectivity) by the fact that the term “self-determination” only dates from the twentieth 
century, while many of the categories that have been identified are more recent still (indeed, 
this piece is proposing a new “taxonomy”).39  The categorisation of earlier appeals made as 
“self-determination” claims, or as claims of a particular kind, is therefore anachronic and risks 
applying modern modes of thought to events which long predated them.  In order to avoid (to 
the extent possible) these dangers, this chapter will focus on self-determination claims as 
                                                     
36 As Binder points out, the decision to treat cases of colonial secession separately from secessions from unitary or 
post-colonial States is a political decision based on a perceived difference between these cases, which she regards 
as unjustifiable:  Binder (n 2) 226 et seq. 
37 The term “remedial” is often attributed to Buchanan:  Allen Buchanan, ‘Secession, Self-Determination, and the 
Rule of International Law’ in Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim (eds), The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford 
University Press 1997); Allen Buchanan, ‘Theories of Secession’ (1997) 26 Philosophy & Public Affairs 31; 
Buchanan, ‘Democracy and Secession’ (n 3). 
38 See above p.16-20. 
39 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 11) 202. 
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various kinds of appeals to justification which may be grouped together like with like, and 
which later acquired the status of concepts moral, political and (in some cases) legal.  It will 
be argued that in different contexts the idea of self-determination has been understood as 
conferring different kinds of legitimacy by the individuals invoking it, and it will be argued 
that these legitimacy claims can broadly be categorised under the four headings defined above: 
political, remedial, colonial and secessionary. 
The purpose of the chapter is not primarily to seek or identify a particular progression or 
direction of travel except in the sense that many of the later appeals to self-determination build 
upon or make reference to earlier examples (although certain trends will be identified, such as 
a trend towards the greater recognition of colonial self-determination during the period 
following WWI), and no attempt at a comprehensive history is therefore made.  Rather the 
chapter identifies examples which pertain to each of the four species of self-determination 
(examples include the twin secessions of Norway, which provide a rare instance of a pure 
claim to secessionary self-determination), or which have a particular political significance 
(such as the American and French Declarations of 1776 and 1789) or a particular significance 
for international law (such as the Åland Islands dispute, which was the first of its kind to be 
submitted to a form of international adjudication). 
2. Self-Determination in the 18th Century:  the Genesis of an 
Idea 
The idea of self-determination has evolved and changed significantly during the course of its 
development.  Although it is difficult to pinpoint the genesis of the concept with any degree 
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of certainty, most scholars find its first expression in the American Declaration of 
Independence of 1776.40 
2.1. The American Declaration of Independence 
The American Declaration of Independence was drafted by Thomas Jefferson, and was 
adopted in Congress by the (then) thirteen States of America on the 4th July, 1776.41  In the 
Declaration, Jefferson derives the right of the people of America to throw off the sovereignty 
of the King of England from his statement, said to be ‘one of the best-known sentences in the 
English language’,42 that: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.43 
As Lucas notes, the scope, and thus the true significance, of this statement is contested: 
It has been studied and restudied by historians, critics, philosophers, and political 
theorists – usually in an effort to determine what Jefferson and the Congress 
intended by such phrases as “created equal” and “the pursuit of Happiness.”  But 
there are no definitive answers – partly because Jefferson never explained what 
he meant, partly because the words of the Declaration did not mean the same thing 
to all members of Congress (or to all readers).44 
The definitional uncertainty noted by Lucas also applies to much of the remainder of the text.  
While the declaration as a whole clearly represents a claim by the American People of a right 
to separate from Britain, the basis and ambit of the right are not self-evident.  If, as some have 
                                                     
40 See e.g. Cassese (n 3) 11; Raič (n 13) 172–73; but, contra, Rodríguez-Santiago (n 11) 202–04, who finds 
precursors of the modern concept in the Fifteenth Century debates over the European colonisation of the 
Americas.  The Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 exhibited some of the same ideas in protogeneous form. 
41 ‘The Declaration of Independence: a Transcription’, U.S. National Archives & Records Administration, via 
<www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html> accessed 12th May 2014. 
42 Stephen Lucas, ‘Justifying America:  The Declaration of Independence as a Rhetorical Document’ in Thomas 
Benson (ed), American Rhetoric:  Context and Criticism (Southern Illinois University Press 1989) 85. 
43 The Declaration of Independence (n 41). 
44 Lucas (n 42) 85. 
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suggested, the Declaration represents the first recognisable expression of a self-determination 
claim, it is not sufficient to identify simply by genus, however; in order to understand the 
origin of the principle and the precedent set by the Declaration it is necessary to understand 
the source of the claimed right, and thus to understand the legitimacy-claim made by its 
authors.  In other words, it is necessary to examine the declaration and its language in more 
detail, to identify the species of self-determination it invokes. 
The Declaration holds that, in order to protect the ‘unalienable Rights’ of man, ‘Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed’.45  
Further: 
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is 
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, 
laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such a form, 
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.46 
While certain principles can be discerned in these statements, there remains much which 
requires clarification.  These statements endorse social contract theory, and deny the divine 
right of kings; recognising instead what may loosely be described as popular sovereignty.  It 
remains unclear, however, whether the right to self-determine exists in and of itself, as one of 
the ‘unalienable’ rights of man, or whether it applies as a result of governmental abuses – a 
government ‘destructive’ of its proper ends. 
Nor does the remainder of the document explicitly clarify the basis of the right claimed.  
Although the Declaration holds that ‘Governments long established should not be changed for 
                                                     
45 The Declaration of Independence (n 41). 
46 ibid. 
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light and transient causes’,47 this is described as an obligation of ‘[p]rudence’,48 rather than a 
limit on the right.  Indeed, that abuses by governments are not preconditions for their 
overthrow is implied, if slightly, by Jefferson’s assertion that ‘a long train of abuses and 
usurpations’ results not merely in a right, but also a ‘duty’ to ‘throw off such a government’.49  
It may be significant, though, that while the intended effect of the document was secession, 
the text of the document speaks of the legitimacy of governments, and not of States.  It may 
be inferred that two different incarnations of self-determination are engaged: the right to 
secede is concerned with the redrawing of political boundaries; the legitimacy of governments 
(political self-determination) necessarily presupposes those political delineations, and can 
only operate within them. 
These are separate and distinct forms.  The principle of political self-determination requires 
that the people of an entity should be able to freely choose what form their government will 
take, and is often defined according to the language of the declaration: government by the 
‘consent of the governed’.50  As Waldron correctly identifies, however, political self-
determination neither requires, nor is analogous to, democracy; rather it is a prior and more 
basic concern.51  Political self-determination requires that the people subject to a government 
be the authors of the form of that government.  The American people were subject to a form 
of government that was not of their choosing, and which they regarded as inimical to their 
needs.  But in representations to the British people aimed at altering that governmental form, 
America found no common cause: 
                                                     
47 ibid. 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
51 Waldron (n 24) 408. 
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We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured 
them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, 
would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence.  They too have 
been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity.52 
In other words, the Declaration makes no claim to secession as of right.  Rather, secession is 
justified on the basis of a final resort:  having exhausted the possibility of a change in the form 
of government of the State as a whole, the American people could secure their ‘unalienable’ 
rights only by ridding themselves of the control of the British State.  This is an example of 
what has subsequently been termed the right to secede in extremis, or remedial self-
determination,53 and this statement reveals something of is inner workings.  Far from being a 
facet of a broader right to secede (of “external” self-determination), it is connected to the 
political form.54  Where a section of a population is denied the right to determine along with 
others in the State the form of its government (in other words, the denial of political self-
determination), there results an exceptional right to secede.  It is this remedial form of the 
norm that is claimed alongside political self-determination by the authors of the Declaration 
of 1776.55  No claim to secessionary self-determination, or a right to secede based only on the 
distinctiveness of a group or nation, was made. 
In referring to the Declaration as a claim of right it is important to note, however, that the 
American Declaration made appeal not to remedial self-determination as an idea conferring 
legality, but as an idea conferring legitimacy.  This was a moral and political claim made by 
                                                     
52 The Declaration of Independence (n 41). 
53 Buchanan, ‘Democracy and Secession’ (n 3) 24–25; Milena Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination under 
International Law:  ‘Selfistans,’ secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers (Routledge 2013) 18–22; see also 
Allen Buchanan, ‘Theories of Secession’ (1997) 26 Philosophy & Public Affairs 31. 
54 Tesón characterises remedial self-determination’s claim as a ‘right against a state’, while secessionary self-
determination claims a ‘right to a state’.  Tesón (n 2) 8.  [Emphasis in original]. 
55 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 11) 206–07. 
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the authors that, as a people subject to abuses amounting to a denial of their internal self-
determination, the secession of the Thirteen States from the British Empire was permissible 
and legitimate.  They did not invoke a legal right to self-determination, and there is no 
indication that they considered in writing the Declaration that they were acting in accordance 
with, with the support of, or, indeed, in violation of international law. 
As a political document the American Declaration of Independence is and will doubtless 
remain highly significant, including for its discussion of self-determination.  The reader is 
presented with an apparent paradox:  the intended effect of the document is secession, but the 
rhetoric relates to political self-determination.  A further examination, however, reveals an 
implied connection between political self-determination and secession, and shows that denial 
of the former is conceived as the basis for the latter.  This was a consequential right of 
secession, and not a pure appeal to nationhood or distinctiveness.  It seems that it should, 
therefore, be categorised as an appeal to remedial self-determination, a form which finds its 
roots in the political rather than the secessionary idea.  The Declaration was, however, merely 
the starting point, and the ideas inherent in the Declaration have been reconceptualised and 
restated in many different forms in the interim.  Among the most significant of these 
subsequent statements was the product of the 1789 French Revolution. 
2.2. The French Revolution of 1789 
The Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen was adopted on the 26th August 1789, 
marking the height of the 1789 Revolution.  It represented a powerful recognition of political 
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self-determination, both in its denial of the divine right of kings, and its declaration of the right 
of Peoples to self-government.56 
Like the American Revolution, the French Revolution of 1789 espoused a philosophical 
conviction that ‘[m]en are born and remain free and equal in rights.’57  Those rights, variously 
referred to as ‘unalienable’58 and ‘imprescriptible’,59 are declared to be ‘Liberty, Property, 
Safety and Resistance to Oppression.’60  Like the American Revolution, too, the French 
Revolution recognised the principle of popular sovereignty:  ‘The principle of any Sovereignty 
lies primarily in the Nation.  No corporate body, no individual may exercise any authority that 
does not expressly emanate from it.’61  Cassese comments that, taken together, these events 
[M]arked the demise of the notion that individuals and peoples, as subjects of the 
King, were objects to be transferred, alienated, ceded, or protected in accordance 
with the interests of the monarch.62 
The French Revolution declared that the legitimacy of the form of government derives from 
the will of the people, and that the People, as a corporate entity, has the right to alter that form 
of government.63  In other words, the rhetoric of the French Revolution recognised and 
declared a right to political self-determination. 
                                                     
56 Raič (n 13) 174–75; Cassese (n 3) 11–13. 
57 ‘Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789’, via <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/english/constitution/declaration-of-human-and-civic-rights-of-26-august-1789.105305.html> 
accessed 14th May 2014, article 1.  
58 ibid preamble. 
59 ibid article 2. 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid article 3. 
62 Cassese (n 3) 11. 
63 Raič (n 13) 174. 
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However, the French Revolution also contemplated an infant right to secessionary self-
determination, in the form of irredentism.  Self-determination was proposed as the governing 
principle in transfers of territory as early as 1790, and the principle was codified in the Draft 
Constitution presented to the National Convention in 1793.64  As Raič notes, ‘the plebiscite as 
a means of determining the political fate of a territory was an invention of the French 
Revolution.’65  Although the proffered choice was between existing States (independence was 
not envisaged), the plebiscite as the primary tool of territorial delimitation appears to be based 
on a conviction that peoples are entitled to determine their own political fate, even to the extent 
of choosing which State to belong to.  Thus, Rigo Sureda argues that the most noteworthy 
aspect of the philosophy of the French Revolution was that it severed the link between State 
‘ownership’ and territory: 
[T]he territorial element in a political unit lost its feudal predominance in favour 
of the personal element: people were not to be any more a mere appurtenance of 
the land.66 
If the recognition of self-determination as a right of peoples in determining their political 
status was significant, however, the principle as applied did not live up to these noble ideals.  
Although the revolution yielded a number of statements which repudiated wars of conquest 
and territorial acquisitions,67 this ideal was ultimately subsumed by a conception of the 
freedom of mankind that went beyond the polity.68  The Revolution’s conviction was that 
individuals should no longer be in thrall to a social elite, and it therefore followed quite 
logically that populations should be enabled to join the new, free, France.  Revolutionary 
                                                     
64 Cassese (n 3) 11. 
65 Raič (n 13) 174.  [Footnoted omitted]. 
66 Andrés Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination:  A Study of United Nations Practice (AW 
Sijthoff-Leyden 1973) 17. 
67 Rodríguez-Santiago (n 11) 206. 
68 As Hobsbawm notes, ‘the French [revolution] was ecumenical.  Its armies set out to revolutionize the world; its 
ideas actually did so.’  Eric J Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution:  Europe 1789-1848 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson 
1962) 75. 
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thought therefore recognised a doctrine of secessionary self-determination premised on the 
freedom of the individual and the right of peoples ‘not content with the government of the 
country to which they belong […] to secede and organise themselves as they wish.’69  In 
practice, however, the freedom of the individual was mythologised to the extent that actions 
which detracted from an individual’s ability to freely self-determine were justified in its 
pursuit.  Self-determination was deployed to rationalise the transfer of territories to France if 
the populace voted in favour of incorporation,70 and sometimes even if it did not:  
At first, the French revolutionaries consistently with their ideals renounced all 
wars of conquest and agreed to annexations of territory to France only after a 
plebiscite.  However, when they considered that their democratic ideals were 
threatened, they tried to impose them by force upon other peoples: how could men 
choose not to be free?71 
Whatever the deficiencies in the application of the principle, the French revolutionary 
conception of self-determination should be seen as highly significant.  Although the 
application of self-determination principles was not consistent with the ideals which 
underpinned them, there can be no doubt that the principles enunciated in 1789 and the years 
that followed further advanced the sense that self-determination conferred legitimacy, and 
were a significant contribution to the development of the concept. 
2.3 The Age of Revolution and the Long 19th Century – 1789-1920 
The ‘Age of Revolution’ is a term used by Hobsbawm to refer to the years 1789-1848 – a 
period of extraordinary political and social change in Europe.72  During this period, which saw 
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the beginning of the industrial revolution,73 democratic uprisings threatened many of Europe’s 
monarchies, in some cases successfully,74 and the period had a significance which went far 
beyond Europe.  Armitage identifies this as the first of four independence ‘moments’ – points 
in time which saw the creation of many new States and the diminution of empires.75 
The influence of the American and French declarations on the would-be revolutionaries or 
secessionists of this period is difficult to quantify, but almost impossible to overstate.  It is 
clear that the American declaration was an influence on the French revolutionaries, and that 
the potential of both documents to inspire or incite others was amply appreciated.  As 
Armitage observes, ‘[t]he claim of some French revolutionaries that their movement owed its 
inspiration to the United States rendered key documents like the Declaration suspect and 
dangerous in the eyes of those who feared the wholesale destruction of the political and 
diplomatic order of the Atlantic world.’76  The fear was justified:  the American influence on 
many of the declarations of independence in the period was clear to see,77 and the influence 
of the French revolution was arguably greater still.  As Hobsbawm notes, ‘France made [the 
19th century’s] revolutions and gave them their ideas, to the point where a tricolour of some 
kind became the emblem of virtually every emerging nation’.78 
Hobsbawm is undoubtedly correct to highlight the importance of the French revolution.  It is 
here that the inward-facing aspect of the idea of political self-determination—that the form of 
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government should be determined by the people—finds its most influential roots.  
Nevertheless, the influence of the American declaration should not be underestimated:  it 
remains true that there was, as identified by Armitage, an ‘American component’ to many of 
the revolutions of the long 19th Century,79 composed of a combination of substance and form.  
Substantively, the American declaration sought to establish an independent State with full 
external sovereignty.80  To that extent, it signalled an intention on the part of the Declaration’s 
authors to “play within the rules” of the international system.  By conforming to the 
established models of statehood and sovereignty, they chose to ‘affirm the maxims of 
European statecraft, not affront them.’81  Truistic though it may appear, it is significant that 
the great majority of subsequent declarations of independence, too, sought independent 
statehood.  That revolutionary approaches to political authority conformed so closely to the 
established norm served further to entrench that norm, and the State was thus (re-)established 
as the single viable form of non-dependent socio-political community within this international 
legal paradigm.  To this extent, the American independence struggle and those that followed 
it were ‘decidedly un-revolutionary’ revolutions.82 
More significantly still, the form of the 1776 Declaration proclaimed the principle of remedial 
self-determination, and this is (at least in this area) arguably its most profound and lasting 
legacy.  Like the American declaration, the majority of independence movements which 
followed made claims to remedial self-determination.  Their focus is on the rights (individual 
or collective) of the people, and they begin with an exposition of the iniquities suffered by the 
would-be State on the understanding that to cast their claim as a remedy to long suffering 
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confers legitimacy.  This feature is particularly clear in, for example, the declarations of 
independence of Flanders,83 Venezuela,84 Liberia,85 and Hungary,86 and can be seen in most 
declarations of the period.87  These appeals to remedial self-determination, although unlikely 
to have created a legal right, are very likely to have further instituted the growing sense of 
                                                     
83 Manifesto for the Province of Flanders, in Armitage (n 75) 187–91: 
 ‘… it is incontestable that the Emperor has broken all of his agreements with us.  By violating the social and 
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85 The declaration of Independence of Liberia, in Charles Henry Huberich, The Political and Legislative History 
of Liberia (Central Book Co 1947) vol 1, 828 et seq: 
‘We, the people of the Republic of Liberia, were originally the inhabitants of the United States of North America. 
‘In some parts of that country we were debarred by law for all rights and privileges of man – in other parts, 
public sentiment, more powerful than law, frowned us down. 
‘We were excluded from all participation in the government. 
‘We were taxed without our consent. 
‘We were compelled to contribute to the resources of a country with gave us no protection. 
‘We were made a separate and distinct class, and against us every avenue of improvement was effectively closed.  
Strangers from other lands, of a color different from ours, were preferred before us.  […]’ 
86 Hungarian Declaration of Independence, in Henry de Puy, Kossuth and His Generals (Phinney & Co 1852) 202–
25; see also Armitage (n 75) 124: 
‘WE, the legally constituted representatives of the Hungarian nation, assembled in Diet, do by these presents 
solemnly proclaim, in maintenance of the inalienable natural rights of Hungary, with all its dependencies, to 
occupy the position of an independent European State – that the house of Hapsburg-Lorraine, as perjured in the 
sight of God and man, has forfeited its right to the Hungarian throne.  At the same time we feel ourselves bound 
in duty to make known the motives and reasons which have impelled us to this decision, that the civilised world 
may learn we have taken this step not out of overweening confidence in our wisdom, or out of revolutionary 
excitement, but that it is an act of the last necessity, adopted to preserve from utter destruction a nation persecutes 
to the limit of its most enduring patience. 
‘Three hundred years have passes since the Hungarian nation, by free election, placed the house of Austria upon 
its throne, in accordance with stipulations made on both sides, and ratified by treaty.  These three hundred years 
have been for the country, a period of uninterrupted suffering.’ 
87 For an excellent table listing many of the post-1776 declarations of independence see Armitage (n 75) 146–55. 
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right which was a hallmark of both the American and French declarations:88 an exercise of 
remedial self-determination following the denial of the political form was seen by secession 
movements as a legitimate justification for rebellion, and each declaration which appealed to 
those principles further entrenched the status of remedial self-determination as conferring 
legitimacy on those who invoked it.  
Few secession movements during this period appealed to justifications other than remedial 
self-determination, but there are notable exceptions.  One such example is Norway.  In both 
1814 (ultimately unsuccessfully) and 1905 (successfully) the Norwegian people sought their 
independence from the Scandinavian powers.  Norway’s 1814 declaration of independence, 
in particular, is noteworthy, because of its claim to secessionary self-determination. 
2.3.1 The Secessions of Norway – 1814 
At the beginning of 1814 Norway was, and had been since 1380, a territorial possession of the 
Danish Monarchy.89  While the union began as a consensual union of two States under a 
common ruler, Norway’s independent character was gradually eroded.90  The decisive moment 
in this decline was the declaration, in the 1536 Charter, ‘that the country should cease to be a 
separate kingdom, and be incorporated in Denmark.’91  Thereafter Norway was ruled from 
Denmark and had no international representation, becoming little more than a region in a 
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Danish State.  The PCIJ has subsequently concluded that during this period the Norwegian 
State ceased to exist.92 
Norway remained a Danish possession until 1814, when it gained a short-lived 
independence.93  The Napoleonic wars wrought significant changes in the power structures of 
Scandinavia.  Although initially neutral, Denmark, Sweden and Russia were drawn into the 
wars.  Denmark allied itself to France; Russia to Great Britain.  Sweden initially joined 
Napoleon, but following the 1809 Finnish War and the loss of Finland to Russia, Sweden 
made overtures to the Anglo-Russian coalition.94  Its crown prince, Karl Johan, sought to gain 
the friendship of Russia by renouncing its claim to Finland, hoping instead to acquire 
Norway.95  By October 1813 the Danish cause had been defeated at the battle of Leipzig and, 
on 14th January 1814, Denmark and Sweden concluded the Treaty of Kiel, by which Norway 
would be transferred ‘with all rights, entitlements and incomes, in full ownership and full 
sovereignty to His Majesty the King of Sweden.’96  The implementation of the Treaty was 
frustrated by Norway’s claim of independence, however.  This situation was remarkable 
because Norway claimed a right to independence based solely on its separate national 
character and the will of its people:97  it did not claim a subsisting sovereignty, nor that it had 
gained a right to independence as a result of historical wrongs.  In other words, Norway’s 
claim was one of secessionary self-determination.  Although it did not yield Norway’s 
independence—the Kings of Sweden would rule Norway from 1814-1905—the situation was 
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97 Gjerset notes that the people of Norway ‘felt that they had been bartered away in a manner disgraceful to a free 
people.’  Gjerset (n 94) 417. 
54 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTRED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
remarkable, too, in that Norway’s claim appears to have been accepted by Sweden.  Indeed, 
Norway was de facto independent for some months, and when united with Sweden—
compelled by the threat of vastly superior Swedish military force, lack of sympathy among 
the great powers, and a British naval blockade—it was as a distinct State under a joint 
monarchy, and not as the territorial possession envisaged by the Treaty. 
Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiel there was widespread resentment against 
Denmark and Sweden in Norway; the one for bargaining away the country without 
consultation, the other for seeking to gain control of Norway against the wishes of its 
population.98  An assembly of elected delegates was called and, on 17th May, a new 
Constitution was signed at Eidsvoll.99  It included a statement that ‘Norway […] shall be a 
free, independent, and indivisible kingdom[.]’100  At a similar time, Karl Johan ordered that a 
force be sent to occupy Norwegian fortresses, stating that ‘Norway is to be taken possession 
of, not as a province, but only to be united with Sweden in such a way as to form with it a 
single kingdom.’101  The intention of Sweden was very clear: Norway would not be 
independent, but would be incorporated as a part of the Swedish State. 
As the war in Europe came to an end and Karl Johan was able to re-focus on the acquisition 
of Norway, so too did Norway’s short-lived independence.102  As Swedish forces returned to 
Sweden it became increasingly obvious that resistance against the far-superior Swedish 
military was doomed to fail and, indeed, hostilities lasted only from 29th July to 14th August, 
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when the Convention of Moss was signed.103  During the brief conflict the Norwegian forces 
had been significantly overmatched,104 and there can be little doubt that, had the war been 
prosecuted to its conclusion, heavy defeat for Norway would have resulted.105  Nevertheless, 
a number of significant concessions were made to Norway.  Notably, the Convention of Moss 
made no reference to the Treaty of Kiel, and did not seek to effect the union of the two States.  
On the 20th October 1814 the Norwegian Storthing, the Parliament established under the 
Eidsvoll Constitution, voted in favour of the union of Norway and Sweden as independent 
states under a common monarchy, and Karl Johan proclaimed the ‘freedom of each nation’.106 
It may seem strange to speak of a successful claim to self-determination on the part of Norway 
when, as the result of a short war and the threat of force, Norway ultimately entered into an 
unpopular union with Sweden.  The change in the Swedish position over the course of 1814 
is, however, striking.  At the beginning of the year Sweden claimed an absolute sovereignty 
and title over Norway as a result of the Treaty of Kiel, and there can be little doubt that at the 
beginning of 1814 Norway was not a State, having lost its independence in 1536.  However, 
when the union was carried into effect in October 1814, Norway entered the joint monarchy 
consensually, as the result of an international treaty—the Convention of Moss—concluded 
between Sweden and Norway, and with an established Constitution which (contrary to the 
wishes of Sweden) was amended in the course of the incorporation negotiations to strengthen 
Norway’s independence.  During this process Sweden treated Norway not as a rebellious 
province to which it already had title, nor as a conquered territory, but as a sovereign State 
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with international capacity.107  Nor, it appears, was Norway’s independent personality lost as 
a result of the union, as the events of 1905 were to demonstrate. 
2.3.2 The Secessions of Norway – 1905 
In 1905 the 91-year union between Sweden and Norway came to an end.  While some within 
Sweden considered Norway an inferior partner in the union, Norway regarded itself as an 
equal, sovereign State.108  Both in matters of internal governance and external relations 
Norway sought to exercise its independence, creating a quiet conflict with the King of Sweden.  
The events leading to the dissolution of Norway/Sweden in 1905 suggest that Norway not 
only achieved independence in 1814, but that it did not lose that independence when it united 
with Sweden.109  When it sought to leave the Swedish union, it was as a State asserting its 
sovereign right. 
The political structure of Norway/Sweden was complex and contested, with both sides of the 
union claiming a greater degree of power and control (on Sweden’s part) or autonomy (on 
Norway’s) than the other would accept.110  Thus, while the Storthing and the Norwegian 
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Government had a day-to-day competence for the internal governance of Norway, the 
Government was an appointment of the King, and he had (and made use of) the power to veto 
legislation.  Two incidents in particular are especially demonstrative of the conflict over 
Norway’s political status.  The first came to a head in 1884, and concerned the power of the 
Norwegian Storthing to amend the constitution without the King’s approval.  Three successive 
Storthings had passed a constitutional amendment intended to seat the Norwegian ministers 
in the Storthing, but on all three occasions the King vetoed the measure.111  While it was clear 
that the King had the power to veto ordinary legislation, many within the Storthing refused to 
accept a power of veto over constitutional amendments.112  Accordingly, on the 9th June 1880, 
the Storthing overwhelmingly passed a resolution declaring that the Constitution had been 
successfully amended and instructing the government both to promulgate and comply with it.  
This the government, anxious to avoid a conflict with Sweden, refused to do.113  No further 
action was taken until 1882.  The final card left to the Storthing was its power to impeach the 
ministers for their failure to comply with the Constitution, and there was an understandable 
reluctance to pursue such a radical course.  Following the 1882 election, however, which gave 
the majority within the Storthing a clear mandate from the electorate to pursue the amendment, 
impeachment proceedings were begun against the ministers.114  On the 27th February 1884, 
the ministers were found guilty of failing to comply with the constitution, and eight ministers 
were sentenced to loss of office.115  Perhaps surprisingly, the King chose to ratify the decision, 
and dismissed the government.  Having first failed to form a new government of the unionist 
Right, the King asked majority leader Johan Sverdrup to form a government and, on the 2nd 
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July 1884 Sverdrup and his new ministers took their seats in the Storthing.116  In defying the 
King’s veto of the constitutional amendment Norway was asserting its independence.  The 
Storthing had declared that the monarch’s legitimate power stemmed from the Constitution, 
rather than constitutional legitimacy flowing from the monarch.  In doing so, it asserted the 
control of Norway over the legal basis of the union. 
A second source of conflict was the external competences of the two States, and it was to 
precipitate the end of the union.  In 1885 Sweden proposed a new Council of foreign affairs, 
consisting of ‘the minister of foreign affairs […] two other members of the Swedish and three 
of the Norwegian ministry.’117  The proposal created outrage—never before had it been 
specified that the minister of foreign affairs of Norway/Sweden had to be a Swedish 
minister118—and it was seen as proof of Norway’s inferior position in the union.119  Norway 
by this time had the third largest merchant marine in the world, and there was widespread 
feeling among its ship-owners and seamen that its unique interests were not being catered to 
by the Swedish diplomatic service.120  Old desires for distinct Norwegian international 
representation were reawakened and, in 1891, the Storthing passed a bill establishing a 
Norwegian consular service.  Despite Norway’s opinion that such an action was within its area 
concern as stipulated in the Act of Union, Sweden held that the establishment of a consular 
service was a matter for the union and, accordingly, the King vetoed the bill.121  A period of 
low-level conflict followed for several years evidenced by a succession of short-lived 
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Norwegian governments until, on 11th March 1905, a government was formed under the 
charismatic Christian Michelson.122 
Michelson’s actions swiftly brought the crisis to a head.  On the 27th May 1905 the Norwegian 
ministers in Stockholm presented the King with a new bill establishing a Norwegian consular 
service.  Once again the King vetoed the measure.123  On this occasion, however, refusing to 
accept the veto, the minsters offered the King their resignation, and immediately returned to 
Norway.124  On the 7th June, the Michelson government resigned en masse, and presented to 
the Storthing two resolutions, which were adopted without debate. 
The first stated that whereas a primary duty of a constitutional monarch was to 
supply the country with a responsible government and the king was unable to do 
this, the royal power had ceased to function.  Oscar II had therefore ceased to be 
king of Norway, and thereby the union, which had existed by virtue of a common 
monarch, had come to an end.125 
In the second, the Storthing communicated the end of the Union to King Oscar II, and asked 
his leave to elect a Bernadotte Prince to the throne of Norway.  The Storthing’s actions were 
subsequently endorsed by the electorate by a huge margin in a referendum.126 
The Storthing’s declaration almost provoked a war.  Surprisingly, Sweden appeared to be 
willing to allow Norway to leave the union, but Sweden demanded that a series of concessions 
be made, not least that a neutral zone be implemented along the border, and that several 
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frontier forts be demolished.  In Norway these demands were seen as quite unacceptable, and 
for a time it appeared that no compromise could be reached.  Troops were mobilised, and it 
appeared that the two countries might slide once more into conflict.127  Eventually, however, 
the countries negotiated the demilitarisation of certain Norwegian frontier forts rather than 
their demolition and, on the 23rd September 1905, the Karlstadt agreement was signed, 
repealing the Act of Union.  On the 27th October, Oscar II abdicated the throne of Norway, 
and the Union was at an end.128 
The Norwegian secessions are examples of a trend which typified the Age of Revolution, and 
which has arguably continued until the present day:  the growing acceptance that self-
determination confers legitimacy.  Like the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the 
French Declaration of 1789, Norway’s invocation of self-determination principles was a claim 
of legitimacy.  It is a rare and intriguing example, however, in that the claim of the Norwegian 
people was of secessionary self-determination, and did not cite the abuses of the sovereign as 
justification.  On the contrary, Norway claimed its independence on the basis of its will.  
Equally unusual was Sweden’s apparent acceptance of the legitimacy of Norway’s claim: few 
claims to secessionary self-determination have been made, fewer have been successful, and 
fewer still received the blessing of the previous sovereign.  The pattern holds true in the 
modern day, where secessionary self-determination continues to be repudiated by the majority 
of States (although it is in the modern day, too, that one may find echoes of the Norwegian 
example).129  Notwithstanding its singular character, the Norwegian secessions suggest that 
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the concept of self-determination was, by this time, seen as conferring a substantial legitimacy 
on those invoking it. 
Although the Norwegian example is in many respects unique, it should be noted that like the 
declarations of 1776 and 1789 Norway’s was a political and a moral claim, and not an appeal 
to international law.  It is clear, therefore, that the example can reveal little about the legality 
of self-determination.  It was in the years that followed, however, that the first 
internationalised dispute concerning self-determination—the Åland Islands dispute of 1920—
was decided, and the question of self-determination’s legality, rather than legitimacy, came to 
the fore. 
2.4 The Åland Islands 
The Åland Islands “case” remains a renowned example of a self-determination claim, and one 
of the first to be subject to international adjudication.130  The Åland Islands are a Swedish-
speaking archipelago off the coast of Finland, and in 1920 Sweden asked the Council of the 
League of Nations to decide whether the islanders had a right to secede and join Sweden.  
Following agreement by Finland the Council of the League appointed a Committee of Jurists 
to pronounce on the jurisdiction of the Council.131  Following their determination that the 
Council had jurisdiction, the Council appointed a Commission of Rapporteurs to make 
substantive recommendations.132  Both reports considered the claims of the Åland islanders to 
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self-determination, and reveal a great deal about the ambit and nature of self-determination as 
it was then understood.  The process was all the more remarkable, too, because the Jurists and 
the Rapporteurs reached very different conclusions. 
The Jurists began their analysis with an examination of the relationship between self-
determination and State sovereignty.  Their conclusion was that State sovereignty, in the 
absence of an express limitation, remains dominant.133  Nevertheless, the Jurists accepted that 
self-determination has a role to play in the formation of States.  Where a State is, as yet, 
unformed and its sovereignty is imperfect, ‘aspirations of certain sections of a nation […] may 
come to the surface and produce effects which must be taken into account in the interests of 
the internal and external peace of nations.’134  Indeed, the Jurists cast national self-
determination as ‘the most important of the principles governing the formation of States’,135 
but one that is nevertheless confined to the pre-State context.  Any other finding, they argued, 
would be ‘contrary to the very idea embodied in the term “State”.’136  While it is clear that the 
Jurists’ understood self-determination to be a right attaching to “nations”, then, they construed 
it as a weak right and one which is subordinate to the right of the State to territorial integrity.  
Nevertheless, that weak right was applied in this case:  the Committee concluded that the 
League of Nations had competence to address the question because ‘Finland had not yet 
acquired the character of a definitively constituted State.’137  Thus, it was because Finland had 
not yet achieved statehood and its rights over the territory were less than sovereign that the 
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claim to self-determination should be considered, and not because self-determination was a 
right capable of defeating the claim of the sovereign State over its territory. 
Far from recognising an effective right to secede, therefore, the report of the Committee of 
Jurists declared that sovereignty prevails over self-determination.  Nor, as has been wrongly 
suggested,138 did the Jurists assert that remedial principles may operate to “internationalise” 
an ostensibly domestic dispute: 
The Commission, in affirming these principles, does not give an opinion 
concerning the question as to whether a manifest and continued abuse of 
sovereign power, to the detriment of a section of the population of a State, would, 
if such circumstances arose, give to an international dispute, arising therefrom, 
such a character that its object should be considered as one which is not confined 
to the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned, but comes within the sphere 
of action of the League of Nations.139 
It is important to note, first, that the Committee declined to give an opinion on the question.  
Regardless, however, interpretation of their statement as an endorsement of remedial self-
determination would be questionable, given that the passage considers only who should have 
jurisdiction over the dispute, and not on what principles it should be decided.  Indeed, the 
passage even suggests that the abuse of sovereign power by a State would not be sufficient, in 
itself, to confer jurisdiction on the League of Nations, but that the dispute would first have to 
be “internationalised” by other means.140 
While the Jurists decided that the right to self-determination had relevance for the question 
because Finland had not yet attained full sovereignty, the Rapporteurs were emphatic that no 
right to secessionary self-determination then existed in international law.141  Unlike the 
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Committee of Jurists, though, the Rapporteurs did explicitly recognise a right to remedial 
secession ‘as a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply 
just and effective guarantees’ of minority rights.142  They stressed, however, that such a 
secession ‘can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution’.143  Applying the 
criteria for such a right to the case of the Åland Islanders, they found that no such exceptional 
situation existed, and that Finland was prepared to offer the Islanders protection of their rights 
as a minority.144  They therefore concluded that the Islanders did not have a right to separate 
from Finland.145 
Although the reports disagree on a great many points, it is clear that self-determination was 
considered by both to be subordinate to territorial sovereignty.  While the Jurists believed that 
secessionary self-determination existed as a right, albeit a weak right which would only have 
application where the State’s sovereignty was imperfect, the Rapporteurs denied its legal 
character altogether.146  Concurrently, in a conclusion which lends further support to the 
ideational separation between the secessionary and the remedial forms, the Rapporteurs 
recognised that a right to remedial secession may exist in international law (although they 
were emphatic that it would not apply to the circumstances of the Åland Islands), a point on 
which the Jurists made no determination.147  Overall, the Åland Islands question did not greatly 
clarify either the legal status of the various forms of self-determination, or their ambits.  Even 
if a right either to secessionary or to remedial self-determination existed at this time, any such 
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right must be regarded as weak and imperfect, and to be at least as much a question of politics 
as a question of law.  It was only through the decolonisation process that this was to change, 
and that a form of self-determination with an unambiguously legal status was to emerge. 
3. Self-Determination and Decolonisation 
Although since 1776 it had been invoked by many States and peoples, at the beginning of the 
twentieth Century self-determination remained an inherently controversial concept among 
States.  In the aftermath of the First World War, however, self-determination began to gain 
currency and acceptance as a tool in the decolonisation process. 
In many ways the story of the twentieth Century post-WWI is a story of decolonisation.  
Although there were many other notable developments in international law and politics during 
the period (including the foundation of the League of Nations and the laying of the 
groundwork of the United Nations), the massive expansion and diversification of the 
membership of the international community is perhaps the defining change.  The 
decolonisation process, of course, was highly complex and had a great many causes, but it is 
very plausible that it was sparked by the actions and rhetoric of the powers during and in the 
aftermath of WWI.  There is a sense that they began the decolonisation process unintentionally 
– as Holland notes, for example, ‘the territorial zenith of modern colonialism was attained 
only in 1919’,148 long after the wartime actions of Europe’s leaders had made some form of 
decolonisation process inevitable. 
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3.1 WWI Rhetoric:  Lenin and Wilson on Self-Determination 
The First World War was a globalised European war.  The main participants were European 
powers, but the involvement of the colonies held by those powers resulted in a truly global 
war.  The colonies not only provided vital supplies to both sides during the conflict but also 
provided manpower to bolster the European armies,149 and it was thus clear to both sides that 
by ridding the other of its colonial supply-chain they could gain a considerable advantage.  In 
due course, therefore, the colonies became frontlines, both as direct theatres of engagement 
and battlegrounds of ideas.150  Wishing to destabilise enemy colonies and guarantee the loyalty 
of their own, both sides promised greater independence or full self-governance in an effort to 
win and keep allies.151 
That process only increased with the rise to power of the Bolsheviks in Russia.  The right of 
nations to self-determination was a mainstay of Lenin’s political thought, and was the official 
policy of the Bolshevik movement.152  According to Lenin’s theory, the actualised right of 
those nations that wished it to secessionary self-determination was a first and necessary step 
towards an end of nationalism and, ultimately, the great socialist awakening.153  It was, Lenin 
argued, the duty of all to reject nationalism in all its forms, yet self-determination he divorced 
from nationalism per se, identifying it as a necessary aspect of a declaration that all nations 
are equal in rights. 
In this situation, the proletariat of Russia is faced with a twofold or, rather, a two-
sided task:  to combat nationalism of every kind, above all, Great-Russian 
nationalism; to recognise, not only fully equal rights for all nations in general, but 
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also equality of rights as regards polity, i.e., the right of nations to self-
determination, to secession.154 
Lenin’s thought on self-determination was to prove to be highly influential. 
1919 saw the end of the war, and the defeat of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.  By 
that time most of the colonies of the Central Powers had fallen into Allied hands, and it became 
increasingly important to determine their future.155  It was the leaders of the Russian revolution 
who first advocated that the colonies be permitted to self-determine, but their calls were 
swiftly echoed by others.156  In particular, Lenin’s call for self-determination influenced Henry 
Balfour—the first to moot the idea of international control of the territories—whose ideas 
were in turn taken up (most influentially) by Woodrow Wilson.157 
During the course of the War and the subsequent peace process, Wilson became a strong 
advocate of self-determination, although it seems clear that his was a narrower conception 
than that advocated by Lenin.  In January 1917, Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress.  
His address was entitled ‘Peace Without Victory’, and in the course of the speech he laid out 
a vision for peace in Europe which, he hoped, would encourage the Central Powers to submit 
to a negotiated ceasefire.  Central to his vision of a stable Europe was the principle of political 
self-determination: 
No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the 
principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the 
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governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from 
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.158 
It is not clear from this passage whether Wilson was advocating a division of contested 
European territories along national lines in accordance with the wishes of their inhabitants, or 
whether his goal was to ensure that the war would not result in the acquisition of territories by 
either side.  It may be indicative, though, that the impermissibility of territorial acquisitions 
was the focus of Wilson’s letter to the Pope of the 27th August 1917.159 
Although it seems clear that Wilson was not seeking to institute a right to secessionary self-
determination, nor to establish definitive principles for the determination of territorial claims, 
he insists on the superiority of the rights of ‘peoples’ over the rights of ‘Governments’.  All 
peoples, he argues, have an equal right to freedom and self-government.  These statements 
establish Wilson’s commitment to political self-determination, and his conviction that the 
peace process in Europe should take self-determination principles into consideration.  In the 
early part of 1918, his thoughts on the peace process were to be refined and formalised in his 
famous ‘Fourteen Points’ speech of January 1918.  Wilson’s fourth point stated that there must 
be: 
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, 
based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such 
questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have 
equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
determined.160 
While the address was not a ringing endorsement of self-determination, Wilson established 
that the will of the population was a factor to be considered in the determination of colonial 
claims.  Cassese is, of course, correct to strike the cautionary note when he comments that for 
Wilson ‘self-determination should not be the sole or even the paramount yardstick in this area, 
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but must be reconciled with the interests of colonial powers.’161  Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
overstate the importance of the idea that colonial peoples should be given some measure of 
influence over their future circumstances. 
Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an 
international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists.  
National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and 
governed only by their own consent.  “Self-determination” is not a mere phrase.  
It is an imperative principle of actions which statesmen will henceforth ignore at 
their peril.162 
Although it would be many years before the idea would achieve general acceptance, Wilson 
had set in motion the creation of a right to colonial self-determination.  Although colonial self-
determination shares a similarity of outcomes with the secessionary form, its ideational 
foundations are distinct (it is more closely connected ideationally to the political than the 
secessionary form), and it merits its own category because of its political status.  In 1918 
Wilson began a process which would eventually yield a political conviction that colonialism 
is inherently reprehensible, and that colonial peoples should be granted self-government.163  
In determining the form that self-government should take in any particular case, self-
determination became the accepted tool of the international community. 
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3.2 The Mandates System 
The end of the First World War left the international community with a dilemma over the 
colonial possessions of the defeated Central Powers.  While it was considered unacceptable 
for the colonies to revert to their pre-war masters, many States were reluctant to see the 
empires of France and the United Kingdom grow yet larger.  Their answer was to place the 
colonies into international stewardship, under a system devised by General Smuts.164  Smuts 
considered that the task of administering the territories could not practicably be carried out at 
the international level, and so proposed a system of mandates.165  Article 22 of the League of 
Nations Covenant established the mandates system: 
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them 
and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle 
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of 
civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be 
embodied in this Covenant.166 
Rodríguez-Santiago describes this as an embryonic form of the right to colonial self-
determination that would later evolve under the auspices of the United Nations:  individual 
States would be given responsibility for Mandated territories under the supervision of the 
League, and the principle was established that the purpose of the arrangement was the care 
and development of the territories, and not the ownership of or profit from them.167 
The system has been described by Wright as a form of tutelage.  The colonies of the defeated 
powers were placed under the control of one or more of the allied powers to hold in trust on 
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behalf of the international community.168  While the colonial possessions of the European 
powers that remained outside the Mandates system were conceived as the property of those 
States, the Mandate territories were treated quite differently.  Callahan observes, for example, 
that the Mandate territories were often subject to better treatment than the Mandatory’s own 
colonial possessions.169  A similar distinction can been seen in that, while the Mandatories 
tended to regard their own colonies as permanent possessions over which their rights were 
absolute, it was accepted that the ultimate goal of the Mandates was the independence of the 
territories: 
[T]he phrase “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves” is used [in Article 22 
of the League Covenant].  It follows from this and from the very conception of 
tutelage that this mission is not, in principle, intended to be prolonged indefinitely, 
but only until the peoples under tutelage are capable of managing their own 
affairs.170 
While the suggestion that a people should be denied independence until such time as Western 
powers considered them sufficiently “civilised” is markedly distasteful, there can be no doubt 
that a declaration that these territories were to be guided towards independent statehood was 
enormously powerful.  Wright argues that ‘[t]he notion that the eventual independence of 
dependencies was inevitable and expedient tended to the notion that it was a right.’171  That 
notion was strengthened yet further when, in 1931, the Permanent Mandates Commission 
produced a report for the League Council laying down the conditions which, in its opinion, 
should exist in a Mandate territory before that territory should be granted independence.172  
The PMC did not have the capacity to make demands of the Mandatories in most cases, so the 
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conditions were ‘merely suggestions’, and not stipulations.173  Nevertheless, the duty to report 
to the PMC contributed to a sense that territories should be prepared for their eventual 
independence.174 
The League of Nations did not live up to its promise.  It failed to prevent the outbreak of war 
between two of its members, Japan and China, in 1931 and, through its silence, condoned 
Mussolini’s action in Ethiopia in 1936.175  Following the Second World War the League of 
Nations was replaced with the United Nations (UN).  In many ways, however, the Mandates 
system was to prove stronger than the League.  Callahan notes that when Japan pulled out of 
the League in 1935 it maintained its Mandates, retained its seat on the Permanent Mandates 
Commission, and continued to send the proper reports and representatives to the 
Commission.176  Thus when the UN Charter was negotiated in 1945 it was not only the 
practical provisions on the administration of the Mandate territories that were to be recreated 
in the Trusteeship system; many of the ideas of self-government and self-determination that 
the Mandates system had engendered found textual expression in the new system. 
3.3 The United Nations and the Trusteeship System 
On the 26th June 1945, the delegates to the San Francisco Peace Conference concluded the 
Charter of the United Nations, and replaced the League’s Mandates system with a system of 
Trusteeship.  Although the systems were not identical, many of the Mandates system’s central 
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features were incorporated into the Trusteeship system with only minor changes.  Unlike the 
Mandates system, however, the Trusteeship system was given a textual foundation in the 
Charter: Chapter XII is devoted to the system, and Chapter XIII sets out the powers and remit 
of the Trusteeship Council. 
The anaemic textual basis of the Mandates system can be contrasted directly with the full and 
thorough expression of the principles and powers associated with Trusteeship in the Charter.  
While the principles that underpinned the Mandates system were largely unwritten and were 
often vague, the Charter codified the principles applicable to the Trusteeship system, and made 
several significant changes to the language of the system which point to a more explicit focus 
on the ultimate independence of Trust territories.177  Not only did the Charter create an 
obligation on the Trustee to progressively develop the infrastructure and institutions of the 
Trust territory towards the self-government or independence of the population,178 but Article 
76 declared the relevance of self-determination in that endeavour:  the ‘freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned’ are declared to be relevant to the development towards either 
self-government or independence. 
In one respect, however, the Charter was far more radical than the League:  the Charter even 
purported to give certain rights and entitlements to the populations of colonial (non-self-
governing) territories that were not the subject of a Trust.  While Chapter XII of the Charter 
laid down the principles to be applied specifically to the Trusteeship system, Chapter XI sets 
down principles for the administration of all non-self-governing territories: 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the 
administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of 
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self-government recognise the principle that the interest of the inhabitants of these 
territories are paramount[.]179 
Article 73 defines several aims which the States involved must pursue in the interests of the 
inhabitants.  Prominently placed among these is the obligation to develop self-government in 
the territories.180  As Rothermund notes, the Charter is careful to refer only to ‘self-
government’, and not to ‘self-determination’ or to ‘independence’.181  Nevertheless, for the 
first time it had been declared (and, by the Colonial powers, accepted) that the powers had 
certain obligations vis-à-vis their colonies.  Other provisions, too, point to an emerging sense 
that the colonies and the trust territories were of a kind.  While the Mandates system applied 
only to those territories stripped from the defeated Central Powers in the aftermath of WWI, 
the Trusteeship system was designed to apply to the existing mandated territories, territories 
‘detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War’ and even ‘territories 
voluntarily placed under the system’.182  This expansion explicitly made the system relevant 
to colonies held by States in their own capacities.  While States were under no obligation to 
place colonies into the Trusteeship system, it was nevertheless made clear that there was no 
difference in kind between the colonies stripped from the defeated powers in both wars, and 
the colonies held by the victors.  This declaration of equivalency between the former Mandates 
and other colonies naturally contributed to a sense that the same principles should apply to 
each. 
Notably, however, the Charter stops short of creating a right to independence, even for those 
territories under international Trusteeship.  Self-government, it seems clear, does not amount 
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to independent statehood, but is better analogised to a form of devolution.183  In practice many 
Trust territories did achieve independence within a few decades and the practice of the UN 
and its members was ultimately to institute independence as the goal of Trusteeship, and to 
extend that principle to apply to all non-self-governing territories.  Over time, therefore, a 
right to colonial self-determination capable of resulting in the formation of an independent 
State was to emerge. 
4. Self-Determination in the Law of the United Nations 
4.1 The Charter of the United Nations 
There can be no doubting the importance of the Charter of the United Nations for modern 
international law.  As Tomuschat has observed, ‘[t]he present-day world order rests entirely 
on the Charter’,184 and some authors have even characterised the Charter as a constitution of 
the international community.185  Its unique status and normative force are based not only on 
the fundamental organisational principles of the international system with which it deals, but 
also on its status as a treaty of universal application.  Uniquely among treaties all 
acknowledged States have accepted the obligations it imposes as a matter of conventional 
international law; indeed, the list of the Charter’s parties is sometimes taken to be a definitive 
list of the States of the world.186  The legal status of references to self-determination in the 
Charter, and the forms of self-determination they invoke, are uncertain, however. 
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The most significant Charter statement of self-determination is Article 1(2), which declares 
that: 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
[…] 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace[.]
187
 
 
The status of Article 1 of the Charter is among the least certain of the Charter provisions, and 
it remains unclear whether it constitutes a binding obligation on the Member States, or merely 
imposes obligations on the Organisation.188  A textual approach to the article suggests, in the 
first place, that these are purposes of the Organisation, and not of the members.  It is addressed 
to the Organisation, and not to the member States, as clearly demonstrated by Article 1(4), 
which lists as a purpose ‘[t]o be a centre’ for the facilitation of efforts towards those ends of 
the Organisation.189  The part clearly refers to a body (singular) which is the subject of the 
obligation, and as such the provision cannot apply to a multitude of actors.  It may also be 
observed, with Wolfrum, that the language of the article ‘is more appropriate for political 
objectives rather than for legally binding obligations.’190 
In their respective analyses of the Charter, both Kelsen and Cassese conclude that Article 1 
creates no obligations on UN Members.  Kelsen begins his analysis with the first purpose 
listed, that of maintaining international peace and security.  The emphasis of the provision, in 
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Kelsen’s opinion, is preventative:191 its focus is on the pacific settlement of international 
disputes,192 and as such it is institutional in focus, centring on the infrastructure created by the 
Charter with a view to the maintenance of peace – the General Assembly, the Security Council 
and the ICJ.193  Article 1 therefore sets down the ‘function[s] of the Organization’, while the 
‘corresponding’ ‘obligation[s] of the Members’ can be found in Article 2.194 
Kelsen also argues that Article 1 could not create legal rights. 
[I]t is highly problematic to refer in a legal instrument to rights without referring 
to the corresponding duties, since legally there exists no right of an individual 
without a corresponding duty on another individual; and if the right is a 
“freedom,” not without a corresponding duty of the government.195 
According to Kelsen, not only does the Charter not stipulate which rights individuals should 
have, nor who should have the responsibility for ensuring that those rights are respected and 
fulfilled, but it also fails to provide any form of redress for individuals whose rights are 
breached.196  Indeed, the Statute of the ICJ specifically excludes the possibility that individuals 
could have standing before it.197  Kelsen concludes that ‘[a]ll the formulas concerned establish 
purposes or functions of the Organisation, not obligations of the members’.198  Cassese agrees, 
and he argues that self-determination 
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[W]as envisaged primarily as a programme or aim of the Organization [...] the 
Charter did not impose direct and immediate legal obligations on Member States 
in this area[.]199 
Rather than imposing what may have become highly burdensome obligations on States, it 
‘merely laid down [the] many lofty goals of the Organization.  The Threat to State interests 
was thus minimized.’200  There are, therefore, many textual indications that the Article does 
not impose obligations on the member States.  Nevertheless, there are suggestions that States 
have considered Article 1 to be binding, both during the drafting of the Charter and 
subsequently. 
During the San Francisco conference, the categorisation of the statements reflecting the values 
of the Charter and the Organisation as preambular, purposes or principles was discussed by 
Subcommittee I/1/A.201  Although it is clear that the subcommittee understood the three parts 
as having a differing emphasis,202 it appears they did not draw the sharp distinctions between 
the parts that conventional understanding has done, finding that all parts of the Charter 
(including the preamble) were capable of creating judiciable rights: 
The provisions of the Charter are, in this case, as in any other legal instrument, 
indivisible.  They are equally valid, binding and operative.  […]  May the 
understanding of these remarks dispel any doubts and quiet any apprehensions as 
to the validity and value of the Charter, whether called Preamble, Chapter I or 
Chapter II.203 
                                                     
199 Cassese (n 3) 43. 
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There are some indications, also, that the subcommittee may have anticipated a wider role for 
the purposes than simply as a set of standards pertaining to the Organisation.  The Rapporteur 
stated that: 
The Purposes form the raison d’être of the Organisation.  They are the 
aggregation of the common ends on which our minds, one and all, met; hence the 
object of our Charter, the signatories of which collectively and severally 
subscribe to.204 
Kelsen remarked on the close links between Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, with many of the 
provisions existing both as obligations upon the Organisation in the former, and the Parties in 
the latter, and it may be that this dualism squares the Article 1 circle.205  Article 1 is a mirror, 
and its reference to self-determination is paralleled (if not by name) in the Article 2(1) 
guarantee of the equality of member States and the Article 2(4) prohibition on intervention.  
In its political form the right of self-determination attaches to the population of a State as a 
whole, and guarantees a choice over the form of government; a choice which belongs to that 
population alone. 206  Any external interference with that choice is inimical to the principle 
underpinning the right, and is illegitimate.  Self-determination stands as an affirmation that no 
one peoples’ interests may be considered superior to another’s, such that the first can dictate 
the terms of the latter’s national life.  The principle thus guarantees both the equality of peoples 
(and thus the equality of polities) and the prohibition on intervention, which the Charter 
expresses as rights of “peoples” (Article 1(2)) and as corresponding duties of States (Articles 
2(1) and 2(4)).  This appears, therefore, to meet Kelsen’s criterion of a true legal right; that is 
to say, one which carries with it a corresponding duty and a potential remedy.207 
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However, the Charter appears to create such a right only in relation to one part of the political 
self-determination norm.  As discussed above, political self-determination has both inward- 
and outward-facing aspects, which respectively stand for the principle that the individuals who 
comprise a social-political system should not be excluded from the determination of the form 
which that system will take (sometimes referred to as popular sovereignty), and the principle 
that no others who are outside the system should substitute their judgment for that of the 
individuals within it (non-interference).208  Only the second of these, the outward-facing 
aspect of the right, is expressed as a true right under the Charter.209 
Although of restricted scope, a recognition in the Charter of the principle of political self-
determination is of great importance, and may represent a significant turning-point.  As has 
been argued in this chapter, the political form of self-determination is the best established 
species of the self-determination genus, with roots as a legitimacy-claim in the American and 
French revolutionary declarations of the 18th Century.210  It is this form of self-determination 
which, according to the hypothesis examined in this thesis, has been established as the 
structural principle of the modern international legal system, and which is both driving and 
being sustained by the ongoing process of the humanisation of international law which has 
been identified by Peters and others,211 as part of a recursive process.212  There can be little 
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doubt that the inclusion of this statement of principle in the Charter and subsequent 
developments have contributed to that process. 
4.2 Resolutions 545(VI) and 637(VII) 
In the years that followed the adoption of the Charter, the status of self-determination as a 
legal norm was increasingly acknowledged.  In 1952 the General Assembly passed resolution 
545(VI),213 by which it decided to include ‘an article on the right of all peoples and nations to 
self-determination in reaffirmation of the principle enunciated in the Charter’ in the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, which were then being drafted.214  This resolution 
has a dual significance.  Not only can this statement assist in interpreting the reference to self-
determination in the Covenants, but it can also aid in interpreting the Charter.  The resolution 
is an example of the subsequent practice of the organisation, and indicates the interpretation 
of the Charter reference to self-determination to which the States Members present 
collectively subscribed:215  the Covenants’ references to self-determination were understood 
as invoking the same principle as the Charter, which the States present clearly understood as 
a reference to the political form.  During the debate it was stated that the right to self-
determination ‘should not be confused with the rights of minorities’,216 and the discussions 
referred to a ‘true right’ comprising two elements: domestically it ‘signified the people’s right 
to self-government and from the external point of view their independence.’217  This confirms 
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the conclusion above—that political self-determination had become a legal right under the 
Charter, at least in certain of its aspects—but other forms did not receive the same approval.  
The right of national minorities to self-determination was rejected, and it was understood that 
self-determination carried with it no right to secession or to disrupt the national unity.218 
A contrast may be drawn with resolution 637(VII), which deals with the substance of the right 
which was to appear in the Covenants.219  It declared the right to self-determination to be a 
‘prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights’, and recommended that 
Members ‘uphold’ the principle.220  Two forms of self-determination are engaged in these 
statements.  The majority of references to self-determination which appear in resolution 637 
seem to refer to the Charter’s references to political self-determination, and are therefore best 
seen as re-statements of that right.221  Certain provisions differ, however, and make reference 
to decolonisation and self-determination’s application to non-self-governing territories.222  
The resolution therefore appears to support the proposition that two forms of self-
determination were acquiring a legal status: political and colonial self-determination. 
It did not, however, develop that legal status, and nor does it seem to have contributed 
significantly to the formation of a wider customary right either of political or of colonial self-
determination.  Although it received widespread support, it probably did not demonstrate an 
opinio iuris of States voting for it.  On the contrary, the resolution speaks of a ‘principle of’ 
rather than a ‘right to’ self-determination; and refers to the ‘right to’ self-determination only 
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in the context of non-self-governing territories, where it almost certainly retained the ambit of 
the weak right contained in the Trusteeship provisions of the Charter.  Subsequent resolutions, 
however, did crystallise a customary norm. 
4.3 Resolution 1514(XV) 
Resolution 1514(XV), the ‘[d]eclaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries 
and peoples’,223 represented a significant departure from the General Assembly’s previous 
references to self-determination, and was ‘one of the most significant contributions the United 
Nations has made to developing the concept’.224  For the first time, the General Assembly 
sought not only to re-state, but to develop the law on self-determination under the Charter. 
Self-determination as formulated in the declaration refers exclusively to the colonial form.  
The preamble identifies those to whom the right would apply as ‘dependent peoples’,225 and 
declares that ‘an end must be put to colonialism’.226  The operative paragraphs condemn ‘[t]he 
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation’,227 and mandate 
action in respect of ‘Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet 
attained independence’.228  It was also clear that the principles applied could not be employed 
outwith the colonial context.  The declaration specifically excludes their application in other 
cases, stating that: 
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Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.229 
Significantly, this statement shows that the declaration regards colonial and secessionary self-
determination as unrelated concepts.  There is an understandable tendency to connect these 
forms of self-determination, which often result in similar outcomes (viz. the removal of a 
territory from the control of a State power and its establishment as a new State or its integration 
with another State).  It was the view of the General Assembly, however, that that these are 
separate ideas, hence the declaration’s fulsome endorsement of the colonial form, while 
secession was declared unlawful. 
Although a partial right to colonial self-determination had been established as part of the 
Mandate system (and then further developed under the Trust system), it was in this resolution 
that the ambit of that right was extended from trust territories to all non-self-governing 
territories.  It speaks in absolutes:  the ‘subjection of peoples to alien subjugation’ is a ‘denial 
of fundamental human rights’ and ‘is contrary to the Charter’;230 powers are to be transferred 
to the populations of non-self-governing territories ‘without any conditions or reservations’;231 
the aim of the declaration is to bring about the ‘end of colonialism in all its manifestations’.232  
It seems clear, too, that the declaration was more than a political statement, and was capable 
of contributing to the formation of custom as an expression of the opinio iuris of States.  The 
resolution mandates action formulated in specific and absolute terms, requiring that 
‘[i]mmediate steps’ be taken to grant non-self-governing territories independence ‘in 
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accordance with their freely expressed will and desire’.233  It demands action by the Trustee 
powers, an action within the General Assembly’s competence under the trust system.234  The 
resolution also attracted widespread support, passing by 89 votes in favour with nine 
abstentions and no State voting against, and it appears that those States members involved in 
the drafting of the declaration accepted its significance and regarded it as a law-creating 
document: 
It was considered that the Declaration revitalized the spirit of the Charter restored 
strength to the Charter provisions on self-determination and gave a new sense of 
reality and greater validity to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The 
new Declaration would be an epoch-making document, on an equal footing with 
the Charter and the Universal Declaration.235 
It seems likely that the declaration was sufficient to crystallise a norm of customary law 
relating to colonial self-determination and thus to extend the ambit of the norm beyond trust 
and mandate territories to all non-self-governing peoples.  It also seems clear, however, that 
it did not affect the extent or legal status of self-determination in its other forms. 
4.4 International Human Rights Covenants 
The International Human Rights Covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) are twin 
treaties which were created in order to render the rights proclaimed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights enforceable.  The Covenants have a common first Article, which 
provides that: 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.   
[…]  
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3. The States Parties to the present convention, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, 
shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect 
that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations.236 
Although the Article refers again to the decolonisation context, and so probably constitutes a 
re-statement of the right of non-self-governing peoples to colonial self-determination,237 the 
major focus of the common Article is on the right of ‘all peoples’ to ‘freely determine their 
political status’.238  Such language is more appropriate to a right to political self-determination, 
or the right of a population to institute the political and economic system of their choosing 
without outside interference, than a right to colonial or to the other forms of self-
determination.  Conspicuously, also, the Article does not limit the scope of the right to colonial 
self-determination – rather, it refers to ‘all peoples’.  It seems equally clear, though, that the 
references to ‘peoples’ was understood to mean the population of States and of colonised 
territories, and not sub-State groups.  Reference to the travaux préparatoires suggests that the 
States Parties did not envisage a right to secessionary self-determination: 
In paragraph 1 of the article, [Venezuela] understood the term “peoples” in the 
most general and unqualified sense, and therefore as not applicable to racial, 
religious, or other groups or minorities.  […  Self-determination means] freedom 
for all peoples and nations to manage their affairs in all respects without the 
intervention of another people or nation.239 
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It can be concluded, therefore, that the Covenants concerned primarily political and 
secondarily colonial self-determination, and did not institute a right to secessionary or 
remedial self-determination. 
The formulation of the right to political self-determination in the Covenants may have 
extended the ambit of the right, however.  Prior to the conclusion of the Covenants, as noted 
above, political self-determination was vulnerable to the challenge that an obligation without 
a corresponding remedy cannot be a legal obligation, properly so called.240  Although the 
outward-facing aspect of political self-determination—guaranteeing non-interference—had 
achieved the status of an enforceable right under the Charter, political self-determination 
remained a “half-right”.  Its internal facet—guaranteeing the equality of population groups in 
determining the form of a State’s governance—lacked an enforceable remedy or sanction.  
The Covenants may have remedied that lack, by creating a right to political self-determination 
enforceable against States Parties.241  In that way the Covenants may have facilitated the 
emergence of political self-determination as a full right opposable to the States Parties. 
It is also significant that the Article is common to both Covenants.  Rather than being a right 
of the same kind as those enumerated in the Covenants, its verbatim inclusion in both 
documents suggests that it was seen as having a different, and more basic, character.  These 
are matters which, it seems to declare, come prior to the subdivision of human rights into civil 
and political or economic social and cultural.  To that extent it receives a treatment different 
even to the right to life, which appears in the list of civil and political rights only.  There can 
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hardly be a more eloquent indication of the fundamental character which the norm of political 
self-determination was understood to possess. 
4.5 Declaration on Friendly Relations 
In 1970 the United Nations General Assembly agreed Resolution 2625(XXV).242  The 
Resolution approved the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(Declaration on Friendly Relations), the text of which was annexed to the Resolution.  It is 
doubtless the single most significant document on self-determination produced under the 
auspices of the United Nations,243 in that the declaration not only materially develop the law 
on self-determination, but it cemented its legal status. 
The declaration is customary in its entirety.  In its Nicaragua decision the ICJ declared the 
Declaration to be customary international law, holding that the Declaration was more than a 
mere ‘reiteration or elucidation’ of the Charter,244 but that ‘the adoption by States of this text 
afford[ed] an indication of their opinio iuris as to customary international law’.245  In its 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo the Court cited its judgment in Nicaragua, confirming that the 
Declaration ‘reflects customary international law’.246  The Court did not confine its comment 
to a section of the declaration, nor point to such a limit in the Nicaragua judgment, and should 
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be interpreted as a recognition of the status of the declaration as a whole.  It is also clear, as 
the Court apprehended when it examined the text of the Declaration during the proceedings in 
Nicaragua, that the obligations found in the Declaration go beyond those of the Charter.  The 
Declaration was therefore not merely a source of law, but a source of new law. 
At first sight the declaration appears simply to restate those forms of self-determination which, 
as discussed above, already existed in the law of the Charter and of the United Nations.  The 
Declaration again emphasises the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and reiterates 
the conviction that ‘subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a violation of [self-determination], as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, 
and is contrary to the Charter.’247  It also restates the rights of peoples to political self-
determination: 
[A]ll peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, 
their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with 
the provisions of the Charter.248 
Once more, it seems clear that “peoples” was understood to mean the populations of States, 
and not sub-State groups.  The declaration itself excludes the application of the principle to 
break up the State in very definite terms: 
Nothing in the forgoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States[.]249 
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It therefore seems clear that no right to secessionary self-determination was created by the 
Declaration and, further, that no right to secessionary self-determination then existed in 
international law. 
This “safeguard clause” may have another significance, though.  Perhaps surprisingly, the 
clause does not provide States with an absolute protection against secession, but only a limited 
one.  The clause forbids actions which would break up  
[S]overeign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples described above, 
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to 
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.250 
This clause excludes from its protection colonial States, which do not represent the people of 
the territory without distinction; it excludes entities which have not yet achieved statehood 
and independence; and (most significantly) it does not protect States which deny their 
population’s right to internal self-determination, access to government, or full and equal 
participation in the State’s political life.  Some have argued that this amounts to recognition 
of a legal right to remedial self-determination, and it may be that this conclusion is correct.251  
However, it would be equally possible to interpret the statement as expressive of a legal lacuna 
– as indicating that while it may be that no permissive rule enabling secession exists, that 
peoples living in States which do not respect the rights of the whole population to political 
self-determination are at least not actively prohibited from seceding on remedial grounds.  
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Even if, therefore, it is not creative of a legality, it appears at least to be a recognition in 
principle of the legitimacy of succession in extremis by peoples denied political self-
determination. 
The law on self-determination still largely reflects that set down in the Declaration.  Resolution 
2625 is, to date, the last of the significant statements made by the General Assembly on self-
determination and, although the legal scheme has been clarified and refined by case law both 
prior to the Declaration’s adoption and subsequently, the basic position remains that posited 
by the declaration in 1970.252  Colonial self-determination is well-established as a legal right 
attaching to non-self-governing peoples, and the principle that the wishes of the inhabitants of 
a territory should be of great weight in determining its future status may now have some 
application beyond the strict definition of a colonised people.  Of less certain application is 
the principle of remedial self-determination, which while it received some endorsement in the 
Declaration, is still of uncertain status.  The same cannot be said of the secessionary form, 
which was rejected entirely.  Perhaps of most significance, though, was the Declaration’s 
treatment of political self-determination.  That form of self-determination was strongly 
reasserted, and the importance of the principle for the modern international legal system was 
made clear both in the Declaration’s statement that ‘peoples have the right freely to determine, 
without external interference, their political status’, and that States which fail to ‘conduct[] 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ 
or which are not ‘possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour’ do not automatically receive the strong 
endorsement of their territorial integrity from which compliant States benefit.253  These 
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powerful statements demonstrate again the vitally important position which the principle of 
political self-determination occupies in the post-Charter legal world. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that self-determination, rather than being understood as a unitary or 
two-sided concept, should be cognised as a genus comprising four distinct “species” of self-
determination ideas.  These were identified as political, remedial, colonial and secessionary 
self-determination.  Although there are connections between these ideas—particularly, 
perhaps, between remedial self-determination and the political form—the historical analysis 
suggests that the ideational foundations of the kinds of self-determination are sufficiently 
distinct that they should be treated separately.  That indicates not only that the legitimacy 
claims made by each form are distinct, but also that they should be given different statuses 
and treatment as a matter of international law. 
Indeed, a four-part taxonomy of self-determination claims was shown to be helpful in 
understanding the contested position of the concept at international law.  The long-standing 
uncertainties and apparent dissonances in the legal regulation of the norm (how can an idea 
be simultaneously reviled as capable of dismantling the international legal order254, and 
declared to be of erga omnes255 and ius cogens character?256) can be explained by 
disaggregating the kinds of claims made.  Thus, although the status of remedial self-
determination has been left somewhat unclear by the discussion thus far, and although the 
secessionary form remains widely reviled, it is clear that self-determination of non-self-
governing peoples in the colonial context has now been established as a legal right under 
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customary law.  Of most significance to the wider concerns of this thesis, however, is the 
position of political self-determination – that principle which stands in its inward facing aspect 
for the proposition that all individuals and sub-groups within the population of a society should 
have the opportunity to determine the form of the political structures which apply to the society 
on conditions of equality, and in its outward-facing aspect that the determination of the form 
of socio-political organisation which applies in a society is a matter solely for the individuals 
who make up that society.  That idea, long seen as a powerful source of legitimacy, has become 
a deeply embedded principle of the post-Charter international legal order.  It is this principle 
which, according to the hypothesis examined in this thesis, has been established as a structural 
principle of the modern international legal system, and which helps to explain the ongoing 
humanisation of the structural properties—the deep level conceptual foundations—of the 
international legal system; statehood, personality, sovereignty, obligation, and ius cogens, 
which are discussed in later chapters. 
This chapter has introduced the four-part taxonomy of self-determination, and has given 
examples of the use of the forms identified from different historical periods.  The separate 
ideational foundations of the species of self-determination have been demonstrated, and it has 
been shown that each stands for a different legitimacy claim, some of which have and some 
of which have not been accepted as rights claims in international law in the events discussed 
here, or in the documents produced under the auspices of the United Nations.  The next chapter 
continues and adds to this examination with an appraisal of the treatment of self-determination 
before judicial bodies in the post-Charter era, and discusses some recent developments. 
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Two 
Self-Determination II:  Judicial 
Treatments of Self-Determination 
1945-Present 
Roper: So, now you give the Devil the benefit of law! 
More: Yes!  What would you do?  Cut a great road through the law 
to get after the Devil? 
Roper: I’d cut down every law in England to do that! 
More: Oh?  And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 
’round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all 
being flat?  This country is planted thick with laws, from coast 
to coast, Man’s laws, not God’s!  And if you cut them down, 
and you’re just the man to do it, do you really think you could 
stand upright in the winds that would blow then?  Yes, I’d give 
the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake!1 
1. Introduction 
Although claims to self-determination have seldom been the direct subject of judicial 
processes, self-determination claims have been considered in certain curial and quasi-curial 
processes before national and international bodies.  This chapter will build upon the analysis 
that was conducted in chapter one, and will apply the same four-part taxonomy of self-
determination claims to judicial considerations of self-determination.  In so doing it will 
permit a greater focus on the legal status of the various strands of the self-determination idea.  
While the legal status of the norms was discussed in relation to their development under the 
auspices of the political organs of the United Nations, the documents considered speak of self-
determination in the abstract, and references to it are often vague and imprecise.  In these 
                                                     
1 Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons (A&C Black 2013) 41–42. 
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cases, by contrast, the right to self-determination is operationalised:  courts, by their nature, 
deal with specificities in seeking to apply the correct interpretation of the law to the facts.  
Given this aspect of the judicial function, it is perhaps surprising that both national and 
international Courts have tended to avoid ruling on the status and scope of the various forms 
of self-determination (with the exception of colonial self-determination), and that such rulings, 
where made, are characterised by paucity of detail and a dearth of argumentation.  
Nevertheless, certain principles may be discerned which assist in an analysis of self-
determination. 
This chapter examines the major decisions of national and international courts in the post-
Charter era.  Although there are rare examples of self-determination questions coming before 
courts before 1945—including the declined Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the matter concerning the Status of Eastern Carelia2—as found in 
chapter one, it was in the post-Charter era that various of the forms of self-determination began 
to acquire legal force, and it is in this period that judicial interpretations of self-determination 
have become increasingly important, particularly before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).  Tesón asserts that ‘[i]n none of its opinions on self-determination did the Court depart 
from the restrictive view that only former colonies […] had the right to self-determination.’3  
A different view will be presented here.  In contrast to Tesón’s statement, it will be argued 
that the Court has implicitly or explicitly recognised several forms of self-determination, and 
has accepted a customary law status for at least two forms: colonial and political self-
                                                     
2 Status of Eastern Carelia (1923) PCIJ, Series B, No.5, 7.  The Court was asked to render an Advisory Opinion 
on the legal obligations on Finland and Russia under the Treaty of Dorpat which, among other matters, provided 
for ‘the national right of self-determination’ for the territory of Eastern Carelia, which at that time was split 
between Russian and Finnish territory (Treaty of Dorpat, concluded 14 October 1920, in force 1 January 1921, 
Article 10).  The Court declined to give an opinion on the dispute because Russia had not given its consent to 
the jurisdiction of the Court (p.28). 
3 Fernando R Tesón, ‘Introduction:  The Conundrum of Self-Determination’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory 
of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press 2016) 2, f5. 
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determination.  Nor are such developments insignificant.  As Thirlway restrainedly concludes:  
‘it is universally accepted, if not self-evident, that every decision the Court hands down will 
have an influence (to put it no higher) on how the law in the relevant field will thereafter be 
understood’.4  
This chapter begins its survey with the Namibia Advisory Opinion of the ICJ (1971), before 
considering its Advisory Opinion in Western Sahara (1975), the judgment in East Timor 
(1995), the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights decision in Katanga (1995), 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s judgment in Reference Re: Secession of Quebec (1998), and 
the Advisory Opinion in Wall (2004).  It concludes with an in-depth assessment of the ICJ’s 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion (2010)—its most recent foray into this territory—and a discussion 
of the ways in which the reasoning of the Court has been used by the parties to the conflict in 
Crimea.  It will conclude that although international law remains deeply conflicted over the 
status of secessionary self-determination (the principle is widely reviled, but it cannot be said 
with certainty that secessionary self-determination is illegal), and remains somewhat uncertain 
or ambivalent about the legality of remedial self-determination, the judicial history confirms 
the findings of the previous chapter, that colonial self-determination is now firmly established 
as a legal norm, and that political self-determination is a vital and deep-seated principle of the 
international legal order. 
                                                     
4 Hugh Thirlway, The International Court of Justice (Oxford University Press 2016) 202.  On this point see further 
Hernández, who provides a summary of academic and judicial opinion on the ability of the Court consciously to 
develop international law:  Gleider I Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 90 et seq. 
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2. Judicial Treatments of Self-Determination before Kosovo 
2.1 Advisory Opinion on Namibia (South West Africa) 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) of 1971, the ICJ was asked by the Security 
Council to assess the legalities pertaining to the continued administration of the Mandate 
territory of Namibia by the former Mandatory power, South Africa.5 
On the 27th October 1966 the General Assembly adopted resolution 2154(XXI), by which it 
terminated the Mandate for South West Africa, previously held by South Africa.  Following a 
long-running dispute over the application by South Africa of apartheid policies to the region, 
the General Assembly chose instead to place the territory under the administration of an 
international committee of States Members of the General Assembly, whose task it would be 
to exercise the direct responsibility of the United Nations towards the territory and its people.6  
Upon South Africa’s failure to surrender the territory, the Security Council requested the Court 
render an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the situation in Namibia.7 
Among the arguments advanced by South Africa was the claim that class-C Mandates—
including South West Africa—were transferred to the Mandatory powers on terms ‘not far 
removed from annexation’,8 and it was in the course of rejecting this claim that the Court made 
                                                     
5 For a summary of the events that form the background to the Court’s opinion see Thomas D Musgrave, Self-
Determination and National Minorities (Clarendon Press 1997) 80–84; John Dugard, ‘The Opinion on South-
West Africa (“Namibia”):  The Teleologists Triumph’ (1971) 88 South African Law Journal 460; Edward 
Gordon, ‘Old Orthodoxies amid New Experiences:  The South West Africa (Namibia) Litigation and the 
Uncertain Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice’ (1971) 1 Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 65. 
6 UN General Assembly Resolution 2145(XXI), [4-6]. 
7 UN Security Council Resolution 284(1970). 
8 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South African in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, (1971) ICJ Reports 16, [45]. 
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its remarks on self-determination.  It held that all categories of Mandates were underpinned 
by a consistent set of principles.9  Prominent among these was the idea that such territories 
were held on “trust” – that no matter what their current state of development, the people of the 
territories have ‘a potentiality for independent existence’, and that Mandatories should provide 
the ‘help and guidance necessary to enable them to arrive at the stage where they would be 
“able to stand by themselves”.’10  There was, therefore, both in general and in the particular 
case of the Mandate for South West Africa, a ‘rejection of the notion of annexation.’11  These 
foundational principles of the system had not lapsed on the transposition of the Mandate 
system (under the League of Nations) to the United Nations.12 
More significantly for present purposes, the Court found that ‘the subsequent development of 
international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them.’13  It is 
unclear from whence the Court regarded this customary norm of self-determination for non-
self-governing territories as having sprung, save from the Charter itself.  It seems likely, 
however, that the Court was referring to the major declarations of the General Assembly—
resolutions 1514(XV) and 2526(XXV)—and of the practice of that body with regard to other 
non-self-governing territories.  Although this lack of a clear basis for its statement reduces its 
impact somewhat, it is nevertheless significant as a recognition of the customary status of the 
                                                     
9 ibid [45-46]; Arthur W Rovine, ‘The World Court Opinion on Namibia’ (1972) 11 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 203, 206. 
10 Namibia (n 8) [46]; see also Elizabeth Rodríguez-Santiago, ‘The Evolution of Self-Determination of Peoples in 
International Law’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press 
2016) 214; ‘The United Nations, Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions’ (1972–73) 82 Yale Law Journal 
533, 539–40. 
11 Namibia (n 8) [50]; Oliver J Lissitzyn, ‘International Law and the Advisory Opinion on Namibia’ (1972) 11 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 50, 56–57. 
12 ‘The United Nations, Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions’ (n 10) 535–36. 
13 ibid [52]; see also Musgrave (n 5) 84–85; Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 226. 
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right to self-determination, which may be presumed to be the colonial form.  Other forms of 
the self-determination norm were not considered, and it seems highly likely from the 
specialised context that the reference made was to colonial,14 and not to any other form of self-
determination.15  That interpretation is also supported by the similar (although more explicit) 
reasoning of the Court in its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, given just a few years 
later. 
2.2. The Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 
In 1975 the ICJ handed down its Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara in response to a 
question posed by the General Assembly.16  The General Assembly was, at that time, 
considering the decolonisation of Western Sahara.17  Morocco and Mauritania each argued 
that Western Sahara had, prior to Spanish colonisation, been a part of their territory, and the 
Court was asked to assess whether, at the time of its colonisation, Western Sahara was terra 
nullius and what ties then existed between the territory and either State.18   
                                                     
14 Katja Samuel, ‘Can Religious Norms Influence Self-Determination Struggles, and with What Implications for 
International Law?’ in Duncan French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination:  Reconciling Tradition and 
Modernity in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 304. 
15 But see, contra, Macklem, who argues that this is better understood as an example of self-determination in the 
context of foreign occupation.  Patrick Macklem, ‘Self-Determination in Three Movements’ in Fernando R 
Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press 2016) 104.  See also Lissitzyn (n 
11) 58. 
16 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, (1975) ICJ Reports 12.  For a summary of the events leading up to and 
following the case see Sven Simon, ‘Western Sahara’ in Christian Walter and others (eds), Self-Determination 
and Secession in International Law (Oxford University Press 2014); Eibe H Riedel, ‘Confrontation in Western 
Sahara in the Light of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 16 October 1975.  A Critical 
Appraisal’ (1976) 19 German Yearbook of International Law 405. 
17 The question of Western Sahara remains on the General Assembly’s agenda (see, e.g. GA Res 71/106 (2016)).  
18 Western Sahara (n 16) [1]. 
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Although the question posed to the court was primarily one of historical title,19 questions of 
self-determination formed the background to the request for the Advisory Opinion, and were 
discussed by the Court in its answer.20  The Court concluded that it 
[H]as not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of 
resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, 
of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of 
the will of the people of the Territory[.]21 
Although this is a somewhat ambiguous statement, and leaves open the possibility that the 
Court found that the application of self-determination was merely not impeded—rather than 
was authorised—by law,22 the Court’s discussion of self-determination clearly indicates its 
belief that it had acquired a legal status under customary law.23 
The Court cited its previous decision in Namibia, and repeated its finding that following the 
adoption of the UN Charter and resolution 1514(XV), there is ‘little doubt that the ultimate 
objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples 
concerned’, developments which it characterised as customary law.24  It then cited the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations as further authority for the existence of a right to self-
                                                     
19 For an analysis of these aspects of the Advisory Opinion see Gary Jay Levy, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Western 
Sahara’ (1975–76) 2 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 289; Mark A Smith, Jr., ‘Sovereignty over 
Unoccupied Territories - The Western Sahara Decision’ (1977) 9 Case Western Journal of International Law 
135. 
20 Western Sahara (n 16) [54-55]. 
21 ibid [162]. 
22 Jorri Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States:  Self-Determination and 
Statehood (Cambridge University Press 1996) 61–62. 
23 But see, contra, Smith, who sees none of this ambiguity.  Smith argues that ‘[t]he right of a colonized people to 
self-determination could not have been expressed more clearly.’  Jeffrey J Smith, ‘Western Sahara:  The Failure 
and Promise of International Law’ (2011) 69 Advocate Vancouver 179, 182, [footnotes omitted]; see also Mark 
Weston Janis, ‘The International Court of Justice:  Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara’ (1976) 17 Harvard 
Journal of International Law 609, 618. 
24 Namibia (n 8) [53], cited in Western Sahara (n 16) [56].  See also Martin Dawidowicz, ‘Trading Fish or Human 
Rights in Western Sahara?  Self-Determination, Non-Recognition and the EC-Morocco Fisheries Agreement’ in 
Duncan French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 254–55; Riedel (n 16) 423–24. 
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determination.25  While this confirmation that self-determination had acquired a legal 
character is significant, it remained limited.  It is clear that in the Court’s view the right thus 
established was to colonial self-determination,26 and the Court gave no opinion either on the 
way in which that right should be implemented,27 or on whether other forms of the norm had 
also acquired legal status.28  Although it was implied by the Court that the principle of self-
determination as posited in the Charter may have broader applications, its presence in 
resolution 1514(XV) was in its incarnation as a tool ‘for the purpose of bringing all colonial 
situations to a speedy end’.29 
2.3. East Timor 
In the case concerning East Timor the idea of self-determination came again before the ICJ, 
and it reaffirmed its finding made in the Namibia and Western Sahara Advisory Opinions that 
certain of the forms of self-determination had acquired legal status.  Although the Court found 
that it had no jurisdiction to consider the application—any finding by the Court would 
necessarily involve determining the rights of a third party, Indonesia, which had not consented 
to the Court’s jurisdiction—the Court considered the status of the right to self-determination 
                                                     
25 Western Sahara (n 16) [58].  Rodríguez-Santiago argues that the Court’s straightforward application of the 
principles demonstrates that ‘at that point, the right to self-determination for the peoples of the non-self-
governing territories was, in the eyes of the Court, something already consolidated in the positive law’:  
Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 227. 
26 Musgrave (n 5) 86; Lawrence L Herman, ‘Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, P. 12 - An 
Analysis of the World Court Judgment in the Western Sahara Case’ (1976–77) 41 Saskatchewan Law Review 
133, 135; Laurence S Hanauer, ‘The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to Ethno-National Conflict:  A New 
Look at the Western Sahara Case’ (1995) 9 Emory International Law Review 133, 145; Riedel (n 16) 426. 
27 Frank Wooldridge, ‘The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara Case’ 
(1979) 8 Anglo-American Law Review 86, 106–07. 
28 ibid 117. 
29 Western Sahara (n 16) [55]. 
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in seeking to ascertain whether the application of the principle was sufficient to ground its 
jurisdiction.30 
Despite its brevity—the Court’s consideration of self-determination is cursory at best—the 
East Timor case may be the most significant judgment on the subject handed down by any 
court.  Its great magnitude lies in the Court’s determination that the 
[A]ssertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the 
Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is 
irreproachable.  […  I]t is one of the essential principles of contemporary 
international law.31 
This is a statement of particular significance.  In making it the Court confirmed that self-
determination has acquired a legal status:  a right cannot be of erga omnes character unless it 
first possesses the character of a legal right.  It is also clear that it is a right of exceptionally 
high status:  all members of the international community have a legal interest in its protection 
and fulfilment.  It is not immediately clear, however, to which form or forms of the idea the 
Court refers.  The dispute concerned the purportedly illegal annexation of East Timor by 
Indonesia in 1975.32  During the course of 1975 the civil and military authorities of Portugal, 
the then colonial power, had been withdrawing from the territory, and in December 1975 they 
left East Timor altogether.  Overlapping slightly with the Portuguese departure, on the 7th 
December Indonesia intervened militarily in the territory, swiftly gaining effective control of 
the territory.  Its occupation was widely condemned (including as an infringement on the rights 
of the Timorese population to self-determination) by States, the Security Council, and the 
                                                     
30 East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, (1995) ICJ Rep 90, [28-9]. 
31 ibid [29]. 
32 The Court summarised the history of the dispute in paragraphs 11-18 of the Judgment; see also Christine Chinkin, 
‘East Timor:  A Failure of Decolonization’ (1999) 20 Australian Yearbook of International Law 35; Rebecca 
Kavanagh, ‘Oil in Troubled Waters:  The International Court of Justice and East Timor’ (1996) 18 Sydney Law 
Review 87; Daniel C Turack, ‘Towards Freedom:  Human Rights and Self-Determination in East Timor’ (2000) 
1 Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and Law 55; Nehal Bhuta, ‘Great Expectations – East Timor and the 
Vicissitudes of Externalised Justice’ (2001) 12 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 165. 
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General Assembly.33  During this period East Timor continued to be listed as a non-self-
governing territory under Chapter XI of the Charter.34 
On the 15th December 1978 Australia announced that, although it objected to the invasion, it 
would begin negotiations with Indonesia over the delimitation of the continental shelf in the 
“Timor Gap” between East Timor and Australia.  The negotiations yielded a treaty creating a 
Zone of Cooperation for the joint exploration and exploitation of the resources of the area, 
which was concluded in December of 1989.  Portugal brought an application before the ICJ, 
arguing that by concluding the treaty Australia had infringed the rights of the Timorese 
population to self-determination, including their sovereignty over natural resources.35 
The Court found that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case, because to do so would involve 
determining the rights of a State not party to the proceedings (Indonesia).36  Portugal, however, 
had submitted that because the rights breached by Australia—the rights of the Timorese 
population to self-determination—were of an erga omnes character, Portugal was entitled to 
‘require [Australia], individually, to respect them regardless of whether or not another State 
had conducted itself in a similarly unlawful manner.’37  This argument was ultimately 
unsuccessful, but it was in the course of rejecting this ground for jurisdiction that the Court 
                                                     
33 See SC Res 384(1975); SC Res 389(1976); GA Res 3485(XXX); GA Res 31/53(1976); GA Res 32/34(1977); 
GA Res 33/39(1978); GA Res 34/40(1979); GA Res 35/27(1980); GA Res 36/50(1981); GA Res 37/30(1982). 
34 The situation was complicated further because Indonesia claimed to be acting in furtherance of the self-
determination of the East Timorese population, and in direct accordance with their wishes.  As Clark notes, this 
claim does not stand up to scrutiny:  Roger S Clark, ‘The “Decolonization” of East Timor and the United Nations 
Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression’ (1980–81) 7 Yale Journal of World Public Order 2, 11–19. 
35 East Timor (n 30) [19]. 
36 ibid [28].  For discussion of the Court’s previous case-law on indispensable third-parties and its decision in this 
case see Kavanagh (n 32) 90–92. 
37 East Timor (n 30) [29]. 
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held that self-determination has an erga omnes character, and that ‘it is one of the essential 
principle of contemporary international law.’38  This context implies, but does not clearly 
demonstrate, which forms of the idea it was to which the Court referred.39 
In the first place, it is clear that despite the withdrawal of the colonial power (Portugal) East 
Timor was still considered during this time to be a non-self-governing territory for the 
purposes of the decolonisation provisions of the UN Charter.40  The interpretation of the 
judgment as referring primarily to colonial self-determination is supported, too, by the Court’s 
references to its previous statements in Namibia and Western Sahara, both of which dealt with 
the colonial form of the norm.41  However, the context appears to be more appropriate to 
political self-determination, and particularly its manifestation as a guarantor against 
intervention in the internal affairs of States and polities, and their right to dispose freely of 
their natural resources.  In fact, elements of both the political and the colonial forms of the 
right can be seen throughout the history of the situation, and elements of both norms were 
referenced by many of the States participating in the debates before the General Assembly.42  
This practice cannot be collapsed to a reference to a single form, and the statement by the 
                                                     
38 ibid. 
39 For an excellent summary which highlights the complexities of determining which form of self-determination 
was at issue in the case see Maria Clara Maffei, ‘The Case of East Timor before the International Court of 
Justice—Some Tentative Comments’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 223, 228–30. 
40 Musgrave (n 5) 88–90; Richard Burchill, ‘The ICJ Decision in the Case Concerning East Timor:  The Illegal Use 
of Force Validated?’ (1997) 2 Journal of Armed Conflict Law 1, 5 et seq. 
41 See also Chinkin, Simpson and Rodríguez-Santiago, all of whom characterise the question as one of colonial 
self-determination: Chinkin (n 32) 53; Gerry Simpson, ‘Judging the East Timor Dispute:  Self-Determination at 
the International Court of Justice’ (1993–94) 17 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 323, 335; 
Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 227; and contra Charney, who comments that a non-intervention lens seems more 
apposite: Jonathan I Charney, ‘Self-Determination:  Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor’ (2001) 34 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 455, 465. 
42 See extensive citations to this practice in the Counter Memorial of the Government of Australia, 1 June 1992, 
[100-140]. 
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Court of the high status to be attributed to self-determination should therefore be understood 
as a reference to both the colonial and political forms. 
Although its ambit appears to be limited to the established forms of the right, the judgment in 
East Timor nevertheless represents a very significant advance in understanding of the idea.  It 
should be taken to declare that both the right of colonial peoples to determine their future 
political status and the right of States to freedom from external interference are principles of 
exceptionally high status in the international legal order.43  Given their presence in the Charter 
and their consistent application in UN practice, it is these forms of the norm which fall within 
the ambit of the Court’s dictum, and should be considered legal rights of erga omnes character. 
2.4. Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire 
1995 also produced a decision by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in 
response to a communication brought by the Katangese Peoples’ Congress against Zaire.44  
The Congress alleged a breach of Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) which provides for the ‘inalienable’ right of peoples to self-determination, 
to free determination of their political status, and of their right to existence;45 to the right of 
colonised peoples to independence;46 and the right of peoples to the assistance of States Parties 
                                                     
43 Rodríguez-Santiago rhetorically asks whether the Court’s ‘equation – inalienable plus fundamental human right 
plus erga omnes character plus essential principle of international law – be interpreted as an intention of the 
Court to rank self-determination as a jus cogens norm?’  Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 228.  [Emphasis in original].  
She does not immediately answer the question, but argues that the Court’s later Wall decision shows that the 
Court did indeed intend to imply an ius cogens status for self-determination (p.230). 
44 Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication no. 
75/92(1995). 
45 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, in force 21 October 1986, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, Article 20(1). 
46 ibid, Article 20(2). 
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to the Charter in cases of ‘foreign domination’.47  The Congress alleged that as a popular 
liberation movement, it was entitled to the support of the States Parties to the Charter, to 
recognition of the independence of Katanga, and to the evacuation of Zaire from the territory.48 
The judgment of the Commission was brief, but nonetheless intriguing.  It began by 
recognising that ‘[a]ll peoples have a right to self-determination’,49 and although it noted the 
existence of controversy over the definition of ‘people’, it seems to have accepted that the 
people of Katanga met this criterion.50  However, the Commission found that no right to 
secessionary self-determination attached to Katanga.  Like the Jurists in the Åland Islands 
dispute it prioritised the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire, holding that the form of 
self-determination exercised by a people must be ‘fully cognisant’ of ‘sovereignty and 
territorial integrity’.51 
However, the Commission also made a reference to remedial secession.  It implied that 
secession may be lawful when employed as a final resort to remedy abuses: 
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that 
the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called into question and in the absence 
of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in 
Government […] the Commission holds the view that Katanga is obliged to 
exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Zaire.52 
                                                     
47 ibid, Article 20(3). 
48 Kantanga (n 44) [1]. 
49 ibid [3]. 
50 ibid [3-6]. 
51 ibid [4-5]. 
52 ibid [6]. 
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In other words, self-determination must first be exercised internally, but where political self-
determination is denied, secession may result as the application of the remedial form of self-
determination.53  The substance of this brief statement was to be further discussed (although 
not referred to) in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in its Reference Re: Secession 
of Quebec. 
2.5. Reference Re Secession of Quebec 
In the case concerning the Reference Re Secession of Quebec the Supreme Court of Canada 
considered whether Quebec could legally separate itself from Canada by its unilateral act, both 
under the Canadian Constitution and general international law.54  By contrast to the prior 
decisions of the ICJ, therefore, the case dealt not with colonial self-determination, but with 
the secessionary and remedial forms.  Despite being the judgment of a national court, the 
Quebec decision has proven to be at least as influential in this area as many of the ICJ’s 
offerings.  It has proven to be a gravitational judgment; one that is regularly cited both by 
learned publicists and States as highly persuasive authority when dealing with questions of 
self-determination and secession.55 
                                                     
53 Simon draws a somewhat more minimal interpretation, that in the absence of ‘a showing of denial of internal 
self-determination and group harms, Katanga lost its secessionist bid.’  Thomas W Simon, ‘Remedial Secession:  
What the Law Should Have Done, from Katanga to Kosovo’ (2011) 40 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 105, 157.  In the opinion of the present author, the formula “in the absence of… then…” 
clearly implies the possibility of a reverse holding, and it is therefore reasonable to draw the conclusion given 
above:  that the Commission implicitly recognised that the presence of abuses (presumably to a sufficient 
threshold) overcomes territorial integrity and permits remedial secession. 
54 Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217.  For a summary of the background to the dispute see Pierre 
Bienvenu, ‘Secession by Constitutional Means:  Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec 
Secession Reference’ (1999–2000) 21 Journal of Public Law and Policy 1. 
55 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2006) 119–20; Written 
Comment of Argentina, Kosovo Advisory Opinion [48]; Written Comment of Cyprus, Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
[154-155]; Written Comment of the Czech Republic, Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 7; Written Comment of Finland, 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion [8]; Written Comment of Norway, Kosovo Advisory Opinion [5]; Written Comment 
of Russia, Kosovo Advisory Opinion [84-86].  For an explanation of why certain judgments and other forms of 
interpretation of law acquire this kind of gravitational status see Andrea Bianchi, ‘The Game of Interpretation in 
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The Court’s answer to whether secessionary self-determination could apply to the situation of 
Quebec was emphatic: 
It is clear that international law does not specifically grant component parts of 
sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their “parent” state.56 
Similarly, the Court stated definitively that, whatever its legal status, remedial self-
determination would not apply to Quebec.  That conclusion was reached despite the Court 
claiming that it made no determination on the status of remedial self-determination.57  It is on 
this basis, as a proof that Quebec could not avail itself of remedial secession even were it to 
exist as a legal right that the Court stated that: 
[T]he international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right 
to external self-determination in situations of former colonies; where a people is 
oppressed, as for example under a foreign military occupation; or where a 
definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their 
political, economic, social and cultural development.  In all three situations, the 
people in question are entitled to a right to external self-determination because 
they have been denied their ability to exert internally their right to self-
determination.58 
In so doing the Court relied on the same principles as the earlier judgment of the African 
Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights in Katanga,59 although it neither mentioned nor 
                                                     
International Law:  The Players, the Cards, and Why the Game is Worth the Candle’ in Andrea Bianchi and 
others (eds), Interpretation in International Law (Oxford University Press 2015). 
56 Quebec (n 54) [111]. 
57 ibid [135].  Nevertheless, many authors hold that the Court did in fact implicitly acknowledge the existence of a 
legal rule permitting remedial secession.  Bienvenu, for example, draws attention to the Court’s finding that the 
denial of the legality of unilateral secession under international law is ‘implicit in the exceptional circumstances 
required for secession to be permitted’ (Quebec [112]).  Bienvenu appears to take this as a recognition of the 
legality of secession in extremis, stating that ‘[t]he Court has no difficulty in finding that […] self-determination 
only equates with a right to external self-determination’ in extreme circumstances:  Bienvenu (n 54) 56,  
[Emphasis added]; David Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law International 2002) 
331; see also van der Vyver, who seems to feel sufficiently strongly that the Court recognised remedial secession 
that he considers it necessary to rebutt that finding: Johan D van der Vyver, ‘Self-Determination of the Peoples 
of Quebec under International Law’ (2000) 10 Transnational Law and Policy 1, 22–26. 
58 Quebec (n 54) [138]; see also Kevin MacMillan, ‘Secession Perspectives and the Independence of Quebec’ 
(1999) 7 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 333, 359–61; Roya M Hanna, ‘Right to Self-
Determination in In Re Secession of Quebec’ (1999) 23 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 213, 
234–36. 
59 Katanga (n 44). 
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cited that judgment.  It is significant to note, therefore, that two Courts operating in different 
legal systems independently came to similar conclusions. 
The parallels between the judgments are striking.  The Commission gave broad statements 
that ‘in the absence of […] violations of human rights to the point that the territorial integrity’ 
of the State should be compromised, and that unless ‘the people of Katanga are denied the 
right to participate in Government’,60 self-determination could not be exercised through 
secession.61  The Canadian Supreme Court stated in greater detail that it considered the 
threshold for remedial secession to be very high:  except in cases of colonisation, the Court 
held that ‘only’ oppression akin to a people being ‘under foreign military occupation’, or the 
denial of a ‘definable group’ to ‘access to government’ would justify remedial self-
determination.62  In other words, under the framework mooted by the Canadian Supreme 
Court, remedial self-determination would only apply where there are exceptionally grave 
abuses against a definable population group within a State, and which amount to a manifest 
denial of that group’s political self-determination.  Thus the Court implies an exceptionally 
high threshold. 
While it is debateable whether the Canadian Supreme Court was correct to posit such a high 
threshold, it clearly stated its position that its discussion of the threshold requirement is 
hypothetical given that the issue did not arise in the case.63  Indeed, the Court declined to make 
                                                     
60 ibid [4].  [Emphasis added]. 
61 ibid [6]. 
62 Quebec (n 54) [138]. 
63 ibid [135]; see also ‘Reference Re Secession of Quebec from Canada:  Breaking Up is Hard to Do’ (1998) 21 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 834, 841–43. 
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a determination on whether remedial self-determination exists at all.64  Nevertheless, the 
Court’s judgment is routinely cited by both commentators and States as a judicial finding that 
remedial secession applies only in exceptional circumstances, and there can be little doubt that 
it has contributed to a developing opinio iuris on behalf of States that remedial self-
determination is a right of very limited application.65 
2.6. The Wall Advisory Opinion 
In 2004 the ICJ replied to the request of the General Assembly, giving its Advisory Opinion 
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.66  In a wide-ranging examination, the Court opined that the construction of the 
wall67 contravened both international human rights law and international humanitarian law.68  
Significantly, it also held that the construction of the wall represented a breach of the 
Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.  It should be noted at the outset, however, that 
whether the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination gave rise to a right to 
independence or statehood was beyond the scope of the question presented by the General 
Assembly and was not discussed. 
                                                     
64 Quebec (n 54); Mégret describes the judgment as a ‘passing recognition’ of the idea or remedial secession in an 
otherwise ‘lukewarm’ international reception of the idea:  Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Right to Self-Determination:  
Earned, Not Inherent’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press 
2016) 52. 
65 See, e.g. Jens David Ohlin, ‘The Right to Exist and the Right to Resist’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory 
of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press 2016) 72–73; Macklem (n 15) 113–14. 
66 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
(2004) ICJ Rep 136. 
67 The “wall” is known variously as the “separation fence”, “separation wall”, “security fence”, “separation barrier” 
and “Apartheid wall”.  In its decision the ICJ adopted the (more neutral) terminology of “wall” employed by the 
General Assembly in its request for an Advisory Opinion (See ibid [66].).  I adopt that terminology here. 
68 For an excellent summary and analysis of the many legal issues discussed by the Court see Andrea Bianchi, 
‘Dismantling the Wall:  The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and Its Likely Impact on International Law’ (2004) 47 
German Yearbook of International Law 343. 
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Recalling its prior judgments on self-determination, the ICJ confirmed that self-determination 
had acquired the status of a legal right under international law.  States are under parallel 
obligations under the Declaration on Friendly Relations, to ‘refrain from any forcible action 
which deprives peoples […] of their right to self-determination’,69 and the common Article 1 
ICCPR/ICESCR, to ‘promote the realization of [the right to self-determination] and to respect 
it’.70  The Court found that the construction of the wall violated both the negative and the 
positive obligations.  It found, first, that the construction of the wall ‘would be tantamount to 
de facto annexation’,71 implying a breach of the negative obligation not to deprive; and that 
its construction violates the State’s positive obligation by ‘imped[ing] the exercise by the 
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination’.72  The negative obligation to refrain from 
depriving peoples of their right and the positive obligation to promote its realisation were also 
held to apply to other States.  The Court confirmed that third States are under an erga omnes 
obligation to refrain from recognising the ‘illegal situation resulting from the construction of 
the wall’, and to withhold ‘aid or assistance in maintaining the situation’.73  More surprisingly, 
the Court also held that all States are under the parallel positive obligation to promote the 
realisation of self-determination.74 
                                                     
69 Declaration on Friendly Relations, annexed to UNGA Res 2625(XXV), in Wall (n 66) [88]. 
70 Wall (n 66) [88]. 
71 ibid [121]; Sten Verhoeven, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories’ (2004) 6 International Law FORUM du droit international 106, 108; Caroline 
E Foster, ‘Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory:  The Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice, Human Security and Necessity’ (2005) 2 New Zealand Yearbook 
of International Law 51, 77. 
72 Wall (n 66) [122]; see also ‘Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory:  Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1003.  For 
an analysis of the Separate and Dissenting Opinions in the case, and in particular the question of whether every 
impediment to self-determination amounts to a breach of the norm see Susan Akram and Michael Lynk, ‘The 
Wall and the Law:  A Tale of Two Judgments’ (2006) 24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 61, 77–78. 
73 Wall (n 66) [159]. 
74 ibid. 
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Although the Court stated clearly that a right to self-determination exists under international 
law, and that the corresponding obligations apply both to Israel and to third States, the form 
of the right engaged is less clear.  Although the Court referred to its case-law on colonial self-
determination, it does not appear that the Court considered that Palestine had a right to self-
determination as a former mandate or as a non-self-governing territory.75  By contrast, the 
Court laid emphasis on Palestine’s status as an occupied territory,76 and it seems likely, 
therefore, that the Court relied principally on the right of the Palestinian people to political 
self-determination in making its decision.77  The construction of the wall by Israel effected the 
de facto annexation of the territory, prejudicing the ability of the Palestinian peoples, as a unit, 
to determine the form and manner of their political integration and future governance.78   
The primary significance of the Advisory Opinion is often seen as the ICJ’s confirmation that 
Israel’s legal status in the Palestinian territories is that of an occupying Power.  Nevertheless, 
an equally important aspect of the Opinion was its contribution to the understanding of self-
determination.  Israel was declared to be under an obligation to cease construction of the wall, 
to dismantle those sections already constructed,79 and to return lands seized for the purpose of 
constructing the wall.80  Other States, meanwhile, are under parallel obligations to refrain from 
recognising the situation created by the wall, to refrain from enabling its construction, and to 
                                                     
75 ibid [88]. 
76 ibid [78]. 
77 As Orakhelashvili notes, this was an ‘innovative’ application of self-determination ‘outside the colonial context’:  
Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory:  Opinion and Reaction’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 119, 122; see also Foster (n 
71) 76. 
78 Samuel (n 14) 304; Christopher Waters, ‘South Ossetia’ in Christian Walter and others (eds), Self-Determination 
and Secession in International Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 184–85. 
79 Wall (n 66) [151]. 
80 ibid [153]. 
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take steps to bring the impediment to the exercise of the Palestinians’ political self-
determination to an end.81  Not only does the Advisory Opinion amount to a reaffirmation of 
the non-interference aspect of political self-determination, therefore, but it confirms that it 
exists as a right erga omnes in both its positive and negative aspects.82 
3. The Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
In 2010, the ICJ issued its much-anticipated Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo.83  The 
opinion has rightly been seen as highly significant, and a great deal of ink has been expended 
in analysis of its many facets.84  Nevertheless, subsequent events in Crimea demand a 
                                                     
81 ibid [159]; see also Iain Scobbie, ‘Unchart(er)ed Waters?:  Consequences of the Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for the Responsibility of the 
UN for Palestine’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 941, 945–48. 
82 Rodríguez-Santiago goes further, arguing that the ‘whole approach by the Court’ together with the reference to 
a right of erga omnes status suggests that the Court ‘was under the understanding that it was dealing with a jus 
cogens norm.’  Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 230.  By contrast the present author does not feel that the text of the 
Advisory Opinion, for all that it demonstrates that the Court considered the right to political self-determination 
to be a norm of high status, supports such a far-reaching conclusion. 
83 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, (2010) ICJ Reports 403. 
84 See e.g. Nate Beal, ‘Defending State Sovereignty:  The I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on Kosovo and International 
Law’ (2011–13) 21 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 549; Thomas Burri, ‘The Kosovo Opinion 
and Secession:  The Sounds of Silence and Missing Links’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 881; Theodore 
Christakis, ‘The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo:  Has International Law Something to Say about Secession?’ 
(2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 73; Elena Cirkovic, ‘An Analysis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion 
on Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 895; James Crawford, 
‘Kosovo and the Criteria for Statehood in International Law’ in Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The 
law and politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015); Hurst Hannum, ‘The Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo:  An Opportunity Lost, or a Poisoned Chalice Refused?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 155; Peter Hilpold, ‘The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo:  
Perspectives of a Delicate Question’ (2009) 14 Australian Review of International and European Law 259; 
Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, ‘Delphic Dictum:  How Has the ICJ Contributed to the Global Rule of Law by 
Its Ruling on Kosovo?’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 841; Miodrag Jovanović, ‘After the ICJ’s Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo:  The Future of Self-Determination Conflicts’ [2012] Annals of the Faculty of Law in 
Belgrade - International Edition 292; Daniel H Meester, ‘The International Court of Justice’s Kosovo Case:  
Assessing the Current State of International Legal Opinion on Remedial Secession’ (2010) 48 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 215; Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and Politics of the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015); Robert Muharremi, ‘A Note on the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 867; Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The International Court’s 
Advisory Opinion on the UDI in Respect of Kosovo:  Washing Away the “Foam on the Tide of Time”’ (2011) 
15 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 65; Alain Pellet, ‘Kosovo - The Questions Not Asked:  Self-
Determination, Secession, and Recognition’ in Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and Politics 
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reassessment of the Advisory Opinion, and in particular its understanding of self-
determination. 
In the guise of the General Assembly’s question on the legality of the unilateral declaration of 
independence, the Court was presented for the first time with an opportunity to rule directly 
on the legality of secession, and in particular to examine those forms of self-determination 
which can result in the separation of a territory from a State: remedial and secessionary self-
determination.  This the Court chose not to do.  Despite a growing, if very tentative, consensus 
on the legality of remedial secession in the years that preceded the opinion, the Court made a 
choice to disregard these fledgling legal principles in favour of a reassertion of the Lotus 
dogma.85  In so doing, the Court removed the question of secession from the ambit of law 
altogether, and relegated it to the sphere of power politics. 
In order to interrogate these aspects of the opinion, the text of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
will first be examined, and it will be argued that the Court’s treatment of sovereignty and self-
determination—facilitated by its (mis)interpretation of the General Assembly’s question—
demonstrated a desire on the part of the Court to avoid substantive engagement with questions 
relating to secession.  Strikingly, however, as will be argued further in chapter three, the 
                                                     
of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015); Anne Peters, ‘Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-
Land of Freedom?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 95; Anne Peters, ‘Has the Advisory Opinion’s 
Finding that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence Was Not Contrary to International Law Set an Unfortunate 
Precedent?’ in Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
(Oxford University Press 2015); Milena Sterio, ‘The Case of Kosovo:  Self-Determination, Secession, and 
Statehood under International Law’ (2010) 104 American Society of International Law Proceedings 361; Mindia 
Vashakmadze and Matthias Lippold, ‘“Nothing but a Road towards Secession”? - The International Court of 
Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo’ (2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of International Law 619; Mark Weller, ‘Modesty Can Be a 
Virtue:  Judicial Economy in the ICJ Kosovo Opinion?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 127; 
Marc Weller, ‘The Sounds of Silence:  Making Sense of the Supposed Gaps in the Kosovo Opinion’ in Marko 
Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University 
Press 2015); Ralph Wilde, ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 301. 
85 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10. 
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conclusions of the Court may lend some support for a change in the structure of the 
international legal system of the kind hypothesised in this thesis.86  Finally, the conflict in 
Crimea will be discussed, as a recent conflict in which self-determination principles—and 
Kosovo—were explicitly invoked. 
3.1 The Advisory Opinion 
In its Kosovo Advisory Opinion the ICJ was, for the first time, called upon to decide a question 
which placed secession and self-determination at the heart of its decision.87  The General 
Assembly asked ‘[i]s the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?’88  According to one 
point of view, the Advisory Opinion was the most significant statement of the law of self-
determination yet achieved,89 but from other perspectives the judgment appears to be, 
variously, a culpable example of judicial law-making,90 a narrow answer to a narrow 
                                                     
86 See below p.182-192. 
87 Kosovo (n 83).  For a summary of the factual background to the opinion see James Summers, ‘Kosovo’ in 
Christian Walter and others (eds), Self-Determination and Secession in International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2014). 
88 Kosovo (n 83) [1]; GA Res. 63/3, 8 October 2008. 
89 --, ‘K. Albanians Hail ICJ Decision as Big Victory’, b92.net (22 July 2010) 
<http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=68621> accessed 16 
April 2015; --, ‘Albania Welcomes UN Court’s Backing of Kosovo Independence’, CRIENGLISH.com (23 July 
2010) <http://english.cri.cn/6966/2010/07/23/1461s584558.htm> accessed 16 April 2015. 
90 Leonid Slutsky, first deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma’s International Affairs Committee stated that 
the Court’s ruling ‘could be likened to Pandora’s box’.  See Natalia Makarova, ‘UN Court Ruling Doesn’t 
Change Moscow’s Stance on Kosovo’, RT (5 August 2010) <http://rt.com/politics/kosovo-independence-
moscow-stance/> accessed 16 April 2015. 
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question,91 poor judicial reasoning,92 ‘institutional cowardice’,93 or something of a damp 
squib.94  By contrast, it will be submitted here that the Advisory Opinion represents a strange 
dichotomy.  In side-stepping questions of self-determination and choosing to render no 
opinion on significant issues, the Court failed to provide guidelines for future conduct and, 
crucially, created a legal regime which cannot be successfully implemented in practice.  It has 
been suggested that these lacunae in the Court’s opinion were a creditable recognition that its 
function is not to make, but to apply, law.95  However, while it may be true to say that no law 
relevant to the questions existed, the Court’s avoidance of the question of whether or not 
relevant legal rules exist amounts to a failure of the judicial function, and represents a choice 
not to apply relevant and applicable international law even if some should be found.  Indeed, 
in some regards the Court’s failure to apply putative legal standards has retrospectively cast 
doubt on the validity of those standards.  In doing so the Court has not only failed to resolve, 
but has increased the uncertainty in this already vague area of international law.  At the same 
time, however, the Court has delivered an opinion which may have weighty implications for 
the structure of international law.  It implied a changing conception of the sovereignty of the 
                                                     
91 See e.g. Christian Tams, ‘The Kosovo Opinion’ (EJIL:Talk!, 6 August 2010) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
kosovo-opinion/> accessed 16 April 2015; Chris Borgen, ‘The Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Self Determination, 
and Secession’ (Opinio Juris, 23 July 2010) <http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/23/the-kosovo-advisory-opinion-
self-determination-and-secession/> accessed 16 April 2015. 
92 See e.g. Jure Vidmar, ‘The Kosovo Opinion and General International Law: How Far-Reaching and 
Controversial Is the ICJ’s Reasoning?’ The Hague Justice Portal 
<http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=12110> accessed 16 April 2015. 
93 Michael Blake, ‘Civil Disobedience, Dirty Hands, and Secession’ in Fernando R Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-
Determination (Cambridge University Press 2016) 167.  Blake ultimately dismisses the charge of moral 
cowardice, concluding that ‘the modesty of this decision is worth celebrating, rather than lamenting’ (p.168). 
94 See e.g. Dov Jacobs, ‘The Kosovo Advisory Opinion:  A Voyage by the ICJ into the Twilight Zone of 
International Law’ (The Hague Justice Portal, 12 October 2010) 
<http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=12131> accessed 16 April 2015; John Cerone, ‘The World 
Court’s Non-Opinion’ (Opinio Juris, 25 July 2010) <http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/25/the-world-
court%E2%80%99s-non-opinion/> accessed 16 April 2015. 
95 Tams (n 91). 
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State, and one which accords with the hypothesis discussed in this thesis:  that the idea of 
political self-determination is humanising the secondary concepts of international law. 
3.1.1 A Caveat 
Before criticising the Court’s decision, it is important to acknowledge that there were certain 
matters that the Court did not, and arguably some that it could not, address.  It is worth noting, 
first, that the subject matter of the Advisory Opinion was not self-determination, but rather the 
legality of the declaration of independence.96  Indeed, the Court clearly stated its view that an 
assessment of whether international law contained a right of self-determination (of whatever 
form) would be beyond the scope of the General Assembly’s question. 
The Court is not required by the question it has been asked to take a position on 
whether international law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally 
to declare its independence or, a fortiori, on whether international law generally 
confers an entitlement on entities situated within a State unilaterally to break away 
from it.  Indeed, it is entirely possible for a particular act ⎯ such as a unilateral 
declaration of independence ⎯ not to be in violation of international law without 
necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it.  The Court has been 
asked for an opinion on the first point, not the second.97 
Nor, to the disappointment of some,98 did the Court consider whether Kosovo had achieved 
statehood, and whether third States were obliged either to recognise Kosovo as an independent 
State or to refrain from doing so.99 
                                                     
96 Although see contra Milanović, who points out that although ‘everybody concerned claimed that the question 
was clear, narrow, and precisely defined’, it was in fact anything but.  He argues that ‘practically every single 
word in the question required interpretation, and in fact allowed for several possible interpretations.’  Marko 
Milanović, ‘Arguing the Kosovo Case’ in Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and Politics of 
the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015) 30.  [Footnotes omitted]. 
97 Kosovo (n 83) [56]. 
98 See e.g. Borgen (n 91); Tams (n 91). 
99 Kosovo (n 83) [51].  See further Daniel Müller, ‘The Question Question’ in Marko Milanović and Michael Wood 
(eds), The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015) 120–22. 
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The coherence of the Court’s reasoning on the first point is doubtful – after all, while the 
absence of a prohibition may demonstrate that the declaration of independence was lawful, it 
is equally possible to demonstrate its legality by showing the existence of a permissive rule.  
Concurrently, although the absence of a prohibition can demonstrate the legality of an act,100 
the reverse cannot be maintained.  Were the Court to find a prohibition on secession (in the 
form of territorial integrity, for example), it would nevertheless be necessary to show that no 
permissive rule qualified that prohibition.101  In other words, had the Court found evidence for 
a prohibition its (supposedly value-neutral) methodological approach would no longer have 
been adequate to answer the question posed by the General Assembly. 
The Court’s interpretation of the question posed thus appears teleological – as if the answer 
informs the question.  In his Declaration, Judge Simma is highly scathing about this restrictive 
reading: 
Under these circumstances, even a clearly recognized positive entitlement to 
declare independence, if it existed, would not have changed the Court’s answer in 
the slightest.102 
Hilpold, too, is critical of the Court’s decision to focus purely on prohibitive rules.  He 
comments that 
Unlike the situation prevailing a century ago, international law is now far more 
dense and no longer regulates state behaviour primarily by prohibitive rules.  State 
interaction is far too complex [for] such an approach to be sufficient.103 
                                                     
100 Lotus (n 85); Hernández (n 4) 263–76, esp. 264-66.  Hernández discusses the significance of the Kosovo Opinion 
for the structure of international law and the continuing relevance of the Lotus principle.  He notes that the 
Court’s Opinion in Kosovo has had the effect of ‘resuscitating Lotus’, commenting that ‘[d]iscarding all 
intermediate views, the Court arguably took the view that international law was a gapless legal order, but it did 
so in the most straightforward manner, adhering to the binary conception of international law in the mould of 
the Lotus judgment, and not, for example, examining the possibilities of negative permissions and prohibitions 
and of legal neutrality’ (p.265, footnotes omitted).  See also Müller (n 99) 130–32. 
101 See contra Rodríguez-Santiago, who argues that ‘however absurd the Court’s reasoning might seem, there was 
no contradiction in it’:  Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 232.  
102 Declaration of Judge Simma, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (2010) ICJ Reports 478, [8]. 
103 Hilpold (n 84) 287; see also Orakhelashvili (n 84) 73. 
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In excluding international law rights from its analysis the Court did not merely give a strict 
answer to a narrow question; such a narrow interpretation of the question necessitated an 
alteration of the question, and not ‘only in a linguistic sense, but in fact deeply modifying its 
meaning.’104  Simma concludes that the Court’s restrictive interpretation ‘significantly reduces 
the advisory quality of this Opinion.’105 
The Court’s decision that the question did not require an examination of the consequences of 
the declaration is more reasonable.106  While it is arguable that a full consideration of the legal 
issues necessitated an examination of whether the declaration had any effect (as will be argued 
below, the Court’s failure to decide whether the declaration of independence was effective is 
one of the most damaging legacies of the opinion), the Court was probably correct in its 
holding that the question ‘d[id] not ask whether or not Kosovo ha[d] achieved statehood’,107 
but instead focused solely on the legality of the act of declaring independence.  Although the 
Court’s decision to exclude these considerations is, therefore, disappointing, their inclusion 
would have necessitated a (further) strained reinterpretation of the General Assembly’s 
question.  It would, therefore, not be appropriate overly to criticise the Court for this omission. 
3.2 The Court’s Decision 
Although the Court’s conclusions were narrow, they were not insignificant.  As previously 
stated, the Court chose to construe the question as one phrased entirely in the negative.  In 
                                                     
104 Hilpold (n 84) 288–89; see also André Nollkaemper, ‘The Court and Its Multiple Constituencies:  Three 
Perspectives on the Kosovo Advisory Opinion’ in Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and 
Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015) 224; but see, contra, Pellet, who argues 
that the ‘Court strictly kept to the question asked—and rightly so’: Pellet (n 84) 269. 
105 Declaration of Judge Simma (n 102) [10].  [Original emphasis]. 
106 Müller (n 99) 123; Nollkaemper (n 104) 221 et seq. 
107 Kosovo (n 83) [51]. 
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other words, on the premise that any action not prohibited is permitted,108 the Court considered 
that a sufficient answer could be given by asking a more limited question: does international 
law prohibit declarations of independence? 
The Court’s answer was that international law contains no ‘prohibition on declarations of 
independence.’109  Although it held that a declaration could be rendered unlawful by a 
connection to certain illegal acts (such as an illegal use of force),110 it decided that no norm of 
general application prohibits declarations of independence.  By contrast, many States had 
argued that ‘a prohibition of unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle 
of territorial integrity’,111 arguing that territorial integrity is inviolable, and that the State’s 
right to territorial integrity forbids secession.  The Russian Federation, for example, argued 
that: 
The Declaration of independence sought to establish a new State though 
separation of a part of the territory of the Republic of Serbia.  It was therefore, 
prima facie, contrary to the requirement of preserving the territorial integrity of 
Serbia. 
Territorial integrity is an unalienable attribute of a State’s sovereignty.112 
Azerbaijan, likewise, stated: 
International law is unambiguous in not providing for a right of secession from 
independent States.  Otherwise, such a fundamental norm as the territorial 
integrity of States would be of little value were a right to secession under 
international law be recognised as applying to independent States.113 
                                                     
108 See the Declaration of Judge Simma, who described the Court’s line of reasoning as ‘obsolete’: Declaration of 
Judge Simma (n 102) [3]; see further Hernández (n 4) 264–66. 
109 Kosovo (n 83) [84]. 
110 ibid [81]. 
111 ibid [80]. 
112 Written Statement of Russia, 16 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [76-77].  [Footnotes omitted]. 
113 Written Statement of Azerbaijan, 17 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [24]. 
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Similar arguments were advanced by Argentina,114 China,115 Iran,116 Romania,117 and Spain.118 
Despite this strongly-expressed argument, the Court referred to obligations on States to respect 
the territorial integrity of other States in the UN Charter and the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, and a statement to the same effect in the Helsinki Final Act, and concluded that 
States alone are bound by the international law prohibition on any action which violates 
territorial integrity, holding that ‘the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined 
                                                     
114 ‘The aim of the principle of territorial integrity is to protect a quintessential element of the State – its territory 
– whereby any modification of a State’s territorial sovereignty must take place in accordance with international 
law, mainly through the consent of the interested State.  As a corollary of the sovereign equality of State, the 
principle of the respect of territorial integrity is a fundamental principle of international law.  The 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations lists as one of the elements of the 
equal sovereignty of States the principle that “[t]he territorial integrity and political independence of the State 
are inviolable”.’  Written Statement of Argentina, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [70].  [Footnotes omitted]. 
115 ‘In the exercise of the right to self-determination, the territorial integrity of a sovereign State should be respected 
rather than undermined.  A series of important international and regional documents, while affirming the right 
of self-determination, all provide for respect for State sovereignty and territorial integrity.  The above principle 
is also reflected in State practices.’  Written Statement of China, 16 April 2009, Accordance with International 
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo 5. 
116 ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the principle of territorial integrity prevails both between and within 
states.  It might falsely be argued that the principle of territorial integrity applies solely between states in their 
relations, i.e. only states are obliged to respect territorial integrity of the other states and not to encroach on the 
territory of their neighbors and other states.’  Written Statement of Iran, 17 April 209, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [3.1]. 
117 ‘The principles of territorial integrity and of the inviolability of frontiers have an absolute character.  This means 
that no changes to a State’s territory or to its frontiers can occur except in those cases when the State concerned 
consents to that end. 
‘Therefore, the territorial integrity of States can not be affected as a result of a unilateral right of secession, which 
is not recognized as such by international law […] but only as a result of a mutual agreement between or among 
the parties involved.’  Written Statement of Romania, 14 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [97-8]. 
118 ‘Taking into account the nature of the UDI and its intended effects, it seems obvious that the legal standards of 
reference should be found in the rules that regulate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, especially 
in the form of the principle of the sovereignty equality of States, solemnly proclaimed in the Charter of the United 
Nations, in Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the General Assembly and reaffirmed in a large number of international 
instruments with a general scope, especially the Helsinki Final Act.  Undoubtedly, this is a basic principle of 
contemporary international law, which constitutes one of the basic tenets of the existing politico-legal system 
and which contributes decisively to guaranteeing peace and security in international relations.’  Written 
Statement of Spain, 14 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence In Respect of Kosovo [13]. 
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to the sphere of relations between States.’119  This finding has attracted significant criticism, 
including by Judge Koroma in his Dissenting Opinion,120 and, indeed, the Court’s reasoning 
on this point is flawed and cursory.121  It is startling, first, that the Court considered it sufficient 
to refer to three documents (one of which is of uncertain legal status) in reaching the central 
conclusion of the Opinion.  As a matter of logic, the fact that the UN Charter (a treaty between 
States), does not seek to impose an obligation on non-State actors is not determinative of the 
non-existence of such an obligation.  Indeed, Jovanović cites a number of examples of other 
international documents which appear to recognise an obligation to respect territorial integrity 
opposable to non-State actors,122 and the opinion that territorial integrity is a right of States 
appears to be entirely orthodox.123 
In other words, the Court either identified or caused a not insignificant shift in the meaning of 
territorial integrity.  While the paucity of reasoning makes it difficult to identify which of these 
most closely accords with the Court’s own interpretation of its judgment, it is submitted here 
that the former is the better reading.  As discussed more fully in chapter three, this 
characterisation of territorial integrity lends support to a wider shift in the structure of 
                                                     
119 Kosovo (n 83) [80]. 
120 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (2010) ICJ Reports 467 [21-23]: ‘The truth is that 
international law upholds the territorial integrity of a State.  One of the fundamental principles of contemporary 
international law is that of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.  This principle entails an 
obligation to respect the definition, delineation and territorial integrity of an existing State’ [21].  See also Beal 
(n 84); Jovanović (n 84). 
121 Weller lists this as an example of one of the ‘major determinations by the Court which are stated, but not 
supported by a deeper analysis of their legal basis.’  Weller, ‘The Sounds of Silence:  Making Sense of the 
Supposed Gaps in the Kosovo Opinion’ (n 84) 188. 
122 Jovanović (n 84) 300–02. 
123 See e.g. Marcelo G Kohen, ‘Introduction’ in Marcelo G Kohen (ed), Secession:  International Law Perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 6; Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 234–35; see also support for this position in 
Alain Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee:  A Second Breath for the Self-Determination 
of Peoples’ (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 178, 180; but note the different view expressed in 
Pellet (n 84) 274–75, where he argues that the Court was correct to hold that territorial integrity applies only 
between States. 
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international law towards a human-centric model.124  A self-determination-based conception 
of the sovereignty of the State conceives of sovereignty primarily as the sphere of competence 
of the people of a polity to determine the principles and structures by which their society is 
governed, and therefore gives rise to a corollary right of that polity to be free from external 
interference.  Such a conception would appropriately consider that territorial integrity is 
exclusively an external phenomenon: societies are not entitled to international legal 
protections against their own membership.125 
Nevertheless, that the Court’s conclusion was (in the view of the author) correct does not 
absolve it of the need to provide adequate reasoning for its finding.  It is submitted here that 
the Court’s incomplete and unsatisfying treatment of territorial integrity is the result of its 
overall approach to the judgment.  Following its insistence that the question posed by the 
General Assembly required only a negative treatment, the Court could only, with any 
consistency, treat territorial integrity as a negative concept.  This it did uncritically rather than, 
as would have been more appropriate, giving a reasoned appraisal of the change in the 
meaning of the concept.  Whatever its reason, instead of considering whether territorial 
integrity exists as a positive right of States the Court construed it as a negative obligation on 
the part of other States.  Given that it found no evidence of a similar, express obligation 
applying to non-State actors, it declared that no such norm operated to prevent the impairment 
of a State’s territorial integrity.  By contrast a more rigorous analysis of the idea would not 
only have resulted in a richer and more intellectually honest Opinion, but would have provided 
an opportunity to test the hypothesis that the structure of international law is changing and, 
perhaps of more immediate significance, would have retained an important principle:  that 
international law is capable of regulating such conflicts.  By contrast, as will be argued, the 
                                                     
124 See below, p.185-187 
125 For a detailed account of this argument see p.172-182. 
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Court has effectively removed the question of secession from the ambit of law entirely, 
retaining only some limited regulation of the conduct of the parties in the course of secession 
conflicts. 
3.2.1 Remedial Self-Determination after Kosovo 
The Court expressly chose not to consider remedial self-determination in the course of the 
Advisory proceedings, holding that the question of whether international law gave Kosovo a 
right to separate from Serbia was beyond the scope of the question posed by the General 
Assembly.126  Its passing remarks on the subject were, nonetheless, significant.  As has been 
discussed in this and in the previous chapter, the legal status of remedial self-determination 
remains unclear.127  There are, however, some indications that remedial self-determination 
may be in the process of emergence as a norm of customary international law, and particularly 
the so-called “safeguard” clause of the Declaration on Friendly Relations,128 which appears to 
exclude States which deny their population’s right to internal self-determination, access to 
government, or full and equal participation in the State’s political life from the protection 
against secession.129  While, as noted above, it is not clear that this amounts to a recognition 
of remedial self-determination,130 it has been interpreted as doing so both by academics and a 
                                                     
126 Kosovo (n 83) [82-83]. 
127 See above, p.90-91. 
128 Declaration on Friendly Relations (n 69). 
129 The same logic—although without reference to the Declaration—leads Pellet to conclude that there exists a 
right to remedial secession as the necessary corollary of the ius cogens (in his view) right to political self-
determination.  Pellet (n 84) 272. 
130 As stated above, it may be that this statement amounts not to a recognition of a legal rule, but rather as 
recognition of a legal lacuna.  In other words, that while the breakup of States which do properly protect the 
political self-determination of their populations is prohibited, no rule acts to prevent the breakup of States which 
do not do so.  That would, on the reasoning of the Court in Kosovo, be something less than a permissive rule.  
See above, p.117-119. 
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number of States,131 and the Declaration was cited as the basis of remedial self-determination 
by Judges Cançado Trindade and Yusuf in their Separate Opinions.132 
Remedial secession has also been discussed by two significant cases in recent years: 
Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire, and the Reference Re: Secession of Quebec.133  
Although the Court in Quebec explicitly refused to rule on the legal status of remedial self-
determination,134 the Commission in Katanga does appear to have accepted the existence of 
the norm.135 
                                                     
131 The proposition is supported by the written submissions of a number of States to the Court in the course of the 
proceedings, as well as academic commentators.  See, for example, Written Statement of Estonia, 13 April 2009, 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [2.1]; 
Written Statement of Finland, 16 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [8]; Written Statement of Germany, 15 April 2009, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo 32-37; Written Statement 
of the Netherlands, 17 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence In Respect of Kosovo [3.6-3.7]; Written Statement of Poland, 14 April 2009, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [6.8-6.9]; Written 
Comment of Switzerland, 17 July 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence In Respect of Kosovo [60]; Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples:  A Legal Reappraisal 
(Cambridge University Press 1995) 108–19; Duursma (n 22) 25; Milena Sterio, The Right to Self-Determination 
under International Law:  ‘Selfistans,’ secession, and the Rule of the Great Powers (Routledge 2013) 12–13; 
Valerie Epps, ‘Self-Determination after Kosovo and East Timor’ (1999–2000) 6 ILSA Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 445; Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 235; Christian Tomuschat, ‘Secession and Self-
Determination’ in Marcelo G Kohen (ed), Secession:  International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University 
Press 2006) 38–42. 
132 Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (2010) ICJ Reports 523, [175-181]; Separate Opinion 
of Judge Yusuf, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (2010) ICJ Reports 618, [11-12]. 
133 See above 105-110. 
134 See Quebec (n 54) [135]. 
135 See Katanga (n 44) [6]. 
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Despite the affirmation of the legal status of the Friendly Relations Declaration elsewhere in 
its Opinion,136 the Court referred neither to the Declaration nor to the Courts in Quebec or 
Katanga in its consideration of remedial secession, however, merely observing that 
Whether […] the international law of self-determination confers upon part of the 
population of an existing State a right to separate from that State is, however, a 
subject on which radically differing views were expressed by those taking part in 
the proceedings and expressing a position on the question.  Similar differences 
existed regarding whether international law provides for a right of “remedial 
secession” and, if so, in what circumstances.137 
Although the Court’s remarks were purely incidental (the Court declared that ‘it is not 
necessary to resolve these questions’138), they nevertheless cast doubt on the existence of a 
customary law right of remedial secession.  It is probable that this finding does not—formally, 
at least—alter the legal situation pertaining to remedial self-determination, but it nevertheless 
changes the structure of the argument.139  Although it was possible, following the Declaration, 
to argue that a norm of remedial secession was emerging or had emerged,140 that position is 
now harder to maintain:  despite its protestations not to consider the matter the Court has 
effectively indicated that no uniform opinio iuris exists.141  As with the question of territorial 
integrity, that the Court’s conclusion may have been correct (although in the author’s opinion, 
that is far from clear) does not release the Court from the requirement to provide adequate 
                                                     
136 The Court cited its previous judgment in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua ((1986) ICJ Reports 14) as authority for the proposition that the Declaration is customary 
international law.  In Nicaragua the ICJ declared the Declaration to be customary international law, holding that 
the Declaration was more than a mere ‘reiteration or elucidation’ of the Charter [188], but that ‘the adoption by 
States of this text afford[ed] an indication of their opinio juris as to customary international law on the question’ 
[191].  Those holdings were reconfirmed by the Court in Kosovo, where it declared that the Declaration ‘reflects 
customary international law’.  Kosovo (n 83) [80]. 
137 Kosovo (n 83) [82]. 
138 ibid [83]. 
139 Summers (n 87) 252–53. 
140 See, above (n 131-132).  
141 Weller, ‘The Sounds of Silence:  Making Sense of the Supposed Gaps in the Kosovo Opinion’ (n 84) 200–03. 
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reasoning for a statement which, as this does, has implications for the understanding of this 
area of law. 
3.2.2 Declarations of Independence after Kosovo 
Proponents of an extensive international law right to secessionary self-determination may, at 
first sight, have regarded the Kosovo Advisory Opinion as a significant victory.142  As Wilde 
puts it, ‘[a]ll substate groups in the world are now on notice that […] no international law rule 
bars independence declarations.’143  In truth, the Opinion is less favourable to secession than 
it appears, however: ‘[i]n reality […] the principle of effectivity has been dominant.’144 
While the Court held that declarations of independence are not prohibited by international 
law,145 it did not ascribe to them any legal effect.146  A declaration of independence is not 
sufficient to realise the secession of an entity, therefore; it is also necessary for there also to 
be an effective displacement of statal authority.147  In other words, in order to effect 
independence the declaration must reflect a factual situation.  In the example of Kosovo, to 
the extent that Kosovo now exists as a de facto independent entity, the declaration of 
independence may have succeeded in rendering future Serbian authority over Kosovo 
illegitimate by replacing Serbia’s authority-right with Kosovo’s own authority-right, but that 
                                                     
142 See e.g. Rodríguez-Santiago, who argues that the ‘Court ended up validating not only these declarations but 
also the claims for unilateral separation that are always at the heart of them’: Rodríguez-Santiago (n 10) 233–
34. 
143 Wilde (n 84) 304. 
144 Hilpold (n 84) 300; see also Orakhelashvili (n 84) 79; Wilde (n 84) 306; Vashakmadze and Lippold (n 84) 646–
47. 
145 Kosovo (n 83) [84].  The Court’s reasoning has caused Muharremi to question whether the ICJ has extended the 
Lotus principle to non-State actors, see Muharremi (n 84) 876. 
146 Vashakmadze and Lippold (n 84) 646. 
147 “Effective” is used in this section to refer to efficacy in establishing an area outside the control of the parent 
State, and not efficacy in establishing a new State. 
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transfer was only possible because, at the time of the issuance of the declaration, Kosovo was 
under international administration.148  Serbia’s de facto authority over Kosovo was, at that 
time, virtually non-existent.  Although the status of Kosovo remains uncertain, it is clear that 
the exceptional circumstances surrounding the declaration created a situation in which it had 
the potential to be effective. 
Indeed, it is difficult to envisage a situation in which a unilateral secession, either as a result 
of a remedial or a secessionary claim to self-determination, could be effective under such a 
legal framework, short of international intervention under a Security Council mandate (as in 
Kosovo), or where a State is undergoing collapse and is no longer able to exercise authority 
over its territory (as in the disintegration of Yugoslavia).  In all other cases a secession 
movement must effectively displace the authority of the State but, as the Court has reaffirmed, 
it must do so without recourse to unlawful force.149  No such limit is placed on the State, 
however, which is entitled to use force internally provided that it complies with the relevant 
provisions of international humanitarian law, human rights law, and peremptory norms.  
Vashakmadze and Lippold comment that ‘the Opinion lacks practical value.  Secessionist 
movements may interpret the Court’s Advisory Opinion as favourable to their aspirations; 
however, the Court’s Opinion does not give them a legal tool to realize those aspirations.’150 
What, then, is the legal status of the secessionary form of self-determination?  The Court has 
provided no clear answer.  Although it is clearly implied that no strong right of peoples to 
                                                     
148 Kosovo (n 83) [57-77]. 
149 ibid [81].  In the case of a non-State actor, which cannot have recourse to self-defence, unlawful force must be 
interpreted as any use of force which is not authorised by the Security Council, whose practice confirms that it 
considers non-State Actors to be subject to the prohibition on the use of force.  See ibid [116], where that practice 
is cited by the Court. 
150 Vashakmadze and Lippold (n 84) 647. 
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secessionary self-determination has emerged, the Court’s reasoning could support either the 
mere absence of a prohibition, or the existence of a weak right of the kind implied by the 
Jurists in the Åland Islands dispute.151  Nothing in the Court’s judgment aids discrimination 
between these alternatives, and it is not clear even that the Court considered that there is a 
relevant distinction between them:  as Judge Simma commented, the Court’s espousal of the 
‘obsolete’152 Lotus reasoning collapses the categories of ‘“tolerated” to “permissible” to 
“desirable”’ and results in a situation where ‘everything which is not expressly prohibited 
carries with it the same colour of legality’.153  ‘Under these circumstances,’ Simma comments, 
‘even a clearly recognized positive entitlement to declare independence, if it existed, would 
not have changed the Court’s answer in the slightest.’154  While it can be concluded, therefore, 
that secessionary self-determination is not prohibited by international law, the status of the 
concept remains unclear, and significant questions remain over whether—and, if so, in what 
circumstances—it can be effectively implemented outside of the context of international 
intervention or fatal State collapse. 
3.3 Concluding Thoughts 
For those who wished to see clarification of the legal status of the various forms of self-
determination, the Kosovo Advisory Opinion is an opportunity missed.  The Court’s insistence 
on a negative characterisation of the question may have fulfilled its function, in that it has 
provided guidance to the General Assembly on the legal situation pertaining to Kosovo, but it 
has done little to clarify the state of international law on secession and self-determination more 
broadly, and in some respects has added to the confusion surrounding this most contested of 
                                                     
151 See above, p.61-65. 
152 Declaration of Judge Simma (n 102) [3]. 
153 ibid [8]. 
154 ibid.  For a further discussion of the Court’s use of the Lotus reasoning see chapter three, p.187-192 
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concepts.  For example, despite a tentative coalescence of opinion around the idea that a right 
to remedial secession had crystallised in international law, and despite the Court’s 
protestations that it was unnecessary to consider the subject, it has cast doubt on the idea.  In 
parallel, the Court’s negative methodology prevented an analysis of whether secessionary self-
determination is not illegal merely because of the absence of a prohibition, or because a weak 
legal right exists which would have application is some cases.  Whatever the reason, the 
finding that secessionary self-determination is not illegal had the potential to be a startling and 
far-reaching conclusion, but the Court’s ancillary remarks on the subject have shown it to be 
primarily of rhetorical importance.  Far from legalising secession, the Court has created a 
situation in which secession can legally take place only where the State’s authority has already 
been displaced.155  As Orakhelashvili has it, it is ‘understandable that international law 
contains no prohibition on [Unilateral Declarations of Independence], for there can be little 
reason for prohibiting an act that on its own can produce no legal effect.’156Of greater concern, 
however, as will be discussed in the next section, the Court’s studied attempt to say as little as 
possible has had the inadvertent effect of reducing the ability of international law to regulate 
intra- and inter-State conflicts involving claims of secession.  The Court can be forgiven—
even praised—for its reluctance to engage in such intensely political and contentious 
questions, but the better course in such circumstances is surely to decline the reference.157  
Instead the Court has produced a poorly (and teleologically) reasoned, equivocal Opinion that 
                                                     
155 Mégret comments that ‘[n]ormatively, this is arguably the worst possible result, an invitation to political 
adventurism that is not remotely constrained by normative ambition and ends up recognizing what is based on 
purely pragmatic grounds.’  Mégret (n 64) 53. 
156 Orakhelashvili (n 84) 79. 
157 A course of action advocated by Vice-President Tomka and Judge Bennouna: Declaration of Vice-President 
Tomka, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion (2010) ICJ Reports 454 [2-9]; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (2010) 
ICJ Reports 500 [1-26]. 
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ultimately has little ‘advisory’ value.158  This aspect of the Opinion will now be examined in 
relation to a recent example; the irredentist conflict in Crimea. 
3.4 Kosovo Applied: the Crimea Debate 
The effects of the Kosovo opinion and the current state of the international law of self-
determination can, perhaps, best be illustrated by their application to a concrete example.  The 
Crimea situation, one of the most contentious recent examples of the purported application of 
self-determination principles, not only serves the purpose of a case study, but has generated a 
great deal of comment and legal argumentation on the part of States.  It thus provides a vivid 
demonstration of the divergence of self-determination law and State rhetoric in this highly 
politicised arena. 
The facts surrounding Crimea remain in dispute.159  It is accepted by all sides, however, that 
Russian military forces were actively engaged in Crimea in the lead up to the 16th March 2014 
referendum, the result of which Russia recognised as legitimate, but which has been 
condemned by others.160  On 18th March 2014 Crimea became a (de facto, at least) part of 
Russian territory when Russia ratified a treaty effecting the integration of the region.161  The 
reasons for the Russian military presence and its extent and influence, however, are matters 
of controversy. 
                                                     
158 Declaration of Judge Simma (n 102) [10].  [Original emphasis]. 
159 A timeline of events can be found here: --, ‘Ukraine Crisis: Timeline’ (BBC News, no date) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26248275> accessed 29 April 2015. 
160 Security Council, Official Records, 69th Year, 7144th Meeting, 19 March 2014, S/PV.7144, 6-8 et seq. 
161 --, ‘Putin Signs Crimea Annexation into Law’ (Al Jazeera English, 22 March 2014) 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/03/russian-parliament-approves-crimea-annexation-
201432172722744933.html> accessed 29 April 2015. 
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3.4.1 Russia’s Claim 
The main ground advanced by Russia in support of its actions in Crimea and the Crimean 
referendum appears to have been remedial self-determination.  Russia characterised the 
change of government in Ukraine as a ‘coup d’état’ instigated by foreign States, and stated 
that the fall of the legitimate government led to ‘[a]narchy’, ‘gross and mass violations of 
human rights’, and other circumstances including ‘persecution due to nationality, language 
and political convictions – all of this has made the existence of the Republic of Crimea within 
the Ukrainian state impossible.’162  These circumstances, Russia claimed, resulted in an 
exceptional right to separate from Ukraine: 
It is clear that the achievement of the right to self-determination in the form of 
separation from an existing State is an extraordinary measure.  However, in the 
case of Crimea, it obviously arose as a result of the legal vacuum created by the 
violent coup against the legitimate Government carried out by the nationalist 
radicals in Kyiv, as well as by their direct threats to impose their order throughout 
the territory of Ukraine.163 
Notwithstanding that other States denied that any abuses had occurred against the Crimean 
population,164 it is unlikely that the situation described would be sufficient to ground a right 
of the Crimean people to self-determination. 
As discussed above, it is unclear whether international law now recognises a right to remedial 
self-determination.  Although the right appears to have a textual basis in the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations and appeared, prior to 2010, to be gaining a significant degree of 
international acceptance,165 the Kosovo Opinion both suggested that the requisite opinio iuris 
was not present, and implied in its approach that the existence of a right to remedial self-
                                                     
162 Sergey Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, Address to State Duma of Russia, 20th March 2014. 
163 Mr Churkin, Permeant Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Security Council, Security Council, 
Official Records, 69th Year, 7134th Meeting, 13 March 2014, S/PV.7134, 15.  
164 Security Council, Official Records, 69th Year, 7138th Meeting, Un Doc. S/PV.7138, 15 March 2014, at 5 et seq. 
165 See above, n 131-132. 
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determination would, in any event, have been immaterial to a determination of the question.166  
It is doubtful, therefore, whether remedial secession would have been capable of grounding a 
Crimean secession. 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider whether Crimea would qualify for remedial 
secession, should such a norm have crystallised.  Following the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, a State conducting itself in accordance with the right of its inhabitants to political 
self-determination is entitled to the protection of its territorial integrity.  In extension, a State 
which denies a portion of its population political self-determination is not entitled to such 
protection, and it is therefore necessary to assess whether the situation in Ukraine infringed 
the rights of the people of Crimea to this form of self-determination.  The Court in Quebec 
characterised this as a strenuous test.  It held that nothing short of ‘oppression’ equivalent to 
foreign military occupation and denial of ‘meaningful access to government’ would be 
sufficient to show that political self-determination had been denied.167  The ACoHPR held that 
the test would be met by ‘violations of human rights’ or denial ‘of the right to participate in 
Government’, although it, too, implied that there would be a threshold to be cleared, saying 
that it would be necessary to show that abuses occurred ‘to the point that the territorial integrity 
of [the State] should be called into question’.168 
It seems unlikely that the situation in Crimea met this high threshold.  Although there is little 
doubt that the abuses described by Russia would, if true, have amounted to an imposition on 
the rights of the people of Crimea to self-determination, both courts cast secession as a final 
resort.  Although it is likely that certain abuses (genocide is, perhaps, the example par 
                                                     
166 Kosovo (n 83) [56, 82-83]. 
167 Quebec (n 54) [138]. 
168 Katanga (n 44) [6]. 
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excellence) are a sufficiently serious violation of the self-determination and human rights of a 
people to ground an instant right to remedial self-determination, it is unlikely that the abuses 
alleged by Russia fall within this category.  These abuses probably did not ground a right to 
remedial self-determination partially because they had not yet actualised—fear of abuses is 
not sufficient; anticipatory remedial self-determination is a contradiction in terms—and 
because the Crimean population had not exhausted available avenues of recourse, such as the 
2015 Ukrainian elections, which may have served to normalise the situation. 
I would suggest, however, that in principle (and pending, in particular, issues of proof) the 
abuses described by Russia could have been sufficient to ground a right to remedial secession 
for the people of Crimea if not resolved through an internal process.  The denial of political 
self-determination is a factual estate, and remedial secession is therefore contingent on the 
practical effect of its denial.  The question in any given situation is not whether the State’s 
actions are reprehensible, but whether they have the effect of denying to a section of the 
population the right to politically self-determine.  The abuses described by Russia certainly 
appear to have had the potential to produce such effects, but it is not possible to say whether 
that they would, in practice, have done so. 
3.4.2 Crimea’s Claim 
By contrast, Crimea appears to have claimed for itself a right to secessionary self-
determination.  In its declaration of independence of 11th March 2014, the Crimean parliament 
stated that the Kosovo Advisory Opinion provides authority for their secession, as a unilateral 
declaration of independence does not violate any international norms.169  While the ICJ made 
                                                     
169 --, ‘Crimean Parliament Adopted a Declaration of Independence of the ARC and Sevastopol’ (11 March 2014) 
<http://www.rada.crimea.ua/news/11_03_2014_1> accessed 29 April 2015; see also Peters, ‘Has the Advisory 
Opinion’s Finding that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was not Contrary to International Law Set an 
Unfortunate Precedent?’ (n 84) 291. 
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this finding, it did not, thereby, authorise secession.170  On the contrary, the ICJ held that 
declarations of independence, in and of themselves, have no legal effect – a declaration of 
independence is only effective where the declaration is describing a fait accompli.  It is likely 
that Russian military action in Crimea produced exactly such a fait accompli, but it is highly 
likely, too, that the Russian incursion would have rendered the declaration of independence 
unlawful, if it occurred prior to the de facto loss of Ukrainian control over Crimea.  The ICJ 
held that a declaration of independence connected to an unlawful use of force would be 
illegal,171 and two questions are therefore posed: first, did Russia’s intervention occur before 
the de facto separation of Crimea occurred and, secondly, if the intervention took place prior 
to that separation, whether Russia’s use of force was justified by any other rule of international 
law.  The latter question is, perhaps, the more straightforward:  Russia claimed that it 
intervened in self-defence and with the consent of the (deposed) legitimate government of 
Ukraine, but it is clear that a number of States Members of the Security Council regarded 
Russia’s actions as illegal,172 as do most commentators.173  The question of chronology is more 
difficult to address, for several reasons.  It is, first, extremely difficult to pinpoint the moment 
at which Crimea ceased to be under the effective control of Ukraine.  Secondarily, there is 
significant uncertainty surrounding the point at which Russian forces engaged.  It is widely 
believed that Russian troops were covertly acting in Crimea long before Russia engaged 
                                                     
170 Kosovo (n 83) [81]. 
171 ibid. 
172 See, for example, Security Council, Official Records, 69th Year, 7124th Meeting, Un Doc. S/PV.7124, 1 March 
2014; Security Council, Official Records, 69th Year, 7125th Meeting, Un Doc. S/PV.7125, 3 March 2014; 
Security Council, Official Records, 69th Year, 7134th Meeting, Un Doc. S/PV.7134, 13 March 2014; Security 
Council, Official Records, 69th Year, 7138th Meeting, Un Doc. S/PV.7138, 15 March 2014; Security Council, 
Official Records, 69th Year, 7144th Meeting, Un Doc. S/PV.7144, 19 March 2014. 
173 Se e.g. Daniel Wisehart, ‘The Crisis in Ukraine and the Prohibition of the Use of Force:  A Legal Basis for 
Russia’s Intervention?’ (EJIL:Talk!, 4 March 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-crisis-in-ukraine-and-the-
prohibition-of-the-use-of-force-a-legal-basis-for-russias-intervention/> accessed 29 April 2015; Zachary 
Vermeer, ‘Intervention with the Consent of a Deposed (but Legitimate) Government?  Playing the Sierra Leone 
Card’ (EJIL:Talk!, 6 March 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/intervention-with-the-consent-of-a-deposed-but-
legitimate-government-playing-the-sierra-leone-card/> accessed 29 April 2015; Nico Krisch, ‘Crimea and the 
Limits of International Law’ (EJIL:Talk!, 10 March 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/crimea-and-the-limits-of-
international-law/> accessed 29 April 2015. 
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openly, and it is conceivable that the actions of certain of the Crimean militia groups may have 
been attributable to Russia, if the threshold of effective control was met.174  Although various 
indications suggest one or other answer, these are complex factual questions, and ones to 
which may never be fully answered.  While distinctly plausible, even likely, therefore, that the 
Russian use of force would have deprived the declaration of independence of its legality, it is 
far from straightforward satisfactorily to prove that contention. 
A number of States argued, in addition, that the secession of Crimea was illegal because it was 
contrary to Ukrainian constitutional law.  The objection runs, first, that Ukrainian 
constitutional law requires an all-Ukraine referendum to authorise an alteration of its territory, 
and secondly, that Crimea was not competent to call such a referendum.175  Such an argument 
can have no consequences for the legality of Crimea’s secession, however.  The ICJ in Kosovo 
stated clearly that the legality of a declaration of independence under international law does 
not require an investigation of its legality under domestic law.  In answering the question 
posed by the General Assembly, the Court stated that there was no ‘need to enquire into any 
system of domestic law.’176  The issuing of a declaration of independence is an act carried out 
by a sub-State actor on the international plane.  It is an extra-constitutional act, and its legality 
                                                     
174 See, e.g. --, ‘Ukraine crisis’ (n 159); --, ‘Ukraine: Russia behind Airport Takeovers’ (28 February 2014) 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/02/armed-men-seize-crimea-airport-ukraine-
201422844451836650.html> accessed 1 July 2016; Oleksandr Iakymenko, ‘Russian Ruse, Ukrainian Crisis’ (12 
March 2014) <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/russian-ruse-ukrainian-crisis-
20143127276504571.html> accessed 1 July 2016; --, ‘Russian Lawmaker Suggests Moscow Has Sent Troops 
to Crimea’ (12 March 2014) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-troops-
idUSBREA2B22V20140312> accessed 1 July 2016; --, ‘Captured Russian Troops “in Ukraine by Accident”’ 
(26 August 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-28934213> accessed 1 July 2016; --, ‘Ukraine 
Crisis: Russian Troops Crossed Border, Nato Says’ (12 November 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-30025138> accessed 1 July 2016. 
175 Security Council, Official Records, 69th Year, 7134th Meeting, Un Doc. S/PV.7134, 13 March 2014, Statement 
of Luxembourg (p.4); Statement of United States of America (p.6); Statement of United Kingdom (p.7); 
Statement of Australia (p.13). 
176 Kosovo (n 83) [26].  For discussion of this aspect of the Advisory Opinion see Alexandros XM Ntovas, ‘The 
Paradox of Kosovo’s Parallel Legal Orders in the Reasoning of the Court’s Advisory Opinion’ in Duncan French 
(ed), Statehood and Self-Determination:  Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2013). 
 SELF-DETERMINATION II 137 
 
 
 
under domestic or constitutional law is, therefore, irrelevant to the question of its international 
legality. 
Although certain of the arguments advanced by both sides in relation to the Crimean secession 
were clearly specious, it is nevertheless challenging to determine its legality under 
international law.  Although there is, following Kosovo, no prohibition on a declaration of 
independence, such declarations lack legal effect.  Simultaneously, the Russian use of force 
in Crimea may, subject to questions of chronology and extenuating circumstances, have 
deprived the declaration of legality.  Although Russia claimed that its actions were justified 
in pursuance of the Crimean people’s right to remedial self-determination, it is far from clear 
that remedial self-determination exists as a norm of international law, and there remain 
significant questions as to whether any abuses eventuated and, if so, whether they met the 
threshold of the in extremis form.  Three things only are clear following Kosovo: that the 
people of Crimea had no right to separate themselves from Ukraine, that Ukraine had no right 
to prevent them from doing so, and that the Crimean declaration of independence was, legally 
speaking, an irrelevance.  International law, simply put, does not regulate the situation, but 
merely places limited restraints on the conduct of the parties.  Such a conclusion has worrying 
implications for future international stability:  while it is not clear that the absence of legal 
regulation in this area emboldened Russian action in Crimea, it must be regarded as a distinct 
possibility.  As Peters argues: 
[I]t is exactly the sparseness of the Opinion (and in particular the failure of the 
Court to pronounce itself on the underlying issue of secession instead of 
concentrating on the act of declaring independence) which allowed Crimea and 
Russia in 2014 to rely on the ICJ Opinion in order to justify the Crimean claim 
for self-determination and secession.177 
                                                     
177 Peters, ‘Has the Advisory Opinion’s Finding that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was not Contrary to 
International Law Set an Unfortunate Precedent?’ (n 84) 299.  To paraphrase Bianchi, this could be characterised 
as a somewhat pyrrhic victory for the Court in the “interpretation game”:  Bianchi (n 55). 
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While legal rules can be powerful tools for those who seek to wield them,178 it is arguably the 
absence of legal rules (and the liberation of political and power-based approaches that come 
with that) that should be of greater concern. 
4. Conclusion 
The history of the self-determination genus is not the history of an idea, but the history of four, 
connected ideas.  Different forms of the concept have come to prominence at different times, 
and although the favourable treatment of one or other of the forms may have contributed to a 
sense that the others, too, were legitimate, in general State practice appears to support a 
separation of the species.  This is perhaps particularly true of the few cases in which self-
determination principles have been discussed by international or national Courts, where the 
political and colonial forms of self-determination have been found to be legal norms of high 
status, but which have in general treated remedial and secessionary self-determination with 
greater circumspection. 
A historical analysis of self-determination reveals a great deal about the concept – not least 
that there are both subtle and substantial differences in the principles and practices surrounding 
its four distinct forms.  A sophisticated understanding of the conceptual and legal foundations 
of the various forms is lacking in the debates surrounding the application of these principles 
in contemporary international law, primarily manifested in the conflation of self-
determination’s various forms.  An understanding of self-determination as a composite of four 
ideas would also aid clarity in the judgments of national and international Courts, and would 
do a great deal to rid self-determination of its “Jekyll and Hyde” character, at once enhancing 
                                                     
178 See, for example, Judge Koroma’s warning that the Advisory Opinion ‘will serve as a guide and an instruction 
manual for secessionist groups the world over’, and Judge Skotnikov’s warning that the opinion will have an 
‘inflammatory’ effect:  Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma (n 120) [4]; Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Skotnikov, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (2010) ICJ Reports 515 [17]. 
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the legitimacy and the emancipatory potential of its established political and colonial forms, 
and clarifying the grounds of debate surrounding its ill-favoured aspects by more clearly 
delineating the remedial and secessionary forms.  Although an analysis of the position of the 
various self-determination norms in the judgments of courts reveals the uncertainty 
surrounding remedial self-determination and the suspicion with which the secessionary form 
is treated, it is the exceptionally high status accorded to colonial and, in particular, to political 
self-determination that is most striking.  Like the documentary history of the United Nations, 
the judicial treatment of the political form confirms it to be a central pillar of the modern 
international system.  In its Opinion in Wall, for example, the ICJ held political self-
determination to be a norm of erga omnes character in its manifestation both as a negative 
prohibition and as a positive obligation on States.  The hypothesis in this thesis, however, 
makes an additional and a deeper claim.  It is argued that self-determination has been 
recursively instituted as a structural principle of the international legal system, and that it is 
one of the drivers of the ongoing humanisation of international law.  The following chapters 
consider five of the central concepts of international law—sovereignty, obligation, statehood, 
personality, and relative normativity—and will argue that evidence of the central position of 
self-determination can be seen in the theories and working of these structural properties of 
the system. 
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Part Two 
In part one, it was concluded that political self-determination now occupies a high and central 
position within the international legal system.  That conclusion supports, but does not in and 
of itself prove the hypothesis discussed here, that self-determination is now a structural 
principle of international law.  In order to advance the enquiry into that question further, part 
two will consider five key concepts of international law in order to discern whether self-
determination may be said to be theoretically implicated in their operation, or to be affecting 
and guiding their development.  These concepts are sovereignty, obligation, statehood, 
personality, and peremptory normativity, identified above as structural properties of the 
international legal system as we know it today.  It will be argued that each finds its roots in 
self-determination. 
Chapter three considers sovereignty and obligation, chapter four will examine statehood and 
personality, and chapter five discusses norms ius cogens.  The examinations of these closely 
connected concepts will show that self-determination sits at the root of a mutually supportive 
and constitutive web of secondary concepts that give structure to the international legal 
system.  It will therefore be concluded that there are strong indications that self-determination 
is now, as the hypothesis posits, a structural principle of the international legal system and that 
it is contributing to the process of the humanisation of international law
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Three 
Sovereignty, Obligation, and Self-
Determination 
What Better Work For One Who Loves Freedom Than The 
Job Of Watchman.  Law Is The Servant Of Freedom.  
Freedom Without Limits Is Just A Word.1 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will explore the potential of a theory of international law which takes self-
determination to be a structural principle of the international legal system to contribute to 
understanding of the concepts of sovereignty and obligation.  These concepts were identified 
above as among the most fundamental building blocks of the international legal system but, 
as will be shown below, they have often been taken to conflict.  It will be argued here that 
these concepts do not exist in tension but rather in parallel, both finding their roots in the 
principle of self-determination.  The first part of this chapter will introduce the sovereignty 
problem, so-called, and will briefly examine the history and development of sovereignty and 
obligation in order to show that it is not inherent in international law, but rather was a creation 
of the positivism of the long 19th century.  Section 3 will then assess the sovereignty problem 
from a theoretical point of view, and will show that the sovereignty/obligation conflict 
continues to cast doubt on international legality.  Finally, section four will argue that the 
ongoing humanisation of international law and, in particular, an understanding of these 
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concepts premised on self-determination has the potential to reconcile sovereignty and 
obligation, and thus to place the concept of international law on firmer foundations. 
2. The History of Sovereignty and Obligation 
The spectre of John Austin has haunted international law down the years.  The law of nations, 
he said, was law only improperly-so-called, made up of nothing more than the ‘opinions 
current amongst nations’.2  His denial of its legal character stemmed from his reliance on the 
idea of sovereignty.  ‘Laws’, he said, ‘are a species of commands’3 made by ‘a given sovereign 
to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author’,4 and it follows from this that, in 
the absence of a relationship of subjugation, law (properly-so-called) is impossible.5 
Although Austin’s voice is no longer dominant in the theory of international law, the system 
is still dogged by a certain normative insecurity that has its roots in what may be termed the 
problem of sovereignty.6  Sovereignty is absolutist:  the State is the highest authority, and 
nothing sits above it.  It is the sole author of its own legality, and it bound only by those rules 
to which it consents.  But such an absolutist doctrine of sovereignty conflicts directly with the 
principle of obligation:  that States are bound by a corpus of rules which, taken together, may 
be called international law. 
                                                     
2 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence:  Or the Philosophy of Positive Law, Vol. 1 (5th edn., John Murray 1885) 
183. 
3 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray 1832) 117. 
4 ibid 171. 
5 Austin (n 2) 182. 
6 Ole Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: The Rise of the 
International Judiciary (Cambridge University Press 2005) 73. 
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The principle of obligation invites us to look behind the law.  What is it, ultimately, that means 
that a rule accepted by a State is binding upon it?  The theory of sovereignty as it is set out 
above, with its denial of any power beyond or acting upon the State, finds the basis in consent.  
When a State consents to an obligation, the argument goes, it limits its own sphere of action, 
binding itself to the obligation in question.7  But as Brierly has argued, a ‘self-imposed 
limitation is no true limitation at all, but a contradiction in terms’.8  Friedmann, too, objects.  
‘The obvious weakness’, he argues, ‘is that what states can consent to they can also revoke.  
The self-limitation of states can derive normative character only from an existing rule that a 
state is bound to keep its promises’,9 and for that reason, Hegel argues, international “law” is 
a political rather than a truly legal enterprise: 
The basic principle of the law of nations – as the real and general law which ought 
to apply between States, as distinguished from the specific content of particular 
treaties – is that treaties, on which the obligations of States towards one another 
are based, ought to be kept.  Because, however, the relationship between States 
has their sovereignty as its basic principle, they are to this extent in a State of 
Nature the one against the other, and the law of nations does not in general have 
a constitutional force over them, but their laws have their reality in their particular 
wills.  Hence, this general determination persists as an “ought”, and the reality of 
the situation becomes one where treaty-obligations are altered in accordance with 
relations, and revoked for the same reason.10 
Hegel’s account, however, is only one understanding of the concepts of sovereignty and of 
obligation.  Like international law itself, these have not been static concepts but rather have 
                                                     
7 This line of argument found its fullest expression in the Selbstverpflichtung theory of Jellinek: Georg Jellinek, 
Allgemeine Staatslehre (J Springer 1922); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘A History of International Law Histories’ in 
Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 958; see also Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Steven 
& Sons 1964) 85. 
8 James Leslie Brierly, ‘The Basis of Obligation in International Law’ in Hersch Lauterpacht and Humphrey 
Waldock (eds), The Basis of Obligation in International Law and Other Papers by the Late James Leslie Brierly 
(Clarendon Press 1958) 14. 
9 Friedmann (n 7) 85. 
10 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien Der Philosophie Des Rechts (Felix Meiner 1911) 268.  [My 
translation]. 
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altered over time, both in response to and precipitating foundational changes in international 
law.11 
2.1 Sovereignty through History: Approach and Purpose 
As has been noted above,12 there are a number of problems associated with the study of 
international legal history.  The choices of the author as to periodisation, approach, sources 
and many other matters determine the scope of the enquiry, and condition the outcome in ways 
which may or may not be apparent.  As Korhonen has argued, however, that the approach is 
subject to (perhaps incurable) imperfections should not cause it to be abandoned;13 rather an 
attempt should be made to mitigate its problems.  It was argued above that a writer of history 
should clearly set out their approach, in order to lay bare ‘the unavoidable subjectivity’ of their 
decisions.14  This chapter, too, will adopt that approach. 
This section will examine how sovereignty and obligation were viewed both in themselves 
and in their interplay at different points throughout history.  It will use the writings of the great 
publicists to identify conceptions of the concepts that were highly influential in their time.  In 
so doing there is, of course, the risk that such a history will become, to use Koskenniemi’s 
phrase, ‘only a sketch, if not a caricature’.15  Of necessity, a great deal is omitted from this 
brief account, and it is inevitable that the choice of what is and what is not included will impact 
                                                     
11 As Prokhovnik notes, ‘[t]he idea that the meaning of sovereignty is fixed can be very effectively challenged by 
demonstrating the historical malleability of the concept over time.’  Raja Prokhovnik, Sovereignty:  History and 
Theory (Imprint Academic 2008) 2. 
12 See above, p.16-20. 
13 Outi Korhonen, ‘International Lawyer:  Towards Conceptualization of the Changing World and Practice’ (2000) 
2 European Journal of Law Reform 545, 555. 
14 Oliver Digglemann, ‘The Periodization of the History of International Law’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne 
Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 1001. 
15 Koskenniemi (n 7) 945. 
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upon the conclusions that are drawn.  Most notably, the colonial history of the sovereignty 
idea is absent, a decision taken in order to permit a focus on the ways in which the definition 
of sovereignty has changed over time, rather than the ways in which those various definitions 
have been used and by whom.16  It is for the same reason that the decision has been taken to 
focus on doctrine in this short history; in order to facilitate a canvass of the contemporary 
understandings of sovereignty and obligation at various points in time in a way that avoids, so 
far as is possible, distorting the past in the light of the present.  In other words, the attempt 
will be made to engage with the historical theory of sovereignty on its own terms.  The 
objection could be made that by focussing on the classics of international legal doctrine (in 
itself a choice which reinforces the dominance of Western understandings of international 
law) there is a danger that a distorted picture will be produced, and one that makes the 
uncertain assumption that the treatment of sovereignty by the theorists of law reflects the 
actuality of the concept as it was understood by States and State agents at the relevant times.  
It should be recalled, however, that identification of past State practice is not to any greater 
extent a value neutral exercise, nor inherently more accurate or objective.  As Carty notes, 
before relevant and irrelevant practice can be distinguished the ambit of the legal system must 
first be known: ‘the construction of the discipline comes first in providing the means to 
recognize what constitutes legally significant state practice.’17  This observation holds true 
even to a greater extent when dealing with the conceptual framework of international law than 
                                                     
16 Although this is a significant omission, it should not be understood as a denial of the importance of this question.  
As has been amply demonstrated by Anghie, the idea of sovereignty cannot be separated from the colonial 
experience, and attention to that relationship is vital to an understanding of sovereignty’s history and 
development: Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2004).  However, while Anghie’s focus is on the instrumentalisation of the concept of 
sovereignty in the construction of international law (or the reason why certain concepts of sovereignty were 
chosen), this section’s attention is on the effects of the ideas of sovereignty that were produced for the idea of 
international law. 
17 Anthony Carty, ‘Doctrine versus State Practice’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 974–75.  It is important to note, 
however, as Bianchi does, the darker side of this construction, that ‘[a]cting as a broker between raw legal 
materials and its users, doctrine [can] shape[] international law to its own liking’:  Andrea Bianchi, ‘Revitalizing 
the Subjects or Subjectivizing the Actors:  Is That the Question?’ in Andrea Bianchi (ed), Non-State Actors and 
International Law (Routledge 2017) 1. 
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with other questions.  Although the concepts of sovereignty and obligation are implicated in 
the acts (legal, illegal, and in between) of States, relatively rarely are the views of States on 
these interrelations made explicit. 
This section will begin its survey with a brief outline of the role played by the concepts of 
sovereignty and obligation in the theories of the natural law era, before considering the 
development of the concepts in the long 19th century.  It was in this period that natural law 
was replaced with a positivist framework, facilitated in the international legal sphere by Emer 
de Vattel who, despite being a theorist of natural law, heralded the dominance of positivism 
in through his “externalisation” of sovereignty.  In so doing it will seek to demonstrate the 
discontinuities in the histories of sovereignty and obligation.  Far from exhibiting a clear or 
continuous progression towards the 19th Century understanding, or a constant and steady 
meaning through time, the histories of these concepts show that the ways in which they have 
been understood have varied.  Neither inherent nor immutable, they have been—and almost 
certainly remain—subject to change. 
2.2 Sovereignty and Natural Law 
During the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries law was generally understood as being a natural 
phenomenon.  Preceding from a secular or (more commonly) a sacred base, the rights of 
sovereigns to rule within certain limits set by God or nature were proclaimed by the great 
writers of the day.  The first theorist of sovereignty of note was Jean Bodin who, in his own 
estimation, was the originator of the concept.18  His was a highly political project:  his Six 
Books of the Commonwealth were written as a theoretical buttress to the political shifts then 
taking place in a French State that was trying simultaneously to assert its independence from 
                                                     
18 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (Tooley (tr), Basil Blackwell 1967) 25; see also Prokhovnik (n 11); 
but see, contra, Anghie, who begins his survey with the theory of Fransisco de Vitoria, whose De Indis was first 
published in 1532: Anghie (n 16) 13 et seq. 
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the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire externally, and to establish its primacy over the feudal 
baronies internally.  Sovereignty, for Bodin, was an ‘absolute and perpetual power’, but 
crucially one that was ‘vested in a commonwealth’, not in an individual.19  This conceptual 
divide allowed Bodin to maintain legal regulation of the sovereign, who did not possess, but 
merely had the use of the powers attached to its office.20  Nevertheless, internally Bodin’s 
sovereign remained virtually unlimited and illimitable (save that certain of his acts would have 
effect only in his lifetime and would revert on his death, such as an attempt to change the line 
of succession).21  In his external dealings, however, Bodin regarded the sovereign as being 
bound by law properly-so-called, in the form of ‘the laws of God and nature, and even certain 
human laws common to all nations.’22  For Bodin sovereignty and law did not conflict.  On 
the contrary, sovereignty was a product of divine law, and he would have regarded the 
suggestion that the sovereign was not bound by the law as therefore incomprehensible. 
The theory of sovereignty was developed in the 17th century by Grotius and Pufendorf, 
regarded by many as international law’s founding fathers.  For Grotius, sovereignty was 
primarily an internal matter referring to the ultimate power within a State.23  He premised both 
the internal primacy of the sovereign and the binding nature of international law on a theory 
of human sociability, which he argued (following Cicero) would cause men to form societies 
under law, both within and between States.24  Like Bodin, Grotius understood international 
                                                     
19 Bodin (n 18) 25. 
20 Prokhovnik (n 11) 49. 
21 Bodin (n 18) 31; Julian Franklin, ‘Introduction’ in Julian Franklin (ed), Bodin:  On Sovereignty (Cambridge 
University Press 1992) xxiv–xxv. 
22 Bodin (n 18) 34; James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th edn, Clarendon Press 1963) 10–11. 
23 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (Richard Tuck tr, Liberty Fund 2005) 259. 
24 ibid 85–94, 665–66; Patrick Riley, ‘The Legal Philosophy of Hugo Grotius’ in Damiano Canale and others (eds), 
A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Volume 10:  The Philosophers’ Philosophy of Law 
from the Seventeenth Century to Our Days (Springer Netherlands 2009) 14–15. 
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legal limitation not as a defect in the Prince’s sovereignty, but rather as its necessary corollary.  
For Pufendorf, by contrast, the sovereign is under only a weak obligation to uphold his 
promises internationally, with all other obligations being political in character.  He argued that 
the State is a product of two covenants—the first of which establishes a society, while the 
second vests sovereign powers in an individual or body—which men form as a result both of 
their sociability, and fear of others.25  Once instituted, though, Pufendorf regards the sovereign 
as being bound only by the law of nature (that is, the law given to men directly by God).  Thus, 
although the sovereign is under an obligation to keep his promises, it remains an obligation to 
God and not to men, and no earthly remedy exists for its breach.26  However, he does not hold 
his sovereign to be entirely unlimited in his internal or external affairs:  he admits of a right 
of resistance where the sovereign seeks to coerce his subjects into a renunciation of their 
Christian faith,27 and he counsels sovereigns to comply with their external obligations, if only 
for political reasons.28 
The eighteenth century produced the strongest conception of international law of the great 
theorists, that of Christian Wolff.  Wolff held that there existed a civitas maxima, a State of 
States, which consisted of all nations under the law of nature, and whose law was a civil law, 
and thus binding.29  A breach of the law of the civitas maxima could be adjudicated and 
appropriately sanctioned by other States.30  His was a contractarian model:  individuals 
contracted to form a State and, subsequently, to institute a sovereign (who though supreme is 
                                                     
25 Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (4th edn, Printed for J Walthoe, R Wilkin and others 
1729) 629–39. 
26 ibid 688. 
27 ibid 719. 
28 ibid 150–52. 
29 Christian Wolff, Jus Genitum Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum (Clarendon Press 1934) 11–13. 
30 ibid 14. 
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not unlimited), and the State will thereafter contract with other States to form the civitas 
maxima for the benefit of all, thus consenting to the democratic rule of all nations.31  It was in 
direct response to this theory that Emer de Vattel produced his Droit de gens.  Although he 
begun the work seeking only to translate Wolff for a Francophone audience, Vattel ultimately 
produced a significantly different and original theory, and one which has had a far greater 
influence on the development of the law.32  Vattel “externalised” sovereignty, equating it with 
independence, and thus stressing the liberty of the State and its freedom from and obligation 
that it had not accepted.33  Although Vattel retains a role for a natural law-based ‘voluntary’ 
law of nations, he considers this primarily an unenforceable obligation of conscience.34  Vattel 
thus minimised the application of natural law except as a moral code, and contributed to the 
positivisation of international law that was to follow in the long 19th century.  Indeed, that 
Vattel’s account of international law could be recast as a largely positivist theory of law 
perhaps explains its enduring appeal over and above the natural law theories of Wolff and 
Pufendorf.  Whatever the reason, endure Vattel’s influence did, and during the years to follow 
his externalisation of sovereignty was to be taken to its logical limit, with significant 
implications for the idea of obligation.  Here it was that the seeds of the problem of sovereignty 
were planted. 
                                                     
31 ibid 16–17. 
32 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns (G G and J Robinson 1797) xi–xxi; Francis Ruddy, ‘Vattel’s Concept of International 
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33 Vattel (n 32) 2; Stéphane Beaulac, ‘Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of Sovereignty’ (2003) 5 Journal of 
the History of International Law 237, 237. 
34 Vattel (n 32) lvi–lxvi; Charles Fenwick, ‘The Authority of Vattel’ (1913) 7 The American Political Science 
Review 395, 400–04. 
150 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTRED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
2.3 The ‘Long 19th Century’ 
In the development of international law the long 19th Century marked a decisive turning point.  
This was the period in which international legal positivism came to the fore.  Although much 
of the groundwork for these conceptual shifts was laid by Vattel’s restriction of the role played 
by natural law,35 the abandonment of the natural basis of international law resulted in both 
wide-ranging and deep changes to the understanding of the system.  In particular, it is here 
that one sees the creation of the “sovereignty problem”:  a concept of sovereignty which denies 
true legal obligation.  Although this, the so-called “classic” or “classical” doctrine of 
sovereignty, has come to be regarded as a necessary or immutable idea, it was an invention of 
the positivist era, and is as wholly contingent on the conceptual foundations of the system as 
was the internally-focussed sovereignty of the natural law period. 
2.3.1 The Development of International Legal Positivism 
Legal theory in the Anglophone world during this period was dominated by Jeremy Bentham 
and his disciple John Austin.  Although the remarks of both men on international law were 
tangential and brief, their scholarship was central to the development of positivism, and to the 
growth of a view that natural law was without legitimacy and foundation.  Such a view 
inevitably affected the development of international, as well as domestic, law. 
                                                     
35 Although, as Schütze notes, Vattel’s focus on the voluntary law of nations and the consent of States as a source 
of law (and his consequent minimisation of natural law) means that ‘Vattel seems closer to Hobbes than to 
Wolff’’ (Robert Schütze, ‘The “Unsettled” Eighteenth-Century:  Kant and His Predecessors’ in Robert Schütze 
and Markus Gehring (eds), Governance & Globalisation:  International and European Perspectives 
(Forthcoming)), Vattel notes that the ‘principle subject’ of his work will be ‘the necessary and the voluntary law 
of nations [which are] both established by nature, but each in a different manner’:  Vattel (n 32) xvi–xvii; see 
also Emmanuelle Jouannet, ‘Emer de Vattel (1714-1767)’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The 
History of International Law:  The Oxford Handbook (Oxford University Press 2012) 1119, who notes that Vattel 
‘remained a proponent of the school of natural law, subordinating the positivist law of nations to the natural law 
of nations.’  [Footnotes omitted]. 
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Bentham’s treatment of international law is, as Janis notes, fleeting, inconclusive, and easy to 
misread.36  Bentham is often (incorrectly, in Janis’s view) taken to deny the legal nature of 
international law.  On the contrary, Bentham appears to have accepted the validity of 
international law,37 but his scholarship nevertheless contributed to the trend away from natural 
law as the basis of obligation in international law.  Ruddy comments that during the 18th 
Century natural law, a concept previously seen as being benign, ‘a harmless maxim, almost a 
commonplace of morality,’38 awoke from a Leviathan-like slumber and shook the foundations 
of the international legal world.  As Ruddy has it, natural law became a ‘mass of dynamite,’39 
and provided the theoretical underpinnings for two revolutions which, in the case of the 
American Revolution and War of Independence (1775-1783), dispossessed a King and, in the 
case of the French Revolution culminating in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen (1789), deposed another, and saw his execution.40  Natural law, which to that point 
had been instrumentalised by kings to justify their power over their peoples and by European 
empires to arrogate their subjugation of non-Christian peoples, had become in their eyes a 
subversive, revolutionary and unpredictable concept, and one that engendered much 
suspicion.  Writing in response to the French Declaration Bentham expressed this scepticism, 
famously holding that: 
That which has no existence can not be destroy'd: that which can not be destroy'd 
can not require any thing to preserve it from being destroy'd.  Natural rights is 
                                                     
36 Mark Weston Janis, ‘Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law”’ (1984) 78 American Journal 
of International Law 405, 410 et seq. 
37 Jeremy Bentham, ‘A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace’ in John Bowring (ed), The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, vol 2 (William Tait 1843). 
38 Francis Ruddy, International Law in the Enlightenment (Oceana Publications, Inc 1975) 33. 
39 ibid. 
40 Anghie also points to the desire to further the colonial agenda as a factor in the decline of Natural law.  Although 
it had, to begin with, facilitated European expansionism, he argues that natural law was constraining the colonial 
ambitions of the great powers to a certain extent, because of its claim to universal application.  By contrast, the 
positivist legal model—with its sharp distinction between the “civilised” States who were bound by international 
law and were entitled to its protections and the “uncivilised” States which were not—gave those with colonial 
ambitions the freedom to “claim” territory in the non-European world on the grounds that it was terra nullius, 
and even permitted the claim of philanthropy in the form of the “civilising mission”.  See Anghie (n 16) 32–114, 
esp. 52-65. 
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simple nonsense:  natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, 
nonsense upon stilts.41 
Bentham’s highly rhetorical, but supremely memorable, denunciation of natural law and 
natural rights contributed to the erosion of the obligation thesis of international law and, in 
parallel, the strengthening the conception of State sovereignty.  Where previous thinkers had 
grounded international law in a religious or semi-secular natural law, the writers of the long 
19th Century now regarded such a theoretical foundation for international law to be suspect, 
and sought to formulate an international law free from such influences. 
2.3.2 Sovereignty and the Basis of Obligation in International Law 
During the long 19th Century a slightly-modified reading of Vattel’s “external” definition of 
sovereignty, in which sovereignty is equated with external independence, became canonical, 
with few writers willing to accept limitations on the idea.  This section will examine the 
definition of the concept and its effect on international law. 
2.3.2.1 The Definition of Sovereignty 
Von Martens, writing in 1795, gives, perhaps, the most nuanced definition of sovereignty to 
be found during this period: 
For a state to be entirely free and sovereign, it must govern itself, and 
acknowledge no legislative superior but God.  Every thing which is compatible 
with this independence, is also compatible with sovereignty, so that mere alliances 
of protection, tribute or vassalage, which a state may contract with another do not 
hinder it from continuing perfectly sovereign[.]42 
While Von Martens is even willing to accept that treaties of vassalage are compatible with a 
State exercising full sovereignty, later writers seem to have adopted a more absolute definition.  
Wheaton speaks merely of independence in unqualified terms—‘Sovereignty is the supreme 
                                                     
41 Jeremy Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham:  Rights, Representation, and Reform (Clarendon 
Press 2002) 330. 
42 Georg Friedrich Von Martens, Summary of the Law of Nations, Founded on the Treaties and Customs of the 
Modern Nations of Europe (Thomas Bradford 1795) 23–24. 
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power by which any State is governed.  [...]  External sovereignty consists in the independence 
of one political society, in respect of all other political societies’43—and so too does Twiss.44 
It is towards the end of the period, however, that the most uncompromising definitions of 
sovereignty were produced.  Writing in 1911, Smith defined the State as a sovereign, 
independent society: 
The society must be a sovereign independent state, that is to say, its internal 
control of all persons and things within its territory must be complete and 
exclusive, and its external relations must be independent of the control of any 
other society.45 
Similarly Oppenheim, doubtless the most significant Anglophone international law scholar of 
this period, named sovereignty as one of his four criteria for statehood, defining sovereignty 
as: 
[S]upreme authority, an authority which is independent of any other earthy 
authority.  Sovereignty in the strict and narrowest sense of the term includes, 
therefore, independence all round, within and without the borders of the country.46 
For scholars of this period sovereignty consists of three elements:  independence from the 
control of any one State, independence of the control of a collective of States,47 and exclusive 
jurisdiction within its territory.  To be a sovereign State means an absolute and exclusive 
authority over territory, complete liberty of action within its borders, and liberty of action 
constrained only by those obligations the State has accepted outwith them.  It is this definition 
                                                     
43 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Clarendon Press 1936) 27. 
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45 FE Smith, International Law (4th Edn., J M Dent & Sons Ltd 1911) 27. 
46 Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise - Volume 1: Peace (2nd edn., Longmans, 
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of sovereignty that has become canonical, being considered the orthodox, default or “classic” 
expression of the concept. 
2.3.2.2 The Problem of Obligation 
Such a definition, though, when coupled with a general rejection of natural law as a foundation 
of the legal system, poses a unique problem for scholars of international law:  if it is not 
possible to ground international law in natural law, and there is no sovereign authority with a 
mandate or the ability to impose obligations on the various States, can it truly be said that 
there is an international “law”, properly-so-called, at all?  This is a concern stemming from 
the definition of sovereignty, as Brierly identifies: 
[A] modern development of the theory of sovereignty has been to give up the 
attempt to locate absolute power in any specific person or body within the state 
and to ascribe it to the state itself as a juristic person.  [...]  By doing so it raised a 
formidable difficulty for international law.  For if sovereignty means absolute 
power, and if states are sovereign in that sense, they cannot at the same time be 
subject to law.  [...  I]f the premises are correct there is no escape from the 
conclusion that international law is nothing but a delusion.48 
There can be little doubt that Brierly is correct in his assessment of the problem as a formidable 
one, and for much of the long 19th Century it received surprisingly little attention and achieved 
less in the way of resolution.  While some writers continued to rely to some extent on natural 
law,49 the basis of obligation presented a problem for those writers (the majority) in the 
positivist school, and in many cases the basis of obligation was not addressed.50  Where the 
basis of obligation is considered, it is possible to discern two broad schools of thought.  Some 
writers deny international law’s “legal” character, characterising the discipline as a form of 
                                                     
48 Brierly (n 22) 15–16. 
49 See e.g. Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (3rd edn, Adamante Media 2004); Twiss (n 
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50 TJ Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (MacMillan and Co, Limited 1895) 92 et seq. 
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politics,51 while others rely on a nebulous (and apparently self-constituting) principle of ‘good 
faith’,52 later to be systematised and given fuller expression by Jellinek as the theory of self-
limitation.53 
As a basis for law, however, the idea of good faith alone is deficient. 
Georg Jellinek derived the binding character of the customary rules of 
international law from the “self-limitation” of the states.  By consenting to 
observe the customary rules of international conduct, the states accepted these 
rules of conduct without abandoning their sovereignty.54 
However, it is possible to argue, as Friedmann later would, that Jellinek’s Selbstverpflichtung 
still lacks a theoretical foundation: 
The obvious weakness of this theory is that what states can consent to they can 
also revoke.  The self-limitation of states can derive normative character only 
from an existing rule that a state is bound to keep its promises.  In other words, 
this theory postulates that the pacta sunt servanda principle, in order to constitute 
an effective basis of international law, must stand above the revocable consent of 
states.55 
For writers in the positivist school there appears to be little in the way of answer to this 
criticism.  They are faced with the unpalatable alternatives of accepting the (ineffective, as 
Smith has demonstrated56) political force of international law as the only basis for the 
obligations it purports to apply, or accepting a principle of self-limitation (Selbstverpflichtung) 
which can do no more than establish a temporary and tenuous obligation.  Oppenheim sought 
to address these concerns directly when he pointed out that: ‘It is only theorists who deny the 
possibility of a legal responsibility of States; the practice of the States themselves recognises 
                                                     
51 Twiss (n 44) 146–47. 
52 Phillimore (n 49) 211. 
53 Friedmann (n 7) 85. 
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it distinctly’.57  This can, however, only ever be an incomplete and unsatisfying answer to a 
fundamental question.  In the absence of a grounding principle, it can only be concluded that 
the classic doctrine of sovereignty renders the basis of international law suspect.  This 
conclusion even seems to have been accepted by Oppenheim who, in a rather remarkable 
passage, appears to accept the incoherence of the classic doctrine of sovereignty: 
[The history of the concept of sovereignty shows] that there is not, and never was, 
unanimity regarding this conception.  […]  It is a fact that sovereignty is a term 
used without any well-recognised meaning except that of supreme authority.  
Under these circumstances those who do not want to interfere in a mere scholastic 
controversy must cling to the facts of life and the practical, though abnormal and 
illogical, condition of affairs.58 
What was, however, a ‘mere scholastic controversy’ became, in the early 20th Century, a 
matter of much more significant concern. 
2.4 International Law post 1914 
The long 19th Century ended in 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War.59  Certainly 
these years of brutal war, unprecedented in scale, were a turning point in the development of 
international law.  It was during the inter-war period (1918-1939) that significant movements 
were made towards the creation of a binding international law.  Not least among these was the 
establishment of the League of Nations, and the first genuinely international court – the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).  Although these developments ultimately 
failed—the League of Nations failed to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, and 
was subsequently discredited and disbanded—they laid the groundwork for a second phase of 
                                                     
57 Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise - Volume 1: Peace (Ronald Roxburgh ed, 
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58 ibid 113. 
59 Eric J Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (Pantheon Books 1987) 8–9. 
 SOVEREIGNTY AND OBLIGATION 157 
 
 
international integration and law-building, in the United Nations and the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). 
Following WWI a new model of international law swiftly came to be accepted60 – one that 
presumed international law (as a system rather than as individual rules) to be binding on all 
States, that premised the obligation of the State its consent, that presumed that obligations 
once accepted were not dependent on the will of the State, and which considered that those 
rules were judiciable.  Despite the acceptance of this new system, however, the discourse 
surrounding sovereignty continued unchanged.  The 19th Century conception of sovereignty 
(the definition given by Oppenheim61 may be treated as representative) was almost universally 
accepted,62 and the problem of international legal obligation therefore remained.  During the 
inter-war years and the early part of the 20th Century these concerns were rarely addressed.  A 
general presumption grew around the binding force of international law which, failing 
adequately to consider the underlying conflict between the concepts as they were customarily 
expressed, based the binding force of international law on the consent of the State and, 
ultimately, on sovereignty.  Such was the strength of this presumption, accompanied perhaps 
                                                     
60 JHW Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, Vol. 1:  General Subjects (AW Sijthoff-Leyden 1968) 
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by a very present (and very understandable) sense of the need for a binding international law, 
that the ability of international law to bind States was (largely) accepted without demur. 
It is tempting in the modern day to dismiss the problem of sovereignty as a mere scholastic 
controversy.  As Spiermann observes, ‘it is rather trivial, to a practitioner at least, that 
international law is binding’,63 and a long line of PCIJ and ICJ cases marry together the (on 
the argument here) apparently irreconcilable conclusions that the obligations of States rest 
entirely on their expressed will to be bound, and that an obligation once accepted truly binds 
even an unwilling State.  In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, for example, the ICJ held that: 
The Court would set a precedent with disturbing implications for treaty relations 
and the integrity of the rule pacta sunt servanda if it were to conclude that a treaty 
in force between States, which the parties have implemented in considerable 
measure and at great cost over a period of years, might be unilaterally set aside 
on grounds of reciprocal non-compliance.64 
As Hudson has pointed out,65 States accepted international law as binding during the PCIJ era, 
and the observation appears to hold true during the ICJ era.  It is the case that States largely 
recognise the applicability of international law, but there can nevertheless be little doubt that 
the continued presence of such a fundamental conflict at the heart of international law greatly 
weakens the system as a whole both on a practical and a theoretical level: 
Repeated invocations of the principle pacta sunt servanda and the notion of good 
faith [in the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and the ICJ] bear witness to the conception 
of the state as an international legal subject actually losing ground:  systems 
secure in their normative character do not need to repeat themselves.66 
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In the absence of a more compelling obligation thesis in international law, we are forced to 
content ourselves with ‘a de facto order’.67  While this order has, post 1945, demonstrated a 
‘remarkable stability’,68 Friedmann nevertheless rejects it as deficient, remarking that the 
individual and collective wellbeing of humankind stands on no firmer foundation that a ‘hope 
that a general acceptance of international law […] will by and large insure its continuity’.69  
Comforting though it would be to dismiss these doubts, the concern is warranted: the problem 
of sovereignty, if not satisfactorily resolved, will remain a central weakness in the international 
legal system, which has the very real and visible effect of diminishing the authority and 
effectiveness of law.70 
2.5 The History of Sovereignty: Conclusion 
In the course of its long history the sovereignty idea has undergone a number of shifts and 
changes in meaning.  From its roots in the sacred natural law theory of Bodin, it has been 
instrumentalised by different thinkers for different purposes, and the content given to it has 
accordingly changed.71  Perhaps the most significant of these shifts in meaning came in 1758 
with the publication of Emer de Vattel’s Droit de gens.  There, for the first time, sovereignty 
was equated with independence, a circumstance which then married with the positivist 
revolution of the long 19th Century to produce a doctrine of sovereignty which denied the 
possibility of any external limitation on the sphere of State action save that accepted by the 
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State itself.  This extreme understanding of sovereignty, rightly criticised by Brierly and 
Friedmann, stands in direct conflict with the idea of obligation.72  It was here that the “problem 
of sovereignty” was created, and it is this doctrine of sovereignty which has remained (by and 
large) dominant during the 20th Century.73 
That it remains a part of the legal system does not, however, imply that it necessarily or 
inherently is so.  On the contrary, any suggestion that the 19th Century form of sovereignty is 
immutably tied to the international legal order is doubtful considering the very significant 
changes in meaning that have characterised its history.  Sovereignty’s story lacks the character 
of a “progression towards truth”, or a legitimating historical narrative in the sense described 
by Forst,74 and it seems that the concept is, therefore, at least theoretically subject to change 
its meaning again.  Indeed, it will be argued below (section 4.3) that such a change has at least 
begun. 
3. Theoretical Aspects of Sovereignty 
The mid-late 20th and 21st centuries have seen a growing recognition on the part of 
international legal scholars of the paradoxical (and, one might even say, nonsensical) nature 
of sovereignty, and have seen a greater examination of the theory of the concept.  It has been 
argued here that the history of the concept does not necessitate the existence of sovereignty in 
its modern incarnation.  International legal theorists were, in this period, demonstrating that 
the philosophical inquiry into the concept, similarly, fails to provide modern sovereignty with 
                                                     
72 Hegel (n 10) 268. 
73 Anghie (n 16) 33; but see, contra, Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Human Rights and the Social Construction of 
Sovereignty’ (2001) 27 Review of International Studies 519.  Reus-Smit argues that there has been a shift in the 
course of the 20th Century towards an equation of sovereignty and human rights (i.e., the sovereign State as the 
guarantor of human rights). 
74 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification:  Elements of an Account of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (Flynn tr, 
Columbia University Press 2012). 
 SOVEREIGNTY AND OBLIGATION 161 
 
 
a firm basis.  On the contrary: sovereignty was shown to be internally incoherent.  This section 
considers two of the most significant modern critiques of sovereignty; the functional critique 
of Alf Ross, and Martti Koskenniemi’s argument from incoherence.  
3.1 Ross’s Functional Critique 
Ross criticism of the concept of sovereignty focuses on the many and varied functions it serves 
in international law.  Through an examination of each facet of the concept Ross reveals 
inadequacies and inconsistencies in the doctrine, which he ultimately describes as 
‘mysticism’.75  Ross concludes that the concept should be abandoned, to be replaced with three 
‘positive legal situations created directly by rules of law.’76  These he refers to as self-
government, capacity of action, and liberty of conduct. 
Ross, first, identifies that the concept of sovereignty is traditionally seen as being the 
identifying feature of States in international law (and thus the determining factor in attributing 
international legal personality), as well as the source of certain sovereign rights.77  Ross 
accepts that, when sovereignty is defined as ‘self-government’ it can indeed serve as a 
determiner of statehood.78  He emphatically denies, however, that any “sovereign rights” can 
be deduced from the existence of a self-governing community. 
“Sovereignty” involves no other consequences than that of the “sovereign” 
community being invested with the duties (and rights) called international.  What 
these duties and rights are cannot be deduced from this definition but depend 
solely on the content of the norms of International Law actually in force.79 
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Ross attributes the false conflation of self-government and sovereign rights to the natural law 
tradition which, he argues, sought to derive international law from the will of God and the 
divine right of kings.  This Ross dismisses as ‘mystic[ism]’.80  To this tradition Ross attributes, 
also, the theory of self-limitation, grounded in an artificial, “God-given” supremacy, which he 
regards as an impossibility:  ‘[a]n obligation which is dependent on the will of the person 
bound is no real obligation.’81 
Ross concludes that sovereignty is not capable of determining whether or not an entity is 
entitled to personality under international law, nor capable of grounding the central rights 
associated with statehood.  If statehood means independence, Ross argues, it is incompatible 
with the existence of international law.  In order to have any meaning as a concept, therefore, 
it must stand for a lesser proposition: that of ‘sole subjection to International Law’.82  Such a 
statement cannot provide a basis for statehood, however: 
It is said first that International Law is the law binding upon states; next that states 
are the communities bound solely by International Law.  This is evidently a 
vicious circle.  In order to decide whether or not a community is a (sovereign) 
state we must first know whether or not the rules by which it is bound are 
international.  But to know whether or not a rule is international we must first 
know whether or not the subjects bound by it are (sovereign) states.83 
Ross holds that the rights customarily derived from the existence of sovereignty may be 
grouped into three: self-government, capacity of action, and liberty of conduct.  These he 
addresses in turn, and concludes in each case that it is impossible to derive the right from the 
existence of sovereignty.  Self-government is a substantive, and not a formal question: whether 
an entity has or has not self-government in a practical and substantive sense is a question to 
be determined on the basis of the content of the norms which apply to it.  Norms both 
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amounting to a restriction on self-government and not amounting to such a restriction could 
be contained equally well within a treaty or a constitution.  Thus a “sovereign” State, an entity 
bound only internationally, could conclude a treaty which substantially restricted or removed 
its right to self-government, while a federal entity bound by a constitution could enjoy a much 
greater degree of autonomy.  The same formula is applied to rules restricting an entity’s 
capacity of action, and its liberty of conduct, and Ross reaches the same conclusion: whether 
the rule is international or constitutional does not determine the degree to which it can restrict 
the entity’s capacity.84  The connection between these rights and “sovereignty” is, therefore, 
incidental. 
Ross concludes that the concept of sovereignty should be abandoned, to be replaced by the 
three rights previously identified: self-government, capacity of action, and liberty of conduct. 
[T]he current concept of sovereignty consists of a goodly portion of mysticism 
and a consequent confusion of various real legal functions.  Our task must be to 
overcome the idea of sovereignty as a substance or a unitary quality from which 
various effects follow, and instead present the separate “effects of sovereignty” 
as positive legal situations created directly by rules of law.85 
For Ross sovereignty has a rhetorical rather than substantive content. 
We can, if we like, call a state sovereign when it has self-government, when it has 
capacity of action, or when it has the usual extensive liberty of conduct.  But we 
can never “deduce” any of these things from a certain “quality”, sovereignty, 
which is anything else than the various legal rules determining the position of the 
state in each of the three above-mentioned relations.86 
                                                     
84 ibid 42–43. 
85 ibid 44.  [Emphasis in original].  A modern day echo of this idea can perhaps be seen in Krasner’s disaggregation 
of the concept of sovereignty into four categories (domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, 
international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty).  See, Stephen D Krasner, ‘Problematic 
Sovereignty’ in Stephen D Krasner (ed), Problematic Sovereignty:  Contested Rules and Political Possibilities 
(Columbia University Press 2001) 7–12; Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty:  Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton 
University Press 1999) 9–25.  Werner and de Wilde object to attempts along these lines to disaggregate the 
concept of sovereignty into definite legal rules, arguing that to do so fails to give adequate credence to the 
declarative function of sovereignty (the status of ‘being sovereign’).  In so doing, in the author’s opinion, they 
unduly conflate sovereignty with statehood.  See, Werner and de Wilde (n 71) 297 et seq. 
86 Ross (n 75) 45. 
164 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTRED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
Ross’s functional critique of sovereignty shows that we cannot derive rules which determine 
the character and competence of the State from its “sovereign” character.  Instead, he argues 
we should regard the core rules relating to statehood as distinct norms of international law.  
Ross’s critique of sovereignty is effective in showing that the concept is largely devoid of 
substantive content.  He does not, though, address the legitimacy of the concept as 
conventionally conceived.  In fact, many of the criticisms Ross levels at the concept of 
sovereignty can also be applied to his three rights:  if it is these three rights, for example, that 
determine whether an entity is a State—a legal person under international law—and these 
rights are themselves products of international law, it may be asked whence these rights derive 
their applicability.  Ross does not address this question.  In order to gain a more complete 
philosophical understanding of the concept of sovereignty, therefore, it is necessary to address 
the justifications of the concept in more depth. 
3.2 Sovereignty as Dichotomy – the ‘Legal’ and ‘Pure Fact’ Approaches 
In his ground-breaking monograph, From Apology to Utopia, Koskenniemi identifies two 
philosophical approaches to the concept of sovereignty—the ‘legal’ and the ‘pure fact’ 
approaches—each of which he personifies in a champion, respectively Kelsen and Schmitt.87  
For Schmitt, says Koskenniemi, a ‘State’s power is normative and that power is itself external 
to and constitutive of the law.’88  For Kelsen, by contrast, ‘[f]actual power cannot establish 
what ought to be.  […]  The legal argument is prior to factual power.’89  As Koskenniemi 
observes, both approaches appear to be fundamentally flawed when viewed from within the 
other system of thought.  From within the pure fact approach ‘Schmitt’s system seems 
objective because “realistic” and directed towards concrete observable facts.’  Kelsen’s, 
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meanwhile ‘appears utopian:  his is only a scholar’s subjective construction’.90  From within 
the legal approach, by contrast, ‘Schmitt’s system is subjective because apologist, because it 
assumes that might makes right’, while ‘Kelsen’s own ideas seem objective because detached 
from such considerations.’91  This is a conflict based on the very foundations of the two 
systems:  
But it does not seem possible to take a view about the extent of sovereignty 
without forming an anterior stand on the question of its justification.  This is so 
because there is no “natural” extent to sovereignty.  Its extent can only be 
determined within a conceptual system and the systems provided by the two 
approaches [the pure fact approach and the legal approach] are not only different 
but contradictory.92 
This irreconcilability will be amply demonstrated by an account of the two approaches. 
3.2.1 The Legal Approach 
The legal approach presupposes the existence of “law” before the existence of a claim to the 
bundle of rights and competences called “sovereignty”.  Thus, international law is antecedent 
to the State, constitutes the State, and defines its parameters: 
According to this approach, sovereignty is a quality which is allocated to certain 
entities by international law which, in this sense, is conceptually anterior to them.  
[…]  The law delegates to certain entities the quality of statehood as a sum of 
rights, liberties and competences.93 
According to such a view, there is no difficulty in subjecting States to international law:  by 
their very nature they are and must inescapably be legal subjects.  Clearly, though, such an 
approach must rely on a preceding, or “natural”, law.  The existence of such a natural law—
even in its modern, nontheistic form, usually based upon sociability and common interests94—
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is contested, however.  Without agreement on the validity and content of such a pre-existing 
law the legal approach cannot but appear subjective.  Kelsen argued that the Grundnorm of 
the international legal system is that ‘states should act the way they have customarily acted.’95  
To describe this root as “natural” is, of course, controversial: Kelsen regarded his project as 
positivist in character, and he expressly rejected the application of natural law principles by 
other proponents of the legal approach.96  Nevertheless, Kelsen’s Grundnorm is, like natural 
law, not authorised by a higher norm, but must be ‘presupposed’: 
At some stage, in every legal system, we get to an authorizing norm that has not 
been authorized by any other legal norm, and thus it has to be presupposed to be 
legally valid.  The normative content of this presupposition is what Kelsen has 
called the basic norm.  The basic norm is the content of the presupposition of the 
legal validity of the (first, historical) constitution of the relevant legal system[.]97 
Whether one adopts Kelsen’s Grundnorm or a Grotian/Wolffian pre-existing moral code, 
therefore, the basis of the legal order under the legal approach remains controversial.  While 
the legal approach claims to achieve an objective system by eliminating the politics of ‘might 
makes right’ from international law, its opponents point to its foundational uncertainty as 
evidence of its inherent subjectivity. 
3.2.2 The Pure Fact Approach 
The pure fact approach, by contrast, seeks to exclude the application of natural law, basing 
itself instead on the “objective” fact of pre-existing State liberty.  For the pure fact approach 
all law must be created, it cannot simply exist, and the actor (the State) must logically be prior 
to the law, therefore.  If States are prior to the law, they must have existed in a state of full 
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natural liberty—a state of nature—before they chose to subject themselves to law in order to 
safeguard their liberties and ensure their survival. 
In the pure fact view, ‘law is a means to fulfil the liberty of the State.  This may sometimes 
require the restriction of liberty.  But liberty can only be restricted through an unambiguous 
rule of law.’98  It is clear also that such a law must be contractual or voluntary in character: if 
States have full liberty of action prior to the institution of law they cannot be compelled to 
accept legal limitation.  The creation of law is a political act.  Ross objects to this—which he 
characterises as a species of self-limitation argument—saying that: 
It is readily seen, however, that this construction is impossible.  An obligation 
which is dependent on the will of the person bound is no real obligation.  Either 
we must in all seriousness accept the idea that the state is only bound by its own 
will, but if so there is no real obligation, no real International Law.  Or else we 
must seriously accept the international obligation, but in that case the state is 
bound by other factors that its own will, and the latter then is not “sovereign”.99 
In other words, there is therefore a significant danger of sovereignty under the pure fact 
approach descending into what Koskenniemi calls ‘apologism’: 
[T]he conclusion that a State’s liberty extends to anything the State itself thinks 
appropriate to extend it to.  A fully formal idea of “freedom” is incapable of 
constructing a determinate, bounded conception of statehood as well as giving 
any content to an international order.100 
Like Friedmann, Koskenniemi identifies that a reconciliation between the pure fact approach 
and an international legal order can only be effected by means of pre-existing normative 
content,101 the simplest version of which would be the principle pacta sunt servanda.102  This, 
though, is: 
[…] a descending argument which stood in tension with [the] ascending denial of 
a pre-existing (natural) normative code and the very justification for assuming 
                                                     
98 Koskenniemi (n 87) 239. 
99 Ross (n 75) 39–40. 
100 Koskenniemi (n 87) 225. 
101 ibid. 
102 Friedmann (n 7) 85–86. 
168 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTRED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
that States were “free” in the first place.  Just like individuality can exist only in 
relation to community – and becomes, in that sense, dependent on how it is viewed 
from a non-individual perspective – a State’s sphere of liberty, likewise, seemed 
capable of being determined only by taking a position beyond liberty.  The 
paradox is that assuming the existence of such a position undermines the original 
justification of thinking about statehood in terms of an initial, pre-social liberty.103 
In this Koskenniemi must be taken to be correct.  In order for the pure fact approach to avoid 
subjugating the existence of an obligation to the whim of the State and thus descending into 
apologism, it must accept a startling inconsistency: that the argument from liberty depends on 
a pre-existing limitation on liberty.  It must, therefore, either accept apologism, or arrive at a 
conclusion which invalidates its premises. 
3.3 Koskenniemi’s Critique – Mutual Exclusivity and Mutual Reliance 
Koskenniemi presents a compelling critique of both the legal and pure fact justifications of 
sovereignty, showing that neither is coherent.  The legal approach must rely for its validity on 
the pure fact approach, while the pure fact approach must ground itself in the legal approach.  
While this loop of infinite regress would be amply sufficient on its own to demonstrate the 
incoherence of both justifications, it is compounded by the irreconcilability of the two 
systems: the axioms of the legal approach exclude the application of the pure fact approach, 
and vice versa. 
Using a Dworkin-esque lens of the “hard case”, Koskenniemi first demonstrates that neither 
system can, in and of itself, be applied to a hypothetical dispute between States over the extent 
of sovereignty.104  Neither approach, he considers, is capable of providing a resolution: 
In the pure fact view, law is a means to fulfil the liberty of the State.  This may 
sometimes require the restriction of liberty.  But liberty can be restricted only 
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through an unambiguous rule of law.  If such a rule is lacking, then interpretation 
must give effect to the original liberty in its authenticity.  A problem-solver can 
have no authority, no justification, to decide otherwise.105 
By contrast, under the legal approach: 
[T]here is no such anterior liberty.  Behind law, there is only – law.  If the law is 
ambiguous, we cannot solve the problem otherwise than by constructing from the 
legal materials available the best (most useful, most coherent, most “just”) 
solution possible.  The point is not to give effect to some hypothetical, initial 
“liberty” but to consider what the law says, even if this can be determined only 
“constructively”.106 
As Koskenniemi observes: 
But a choice between these two positions cannot be made.  The former will 
ultimately end up in apologism, affirming the State’s self-definition of the extent 
of its sovereignty.  The dispute will remain unsettled.  The latter will lead into 
utopianism, fixing the extent of sovereignty by reference to a natural, non-State-
related morality.  Neither solution seems acceptable.107 
Under the pure fact approach both States have the competence to determine their own spheres 
of liberty, leaving a decision maker facing two irreconcilable claims of equal validity and 
rendering a decision impossible.  Under the legal approach it is necessary to have recourse to 
natural law.  Such a natural law will, however, inevitably have a highly indeterminate content.  
It must, logically, come prior to States—it constitutes them, and not the other way around—
and must, then, be grounded not in the sociality of States but on a higher plane.  Such a 
conception of natural law will inevitably be controversial, and cannot form an authoritative 
basis for international dispute settlement. 
The alternative to an indeterminate moral code of this kind, says Koskenniemi, is a natural 
code ratified by States.  It would then draw its authority not from its moral content but from 
its universal acceptance.  But this is impossible if, as the legal approach asserts, the law exists 
prior to the State, because the ‘interpretative principles [of the approach] cannot be justified 
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without either assuming the correctness of the pure fact view (and thus accepting self-
contradiction) or some form of moral objectiveness which cannot be justified within the legal 
approach itself.’108  The legal approach, then, necessarily relies on the natural liberty of States, 
and thus relies on the pure fact view.  The pure fact approach, though, also fails to satisfy 
Koskenniemi’s dispute settlement test, because it gives ‘each state […] the final say about 
what constitutes “harm” to it, what violates its liberty.  To hold otherwise would be to assume 
the presence of a material criterion which would overrule liberty – a criterion which the pure 
fact approach has excluded.  […  H]ard cases can only be decided by letting each State do 
what it wishes.’109  Thus, says Koskenniemi, the existence of a code establishing a hierarchy 
of liberties is necessary if dispute settlement of any level is to be possible, and ‘[t]hus we come 
back to the legal approach once again.’110 
Koskenniemi’s critique of the pure fact and legal justifications of sovereignty is both powerful 
and convincing.  He demonstrates that no adjudicator could, either on the pure fact or the legal 
approach to sovereignty, render a verdict which is justified by reasons derived solely from 
within each approach, and to that extent he concludes that neither can offer an objective 
answer.  More troubling, perhaps, he demonstrates that an attempt to reason through either 
approach to its limits in order to decide the case necessarily implicates the other approach:  
although each argument structurally excludes the other, it must ultimately rely on it in a futile 
attempt to cure its own deficiencies.  Any attempt to apply the pure fact or legal approaches 
to any dispute over the extent of sovereignty will therefore result in a cycle of infinite regress.  
In thus invalidating their own premises, both approaches show themselves to be incoherent. 
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One avenue for exploration remains, however.  Koskenniemi’s logic implies a possible route 
out of the pure fact/legal approach vortex, and that is if a satisfying basis can be found for the 
legal approach that does not depend ultimately or only on the creation of legality by States.  
Koskenniemi denies such a possibility, labelling it ‘utopian’ and arguing that such a “natural” 
law would be too indeterminate and controversial satisfactorily to be employed in inter-State 
dispute settlement – his chosen litmus test.111  Nevertheless, Werner and de Wilde see a 
possibility, and they argue that an understanding of sovereignty as a social institution obviates 
this infinitely regressive cycle.112  Their argument conceives of sovereignty as a social fact 
which, when spheres of action overlap, is implemented as a claim-right to justify one or other 
party’s primacy in a particular setting.  Crucially, the audience for that claim is the 
international community, and it is by implicating the addressee that Werner and de Wilde hope 
to move beyond current conceptions of sovereignty.  Rather than conceiving of sovereignty 
(as Ross does) purely as a set of norms, they understand sovereignty as a set of norms premised 
on Searle’s theory of social fact:  that of a right to bear those competences recognised by the 
community to which they are addressed.  Sovereignty, they argue, ‘plays an important role in 
normative discourses by—imaginarily—bridging the gap between “is” and “ought” – a 
successful claim to sovereignty establishes a link between an institutional fact (“being” 
sovereign) and the rights and duties that follow from the existence of this institutional fact.’113  
The act of recognising an entity as a State capable of being sovereign establishes both the “is” 
and the “ought” of its sovereignty simultaneously.  It is submitted, however, that the argument 
made by Werner and de Wilde does not succeed in stepping beyond the apologetic/utopian 
tension Koskenniemi identifies, but instead preserves it.  It is unclear why the claim of right 
made by States under this conception is more objective than any other appeal a State may 
make to justification for its control of a particular sphere (historical, cultural, and so on), and 
                                                     
111 ibid 239. 
112 Werner and de Wilde (n 71).   
113 ibid 284. 
172 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTRED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
that it provides no additional ground on which a decision-maker can stand.  The existence of 
a State-like entity capable of being recognised and the question of a criteria for its recognition 
represent the apologetic and utopian poles of vacillation, preceding from the de facto 
independence of the entity, and the enquiry thus follows the structure of an apologetic 
argument from fact in Koskenniemi’s terms. 
Nevertheless, the appeal to the social seems promising, and in the following section an 
argument on similar footings will be advanced.  Here, though, it will be suggested that the 
social structure of law—through, in particular, the principle of self-determination—results in 
the co-evolution of sovereignty and obligation, which are conceived as mutually constitutive 
and reliant rather than in tension.  It is submitted that, in this way, the utopian/apologetic 
tension can be resolved. 
4. Sovereignty, Obligation and the Self-determination Structural 
Principle 
Koskenniemi’s analysis of the structure of international legal argument is a powerful 
demonstration of the incoherence of the sovereignty idea.  Whether grounded in natural law 
or in the will of States it relies, he argues, on a circular reasoning which entails a rejection of 
its own premises, and denies the possibility of the settlement of international disputes 
according to law.114  Similar concerns led Ross to declare ‘[i]t is a disgrace to us that such an 
obvious absurdity marks the current theory of International Law’,115 and prompted Friedmann 
to utter his Cassandra’s warning, that 
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In due course the international legal order will no doubt either have to be equipped 
with a more clearly established hierarchy of norms, and more powerful sanctions, 
or decline and perish.  The present is an era of either dawn or twilight.116 
The sovereignty idea calls into question the idea of an international law.  As argued above, 
however, these arguments presuppose a particular form of sovereignty, and one which has no 
inherent or necessary connection to the idea of international law, nor to statehood.  On the 
contrary: the problem of sovereignty was a creation of the positivist thought of the long 19th 
century, and need not be understood as a basic or indispensable aspect of international law. 
Indeed, it is argued that this—the external, absolutist—idea of sovereignty is (yet again) 
changing or has changed.  Peters argues that the idea of “humanity” (which she treats as a 
term of art) has precipitated a change in the idea of sovereignty away from its 19th century 
meaning: 
It has become clear that the normative status of sovereignty is derived from 
humanity, understood as the legal principle that human rights, interests, needs, 
and security must be respected and promoted, and that this humanistic principle 
is also the telos of the international legal system.  Humanity is the Α and Ω of 
sovereignty.117 
Other authors, too, have noted that “classical” sovereignty no longer sits comfortably in the 
modern legal order.  Cançado Trindade, for example, has noted that a conception of 
international law purely as a sovereignty-based order between States (the ‘jus inter gentes’) 
now appears to be reductive,118 and ‘entirely unfounded.’119  Similarly, Hafner has identified 
a number of developments, as a result of which ‘the whole fabric of international law has 
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become more individual-oriented’,120 Knop speaks of a possible ‘trend away from the rhetoric 
of statism towards some form of liberal agenda’ in international law,121 and Jackson has 
suggested the wholesale replacement of the idea of “sovereignty” with the term “sovereignty-
modern”122 in order to separate the modern form of the idea from its ‘antiquated’ 
predecessor.123  The notion has even found an approving reception in the jurisprudence of 
international courts: 
The State-sovereignty approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-
oriented approach.  Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa ius 
constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a 
firm foothold in the international community as well.124 
Moreover, that the meaning of sovereignty has changed, is changing, and will (almost 
certainly) continue to change should not be surprising.  As argued above, like all facets of 
socially constructed reality sovereignty is subject to recursive creation, and its nature will 
inevitably change as a result of system agents’ shifting expectations and perceptions of social 
reality.125  It was argued that ongoing changes in the modern international legal system (its 
“humanisation”) can be explained by a shift in the structural principles which underpin the 
system as a whole:  that the international legal system is now premised on the idea of self-
determination.  This structural principle, in turn, conditions and shapes the interactions of the 
structural properties of the system, including both the concept of sovereignty and the concept 
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of International Law 782, 785. 
123 ibid 790.  See also O’Donoghue, who discusses the shift away from the Westphalian model of State sovereignty 
in the context of constitutionalisation:  Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘International Constitutionalism and the State’ (2013) 
11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1021. 
124 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), ICTY-94-1 (2 
October 1995), [97]. 
125 See above p.21-23. 
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of obligation.  In order to test the hypothesis of this thesis two questions are therefore posed:  
first, whether a conception of sovereignty and obligation which has its roots in self-
determination offers a more coherent account of the two ideas (both on their own and in their 
interaction); and, secondly, whether a self-determination-based idea of sovereignty and 
obligation can explain the changes in the international legal system identified by courts and 
scholars.  It will be concluded both that it does, and that it can, and that the hypothesis is thus, 
to that extent, supported. 
4.1 Self-Determination and Sovereignty 
This section will argue that the sovereign character of States derives from their social nature:  
the collectivisation of individuals into a social structure creates an aggregated, accreted right 
of self-determination (the political form of self-determination126), which stands for the 
proposition that it is the people of the society and no others who are entitled to determine the 
principles which underpin their social and political organisation (or, put another way, their 
social conception of the good).  These moral claims of societies are transformed on the 
international plane into a right of States to non-interference in internal matters, and a necessary 
subjection to law. 
It is commonplace in a certain tradition of liberal political theory to treat the rights of the State 
as an aggregation of the delegated rights of individuals.  The best known example of this 
school is perhaps Hobbes’s theory of the creation of political society, whereby individuals in 
the state of nature contract with others to form a society for their mutual protection, ceding to 
the Leviathan a portion of their natural liberty in order to safeguard the greater part of their 
                                                     
126 See above p.7-12. 
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rights.127  Similar ideas can be discerned in Pufendorf’s contract,128 Grotius’s sociability,129 
and the consent theories of Locke and Rousseau.130  Each of these authors considers it 
straightforward that an individual may, by their consent, cede a portion of their liberty to the 
State, and thus imbue it with the right to act in certain ways. 
These accounts have been criticised, not least because it is difficult or impossible to discern, 
in most societies, a “consent moment” of this kind, and because it is difficult to justify why 
such a moment—if and where it has occurred—would legitimate the power of the State over 
future generations of people.  It is problematic too, following Hume, to discern why such 
consent should be effective unless individuals (both at the moment of the contract and in future 
generations) have a viable alternative.131  While it may be that in some places and at some 
times the consent theory of the creation of government and social order has offered a full and 
satisfying explanation of sovereignty (this chapter offers no opinion on that question), it seems 
clear that it cannot provide an explanation that is widely or universally applicable.  Self-
determination, on the other hand, offers a plausible explanation. 
Start, as argued above, from the premise that individuals have the right individually to self-
determine – that is, to the highest standard of freedom and well-being consistent with the same 
level of those goods being available to others, in order to realise their capacity as a rational 
                                                     
127 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck ed, Cambridge University Press 1991) §87. 
128 Pufendorf (n 25) 629–39. 
129 Grotius (n 23) 93, 665–66. 
130 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed, Cambridge University Press 1960) §7, 95, 128-
131; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Maurice William Cranston ed, Penguin 1968) §3, 6; Michael 
DA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1994) 101–08. 
131 David Hume, ‘Of the Original Contract’ in Knud Haakonssen (ed), Hume:  Political Essays (Cambridge 
University Press 1994) 263. 
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agent to live a life consistent with the reasons presented to them by their nested practical 
identities as being most in accordance with the realisation of their personhood.132  Although 
this idea of personal self-determination is an individual right, it is not individualistic; rather it 
is inherently social.  It transforms, by means of an internal and external dialectic (that is, an 
inter-personal, social) process, the natural desire of the individual for the basic preconditions 
of the exercise of human agency into a right to the highest generally achievable forms of those 
goods both by means of an appeal to the universal value individuals are thus enjoined to place 
upon humanity (that is, the capacity as a rational agent to live a life structured by reasons) and 
by means of an appeal to consistency.133  It is therefore a right which is exercised in a social 
setting: a lone individual has no right to self-determination.  Their self-determination is a 
meaningless concept, given that their freedom of action is both entirely free from the constraint 
of any other will, and that it is vastly limited by the capacity of one alone to shape the world 
and by the necessities of survival. 
The presence of the individual in a social setting gives meaning to the idea of self-
determination, but it also presents challenges.  Hobbes’s famous warning that absent the 
regulation of violence human life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’,134 
reminiscent also of Pufendorf’s assertion that in the absence of law ‘[w]e should see nothing 
by a furious Multitude of Wolves, of Lions, of Dogs tearing and devouring one another’,135 
presents a very bleak picture of humans, but one that is all too believable.  As Pufendorf 
continues: 
                                                     
132 See above p.7-8; Korsgaard Christine M, The Sources of Normativity (Onora O’Neill ed, Cambridge University 
Press 1996). 
133 See above p.9-11. 
134 Hobbes (n 127) §62. 
135 Pufendorf (n 25) 100. 
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[…] or rather, a Monster more pernicious and more spiteful than the fiercest of 
these Creatures; since Man, of all Living Things, is the most able to hurt Man, 
and, if left to his own furious Passions, the most willing.136 
Although the dialectic process which establishes self-determination entails that each 
individual must recognise and concede the same rights to others as they claim for themselves, 
it would be both naïve and contrary to historical experience to expect this principle of internal 
consistency alone to provide an adequate degree of assurance of the rights of individuals.  
Some form of social regulation and ordering—perhaps in the form of law, law-making and 
law enforcing institutions—may be posited, therefore, and that necessarily implies a concept 
of jurisdiction.137  In other words, the idea of law implies and requires that it be possible to 
determine to whom the obligations of the system apply, and who and where an individual is 
entitled to claim the protection of them.  It is to this idea that Kelsen refers in his description 
of law as a social technique:  law applies to a particular society, and therefore requires an 
understanding of membership of a society – of who is, and who is not, a part of it.138 
The laws and socio-political institutions of a society are specific techniques whereby the 
freedom and well-being of the individuals who compose it—that is to say, their self-
determination—are preserved, maintained, and enhanced.  The form that these institutions will 
take will be dependent on the particular needs of the individuals who comprise that society, 
and is the product of an ongoing process of choice of the form of socio-political organisation 
that best serves the needs of that social collective.  The self-determination of the individuals 
                                                     
136 ibid. 
137 Jurisdiction is not, here, intended to convey the sense of jurisdiction over territory, but rather is used in the more 
nebulous sense of sphere of application.  It attaches primarily to the idea of the society—the polity—and only 
secondarily to the State as an international idea.  For a feminist critique of and review of the literature relating 
to the idea of boundedness and of territorial jurisdiction in international law see Knop (n 121) 325–32. 
138 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State (Anders Wedberg tr, Lawbook Exchange 1999) 19.  It is 
perhaps to this idea that Walker alludes when he defines sovereignty as a claim concerning ‘the identity and 
status of the particular polity qua polity [which seeks] to provide a continuing source and vehicle of ultimate 
authority for the juridical order of that polity.’  Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in Neil 
Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2003) 6.  [Emphasis omitted]. 
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who compose a society—its members—is implicated in its forms and structures both in that 
it exists for and in order to protect them and their rights, and to the extent that the forms and 
structures of socio-political organisation that are in place are the expression of an ongoing 
collective choice.  It therefore follows that to impose from outside a society a different choice 
(or to restrict the freedom of choice) would be to substitute the competence of the members 
of society for that of non-members.  In other words, it would be to sever the link between the 
society and the self-determination of its members. 
The aggregated, accreted self-determination rights of the individuals in a society therefore 
stand for the proposition that it is the members of a society who have the right to decide on 
what principles that society is run.  This may be referred to as political self-determination, 
which guarantees the rights of a society to determine its own form of social and political 
organisation, guarantees the principle of non-intervention, and underpins its jurisdiction over 
its people and territory.139  These are ideas which, as discussed in Part 1, are now deeply 
embedded in the structure of international law, perhaps most notably in the matched pair of 
self-determination provisions in the Charter of the United Nations—article 1(2), and article 
2(4)140—and in the Declaration on Friendly Relations.141  A theory of sovereignty based on 
self-determination therefore returns the idea of sovereignty, to an extent, to its pre-Vattelian 
                                                     
139 Significantly, this is not an argument that the State has a right of self-determination as if it were an individual 
itself, but rather that it has certain rights and competences qua a group of individuals, who are the ultimate 
bearers of the rights involved.  It is true to say that the State is a “person” only in the sense of a term of art 
denoting international legal subjecthood.  For an excellent discussion of this distinction see Knop (n 121) 319–
28. 
140 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed 24 October 1945, in force 
24 October 1945. 
141 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relation and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, annexed to UNGA Res 2625(XXV) 24 October 1970. 
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content; defining it as the right of a society to internal self-government, and its right to be free 
from intervention and coercive or forcible control. 
4.2 Self-Determination and Obligation 
Like sovereignty, it has been argued that obligation is one of the structural properties of the 
international legal system – that is to say, the basic and vital concepts which shape the system 
as it currently exists.  It too, it is argued, is conditioned by (and, indeed, has its roots in) the 
structural principle of the system:  self-determination. 
The aggregated personal self-determination rights of the individuals living in a political 
community give rise to certain basic rights of that community, it has been argued, which may 
be referred to as political self-determination.  This principle of political self-determination 
gives rise to certain moral rights of States on the international plane—those which have been 
described above as the State’s sovereignty.  That principle, too, is the basis of the concept of 
obligation.  Those rights, far from standing in opposition to or in conflict with the idea of law, 
require a conception of it.  As with the rights of individuals within States, the effective 
protection of the moral rights of States to independence, non-interference and integrity 
necessarily implies a form of regulation.  Support for that proposition can be found in a number 
of philosophical approaches to the ordering of societies. 
It may, first, be found in the concept of consistency.  Any State which claims for itself the 
protection of its independence and integrity from the intervention and interference of others 
on the basis of its political self-determination, must necessarily recognise the rights of other 
political self-determination units to the same protections, if it is to be consistent.  Any 
argument grounded in a claim of right—that is to say, any argument which goes beyond the 
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threat of force—must necessarily have this generalisable structure, recognising as sufficient 
in others that which is claimed as the basis for one’s own claim.142 
Support may be found, too, in the contractual theories of law creation of Hobbes and 
Pufendorf, in which recognition of the personal sovereignty, so to speak, of the individual 
through the control of violence is a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a social order.  
Hobbes declares that, in pursuit of security of person and freedom from fear, 
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and 
defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; 
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other 
men against himselfe.143 
Similar protections of the individual from the control of others are the product of Rawls’s veil 
of ignorance thought experiment,144 of Finnis’s exploration of practical reasonableness,145 and 
are a common theme in natural law theory.146 
Obligation, then, is a direct product of self-determination, transforming moral rights-claims 
into rules of law which seek to protect basic independence and integrity.  Such a step is vital 
in securing for each person those goods at the individual and societal level, and may be 
generalised to inter-State relations.147  Without it, as Smith observed, the extent to which those 
rights can be realised becomes a question of what force may be mobilised in their defence: 
                                                     
142 It was this principle that Kant called the categorical imperative:  that I take for myself no principle of morality 
that I cannot will to be a universal law:  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Paul Guyer and Allen W 
Wood eds, Cambridge University Press 1998) 217 (4: 416). 
143 Hobbes (n 127) §64-65. 
144 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press 1973). 
145 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press 2011). 
146 See, for example, the discussion of Vattel’s minimum content of natural law, above p.149; Freeman (n 130) 
101–08.   
147 Indeed, Hobbes, Pufendorf and Vattel all explicitly make this step. 
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Can it be said without absurdity to a small state injured by a great one, “Your 
cause is just:  be not concerned at the poverty of your resources: in international 
disputes all states are equal:  war, however, is the only litigation we know, and 
equality ends when you enter its court”?148 
Far from conflicting with sovereignty, then, obligation finds its roots in the same source.  They 
are mutually constitutive and mutually reinforcing, and are both vital for the realisation of 
political and personal self-determination. 
This section has discussed and defended the proposition that self-determination offers a 
compelling and coherent basis for the principles of sovereignty and obligation, both in and of 
themselves and in their interaction.  The final section of this chapter will now consider the 
second question posed above:  whether a self-determination-based idea of sovereignty and 
obligation can contribute to an explanation of the changes in the international legal system 
identified by courts and scholars.  It will be argued that the ongoing process of humanisation 
of international law provides ample support for the suggestion that the meaning of sovereignty 
in modern day international law is evolving, and that self-determination-based sovereignty is 
becoming the dominant meaning of the term in international law. 
4.3 Sovereignty, Obligation and the Humanisation of International Law 
The process of the humanisation of international law is, and has been, both marked and 
precipitated by a gradual shift in the ways in which system structures and actors act towards 
and regard the individual, including changes of significance for the idea of sovereignty.  These 
will be examined, in order to show that international law’s understanding of sovereignty and 
                                                     
148 Smith (n 45) 37.  On this point see further Bianchi, who criticises the sovereignty-derived doctrine of State 
immunity from the enforcement of international law by municipal courts:  Andrea Bianchi, ‘Serious Violations 
of Human Rights and Foreign States’ Accountability before Municipal Courts’ in Lal Chand Vohrah and others 
(eds), Man’s Inhumanity to Man:  Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law 
International 2003); Andrea Bianchi, ‘The Game of Interpretation in International Law:  The Players, the Cards, 
and Why the Game is Worth the Candle’ in Andrea Bianchi and others (eds), Interpretation in International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2015). 
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obligation is increasingly consonant with the self-determination-based version of the concepts 
set out above.  Three elements will be discussed:  the emphasis on non-intervention in the 
Charter and related documents, restrictions on the scope of territorial integrity in the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion, and the decline in the authority of the Lotus interpretation of sovereignty. 
4.3.1 The Charter and Non-Intervention 
The legal regime established by the Charter of the United Nations was a direct response to the 
horrors of World War Two.  At the dawn of the post-war era, the original signatory States 
committed to a treaty which declared the use of international force to be illegal, save where 
exercised in self-defence or where authorised by the Security Council.  Article 2(4) contained 
the relevant provision, which declared to be illegal ‘the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state’.149  It has been argued above that 
this provision is a mirror image of the Article 1(2) declaration that the self-determination of 
peoples is one of the principles to which members of the United Nations commit, jointly and 
severally.150  Taken together, these provisions are a guarantee of the principle of political self-
determination: that the form of political and social organisation of a State is a matter for the 
people of that State, and for no others.  Notably it is to this idea—that States exist as internally 
independent entities under law—that the Charter refers, and not to the more expansive doctrine 
of sovereignty which characterised 19th and early 20th Century accounts. 
These themes were subsequently developed in the Declaration on Friendly Relations.151  This 
document, which has been said by the ICJ to reflect customary law,152 was adopted by the 
                                                     
149 Charter of the United Nations (n 140). 
150 See above, p.75-81. 
151 Declaration on Friendly Relations (n 141). 
152 As argued above, it appears likely that the Court found that the Declaration is customary as a whole, and it is at 
least clear that it reflects customary law in large part.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against 
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General Assembly on the 24th October 1970 in ‘[d]eep[] convi[ction] that the adoption of the 
Declaration […] would contribute to the strengthening of world peace and constitute a 
landmark in the development of international law’.153  The Declaration proclaimed a number 
of principles, including a restatement of the Article 2(4) injunction against the ‘threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’,154 as well as 
the specific injunction that States shall ‘not intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State’.155  Under that heading, the Declaration states that ‘[e]very State has 
an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without 
interference in any form by another State.’156  Here, too, the rights of States appear to be drawn 
in a way which is consistent with the description of sovereignty given above. 
The International Human Rights Covenants also endorse a doctrine of State sovereignty that 
is consistent with the self-determination-based account.  Article 1 is common to both 
Covenants, and provides that ‘[a]ll peoples have a right to self-determination.  By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.’157  It was concluded above that this statement was intended by the 
States Parties who participated in drafting the convention to refer to the rights of States qua a 
group of people socially and politically organised.158  In other words, the right to self-
                                                     
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment, (1986) ICJ Reports 14, [188]; Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion 
(2010) ICJ Reports 403, [80]; above, p.88-89. 
153 Declaration on Friendly Relations (n 141). 
154 ibid Principle 1. 
155 ibid Principle 2. 
156 ibid. 
157 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, signed 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3, article 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed 16 December 1966, 
in force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171, article 1(1). 
158 See above, p.85-88. 
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determination to which the Covenant refers is the political form of the right, which applies to 
the people of a State as a whole and guarantees the members of a society the choice of the 
forms of social and political structure which they wish to implement.  That the right is 
recognised and the link so explicitly made to the right of the people to determine their political 
status is another indication that the self-determination-derived right of internal sovereignty 
described above has been accepted in international law. 
That the right to internal sovereignty has been accepted does not demonstrate that the 19th 
Century conception of sovereignty has been superseded, however.  In the next sections aspects 
of the external sovereignty of States will be examined, in order to show that 19th Century 
sovereignty is waning, and being replaced by an internal conception of sovereignty that is 
consistent with the self-determination-based version described above. 
4.3.2 Territorial Integrity 
As Kohen has noted, territorial integrity has long been seen as an indispensable aspect of a 
State’s sovereignty: 
For States, respect of their territorial integrity is paramount.  This is a consequence 
of the recognition of their equal sovereign character.  One of the essential 
elements of the principle of territorial integrity is to provide a guarantee against 
any dismemberment of the territory.  It is not only the respect of the territorial 
sovereignty, but of its integrity.159 
Pellet goes further, arguing that the principle of territorial integrity has acquired ius cogens 
status.160  Doubt was cast on the scope and future applicability of the principle, however, in 
the course of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.  Although 
the Court heard strong voices (including Azerbaijan, China, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and 
                                                     
159 Marcelo G Kohen, ‘Introduction’ in Marcelo G Kohen (ed), Secession:  International Law Perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 6. 
160 Alain Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee:  A Second Breath for the Self-Determination 
of Peoples’ (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 178, 180. 
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Spain) in support of the proposition that States’ territorial integrity is absolute and that they 
are entitled to its unconditional protection as a matter of international law, it held that 
territorial integrity is ‘confined to the sphere of relations between States’.161  That conclusion, 
it was argued, represents a substantial shift in the understanding of the scope and source of 
territorial integrity, and one that was insufficiently justified by the Court.162 
Significantly, however, such a definition of territorial integrity would be consonant with the 
self-determination-based concept of sovereignty.  Although States are entitled to the 
protection of their territory from external actors (from non-members of the polity), the 
aggregated self-determination of the members of the society does not provide the State with a 
protection against its own membership.  This is, as Jovanović argues, a change in the meaning 
of territorial integrity, with the concept previously being understood as a right which protected 
the State against all.163  There are indications, too, that this dramatic change in the 
understanding of territorial integrity persists beyond the Opinion of the Court, having been 
employed subsequently by States.164  Such a change lends support to the self-determination-
                                                     
161 Kosovo (n 152) [80]. 
162 See above, p.120-124. 
163 Miodrag Jovanović, ‘After the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo:  The Future of Self-Determination Conflicts’ 
[2012] Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade - International Edition 292, 300–02. 
164 Compare, for example, the language used in Russia’s Written Statement to the Court in the course of the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion, and the justification it gave for its actions in Crimea before the Security Council.  In the first 
setting it argued that 
‘The Declaration of independence [sic.] sought to establish a new State through separation of a part 
of the territory of the Republic of Serbia.  It was therefore, prima facie, contrary to the requirement 
of preserving the territorial integrity of Serbia. 
‘Territorial integrity is an unalienable aspect of a State’s Sovereignty.’ 
(Written Statement of the Russian Federation, 16 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [76-77].)  Russia then cited with approval Pellet’s 
contention that the principle of territorial integrity ‘has today acquired the character of a universal, and 
peremptory, norm.’  (Pellet (n 160) 180, in Written Statement of Russia, [78].) 
There is a marked contrast to Russia’s argument in the second setting, that: 
‘In each particular case, one must seek the right balance between the principles of territorial 
integrity and the right to self-determination.  It is clear that the achievement of the right to self-
determination in the form of separation from an existing State is an extraordinary measure.  
However, in the case of Crimea, it obviously arose as a result of the legal vacuum created by the 
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based concept of sovereignty, and thus to the contention that there has been a deeper shift in 
the underlying properties and principles of the system. 
4.3.3 The Dictum in Lotus 
In its infamous dictum in the Lotus case of 1927, the PCIJ declared that the rules of 
international law applying to States ‘emanate from their own free will’.165  For this reason, it 
said, States retain an expansive liberty of action ‘which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules’.166  This reading of the structure of international law has been understood as 
a declaration that States have an absolute right to undertake any action which is not expressly 
prohibited by international law, and it reinforces the readings of international legal obligation 
as based solely on the consent of States.  Brierly described the reasoning as being ‘based on 
the highly contentious metaphysical proposition of the extreme positivist school that the law 
emanates from the free will of sovereignty independent states, and from this premiss [sic.] 
they argued that restrictions on the independence of states cannot be presumed.’167  The rule 
in Lotus was for many years regarded as definitive of international obligation, and to an extent 
is so still.168  There are, nevertheless, signs that it may be losing its applicability. 
                                                     
violent coup against the legitimate Government carried out by nationalist radicals in Kyiv, as well 
as by their direct threats to impose their order throughout the territory of Ukraine.’ 
(Mr Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Security Council, Security 
Council, Official Records, 69th Year, 7134th Meeting, 13 March 2014, S/PV.7134, 15.) 
165 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” PCIJ, Series A, No.10, 18. 
166 ibid 19. 
167 Brierly (n 8) 143–44. 
168 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 33; Dinah Shelton, 
‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in Malcom D Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2014) 139. 
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In his Declaration to the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, President Bedjaoui discussed in detail the application of the Lotus principle to 
international law, finding its ability to describe the modern legal system wanting.  In those 
proceedings the Court held that it was unable fully to answer the question, concluding that ‘it 
cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival 
would be at stake.’169  Bedjaoui was at pains to stress that the Court’s opinion should not be 
read as an application of the Lotus principle, but rather as a point on which the Court felt 
unable to rule in either direction – a non liquet.  This he contrasted to the approach of the PCIJ: 
‘[w]heras the Permanent Court gave the green light of authorization, having found in 
international law no reason for giving the red light of prohibition, the present Court does not 
feel able to give a signal either way.’170  On the contrary, Bedjaoui argues that the Advisory 
Opinion marks a definite break with the Lotus tradition, in that the Court—having found no 
express prohibition—chose not to draw any legal consequences from the absence of that 
prohibition.171  ‘No doubt this [the Lotus] decision expressed the spirit of the times’,172 
Bedjaoui argues, but: 
It scarcely needs to be said that the face of contemporary international society is 
markedly altered.  […]  The resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of 
international law still current at the beginning of the century—and which the 
Permanent Court did not fail to endorse in the aforementioned Judgment—has 
been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a law more readily 
seeking to reflect a collective juridical conscience and respond to the social 
necessities of States organized as a community.’173 
                                                     
169 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, (1996) ICJ Reports 226, [97]. 
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171 ibid [15]. 
172 ibid [12]. 
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The suggestion that the international legal order has changed since the handing down of the 
Lotus decision is taken up also by others.  In the same case, Judge Weermantry argued that 
Lotus no longer reflects the reality of modern international law.  He declared that ‘[i]n the half 
century that has elapsed since the “Lotus” case, it is quite evident that international law [… 
has] developed considerably, imposing additional restrictions on State sovereignty over and 
above those that existed at the time of the “Lotus” case.’174  The same theme appears in the 
Declaration of Judge Simma to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion—where he described reliance 
on the Lotus logic as a ‘reverti[on]’ to a ‘nineteenth-century positivism’ which is not 
appropriate to the modern day175—and may also be found in the writings of academics.  For 
Hilpold, ‘[u]nlike the situation prevailing a century ago, international law is now far more 
dense and no longer regulates state behaviour primarily by prohibitive rules.  State interaction 
is far too complex [for] such an approach to be sufficient.’176  Similar statements may be found 
in the work of Higgins (writing in an extra-judicial capacity),177 Frowein,178 Mann,179 and 
Hertogen, who argues that the expansive interpretation usually taken for the principle was in 
any event not the meaning intended by the PCIJ.180 
                                                     
174 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weermantry, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
(1996) ICJ Reports 429, 495-496. 
175 Declaration of Judge Simma, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (2010) ICJ Reports 478, [8]. 
176 Peter Hilpold, ‘The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo:  Perspectives of a Delicate 
Question’ (2009) 14 Australian Review of International and European Law 259, 287. 
177 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘International Trade Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes’ (1991) 
230 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 9, 114. 
178 Jochen A Frowein, ‘Kosovo and Lotus’ in Ulrich Fastenrath (ed), From Bilateralism to Community Interest:  
Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press 2011) 923. 
179 FAP Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1964) 111 Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law 1, 35. 
180 An Hertogen, ‘Letting Lotus Bloom’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 901, 902–03. 
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However, the Lotus principle is not quite dead: as Hernández has observed, it has been 
‘resuscitat[ed]’.181  Although (as noted above) in other respects the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
lends itself to an interpretation of sovereignty that is consistent with the account given here, 
in this regard it presents a significant challenge.  The Court took the view that in order to 
demonstrate that the unilateral declaration of independence was compliant with international 
law it was necessary only to discuss whether the act was expressly prohibited by any rule of 
law.182  The Court’s reasoning on this point has been criticised by Hernández, who comments 
that 
Discarding all intermediate views, the Court arguably took the view that 
international law was a gapless legal order, but it did so in the most 
straightforward manner, adhering to the binary conception of international law in 
the mould of the Lotus judgement, and not, for example, examining the 
possibilities of negative permissions and prohibitions and of legal neutrality.183 
The approach has also been characterised as outdated by other academic commentators,184 and 
received withering condemnation in the Declaration of Judge Simma, who noted of the 
majority’s reasoning that ‘[u]nder these circumstances, even a clearly recognized positive 
entitlement to declare independence, if it existed, would not have changed the Court’s answer 
in the slightest.’185 
It is not universally agreed that the Kosovo Advisory Opinion invoked the Lotus principle, 
however.  Müller gives a different interpretation: that the Court was providing an answer 
strictly to the question that was asked of it.  According to Müller, the majority in that case 
                                                     
181 Gleider I Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (Oxford University Press 
2014) 265. 
182 Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 152) [56].  For a discussion and criticism of this aspect of the Court’s Opinion see 
above, p.117-119. 
183 Hernández (n 181) 265.  [Footnotes omitted]. 
184 See e.g. Frowein (n 178); Hilpold (n 176). 
185 Declaration of Judge Simma (n 175) [8]. 
 SOVEREIGNTY AND OBLIGATION 191 
 
 
understood “accordance with” in the sense of the absence of a prohibition, but that it did not 
make the subsequent argumentative leap of equating the absence of prohibition with 
authorisation.186  Thus, the majority’s decision that the declaration of independence ‘did not 
violate’ international law should be read narrowly, as an incomplete answer to a partial 
question:187 one of, as Müller puts it, ‘illegality and non-illegality’, and not of illegality and 
legality.188 
Müller’s reading of the Advisory Opinion is ultimately unconvincing.  The distinction he 
draws between illegality/non-illegality and illegality/legality preserves rather than avoids the 
Lotus principle, particularly in the circumstances of the case – where the question was not 
academic, but rather was immediate and concerned an act against the integrity of a State.  It is 
more convincing, in the author’s opinion, to argue that the Court did fall back on the tired 
crutch of the Lotus principle—perhaps as a way of avoiding the more contentious aspects of 
the question189—but, with Simma and others, to criticise that reliance as outdated and no 
longer appropriate to the international order in which it sits.  It is to be hoped that Kosovo was 
an outlier, the final “hurrah!” of a doctrine on the cusp of obsolescence, and that future actions 
by States and judicial pronouncements will reflect its continued (if non-linear) decline.  
Certainly such would be the outcome recommended by a self-determination-based 
understanding of obligation and sovereignty.  The general direction of travel described here is 
a(nother) factor which lends some support to this reading of these concepts, and it will 
                                                     
186 Daniel Müller, ‘The Question Question’ in Marko Milanović and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and Politics of 
the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (Oxford University Press 2015) 131. 
187 Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 152) [123(3)]. 
188 Müller (n 186) 132. 
189 See above, p.117-119. 
192 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTRED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
therefore need to be seen whether the Kosovo Opinion alters that general trend over the coming 
years and decades. 
4.3.4 The Humanisation of Sovereignty and Obligation: Conclusion 
This section has discussed three modern developments in international law, in order to assess 
whether the international legal concept of sovereignty as understood in the practice of Courts, 
States and International Organisations is changing.  There are indications that it is so and, 
moreover, that it appears to be increasingly consonant with the self-determination-based 
understanding of the concepts set out here.  It is not, however, a homogenous picture.  In 
particular, the Opinion of the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Proceedings stands out as a reversion 
to an older understanding of sovereignty and the international legal system.  That retrograde 
step is not overly troubling to the thesis presented here, however.  The humanisation of 
international law is generally characterised as ongoing and gradual (Tomuschat describes it as 
‘a crawling process’,190 while Peters argues it is more appropriate to say that international law 
is ‘humanising’ than that it has been ‘humanised’191), and it is reasonable to assume that such 
a process will not always be linear.  While the Kosovo example is not dispositive, therefore, it 
will be necessary to follow developments and, over the coming years and decades, to assess 
whether the direction of travel supports the conclusions drawn here. 
5. Conclusion 
The idea of the humanisation of international law maintains that the international legal system 
is in flux.  There is an ongoing transformation which is reorienting international law around 
the individual—the human person—rather than around the interests of States and their Princes.  
                                                     
190 Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Law:  Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’ 
(1999) 281 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 9, 162. 
191 Peters (n 117) 8. 
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Powerful and far-reaching claims have been made of the changes occasioned by this process, 
perhaps none more so than Peters’s declaration that in the modern international legal system 
‘[h]umanity is the Α and Ω of sovereignty.’192  This thesis argues that the mechanism for this 
transformation is a shift in the structural principle which underpins the system, and that self-
determination now serves that purpose in international law.  Such a change, it has been argued, 
will affect the structural properties of the system—the second level of system concepts which 
give shape to the system which is built upon them—and that changes at this level will both 
cause and will be precipitated by substantive shifts in the day-to-day operation of international 
law in accordance with Giddens’s theory of recursive social action.  Two of those structural 
properties have been considered here: sovereignty and obligation. 
This chapter has shown that the doctrines of sovereignty and obligation often taken to be 
representative of the modern content of those concepts are not an inherent or immutable part 
of international law.  Rather, these are concepts the meaning of which has shifted over time, 
and has changed in particular in response to alterations in the foundations of the legal system.  
A significant shift was identified in the transition from the natural law of the 18th century to 
the positivism of the 19th, and it was here that the problem of sovereignty—or the apparent 
irreconcilability of the 19th century’s expansive conception of sovereignty with international 
law properly-so-called—came into being.  That 19th century concept of sovereignty was shown 
to be philosophically incoherent, and to perpetuate a normative conflict which reduces the 
practical and theoretical authority of international law.  Ross, quite rightly, concludes that 
It is a disgrace to us that such an obvious absurdity marks the current theory of 
International Law.193 
Such an understanding of the concept is either meaningless, or makes meaningless 
international legal obligation.  Friedmann has argued that: 
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In due course the international legal order will no doubt either have to be equipped 
with a more clearly established hierarchy of norms, and more powerful sanctions, 
or decline and perish.  The present is an era of either dawn or twilight.194 
By contrast, this chapter has presented a conception of sovereignty and obligation as parallel 
and mutually supportive concepts which find their roots in the idea of self-determination.  It 
was found that not only are the concepts of sovereignty and obligation as described here more 
internally coherent and better grounded, they marry together and reinforce each other rather 
than being in an irresolvable utopian/apologetic conflict.  Furthermore, the polity-focused 
understanding of sovereignty and an effective concept of obligation are consonant with a 
number of developments in the understanding of sovereignty discernible in the practice of 
Courts, States and International Organisation in recent years.  Although this is not a 
homogenous picture, it seems eminently plausible that the ongoing humanisation of 
international law (which most authors describe as a gradual process) will produce an 
increasing number of instances in which this is so.  It therefore appears that the concepts of 
sovereignty and obligation as they are now developing in international practice are more 
accurately described by a self-determination-based understanding, than by the 19th century’s 
incoherent idea of illimitable State power. 
It may be concluded, then, that the examination of sovereignty and obligation given here 
supports the hypothesis of this thesis; that self-determination should now be understood as the 
structural principle of the international legal system, and that it is driving the humanisation of 
international law.  Certainly in this area, in relation to a concept traditionally seen as the 
apogee of the State, it is not the State, but rather the human, which appears to be at the centre 
of the international law world.  The discussion, however, raises further questions about what 
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States are and how they come to be international legal subjects, and these will be the subject 
of the next chapter. 
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Four 
Statehood, Personality and Self-
Determination 
Girders held up the roof; earnest moral statements 
enlivened the flaking green paint.  “Punk is destructive.  
Society does not need it.”  The assertion caused him a 
moment’s indecision.  “Oh, but society does,” he wanted to 
reply; “society is an association of minorities.”1 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will examine the relationship between self-determination and the closely 
connected ideas of statehood and personality.  The hypothesis examined by this thesis posits 
that the self-determination structural principle shapes and gives foundation to the structural 
properties – the second level concepts of the system.  This chapter will argue that an 
examination of statehood supports the hypothesis, and that self-determination is central to the 
statehood idea.  It will adopt an ascending pattern of enquiry—it will seek elucidation in the 
theory of the State, and will extrapolate upwards in order to gain insight into the practical 
aspects of the statehood question—in order to supplement the excellent descending work 
(seeking insights into States in practice and “extrapolating downwards” to discover something 
about their natures) that has been done in recent years.2  It will be argued that the term “State” 
as commonly used by international lawyers and others is in fact a portmanteau of two 
overlapping but non-equivalent ideas—termed here the State(Person) and the State(Polity)—
and a third homonym, the State-like functional subject of law.  Disaggregating and 
                                                     
1 John Le Carré, Smiley’s People (Pan Books 1980) 82. 
2 See e.g. Crawford, who uses this descending form of enquiry to great effect in his excellent Creation of States: 
James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2006). 
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disentangling those ideas aids significantly the investigation of what States are and how they 
come to be, and reveals the central role played by self-determination in the process of State 
formation.  Central to that investigation will be the closely-connected idea of the personality 
of States and other composite entities, and insights will be drawn from linguistics and group 
theory to show that individuals remain central even to non-mereological group actors – or 
groups that can, in a manner of speaking, “think” for themselves. 
2. First Steps 
‘If lawyers do not understand their own person,’ Naffine says, ‘they are lawyering in the dark.  
They cannot criticise or evaluate that which they cannot understand.’3  The State is an idea 
that is both entirely commonplace and deeply puzzling.  The ubiquity of States and the 
constant presence of their effects in almost every aspect of life tends to conceal the fact that 
the question “what is a State” remains one of the most complex and controversial for the 
modern international lawyer to answer.4  It is, too, one of the most important:  the uncertainty 
surrounding the question has implications both for some of the bitterest international 
disputes—such as the status of Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and SADR—and for the 
international legal system as a whole.  While the practical consequences of the lack of an 
understanding of statehood results in a system whose rules cannot be effectively applied in a 
number of circumstances, the macro consequence is a lack of understanding of subjecthood.  
In turn, that want of understanding speaks of a system which is insecure in its normative 
foundations, and that lacks one of the most basic tenets of a legal system at all:  it must know 
                                                     
3 Ngaire Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life:  Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person (Hart Publishing 
2009) 181. 
4 As d’Aspremont has recently reminded us, international lawyers continue to disagree fundamentally on the 
answer to this question: Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The International Law of Statehood:  Craftsmanship for the 
Elucidation and Regulation of Births and Deaths in the International Society’ (2014) 29 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 201. 
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to whom it applies.5  In both practical and theoretical terms the system is weakened by 
international law’s inability to describe satisfactorily either who or what its subjects are. 
The definitional uncertainty surrounding States may be partly because they are constructs, and 
not “real” physical entities.  Raič makes the point elegantly: 
Standing on the moon, watching the earth from a different perspective, one sees 
water and land, and, if one would take a closer look, one might see mountains, 
rivers, forests and deserts.  If one would get even closer to the surface of the earth, 
one would be able to distinguish cities, lakes and roads.  One would, however, 
search in vain if one would wish to identify a “State”.  The reason is obvious: the 
State is primarily a legal concept, created by man for certain purposes.6 
In short: a State is not a natural entity – what Searle describes as an ‘observer independent 
function’.7  Nor does it exist as a “real” person, for as Ross observes ‘[i]n a state with 20 
million inhabitants there are not 20 million and one persons.’8 
This is the point of departure for this discussion:  States are not physical entities which can be 
identified in the “real world”, but are “real” entities in the sense that they demonstrably exist 
– they have effects small and great on the lives of individuals both within and outside of their 
                                                     
5 See e.g. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray 1832) 18; Lon Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 39; Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (2nd edn, 
Clarendon Press 1980) 211; HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 2nd edn, 
Clarendon Press 1994) 79–99, esp. 88-91; Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State (Anders Wedberg 
tr, Lawbook Exchange 1999) 19. 
6 David Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law International 2002) 1. 
7 John Searle, ‘Social Ontology and Political Power’ in Frederick F Schmitt (ed), Socializing Metaphysics:  The 
Nature of Social Reality (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers inc 2003) 196:  ‘To begin, we need to make a clear 
distinction on which the whole analysis rests, that between those features of reality which are observer (or 
intentionality) independent and those that are observer (or intentionality) dependent.  A feature is observer 
dependent if its very existence depends on the attitudes, thoughts, and intentionality of observers, users, creators, 
designers, buyers, sellers, and conscious intentional agents generally.  Otherwise it is observer or intentionality 
independent.  Examples of observer-dependent features include money, property, marriage, and language.  
Examples of observer-independent features of the world include force, mass, gravitational attraction, the 
chemical bond, and photosynthesis.’ 
8 Alf Ross, A Textbook of International Law:  General Part (Longmans, Green and Co 1947) 31; David Runciman, 
Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge University Press 1997) 16 et seq. 
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jurisdictions, and there are elements of the international system as it currently exists which 
cannot easily be explained without the concept.  It therefore appears that there is some element 
to their existence which is more than merely the actions of the individuals who make them up, 
or who speak for them.  In seeking better to understand the State this essay will consider what 
they are, and how they come to be.  As will be seen, these questions are not separate but in 
fact are inextricably linked.  It will be concluded that much of the difficulty in understanding 
what “States” are is linked to the use of the term “State”.  Because the term can be used both 
in a domestic and an international context, there is an insufficiently analysed assumption that 
both contexts make use of a single concept.  It will be argued that this is not the case, and that 
“State” needs to be subdivided into two concepts—referred to here as State(Polity) and 
State(Person)—in order to be adequately understood.  For international law, therefore, the 
question turns out to be not “how are States formed”, but “how is a State(Polity) transformed 
into a State(Person).” 
Having identified two meanings of “State”, it will be further argued that there are two routes 
to State personhood in international law.  The first is an internal process which results in full 
personhood (and thus broadly endorses the “State as fact” theory of State-creation),9 while the 
second is an external process (which partially endorses both a theory of constitutive 
recognition and a theory of legally applied personhood) which results in a functional 
subjecthood. 
2.1 The Idea of Personhood 
If the concept of State is obscure and uncertain, the idea of personality is no less so.  The terms 
“person” and “personhood” are used throughout this chapter as terms of art, denoting a 
‘capacity to have an international right or duty and not merely to be at the mercy of objective 
                                                     
9 This idea is discussed below, p.227-229. 
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international law.’10  Personality is a function of international capacity, and for this reason is 
often taken to apply predominantly or preponderantly to States.11  Portmann notes that there 
is ‘almost universal agreement that states are international persons’, but that the status of 
various other entities—such as individuals, NGOs, armed groups and corporations—remains 
‘unresolved’.12  In the same vein, Shaw says that ‘states remain by far the moment important 
legal persons’ in international law,13 while Cassese describes States as ‘the backbone of the 
community’, and notes that they ‘possess full legal capacity, that is, the ability to be vested 
with rights, powers, and obligations.’14  Indeed, it was historically assumed that States alone 
were persons under international law,15 and although the growth of international organisations 
and the recognition of international rights of corporations, individuals and minorities (among 
others) has largely disabused international lawyers of this oversimplification,16 it remains 
common to see references to States as the “full”, “primary”, or “plenary” persons of 
international law.  Dixon, for example, declares that ‘it is only states and certain international 
organisations (e.g. the UN) that have all of these capacities [to make claims, to bear 
                                                     
10 Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights:  The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (Jonathan Huston 
tr, Cambridge University Press 2016) 36.  [Emphasis omitted].  See also Andrea Bianchi, ‘Looking Ahead:  
International Law’s Main Challenges’ in David Armstrong (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Law 
(Routledge 2009) 393–95. 
11 For discussion of this point see Peters (n 10) 35–41. 
12 Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 1; see also James 
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 115; 
Bianchi, ‘Looking Ahead:  International Law’s Main Challenges’ (n 10) 393–95. 
13 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 143. 
14 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 71.  [Emphasis omitted]. 
15 Jan Klabbers, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 67; Cassese (n 14) 71–72; Janne Elisabeth 
Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality:  An Inquiry into the History and Theory of International 
Law (TMC Asser Press 2004) 7. 
16 Bianchi describes it as a ‘principle of classical international law’ that is now ‘obsolete’:  Andrea Bianchi, ‘State 
Responsibility and Criminal Liability of Individuals’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2009) 17; see also Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘International 
Constitutionalism and the State’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1021. 
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obligations, to conclude agreements, and to enjoy immunities] to the fullest degree’,17 while 
Cassese contrasts the ‘full legal capacity’ of States with the ‘limited legal capacity’ of other 
actors.18 
These definitions seem slightly to miss the point, however.  If personhood is taken to mean 
the ability to bear and to enjoy any and all of the available duties and rights of a legal system, 
it is clear that no persons can exist.  As Peters correctly reminds us, no international legal 
persons—whether they be States, international organisations or individuals—exercise the 
totality of rights or are subject to the totality of obligations which exist under international 
law.  Peters remarks that while ‘no one would claim that individuals can declare war or acquire 
territory with international legal effect’, nor can States ‘enjoy human rights.  In the final 
analysis, only partial international legal subjects exist, with a wide range of different rights 
and duties and very different levels of compactness.’19  Personhood, then, does not and should 
not be taken to speak of a “full” or “entire” gamut of legal rights and duties, but rather makes 
a more restrained claim to a capacity to act in legally relevant ways.  Rather than a substantive 
bundle of rights and obligations, it is a metaphor drawn from municipal legal systems which 
draws a rough equivalence between the various kinds of international “persons” and the 
                                                     
17 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 116; see also Yaël Ronen, 
‘Entities that Can Be States but Do Not Claim to Be’ in Duncan French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination:  
Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 23. 
18 Cassese (n 14) 71–72.  [Emphasis omitted]. 
19 Peters (n 10) 42–43.  Indeed, as Peters argues, individuals are now acknowledged as having and being subject to 
a wide range of international rights and obligations that go far beyond the narrow confined of international 
criminal and human rights law.  See ibid, passim. 
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position of individuals within domestic legal orders,20 and should therefore immediately be 
treated with a certain amount of suspicion.21 
However, neither that statement nor the use of the term “person” is here intended to imply that 
States and other international persons are like individuals in ‘any anthropomorphic or organic’ 
sense.22  Rather, the personhood idea utilised by contemporary international law treats States 
as if they exhibit some individual-like qualities – minimally, their ability within a legal system 
to be treated as unitary, to be treated as capable of making a claim on their own behalf, and to 
be treated as engaging through their actions their own responsibility.23  In the case of 
individuals in a domestic setting it is clear why this should be so,24 but the situation is 
somewhat more complex when it comes to composite “persons” such as States.25  Why is it 
that such constructs should be treated as individual actors by law?  Lauterpacht argued that to 
do so is only ever a fictional account: ‘states are composed of individual human beings; […] 
                                                     
20 ibid 35–36. 
21 On the domestic analogy in international law see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Global Governance and Public 
International Law’ (2004) 37 Kritische Justiz 241; and further Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and 
World Order Proposals (Cambridge University Press 1989). 
22 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International 
Law 1, 27; see also discussion in Karen Knop, ‘Re/Statements:  Feminism and State Sovereignty in International 
Law’ (1993) 3 Transnational and Contemporary Problems 293, 319–323 et seq; Naffine (n 3) 178–79. 
23 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 12) 115. 
24 Individuals—absent any metaphysical speculation—are unitary actors which engage their own responsibility 
through their actions, and their ability to be subjects of law can to a certain extent be presumed, therefore.  
(Although it must be noted that the ability of individuals to bear moral responsibility is a vast and important 
question in jurisprudence and wider philosophical thought.  For a fascinating discussion of the literature on 
various approaches to this question see Naffine (n 3); and further William Lucy, ‘Persons in Law’ (2009) 29 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 787.)  In addition, it is increasingly being accepted that individuals are subjects 
of the international legal system as a whole, and not purely of specialist regimes such as international criminal 
law and international human rights law.  For an discussion of the personality of the individual in international 
law see Peters (n 10) esp. Chapter 3: ‘The Doctrine of the International Legal Personality of the Human Being’; 
Portmann (n 12) 243–83. 
25 Although these questions apply equally to other composite actors such as NGOs, non-State armed groups, 
corporations, and—although at an additional remove—international organisations, this chapter will concentrate 
on States as the central focus of most accounts of international law personality and as the paradigmatic example 
of constructed personhood in international law. 
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behind the mystical, impersonal, and therefore necessarily irresponsible personality of the 
metaphysical state there are the actual subjects of rights and duties, namely, individual human 
beings.’26 
Neither starting point will be adopted here.  In contrast to the orthodox position—that States 
are the primary “persons” of international law and that the personality of other actors needs to 
be justified—this chapter will start from the position that the personhood of States cannot be 
presumed.27  Nor, though, pace Lauterpacht, will it assume that the personhood of States is 
always and inevitably a fiction.  Rather, it needs to be examined whether States are capable of 
performing within the international legal system the functions of an agent – the ability to 
engage through one’s acts one’s own responsibility.  In other words, whether States can speak, 
act, and think for themselves.28 
Moreover, the discussion begins from the premise that the question of international legal 
subjecthood and the more basic question of what States are cannot be resolved simply by 
referring to international law.29 
We have here a vicious circle:  in order to determine whether or not a certain rule 
is international we must know whether or not the legal community bound by it is 
a state.  But in order to decide this question we must know precisely whether or 
                                                     
26 Lauterpacht (n 22) 27.  [Original emphasis; footnotes omitted].  International organisations, too, fit this pattern 
albeit, as observed above, at one additional remove.  Thus international organisations are composite entities 
composed of composite entities; or are organisations composed of States composed of individuals. 
27 Nijman (n 15) 444–45. 
28 To that extent the approach of this chapter could be said to sit somewhere between the ‘individualistic’ and the 
‘actor’ accounts in the typology of personality-claims given by Portmann:  Portmann (n 12) 246–47. 
29 This point may be contrasted to, for example, Cassese’s approach to the question.  He argues that ‘customary 
international law rules grant[] basic rights and duties to States [and] that these rules presuppose certain general 
characteristics in the entities to which they address themselves’:  Cassese (n 14) 73.  Portmann, too, turns to law 
to resolve the question:  ‘It is submitted that international personality has to be administered according to a set 
of legal principles informed by the formal and individualistic conceptions.  Accordingly, with the exception of 
individuals in certain situations, there are no a priori international persons:  personality is acquired in 
international law whenever an international norm is addressed at a particular entity, without there being a 
presumption for or against certain units.’  Portmann (n 12) 3. 
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not the rule in question is international.  The term “International Law” is defined 
by the term “state” and the definition of the term “state” again refers back to the 
term “International Law”.  A definition thus biting its own tail is circular.  The 
consequence is that on the point in question the definition is in reality a blank.30 
This does not imply that the discussion assumes an apologetic framework in which the State 
is understood to precede the law, nor a utopian framework of law preceding the State.31  
Rather, this discussion strives to begin from a point of neutral on that score.  Ross’s 
observation is understood to be definitional – that international law requires a definition of 
State which does not depend on international law, and vice versa.32  Similarly, though, the 
“State as fact” theory appears also to be an insufficient starting point.  As already discussed, 
States are not “real” entities with an indisputable existence, and it is therefore impossible to 
deduce the existence of a State by reference to a given set of facts until it is clear which facts 
are relevant.  The lack of a readable “blueprint” results in the quandary over the legal status 
of those entities which may bear some but not all of the hallmarks of statehood—Kosovo, the 
EU and Shell Corporation, for example—which continues to vex international law. 
3. A Vocabulary of Statehood: Beetles in Boxes 
Pain words, says Wittgenstein, are beetles in boxes.33  Here, Wittgenstein hits upon both a 
characteristically insightful example, and a typically colourful metaphor.  Pain words are 
examples of non-ostensive references – they refer to something which has no correspondence 
in the external world.  An individual may say ‘I am in pain’, but their words can have only a 
very limited meaning for anyone else, because only the speaker can experience the pain to 
which they refer.  Nevertheless, it is habitually assumed that pain phrases—headache, burning 
                                                     
30 Ross (n 8) 12. 
31 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
32 d’Aspermont identifies a similar circularity in the theory of sources of international law: Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The 
Idea of “Rules” in the Sources of International Law’ (2014) 84 British Yearbook of International Law 103, 113–
19. 
33 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (2nd edn, Blackwell 1958) §293. 
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pain, stabbing pain, throbbing pain, and so on—are transferable.  When someone says “I have 
a stabbing pain in my stomach”, we automatically assume that we can understand what they 
are feeling, because we understand how we make use of the term in relation to our own 
experience and assume that the sensation can be generalised.34  Wittgenstein constructs his 
metaphor of the beetle in a box to explain such words: 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it:  we call it a “beetle”.  No one 
can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only 
by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have 
something different in his box.  One might even imagine such a thing constantly 
changing.—But suppose the word “beetle” has a use in these people’s 
language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing.  The thing in the 
box has no place in the language-game at all:  not even as a something:  for the 
box might even be empty.—No, one can “divide through” by the thing in the box; 
it cancels out, whatever it is.35 
In such circumstances “beetle” is vacated of meaning.  It cannot have any descriptive or 
explanatory force because no one can say with certainty to what it refers.  Indeed, the situation 
will often be more complex still, because the people speaking of “beetles” will generally 
believe that they know to what the word refers, and will tend to believe that everyone else uses 
the word in the same way.  Any one individual may be correct that their interpretation is 
generally shared—or, more plausibly, certain others may share their interpretation—but the 
degree of convergence remains unverifiable. 
Pain words are, of course, an extreme example, being a wholly internal experience.  
Nevertheless, it is argued that the word “State”, albeit to a lesser extent, shares many of the 
characteristics of beetles in boxes.  Like pain words, “State” is a non-ostensive reference:  it 
exhibits the characteristics of a parallax, seeming to alter depending on the position and 
perspective of the observer.  In particular, “State” appears to refer to different things when 
                                                     
34 For a discussion of pain words as an example of language relating to unverifiable experience see Marion V 
Smith, ‘Language and Pain:  Private Experience, Cultural Significance, and Linguistic Relativity’ (Unpublished 
Thesis, University of Cambridge 1990). 
35 Wittgenstein (n 33) §293. 
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taken from an internal than from an external perspective, yet observers remain prisoners of 
these perspectives in any examination of States and their natures:  ‘[t]here is no such thing as 
a neutral view from “nowhere” as traditional international legal scholarship wants us to 
believe.’36  More striking still, whether viewed from the internal or external standpoint it is 
impossible to identify any element which is uniquely the State. 
3.1 Internal and External Perspectives 
Viewed from within, it appears impossible to sufficiently capture in any description of its 
constituent parts the all-encompassing aspect of the word “State”.  An attempt to describe the 
“State” from the internal point of view will serve to illustrate.  State and Government appear 
distinct, as do State and Legislature – for clearly State is a larger idea than either.37  The State 
is not the civil service, whose function it is to perform the administrative tasks necessary to 
carry out the function of governance within the State.  The State is not the police, whose task 
is to enforce its laws.  The State is not Judge, central bank or military, nor is it individuals, 
communities or cities.  However, while these things may be incorporated within the term 
“State”, it would not be automatically true to say that a State that lacked, for example, a central 
bank is deficient to that extent.  The term “State” appears to be capable of appropriating to 
itself things which are not, in and of themselves, requirements of a State.  When viewed from 
an internal perspective, no person or agency can be identified which embodies the personality 
“State”.  Indeed, in addition to these functional elements, the “State” appears to include things 
which have none:  it may be used to denote a certain geographical area, for example, or to a 
                                                     
36 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Reflexive Butterfly Catching:  Insights from a Situated Catcher’ in Joost Pauwelyn and others 
(eds), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press 2012) 203.  [Footnotes omitted].  The 
impossibility of detaching the observer of social-scientific processes from the context in which those processes 
occur is also highlighted, albeit in a different context, by Giddens’s concept of the ‘double hermeneutic’:  
Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Polity Press 1984) 284. 
37 Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada claims (Great Britain v Costa Rica), (Tinoco Arbitration) (1923) 1 
RIAA 369, 377-378 et seq. 
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population.  All of these things fall within the totalising definition of “State” from an internal 
perspective.   
Yet on the international plane, the challenge is to arrive at a definition of “State” which is 
sufficiently discriminatory, or that sufficiently captures the distinction between those elements 
which are a part of “the State” and those which are not.  International law necessitates the 
characterisation of the “State” as a unitary entity—a legal person—which can act (can wage 
war, conduct trade, impose sanctions), which can interact (can sign treaties, conduct 
diplomacy, have and resolve disputes), and can cognise action (can plan, choose, justify and 
rationalise its actions).  The “State” is also environment-aware, system-aware and self-aware, 
and can assess the legality, morality and political acceptability of its actions and, being capable 
of thought, belief and motivation, can develop an opinio iuris and can represent (or even 
misrepresent) that opinio iuris in its interactions with others.38  A search for the bearer of that 
consciousness within the State is bound to fall short.39  It must exclude, first of all, the territory.  
Although territory may be a useful concept in understanding the relative authority-claims of 
one State as opposed to another, territory cannot “think”, and so cannot be the actor which is 
sought.  It must also exclude the population.  Although it may be conceivable that a population 
can have a common thought or belief, it is not credible that the population will be the source 
of an international opinio iuris, for most individuals within the population will not be aware 
of the specificities of any given situation, let alone of the application to them of the corpus of 
international law.40  The search must even exclude the government and the Head of State, for 
international obligations are not addressed to the government, but to the State itself.  Only a 
                                                     
38 Cassese, for example, speaks in terms of States being motivated to act by both by legal and other internal and 
external considerations (such as “social, economic or political needs”), and makes the uncontroversial point that 
the distinction is significant:  it is only where the subjective belief on the part of States exist that their actions 
are mandated by law that a customary norm will be seen to emerge. See, Cassese (n 14) 157. 
39 For a discussion of collective consciousness see below, p.219-222. 
40 A similar observation has been made with regard to domestic law by Hart.  See Hart (n 5) 114–15. 
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very few of the most serious international wrongs engage the individual responsibility of, for 
example Presidents and Prime Ministers.41  These unusual norms aside, the vast majority of 
international rights and obligations—maritime claims, trade agreements, sovereign debt and 
so on—attach to the State, and not to any figure within its government.  This is not merely a 
technical distinction, but rather a point of some importance:  it is for this reason that the 
international rights and obligations of the State survive changes in government, and even 
changes in governmental system.42 
In complete contrast to the internal perspective, therefore, in seeking to identify the “State” 
from an external perspective it is difficult or impossible to produce a definition that is 
sufficiently discriminatory.  The State must be an actor—a person—but no individual actor 
within the State appears to satisfy the definition.  While the internal perspective seeks to 
totalise, the external seeks to exclude.  Notably, neither approach arrives at a satisfactory 
conclusion.  It is suggested, however, that both are, in some sense, correct.  It is not possible 
to prefer one point of view over the other and to declare it to be the “appropriate” position 
from which to assess what the State is:  they are in tension.  For this reason this examination 
will advance two conceptions of the State, viewed from the internal and external perspective.  
Moreover, it will be argued that both are necessarily present in any classic “State”, and that 
when “State” is understood as referring to two concepts it becomes significantly easier to 
unpick the definitional difficulties encountered thus far. 
3.2 State as Polity:  the Internal Perspective 
                                                     
41 See Bianchi, who comments that ‘[a] quick look at recent practice is sufficient to realize that state responsibility 
and individual criminal liability are considered as distinct in international law.’  Bianchi, ‘State Responsibility 
and Criminal Liability of Individuals’ (n 16) 16 et seq, [footnotes omitted]; Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (17 July 1998) 2187 UNTS 3, preamble, Article 1. 
42 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 2) 678–80. 
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It has been argued above that when viewed from the internal perspective it is necessary to 
define the State in a way that is totalising.  When viewed in this way the State appears to 
contain certain elements—such as governments, police forces, cities and so on—but these do 
not appear to be either equivalent to it, nor necessary elements of it.  The State appears to be 
passive – a forum of action rather than an actor in its own right.  Giddens describes it as 
structuration43—a recursive interaction between social structures and individual agency—and 
this description appears to have great explanatory potential.  From the internal point of view, 
then, the State can be described as a structure within which a social life is conducted – 
henceforward referred to as a State(Polity). 
Understanding the State(Polity) as a social structure resolves the apparent paradox of its 
existence.  Social structures are, in Searle’s terms, ‘observer dependent feature[s]’; social facts 
that depend for their reality on individuals treating them as real.44  That they are socially 
constructed does not imply States(Polities) are in any sense unreal, however:  as Giddens 
comments, ‘the continued existence of large collectivities or societies evidently does not 
depend upon the activities of any particular individual’.45  Nevertheless, they are contingent 
on the continued presence of the individuals who sustain them:  ‘such collectivities or societies 
manifestly would cease to be if all the agents involved disappeared.’46  Giddens argues that 
the population sustains the structure through recursive social action: 
Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive.  
That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually 
                                                     
43Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (n 36) 1–2.  It is important to note 
that Giddens’ observations are made in the context of an inquiry into the nature of society, rather than “the State”.  
For this reason the vocabulary used does not comfortably transfer.  Giddens uses the term “state” to refer to the 
governmental organs of the society, which he contrasts with “civil society” (Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State 
and Violence (University of California Press 1985) 20.). 
44 Searle (n 7) 196. 
45 Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (n 36) 24. 
46 ibid.  Put another way, to paraphrase Allott, States ‘exist nowhere else than in the human mind.’  Phillip Allott, 
‘The Concept of International Law’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International Politics:  Essays in 
International Relations and International Law (Oxford University Press 2000) 70. 
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recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors.  
In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these 
activities possible.47 
Populations create the social fact called the State(Polity) moment by moment by acting in their 
relations towards one another, it and others as if it exists.  Searle makes a similar point, arguing 
that ‘all of institutional reality is both created in its initial existence and maintained in its 
continued existence by way of representations that have the same logical structure as 
Declarations,’48 while, in turn, a declaration is defined as a linguistic act whereby: 
[W]e make something the case by representing it as being the case.  […]  For 
example, we adjourn the meeting by saying, “the meeting is adjourned”; we 
pronounce someone husband and wife by saying, “I now pronounce you husband 
and wife.”  We thus achieve world-to-word direction of fit, but we achieve that 
direction of fit by way of representing the world as having been changed, that is, 
by way of the word-to-world direction of fit.49 
“State(Polity)”—and its cognates—is not merely a description, but a speech act; an example 
of language as action.50  It is a self-constituting reference which both describes and creates a 
situation. 
That conclusion implies an account of State(Polity) creation, conceived as a linguistic act:  a 
State(Polity) is created where a group of individuals begin to speak of and act consistently 
with the presence of a social community within a bounded space.51  Although this process of 
polity creation is very closely connected to self-determination, it would most likely not be 
accurate to describe it, in itself, as a self-determination process.  Rather, it is a factual process, 
                                                     
47 Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (n 36) 2. 
48 John Searle, ‘Language and Ontology’ (2008) 37 Theory and Society 443, 451.  [Emphasis omitted]. 
49 ibid; see also John Lawrence Austin, How to Do Things with Words (JO Urmson and Marina Sbisà eds, 2nd edn, 
Harvard University Press 1975) 2–6 et seq. 
50 Dennis M Patterson, ‘Law’s Pragmatism:  Law as Practice & Narrative’ (1990) 76 Virginia Law Review 937, 
956. 
51 Referring to State(Polity) creation as a linguistic act does not imply a contractarian model.  Although a social 
contract moment would be consistent with the account, one is not required.  All that is necessary is for the 
individuals within the relevant space to have a common understanding that they stand towards each other in a 
social and/or political relationship, and to act accordingly. 
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based on the manifested belief of the relevant individuals that they exist within a social order.52  
As such, it is their belief in the reality of the social order that is engaged, and not (necessarily) 
their consent to, desire for, or choice towards engagement with the polity.  Nevertheless, it 
cannot be decoupled from self-determination, which manifests in connection with polity-
creation in two main ways.  First, compliance with the self-determination of individuals in the 
creation of the polity is a criterion for legitimacy in polity creation and remains a legitimacy 
criterion for the ongoing conduct of the socio-political life of the polity (the internal facet of 
political self-determination);53 and, secondly, the process of polity-creation effects the 
creation of a self-determination unit for the purposes of self-determination-based sovereignty, 
discussed in chapter three (the external facet of political self-determination).54  As was argued 
there, the accreted individual self-determination claims of the members of a society (a polity) 
require that only those individuals determine the social and political forms and structures 
which govern their shared life, and it is within the boundaries (of whatever kind) of individual 
polities that this process occurs.55 
This account of State(Polity) creation implies a definition, and it is now possible to expand 
the definition given at the start of this section.  A State(Polity) is a structure comprising a 
bounded space within which individuals act consistently with the presence of a common social 
and/or political community, and where their language refers to the existence of that structure.  
                                                     
52 There remains, of course, a question mark over the definition of “relevant individuals”.  This chapter has 
consciously avoided defining the polity in terms of a territory.  Although most (if not all) of the polities and 
States with which we are familiar today are territorially defined, there is no theoretical reason which this need 
be so.  All that is necessary, as was argued in chapter three, is that it be possible to determine of a particular 
individual whether they are or are not a member of a particular polity at any given moment.  By focusing on 
belief, this account implies that it is the individual’s subjective belief that they either are or are not a part of a 
society (or within its sphere of concern) which is relevant, rather than their choice.  Nevertheless, as argued here, 
their choice is relevant to the question of whether the structures of the society legitimately apply to them. 
53 See above, p.7-12. 
54 See above, p.175-180. 
55 See above, p.178-179. 
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It therefore requires a group of individuals, action consistent with a shared social life and 
language which refers to the existence of that State(Polity).  The State(Polity) is a self-
determination unit:  it is the site of politics and law, but it contains them rather than being 
itself reducible to them.  Moreover, and more significantly for the purposes of this 
examination, the State(Polity) is not an actor, rather it is passive.  It is a space within which 
there exists a base-level agreement of sociability, a structure within which individuals act, but 
having no ability to act of its own. 
It therefore becomes necessary to ask what transforms a State(Polity) into a person. 
3.3 State as Person: the External Perspective 
Before it is possible to answer the question of how a person is created, it is necessary to 
examine what it means to say that something is a person.  Personhood is the subject of a rich 
and growing literature which examines, inter alia, the many philosophical questions which 
are raised by this complex idea.  It is, for the most part, not necessary to address these questions 
here, and this section will primarily focus on the more practical aspects of the question and 
seek to arrive at a working definition. 
Naffine identifies four major schools of thought in identifying persons:  legalism, rationalism, 
religion, and naturalism.56  Of these, naturalism and religion can be immediately dismissed as 
unlikely to provide any insight into international personhood.  Naturalism is defined by 
Naffine as a school of thought which believes persons ‘are best regarded as natural corporeal 
beings who can feel pleasure and pain, and who live natural mortal lives’.57  Plainly 
                                                     
56 Naffine (n 3) 20. 
57 ibid 24. 
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international persons are not natural, but instead are constructed or artificial persons,58 and it 
would appear similarly absurd to claim that States fall within the religious definition of 
personhood.  Not only does adopting the religious view of personhood entail, perforce, a leap 
of faith, but it cannot provide an explanation of State personhood.  It should go without saying 
that States are not ‘ensouled’, and it seems highly unlikely that they have ‘the spark of the 
divine.’ 59 
Legalism, too, seems unlikely to offer any useful insight in the context of international law.60  
According to Naffine, Legalism is a school of thought which attempts to avoid the 
metaphysical debates which beset the various realist positions.61  While these approaches seek 
a “true” measure of personhood, legalism is ‘a strictly formal and neutral legal device for 
enabling a being or entity to act in law, to acquire what is known as a “legal personality”:  the 
ability to bear rights and duties.’62  However, as noted above, Ross provides a compelling 
explanation for why a legal definition of personhood cannot apply on the international level.63  
Whereas under a domestic legal system a non-natural person—say a corporation or a charity—
is merely a subject of the law, in international law a person must be both subject and author.  
This presents substantially the same problem as encountered in the context of sovereignty in 
the previous chapter, and results in a similar apologetic/utopian tension.64  It is a basic premise 
                                                     
58 The distinction was influentially drawn by Hobbes:  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck ed, Cambridge 
University Press 1991) §80. 
59 Naffine (n 3) 23. 
60 It should be noted that this is an argument in relation to a specific case, that of international law.  It is not intended 
as a rejection of the utility of legalism as an explanatory framework in other jurisprudential contexts. 
61 Naffine (n 3) 21. 
62 ibid. 
63 See above, text to n 30. 
64 See above, p.164-172. 
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of any non-natural theory of law that law cannot pre-date its authors.65  If, under a legalist 
framework, the relevant persons are creations of law, however, it is unclear who (or what) 
were the authors of the law which enabled the creation of persons. 
Only rationalism, therefore, remains.  Here Naffine points to the rationality of the person—an 
active, autonomous actor:  someone who is positively able to bear legal duties and to assert 
legal rights in their own capacity66—as the determiner of personhood.  As Lucy defines it: 
[R]ationalists think the legal person must be rational and not non-rational.  As 
such, the legal person on this view must be capable of acting upon and 
understanding reasons.  This need not mean that the legal person must be pre-
eminently rational, never making mistakes as to what they have reason to do and 
always and ever conducting themselves in a rationally optimum way.  Nor does it 
mean that the legal person always and ever conducts themselves on the basis of 
the weightiest reasons they have for acting or refraining on some, most or all 
occasions.  It does not even mean that the legal person always and ever conducts 
themselves upon the basis of reasons; rather, it need only require that the legal 
person has the general capacity to conduct themselves upon the basis of reasons 
and does so much of the time.67 
On this account, then, a person is an actor (i), which is self-aware (ii), which is aware of its 
environment (iii), which is capable of forming reasons for acting (iv), and which can act in 
accordance with those reasons (although it need not always do so) (v).  Such a person is, as 
Naffine observes, capable of understanding the legal, moral and political norms which apply 
to it, and of choosing whether to act in conformity with or to disobey them.  It can be said to 
be the author of its actions, and any of its actions which breach the legal, moral or political 
norms applicable to it can therefore be said to engage its, and not any other’s, responsibility.  
                                                     
65 As Gardner comments, in the course of seeking to identify the core beliefs of legal positivism, ‘[w]hat should a 
“legal positivist” believe if not that laws are posited?  […  A] norm is valid as a norm of [a legal] system solely 
in virtue of the fact that at some relevant time and place some relevant agent or agents announced it, practiced 
it, invoked it, enforced it, endorsed it, or otherwise engaged with it.’  John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism:  5½ 
Myths’ (2001) 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199, 200; Ronald Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy for 
International Law’ (2013) 41 Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, n 13. 
66 Naffine (n 3) 60. 
67 Lucy (n 24) 795. 
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Before these criteria can be applied to the State, however, it is necessary to clarify and further 
refine certain elements, beginning with the question of whether groups can be actors for the 
purposes of the rationalist framework. 
3.3.1 What is an Actor? 
States, as artificial entities, have no flesh-and-blood form.  They are composites; 
conglomerates of individuals who imbue them with certain powers, competences and 
purposes, and who in turn may be employed to perform certain tasks on behalf of or to 
represent the opinions of the entity as a whole.68  In considering whether States, as composite 
entities, can be can be “actors” it is valuable to step outside the international law context and 
to consider collectivities in general.  The majority of positions in this debate fall into two broad 
camps.  The first holds that collectivities are capable of performing actions in and of 
themselves, in the sense that they have a “consciousness”—an ability to think and to develop 
purposes—that is distinct from the individuals who comprise them.  When an individual 
performs an action that is mandated by a collectivity, therefore, it is primarily its responsibility 
that is engaged, and not the responsibility of the individual.  The school of thought originated 
in the work of Hobbes,69 although many modern accounts diverge significantly from his 
original description.70  A second school, however, holds that collectivities are no more than 
the sum of their parts.  Thus actions which are taken “on behalf of” a collectivity engage the 
responsibility of individuals, either the individuals who comprise it and are therefore the “true” 
                                                     
68 David Copp, ‘Collective Actions and Secondary Actions’ (1979) 16 American Philosophical Quarterly 177, 177; 
Raimo Tuomela, ‘Actions by Collectives’ (1989) 3 Philosophical Perspectives 471, 472; Hobbes (n 58) §81-83. 
69 Hobbes (n 58) §81-83. 
70 Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom:  From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Polity Press 2001); Philip 
Pettit, ‘Groups with Minds of Their Own’ in Frederick F Schmitt (ed), Socializing Metaphysics:  The Nature of 
Social Reality (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers inc 2003); Frederick F Schmitt, ‘Joint Action:  From 
Individualism to Supraindividualism’ in Frederick F Schmitt (ed), Socializing Metaphysics:  The Nature of Social 
Reality (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers inc 2003); Tuomela (n 68). 
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authors of the action, or the individual who carried it out.  These accounts find their intellectual 
foundations in the scholarship of Hegel.71 
Giddens describes action as the exercise of power.72  By this he does not mean political, 
financial or position-related power, but rather something much more mundane.  Power in this 
context refers to the ability of the agent to create an effect; or ‘the capability of the individual 
to “make a difference” to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events.’73  Put another 
way, Giddens says, ‘action logically involves power in the sense of transformative capacity.’74  
Defined thus, the relevant question is whether groups can produce transformative effects 
which are different in kind to those which individuals can achieve.  In other words, are group 
actions always reducible to the sum of their parts (mereological), or can group action achieve 
an additional effect (synergistic). 
That question, it seems, should be answered affirmatively:  in certain circumstances group 
action can be synergistic.  Indeed, it often is so even in the simplest examples.  Copp argues 
that Massey’s example of group action—Tom, Dick and Harry carrying a piano upstairs75—
is best understood as the actions of three individuals; as mereologically attributable to the three 
individual actors.76  He relies on the observation that there is no effect that is additional to the 
                                                     
71 Georg WF Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (HB Nisbet tr, Cambridge University Press 1991); see 
also Arthur C Danto, ‘Basic Actions’ (1965) 2 American Philosophical Quarterly 141; Copp (n 68); David Copp, 
‘Democracy and Communal Self-Determination’ in Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim (eds), The Morality of 
Nationalism (Oxford University Press 1997). 
72 Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (n 36) 9. 
73 ibid 14. 
74 ibid 15. 
75 Gerald J Massey, ‘Tom, Dick, and Harry, and All the King’s Men’ (1976) 13 American Philosophical Quarterly 
89, 89. 
76 Copp (n 68) 183–84; Massey (n 75).  
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combined efforts of the three actors to conclude that the action is therefore merely the sum of 
its parts.77  Yet it is possible to regard this as an example of a group action par excellence.  
After all, the composite action in this case (the lifting of the piano) could not have been 
achieved without the efforts of all three men.  Indeed, without the efforts of them all none of 
the contributory actions could have been achieved:  had Tom, Dick or Harry attempted to 
carry the piano upstairs on his own, the result would not have been that only a part of the piano 
was moved, it would have been that the piano did not move at all. 
Schmitt gives a still clearer example, one premised on the institutional quality of group action.  
Take as an example a set of three individuals—A, B and C—who together comprise the entire 
membership of two different committees – the library committee and the food committee.78  
When these individuals take an action as members of one committee—such as recommending 
that the library purchase a particular volume—it is not true to say that both committees have 
done so.  The food committee has done nothing.  Nevertheless, were the actions of the library 
committee nothing more than the combined individual actions of A, B and C, and were the 
actions of the food committee nothing more than the combined individual actions of A, B and 
C, it would not be possible to say that this was an action of one committee, rather than of 
both.79  Clearly there is, in this example, a synergistic, rather than a mereological quality to 
the action taken (the recommending of the book).  It is not explicable by the actions of A, B 
and C alone, but has gained an additional quality, however minimal, as a result of being a 
combined action taken in a particular context. 
                                                     
77 Copp (n 68) 184. 
78 Schmitt (n 70) 148. 
79 ibid 147–50. 
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Viewed from this standpoint the question “can groups act” appears to be somewhat facile:  of 
course they can.  They can perform actions which individuals cannot.  An example might be 
the passage of a piece of legislation, which gains its force not from the fact that the necessary 
number of individuals have supported it, but from the fact that those individuals are acting as 
a particular body:  a legislature.  The judgment of a Court does not gain its precedential force 
from the fact that the majority agreed on the interpretation of the point of law, nor from the 
status of the individuals—exactly the same individuals could have written an academic article 
expressing the same opinion, but the kind of authority the article possessed would have been 
quite different to that of the judgment—but from the status accorded to the group in its 
context.80  
 
It is argued, therefore, that groups are capable of action, defined (with Giddens) as the exercise 
of a transformative power which effects the course of events.  A secondary question is whether 
collectivities can be independent actors or, in other words, whether their thoughts, beliefs and 
intentions can be attributed to the collectivity, rather than to their members.  The distinction 
is significant:  if collectivities can believe that a state of affairs exists, evaluate whether a 
response is required and what that should be, and formulate an intention to act in that manner, 
the collectivity is something more than a group with action-power, but should arguably be 
called a person. 
                                                     
80 Hernández discusses the precedential authority of prior decisions of the ICJ, and employs Hart’s concept of 
content-independent authority in explaining why the Court reasons from precedent, despite the exclusion of 
precedential authority in the Statute of the Court.  See HLA Hart, ‘Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons’ 
in HLA Hart (ed), Essays on Bentham:  Studies in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Clarendon Press 1982) 261–
66; discussed in Gleider I Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 170. 
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3.3.2 Can Collectives Think? 
The criteria for personhood set out above required that the person be an actor (i), be self-aware 
(ii), be aware of its environment (iii), be capable of forming reasons for acting (iv), and be 
capable of acting in accordance with those reasons (although it need not always do so) (v).  It 
has been concluded above that collectivities can satisfy the first criterion, that of being an 
actor.  It remains to be seen, however, whether groups can satisfy the other criteria (ii-v).  The 
relevant questions, therefore, are: can groups be self-aware, can they be aware of their 
environments, can they formulate reasons for action, and can they then select a course of action 
on the basis of those reasons.  These are aspects of a more general question:  can collectivities 
think? 
Contrary to first appearances, this is not a far-reaching question implying the creation of a 
new being (“the Group”) which possesses a durée-consciousness analogous to that of an 
individual.81  Rather the question asks, similarly to action, whether there is some element to 
group thought which is not explained solely by the sum of the thoughts of the individuals who 
comprise it.  Schmitt argues that this is indeed so for many groups: 
We don't need to know what individuals' dispositions are to be able to predict 
what the Ford Corporation will do.  The Corporation will act to further its 
interests, given its beliefs.  Of course, this requires that individuals in the 
Corporation act in certain ways, but we do not need to consider what those ways 
might be, or the causes of those actions, to predict what the Corporation will do.82 
Schmitt is correct to observe that the Ford Corporation has certain aims, goals and institutional 
understandings which are internally and historically consistent.  Individual employees may 
come and go, Board members and Chief Executives may change, but the major aims and 
attitudes of the Corporation would be expected to remain generally stable over time.   
                                                     
81 Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (n 36) 3. 
82 Schmitt (n 70) 161. 
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While this may be indicative of a group mind, however, it is some way short of a proof of one.  
Pettit has advanced an argument which demonstrates, he claims, that the decisions of 
collectivities need not represent the opinions of their membership, and which thus 
demonstrates that collective minds are separate from the minds of their members.  This is so, 
according to Pettit, when a collectivity makes decisions by ‘deliberative reason’;83 that is, 
when decisions made by the group are mandated by its prior attitudes and policies, or where 
the decision on overarching questions is mandated by decisions on component parts.  Pettit 
uses the analogy of a workers’ co-operative to explain the concept.  Let us say that a workers’ 
co-operative is faced with a decision of whether to give themselves a pay rise, or instead to 
introduce a new safety measure on a particular machine in the workshop, and let us assume 
for simplicity that the cost of the two measures is the same, that there are no additional funds, 
and that this is, therefore, a choice between mutually exclusive alternatives.84  In order to make 
that decision rationally, Pettit says, the workers must individually evaluate a series of 
variables.  In schema, these might be, first, whether there exists at present a serious danger; 
secondly, whether the proposed measure is likely to be effective; and thirdly, whether the pay 
sacrifice involved would be a bearable loss.  Logically, answering “no” to any of these 
questions will lead the individual worker to conclude that the pay sacrifice should not be made, 
and it is therefore possible, he says, for every individual to conclude that the pay sacrifice 
should not be made, while there nevertheless remains a majority in favour of making the 
sacrifice in relation to each of the three sub-questions.  A group which simply asks its members 
for a decision on the overall question, then, will find them unanimously opposed, while one 
which allows its overall decision to be decided by the answers to the three sub-questions will 
take the decision that the sacrifice should be made.  Thus, the group has reached a decision 
                                                     
83 Pettit, A Theory of Freedom:  From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (n 70) 110. 
84 This analogy can be found in ibid 107–08. 
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which is equivalent to that of no individual member of the group, and must, Pettit argues, 
therefore possess some independent mind, even if minimal.85 
This kind of decision-making, Petit argues, is very common.86  Indeed, he argues that there is 
a significant pressure for groups to take decisions in this way, in that a group that routinely 
adopts inconsistent positions will not be capable of presenting itself as an effective pursuer of 
its purposes, either to its members (who may therefore leave) or to the outside world (who 
will not treat it as a serious actor).87  Instead, the pressure towards internal consistency is likely 
to drive the creation of a minimal form of institutional consciousness, comprised of the 
institutional inertia created by prior decisions, statements and positions. 
Although the idea of an institutional consciousness is applicable to any organisation that has 
a conception of itself as a person separate from its members (hereafter an I-collectivity), 
arguably its paradigmatic example—and the subject of this enquiry—is the State.  It was 
identified earlier that the State lacks a single locus of consciousness:  it cannot be said, for 
example, that the consciousness of the State is located in the President, the Parliament, or the 
Prime Minister.  A State will inevitably have a number of mouthpieces, a number of decision 
makers at various levels, and a history of actions that is far more complicated than Pettit’s 
workers’ collective, but which has the same hallmarks of institutional inertia.  The State’s 
mind is comprised of the statements and actions of those individuals authorised to act on its 
behalf, past and present (such as the Head of State, Head of Government, and 
plenipotentiaries); the opinions of the major domestic actors (in particular the government of 
the day, Parliament, the relevant decisions of Courts, and popular opinion); and its ongoing 
                                                     
85 ibid. 
86 Pettit, ‘Groups with Minds of Their Own’ (n 70) 173. 
87 ibid 177. 
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policies and purposes (close relations with a neighbouring State, for example, or compliance 
with a treaty).  Taken together, these elements result in a situation where the mind of the State, 
although it can be changed by many of the actors in small ways, and by some of them in more 
substantial ways, does not depend entirely upon any one of them.  There is, therefore, an 
ineffably organic quality to State belief and State will which can, under Pettit’s framework of 
deliberative reason, reasonably be described as evidence of an independent institutional 
consciousness. 
3.3.3 State as Person 
Having concluded both that collectivities can act and that institutionalised I-collectivities can 
think, it remains necessary to apply the criteria of personhood to such I-collectivities to 
establish whether they can meet the definition of a rationalist person.  The relevant questions 
are:  can collectivities act, can they be self-aware, can they be aware of their environments, 
can they formulate reasons for action, and can they then select a course of action on the basis 
of those reasons? 
It has been established above that collectivities can exercise a transformative power which can 
affect the course of events.  Although some have argued that collective action is always 
mereologically reducible to the actions of individuals,88 it was argued with Schmitt that there 
can be a synergistic quality to group action which is not accounted for by the sum of the 
constitutive actions of individuals.89  In order to take full account of the action-power 
collectivities can have, therefore, it is necessary to categorise them as actors in their own right.  
It was also concluded that institutional I-collectivities can think in a way that is not 
mereologically attributable to their members.  To that extent, an I-collectivity may be capable 
                                                     
88 See e.g. Arthur C Danto, ‘Basic Actions’ (1965) 2 American Philosophical Quarterly 141. 
89 See above, p.219-222. 
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of self-knowledge and self-reference (self-awareness); it can be aware of the actions of other 
actors and of relevant conditions for acting, such as legal, moral or political norms 
(environment awareness); and it is capable of formulating reasons for acting on the basis of 
that knowledge, and of selecting a course of action in furtherance of those reasons.  
Significantly, those reasons may include the institutional inertia created by its previous 
decisions, statements, and positions, and the resultant pressure towards consistency.  An 
institutional I-collectivity is, therefore, capable of being a person under a rationalist 
framework. 
4. Beetles to Butterflies: the Transformation of Polity to Person 
The discussion thus far has concluded that there exist two forms of (usually) territorial social 
integration, both of which are commonly referred to as “the State”.  It was further argued that 
the two forms often, if not usually, overlap, with both applying to a single socio-political 
community within a single bounded space.  Thus, it is possible to view “the State” both from 
an internal and an external perspective, and each viewpoint reveals a different kind of entity.  
The different perspectives require that different elements of “the State” be prioritised:  while 
the internal perspective was seen to be a totalising definition, the external was discriminatory, 
excluding much of that which the internal perspective sought to include.  Viewed from the 
internal perspective, “the State” was defined as a State(Polity), or a structure comprising a 
bounded space (usually territorial) within which individuals act consistently with the presence 
of a common social and/or political community, and where their language refers to the 
existence of that structure.  Put more simply, a State(Polity) refers to a society and its area of 
concern (its boundaries).  Viewed from the external perspective, meanwhile, “the State” was 
defined as a State(Person).  The State(Person) is an I-collectivity capable of self-awareness, 
environment-awareness and reasoned action, and therefore may be properly described, pace 
Hobbes, as an artificial person. 
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A number of questions are still to be addressed, however.  An account of the creation of a 
State(Polity) has been given, but it remains to be seen how a State(Person) comes to be.  This 
section will consider that question, and in particular whether the creation of the State(Person) 
occurs as a result of a process that is internal to the State(Polity), or whether that process is 
international.  It will be concluded that both questions can be answered affirmatively, but that 
the entities created thereby are of different kinds.  The first produces a true person of which 
international law must take account, while the second is a form of functional subjecthood 
which allows international law to regulate the action-power of an entity, notwithstanding that 
it does not meet the criteria for true collective personhood. 
4.1 Can a State(Person) be Created as a Result of an Act Internal to a 
State(Polity)? 
An answer to this question has already been implied by the discussion of group mind given 
above.  There it was concluded that the existence of an institutional consciousness is a function 
of the internal organisation of the group, and in particular of the ways in which it makes 
decisions.  It was concluded that imbuing a single person with the action- and thought-power 
of a group did not produce a person—the opinions and decisions of such a group are unlikely 
to amount to more than the mereological sum of their parts—but that an institutional 
consciousness would emerge where institutional inertia results in a form of deliberative 
reason.90  That, in turn, is likely to develop where there are a number of individuals who speak 
and act on behalf of the group in different circumstances, and what is needed, therefore, is a 
plenipotentiary rule.  The plenipotentiary rule is a constitution-rule which enables the 
designation of individuals (qua officials), both in particular situations and longitudinally, as 
capable of engaging the responsibility of the group.91  It is a ‘status function’, in the sense of 
                                                     
90 Pettit, A Theory of Freedom:  From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (n 70) 107–10. 
91 This is similar to the formulation given by Tamanaha to describe the creation of system officials for the purposes 
of Hart’s conception of law as the practice of system officials:  ‘A “legal” official is whomever, as a matter of 
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the term used by Searle; an example of institutional reality which is a linguistic phenomenon, 
created and sustained by declarations (statements with a world-word and word-world direction 
of fit).92  It is therefore possible to say that an I-collectivity with an appropriate plenipotentiary 
rule will emerge where the individuals within the State(Polity) begin to speak of and act 
consistently with the existence of a plenipotentiary rule such that individuals designated under 
that rule may represent the polity as a person.93 
This is a process which takes place by means of, and which is enabled by, self-determination.  
It was argued above that the process of polity creation results in a self-determination unit – in 
a concept of jurisdiction, that enables a determination of to whom the obligations of the system 
apply, and which individuals may claim the protection of them.94  In other words, polity 
creation is incumbent on the idea of membership:  of who is, and who is not, a member of a 
particular society, and hence who is and who is not entitled to participate in the determination 
of its structures, processes and forms of governance.95  A claim of this kind exists 
simultaneously on three levels.  It makes, first, a purely factual claim to the identification of 
                                                     
social practice, members of the group […] identify and treat as “legal” officials.’ Brian Z Tamanaha, A General 
Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford University Press 2001) 142.  [Emphasis omitted]. 
92 Searle (n 48) 452.  
93 It seems likely that this accurately describes the international law conception of persons as it currently exists.  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares that an individual shall be competent to bind a State 
where they are imbued with full powers, but it remains the sole preserve of the State how and by what means 
such individuals are designated, with the exception of a limited number of offices (Head of State, Head of 
Government, heads of relevant diplomatic missions and so on) who will automatically be taken to bind the State 
by their relevant actions (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, in force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Article 7.).  In declaring that an individual is competent to bind the State, the 
individual is invested with that ability.  As Aust notes, the formal document (“full powers”) is not required in 
order to affect this transformation:  ‘A person is considered as representing a state […] if (a) he produces 
appropriate full powers, or (b) it appears from the practice of the states concerned, or from other circumstances, 
that their intention was to consider the person as representing the state for such purposes and thus to dispense 
with full powers’:  Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2007) 
77.  [Original emphasis]. 
94 See above, p.178-180. 
95 See above p.9-11, 178-180. 
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the boundaries of a society.  In identifying the membership of the society its sphere of 
concern—its jurisdiction—is defined, and it becomes possible to define the limits of influence 
by individuals over societies, as well as societies over individuals.  Immanent within that 
factual claim is a, second, normative claim, which speaks of the legitimacy of the control that 
societies exercise over individuals – which relates to the internal facet of political self-
determination; and the legitimacy of the control that individuals and groups exercise over 
societies – which may relate (if the group is within a society) to the internal, or (if the group 
is outwith the society) to the external facet of political self-determination.  Finally, it makes a 
prospective claim, which speaks of how the structures and processes of a society come to 
change:  by identifying those individuals who are and who are not relevant to the change-
processes of the society it enables both the factual (whose expectations and actions are relevant 
for the understanding of social change) and the normative (do the changes to the society 
respect political self-determination) aspects of the enquiry.  That self-determination unit is, 
therefore, a necessary precursor to the development of a plenipotentiary rule:  in order for a 
plenipotentiary to speak for a society it must first be possible to say to which society it applies. 
The formation of a plenipotentiary rule—the formation of a person applying to a polity—is 
not merely enabled by self-determination, however; it takes places by means of a self-
determination process.  The formation of a plenipotentiary rule represents a choice on the part 
of the individuals who comprise the polity that they will engage as a single body, as a self, 
with other socio-political groups.  That process need not be an identifiable ‘moment’, and does 
not require a particular method be employed, but requires that the polity begin to understand 
itself and speak of itself as having at its disposal a plenipotentiary rule, such that individuals 
can be selected to speak on behalf of the collectivity as a whole, and to engage its 
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responsibility.  It such circumstances it becomes an I-collectivity, and may appropriately be 
referred to as a Person.96 
4.2 Can a State(Polity) be Transformed into a State(Person) by Means of an 
International Process? 
The forgoing analysis has argued that legal personhood is a concept of limited utility when 
applied to States.  This is because, as Ross has eloquently stated, international law can be 
defined only by reference to the State, which is its author and its plenary subject.97  Any 
attempt to define personhood by reference to law therefore inevitably encounters a familiar 
problem:  which came first?  Personhood has thus far been conceived not as a creation of law, 
but as a function of capacity, therefore:  personhood exists as a function of reality, and is a 
pre-legal fact of which the law must take account. 
However, almost all domestic legal systems have mechanisms for the imposition of 
subjecthood on groups, whether or not these groups meet the criteria of a true personhood.98  
What this amounts to, in the case of imperfect persons, is not that the law thereby confers the 
capacity for personhood on a collectivity—it does not perfect its personhood—but rather it 
requires the group to act as a subject of law as a unitary entity, and grants it a certain set of 
                                                     
96 Viewing this process through a self-determination lens also explains why it is that a—loosely speaking—political 
process within the polity can alter the polity itself.  After all, the polity is both larger than and prior to politics, 
which can only take place once the political space has been defined (see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Two Conceptions of 
Self-Determination’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 408).  The polity must, therefore, surely be on a lower—that is to say, more basic—
normative plane than the political system which operates within it.  Can it be correct, therefore, that the one can 
alter the other?  Self-determination suggests an answer.  Although the creation of the plenipotentiary rule has 
been referred to as a political process, it would be incorrect to categorise it as an act within the political system.  
As an act of self-determination it is better understood as an act akin to the creation of the polity itself, and it 
engages the same popular legitimacy.  It is, therefore, a pre-political act (ibid). 
97 Ross (n 8) 12. 
98 See, for example, in UK law:  Companies Act 2006 c46 Part 2, s9. 
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legal rights and responsibilities.  To this extent, it is distinct from true personhood, and should 
be perhaps considered as legal subjecthood, or as functional personhood.99 
A number of writers have argued that collectivities should be subject to such a functional 
personhood.  These accounts tend to focus on the collectivity’s ability to cause harm, rather 
than on its moral personhood, and in particular on its ability to cause a harm that is of a 
different kind to that threatened by individual action: 
This point is crucial:  individual consequences, when aggregated, constitute a 
harm different from that of the individuals, different in kind.  We can differentiate 
these kinds of harms by their ties to the capacities of the entities to whom they are 
causally attributed.  Insofar as there is an ineliminable reference to a collective in 
the explanation of the production of that harm, the collective should be attributed 
responsibility for the production of that harm, including blame.100 
The ultimate goal, Crawford argues, in understanding harms produced by collectivities as 
such, is that those harm-producing actions can be more appropriately controlled.101 
Here, too, there is a direct link to self-determination, although here the relevant self-
determination unit is the group that is suffering, rather than the group which is causing, the 
harm in question.  In chapter three it was argued that obligation finds its roots in self-
determination.  It was argued that the idea of law and legal regulation of actions is inherent in 
the proposition that political self-determination units have a moral right to their independence, 
to be free from interference, and to the protection of their integrity, and it was argued that the 
creation of inter-societal law is necessary for the protection of individual and collectivised 
                                                     
99 This is a familiar concept in international law.  Indeed, Lauterpacht argues that all international personality is of 
this kind:  Lauterpacht (n 22) 27. 
100 Kenneth Shockley, ‘Programming Collective Control’ (2007) 38 Journal of Social Philosophy 442, 451; see 
also Marion Smiley, ‘From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs:  Re-Thinking Collective Moral Responsibility’ 
(2010) 19 Journal of Law and Policy 171; Brook J Sadler, ‘Collective Responsibility, Universalizability and 
Social Practices’ (2007) 38 Journal of Social Philosophy 486; Ronen (n 17) 31. 
101 Neta C Crawford, ‘Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity’ (2007) 15 
The Journal of Political Philosophy 187, 212. 
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self-determination, therefore.  Harms of the kind which threaten the existence, wellbeing, 
integrity or independence of self-determining communities are not the creation solely of 
individuals, nor yet of I-collectivities.  On the contrary, other groups can produce harms of 
these kinds, and if the self-determination of communities and the individuals who comprise 
them is to be protected it is therefore necessary to regulate the actions of groups which do not 
meet the threshold of true persons for the purposes of moral responsibility. 
There must be, therefore, (at least) two routes to legal responsibility.  True personhood is 
innate:  it is a capacity-dependent trait which exists as a pre-legal fact, and as such cannot be 
imposed and cannot be withheld.  A second route, though, allows a functional personhood to 
be imposed on an imperfect person with the goal of regulating those of its functions with the 
ability to cause harms of the relevant type.  The first route, therefore, is legal responsibility as 
a result of moral responsibility, and applies to natural persons and true artificial persons, or I-
collectivities.  The second is legal responsibility as a result of action-power.  It is logically 
necessary, however, to be able to answer the questions to whom a regulation is addressed, and 
to whom any sanction would apply.102  A functional person must, therefore, be an entity with 
a stable identity (i.e. must not be ephemeral, but have stable identifying factors, for example 
a stable territorial reach, leadership or membership), possessed of an action-power. 
4.2.1 International Politics or International Law? 
It has been concluded that true personhood cannot be imposed on an entity from above.  True 
personhood is a function of capacity, and that capacity can be created only as the result of an 
internal process of self-determination.  Nevertheless, a lesser, functional, subjecthood can be 
applied to stable entities possessed of an action-power.  Where the entity thus rendered a 
functional person is a Polity, international law refers to the resultant functional person as a 
                                                     
102 Lucy (n 24) 790–91.  [Footnotes omitted]. 
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State, failing to differentiate between functionally-applied personhood and capacity-based 
subjecthood.  It remains to be seen, however, whether the process of applying functional 
statehood to a polity is best understood as a process of law or of the political will of existing 
States. 
The mechanism for the creation of functional statehood is understood as (constitutive) 
recognition.  Two major schools of recognition exist.  The first, most influentially stated by 
Oppenheim, holds that a decision to recognise a new State is entirely a matter of discretion on 
the part of the State recognising, and that no State is under a duty to recognise another.103  It 
can be implied from this that no, or only a minimal, criteria pertain to recognition.  The 
opposite position is taken by Lauterpacht, who argues that States are under a duty to recognise 
an entity which meets the criteria for statehood.104  An examination of the process of 
recognition, however, suggests which understanding is to be preferred. 
In recognising an entity, States make a declaration, in Searle’s terms.  Recognition is a 
statement by which they refer to the entity in question using the term “State”, and it thus 
exhibits the double direction of fit (word-world and world-word) which Searle identifies as 
characteristic of declarations.105  This is because the consequence of recognition is the 
assignation of a status function.106  What has changed about the entity as a result of its 
recognition?  In physical and institutional terms, most probably nothing.  It has gained the 
status of “State”, however, at very least in its relations with the recogniser.  Recognition is, 
                                                     
103 Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise - Volume 1: Peace (2nd edn., Longmans, 
Green and Co 1912) 117. 
104 Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge University Press 1947) 78. 
105 Searle (n 48) 455.  
106 ibid 452. 
 STATEHOOD AND PERSONALITY 231 
 
 
therefore, an example of a linguistic act.107  By applying the word “State” to the entity in 
question, the recogniser declares it to be a “State”, and constitutes it (or contributes to its 
constitution) as such.  It may be, therefore, that certain of the criteria that apply to the process 
(if any criteria apply) relate to the meaning of the word “State”.  To put it another way, it may 
be that the word “State” is subject to a language rule.  Patterson explains the concept: 
The justification for any application of a rule is the internal relation exemplified 
by the grammar of the rule.  Applying the rule correctly is a matter of grammar; 
correct application means no more than applying a rule in accordance with its 
grammar.108 
By contrast, if, as Oppenheim implies, the recogniser may apply the term “State” to anything, 
“State” would be a term which ceased to have descriptive meaning, and therefore would be 
nothing more than a status function.  It would be more akin to Wittgenstein’s beetle in a box:  
a term each defines by reference to some internal standard which is not (or is not readily) 
communicable.  It would be a term which ‘cancels out, whatever it is.’109  In short, it would 
have no meaning other than “an entity which is granted international rights and duties.”110  On 
the contrary, however, “State” appears to be a term which retains meaning, largely because it 
is applied by States in more-or-less consistent ways.111  Although individuals bear certain 
                                                     
107 Indeed, the prevalence of such linguistic acts may support Searle’s conclusion that ‘all of institutional reality is 
both created in its initial existence and maintained in its continued existence by way of’ language.  See ibid 451. 
108 Patterson (n 50) 949. 
109 Wittgenstein (n 33) §293. 
110 Indeed, the term may not even refer to a specific or expansive set of rights and duties.  As Anghie has observed, 
the history of international law has been comprised of a series of frameworks which limit the rights and sphere 
of action of certain States.  (Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) passim, esp. 115-194.) 
111 The concept of meaning is highly uncertain and difficult to describe.  Wittgenstein dedicates a substantial section 
of his Philosophical Investigations to an examination of the idea, and suggests, rather than states, an answer to 
the question “what is it for a word to have meaning”, and to the connected question “how does it come to be that 
a word has meaning for a certain group?”  (Wittgenstein (n 33) §1-242.)  Meaning is socially constructed.  
Wittgenstein begins with an example of language acquisition in infants, where words are learnt as a signifiers 
which attach to objects, actions and so on.  (§1.)  This is not simply a case of learning definitions, but also of 
learning and contributing to a practice.  Wittgenstein gives the example of a sign-post, which has significance 
for an individual only because they ‘have been trained to react to [sign-posts] in a particular way’.  Thus, ‘a 
person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.’  (§198.)  Indeed, 
a system of language rules is meaningless without a consonant practice:  ‘If language is to be a means of 
communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in 
judgements.’  (§242.)  See also Bianchi’s discussion of meaning and context in the sphere of law:  Andrea 
Bianchi, ‘Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading:  The Myth of (in) Determinacy and the 
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international rights (under, for example, the ICESCR/ICCPR) and certain international duties 
(not to commit certain acts designated international crimes), it would be seen as manifestly 
absurd to describe an individual as a “State”.  Although there is disagreement in penumbral 
cases, therefore, it can be observed that a certain core of meaning applies to the term “State”. 
Most contemporary authors recognise that Article one of the Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States is the starting point for any discussion of the meaning of statehood 
in contemporary international law.112  The Convention, which despite having only a few States 
Parties is generally regarded as having entered customary law,113 declares that 
The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; 
and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.114 
Significantly, although a number of writers have argued in recent years that the enumeration 
is no longer adequate and should be expanded to take into account such factors a legality of 
origins, minority rights, and democracy,115 the elements it lists—and, in particular, the first 
three—have remained largely stable for many years.  As Grant observes, for example, Jellinek 
defined statehood in relation to three broadly similar elements in the 1930’s—effectiveness, 
population and territory—and similar criteria were widely accepted in other accounts of the 
time.116  Similarly, Hall defined statehood as an independent political community within a 
                                                     
Genealogy of Meaning’ in Pieter Bekker and others (eds), Making Transitional Law Work in the Global Economy 
- Essays in Honour of Detlev Vagts (Cambridge University Press 2010) passim, esp. 41-42. 
112 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 2) 36; Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States (26 December 1933). 
113 Grant notes that the Montevideo criteria have become a ‘touchstone for the definition of the State’:  Thomas D 
Grant, ‘Defining Statehood:  The Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents’ (1998–99) 37 Colombia Journal 
of Transnational Law 403, 416. 
114 Montevideo convention (n 112) Article 1. 
115 See e.g. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 2) 89–95; Grant (n 113) esp. 453; Milena 
Sterio, ‘A Grotian Moment:  Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood’ (2010–11) 39 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 209.  
116 Grant (n 113) 416. 
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defined territory.117  In fact, the markers of statehood, in a form recognisable today, can be 
seen in the writings of Bodin in the 1570s,118 and Grotius in the 1620s.119 
Not only do these criteria appear to have been broadly accepted as an accurate definition of a 
State by publicists, but they appear to have been accepted by States themselves.  During the 
course of the Kosovo advisory proceedings, a number of States submitted written comments 
to the Court, some of which addressed the question of whether Kosovo could claim to be a 
State.  Although differences existed between the participants as to whether recognition is 
constitutive or declaratory, all of those States which addressed the issue referred either to the 
Montevideo criteria themselves or a similar list of requirements of statehood.  Serbia, for 
example, noted that ‘[t]he requirements of statehood focus upon the criteria of population, 
territory and governance’,120 while Luxembourg referred to the need for a ‘defined territory, a 
settled population, and an effective government’,121 and Japan, although arguing that 
recognition is constitutive, stated that 
For the formation of a State, international law generally requires that an entity 
shall meet the conditions of Statehood, namely an entity holds an effective 
government which governs a permeant population within a defined territory.  The 
question of whether an entity fulfils these requirements usually comes into play 
in the context and in the phase of recognition by other States.122 
Japan’s position is illuminating.  It suggests that, although Japan conceived of statehood as a 
matter of recognition, States are not unfettered in the exercise of their power to recognise.  
                                                     
117 ibid 417. 
118 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (Tooley (tr), Basil Blackwell 1967). 
119 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (Richard Tuck tr, Liberty Fund 2005). 
120 Written Statement of Serbia, 17 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [416]. 
121 Written Statement of Luxembourg, 30 March 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence In Respect of Kosovo [16]. 
122 Written Statement of Japan, 17 April 2009, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence In Respect of Kosovo 2. 
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Lalos characterises States as ‘gatekeepers’, who ‘ensure that de facto states meet the criteria 
outlined under the Montevideo Convention.’123  Mugerwa argues on similar lines that ‘there 
appears to be universal acceptance of the rule that recognition must be accorded only when all 
the conditions of statehood are fulfilled.’124 
These criteria have come under attack in recent years, however.  Grant is particularly 
forthright, denouncing the Montevideo criteria as ‘over-inclusive, under-inclusive, and 
outdated.’125  He correctly identifies that a number of entities which have appeared to meet 
the Montevideo criteria—such as Rhodesia—have not been recognised, while entities with 
serious defects in terms of the criteria have been treated as States.126  He identifies a list of 
eight criteria which, he says, would at least have to be given serious consideration, were a new 
international instrument on the lines of the Montevideo Convention to be drafted.  These 
include independence; a claim to statehood; self-determination; internal and external legality; 
the existence of a people joined by historical, cultural, religious or other factors; and United 
Nations membership, as well as a formal requirement of recognition.127  By contrast, although 
Sterio agrees that additional criteria should now be applied to the process of State creation 
(such as recognition by regional States and the great powers, respect for human and minority 
                                                     
123 Dimitrios Lalos, ‘Between Statehood and Somalia:  Reflections of Somaliland Statehood’ (2011) 10 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 789, 800. 
124 Nkambo Mugerwa, ‘Subjects of International Law’ in Max Sørensen (ed), Manual of Public International Law 
(MacMillan 1968) 277. 
125 Grant (n 113) 453.  
126 ibid 442–47. 
127 ibid 450–51. 
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rights and acceptance of international law), she argues that these are best considered to be sub-
elements of Montevideo’s ill-defined fourth criterion, capacity.128 
A somewhat weaker claim is advanced here.  It is argued that the Montevideo Convention 
criteria should be not regarded as a list of requirements for Statehood, but rather as an iteration 
of a definition generally understood.  Thus, while significant disagreements remain when 
faced with penumbral cases, States, commentators and others share a schematic understanding 
of what it is to be a “State”.  In short, that the term “State” is a term defined:  “State” is subject 
to a language rule. 
In the context of functional statehood, then, States are not entirely at liberty to recognise as 
“State” whatsoever they wish (the Oppenheim position):  rather they must take account of the 
meaning of the word “State”.  The precise ambit of the definition would require a review of 
State practice that is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is possible to make a number of 
observations.  It is settled practice, for example, that States are territorial entities, although it 
is accepted that the borders of the territory in question need not be precisely delineated.129  
Similarly, States are populous, and an entity without a population will not be considered a 
State.130  Thirdly, States are polities – that is so say, a group of individuals arranged within a 
                                                     
128 Sterio, ‘A Grotian Moment:  Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood’ (n 115) 2010.  
129 In its judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf case the ICJ commented that:  ‘There is for instance no rule 
that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and often in various places and for long 
periods they are not’:  North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, (1969) ICJ Reports 3, [46].  Crawford comments 
that ‘even a substantial boundary or territorial dispute with a new State is not enough, of itself, to bring statehood 
into question.  The only requirement is that the State must consist of a certain coherent territory effectively 
governed’:  Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 2) 52. 
130 Lauterpacht argues that a State must possess ‘a population subject to the natural process of renewal and growth’ 
(Lauterpacht (n 104) 48.), although it is worth noting, with Duursma, that ‘[n]o reservations have been made by 
the international community with respect to statehood because of the limited number of nationals of micro-
states.’  Jorri Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States:  Self-Determination and 
Statehood (Cambridge University Press 1996) 118. 
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socio-political community.131  Finally, an entity will not be regarded as a State if it is under an 
effective authority-claim by another State.132  For that reason, a sub-State unit cannot be 
recognised as a State under international law, and breakaway regions will be recognised only 
once the State recognising believes that the region has successfully displaced the authority-
claim of the former power.133 
It can be concluded, then, that States are not free to exercise unfettered discretion in the course 
of recognising new States.  However, it may not be correct to characterise certain of the 
limitations on State action in this regard as obligations, nor as stemming from law.  Although 
certain legal rules do apply to the recognition process (such as the obligation not to recognise 
an entity over which an existing State exercises an authority-claim),134 and it may be that legal 
rules exist in parallel with the limitations discussed here, it was found that States are primarily 
limited by the constraints of language.  States are not ‘bound’, in the sense of being subject to 
a norm, but rather are guided by a language rule:  they cannot apply the term “State” to an 
entity which is manifestly ill-suited to bear the term because to describe the entity as a “State” 
would not make sense.  It is, thus, both a less stringent and less certain guide to behaviour than 
a legal rule, but is perhaps stronger in that it is somewhat isolated from deliberate change 
                                                     
131 The classic formulation is Vattel’s, now usually taken as a truism: ‘A nation or State is, as has been said at the 
beginning of this work, a body politic, or a society of men united together to promote their mutual safety and 
advantage by means of their union.’  Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature 
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (G G and J Robinson 1797) 15. 
132 Vattel argued that entities which are in certain ways dependent upon others will not necessarily be denied 
statehood on that account.  The significant factor is authority.  He declares that States ‘acknowledge no other 
law, than that of nations’ (ibid 17.), and by implication holds that entities which acknowledge the rule (the 
authority-claim) of another cannot be considered States.  Crawford, similarly, states that:  ‘A new State 
attempting to secede will have to demonstrate substantial independence, both formal and real, from the State of 
which it formed part before it will be regarded as definitively created.’  Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law (n 2) 63. 
133 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (n 2) 63. 
134 John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Grotius Publications Limited 1987) 86–90; UNSC Res 5002 
(24 November 1961); UNSC Res 497(1981) (17 December 1981); UNGA Res 37/123A (16 December 1982); 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, (1995) ICJ Reports 90. 
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(although meaning may naturally shift over time).  Of course, as with any rule, there remains 
significant room for disagreement in penumbral cases, but these will not normally present a 
challenge to the meaning of the word itself, rather focusing on whether a particular set of facts 
fall just inside the definition or are excluded by it:  the core features of the definition are 
usually accepted by both disputants and, indeed, are therefore reinforced rather than damaged 
by the dispute. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the concept of self-determination, already found to play a vital 
role in founding and shaping sovereignty and obligation, is also central to two more of 
international law’s structural properties:  statehood and personality.  That conclusion demands 
a reassessment of the relative positions of States and individuals and communities in 
international life, and a change of emphasis in the way States are perceived.  In particular, the 
Montevideo paradigm of statehood—which casts the presence of individuals as a criterion 
which must be met by would-be States—does not appear adequately to capture the centrality 
and importance of individuals for statehood.  Viewed through a sociological lens and 
facilitated by a disaggregation of the various entities to which the term “State” can refer—the 
State(Polity), the State(Person) and the State-like functional subject of law—self-determining 
individuals and communities are revealed as being inescapably central to the statehood idea, 
which depends entirely upon them for its continued existence.  As Giddens comments, entities 
of these kinds ‘manifestly would cease to be if all the agents involved disappeared.’135 
Three forms of “State” were identified, each of which has an intimate connection to self-
determination.  The State(Polity) is a social structure within which individuals conduct a 
                                                     
135 Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (n 36) 24. 
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shared socio-political life within a bounded space.  It is a social fact, recursively created by 
the declarative actions of the individuals who live within it, and it engages both the internal 
and the external facets of the political self-determination of that community.  Most 
significantly, it is a political self-determination unit for the purposes of the self-determination 
based conception of sovereignty discussed in chapter three, providing the necessary 
understanding of membership for the proposition that interference with the internal processes 
of the polity by external actors (individuals and groups) is illegitimate. 
The State(Polity), too, is the basic societal unity within which a State(Person) may emerge.  
This second—co-extensive but non-equivalent—idea of “State” emerges where the necessary 
institutional structures exist to permit the collective entity (“the community” or “the group”) 
to act on its own behalf, in ways that are not mereologically attributable to the individuals who 
comprise it.  In contrast to the State(Polity), which is passive, the State(Person) is an actor on 
the international plane which is appropriately a legal person in its own right.  The creation of 
such a personhood was characterised as a self-determination process:  a choice by the 
individuals inhabiting a State(Polity) to develop a plenipotentiary rule, or the institutional 
structures necessary to allow designated individuals to represent the community as a single 
entity. 
Finally, it was argued that collective entities which lack a “true” personhood may nevertheless 
be subjected to international law as functional subjects.  Like full personhood, that conclusion 
is implied, too, by the analysis of sovereignty and obligation conducted in the previous 
chapter.136  There it was concluded that the question of whether an entity is sovereign—
defined as being entitled to independence and protection from external interference—is a 
                                                     
136 See above, p.172 et seq. 
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factual question, based on whether a socio-political community exists such that the personal 
self-determination rights of the individuals who comprise it form an accreted, aggregated right 
to political self-determination.  A political self-determination unit of that kind has a right to 
determine without external interference the principles on which its social and political life will 
be conducted, and the concept of obligation to law is therefore necessarily implied.  
Significantly, however, this analysis decouples sovereignty and international personality:  it 
would be perfectly possible for an entity entitled to the protection of its sovereignty of the 
kind described here to be a State(Polity) which lacked a plenipotentiary rule, and therefore to 
be capable of being only an imperfect or functional legal subject.  That it lacked full 
personhood would, however, neither justify withholding from it the protection of its 
sovereignty and its self-determination, nor of leaving unregulated whatever action-power it 
possesses, potentially to the detriment of other individuals and communities. 
As with the concepts of sovereignty and obligation, the analysis presented here supports the 
proposition that self-determination is deeply embedded in the ideas of statehood, personality 
and subjecthood.  That the concept plays such a vital role in shaping and conditioning these 
structural properties of the international legal system supports the hypothesis of this thesis, 
that self-determination should now be understood as the system’s structural principle, and it 
supports, too, the suggestion that the centrality of self-determination in international law is 
furthering the humanisation of international law.  The previous chapter concluded that it is not 
the State but the human which should now be seen as the centre of the international law world.  
By defining States as and for the protection of self-determining communities rather than—as 
does, for example, Montevideo—simply as containing individuals, this chapter goes further 
still, and begins to break down the distinctions between the two. 
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Five 
Peremptory Normativity and Self-
Determination 
Schnee fiel, als man sich’s erzählte 
in einer östlichen Stadt 
vor einem Kinderkreuzzug 
der in Polen begonnen hat. 
Da trippelten Kinder hundernd 
in Trüpplein hinab die Chausseen 
und nahmen mit sich andere, die 
in zerschlossenen Dörfern stehn. 
Sie wollten entrinnen den Schlachten 
dem ganzen Nachtmahr 
und eines Tages kommen 
in ein Land, wo Frieden war.1 
1. Introduction 
In 1969 an idea that had for many years existed on the outskirts of international law gained 
mainstream recognition.  Although it had been alluded to in 1867 by Bluntschli, to whom 
Sarkin attributes the first reference,2 the inclusion of the idea of “higher order” rules—norms 
which would invalidate even subsequent conflicting provisions—in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties was a revolutionary moment in the development of modern 
                                                     
1 Bertolt Brecht, ‘Kinderkreuzzug 1939’ in HR Hays (ed), Selected Poems of Bertolt Brecht (Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich 1959) 148. 
2 Jeremy Sarkin, ‘Why the Prohibition of Enforced Disappearance Has Attained Jus Cogens Status in International 
Law’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 537, 554.  The most influential early reference to ius cogens 
was very likely that of Verdross in his famous 1937 essay:  Alfred Verdross, ‘Forbidden Treaties in International 
Law’ (1937) 31 American Journal of International Law 571; see also discussion in Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘Alfred 
Verdross and the Contemporary Constitutionalization Debate’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 799. 
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international law.3  These “peremptory” norms, or norms “ius cogens”, have since been seen 
as representing a basic morality of the international community; a minimum requirement of 
humanity built into international law. 
This chapter will argue that the connection between self-determination and ius cogens lends 
further support to the hypothesis of this thesis:  that the influence of self-determination is 
humanising international law.  It will first examine the relationship between ius cogens and 
the concept of self-determination in its personal and political forms—those branches of the 
self-determination genus embedded in international law as structural principles4—and will 
argue that the concept of ius cogens, like the concept of obligation which it modifies, finds its 
roots in the protection of self-determining individuals and communities.  Section three will 
then identify certain norms as ius cogens, before sections four and five examine the 
identification of substantive ius cogens norms, and argue that self-determination contributes, 
too, to the formation of norms of ius cogens status.  It will be shown that the connection to 
self-determination is not in itself sufficient to constitute a norm as peremptory, but it will be 
argued that the function of protecting individual or political self-determination is nonetheless 
a central criterion in the identification and creation of norms ius cogens. 
The chapter will conclude that it is, at a minimum, credible to argue that ius cogens norms 
reflect the demands of protecting individual and group self-determination, and that the 
privileged position given to self-determination in modern international may help to explain 
the development of relative normativity.  It will, however, conclude also that international 
                                                     
3 Bianchi comments, for example, that ‘[h]ad some of the parties to the Vienna Convention clearly foreseen the 
consequences of letting such a Trojan horse into the international legal system, it is not unreasonable to speculate 
that the Convention would have fewer parties than it currently has.’  Andrea Bianchi, ‘Dismantling the Wall:  
The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and Its Likely Impact on International Law’ (2004) 47 German Yearbook of 
International Law 343, 42–44.  [Footnotes omitted]. 
4 See above p.23-25. 
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norms ius cogens represent a system morality, and not an objective morality.  As such the 
creation of new norms ius cogens is a social phenomenon, and not a purely philosophical one. 
2. The Concept of Norms Ius Cogens 
Although ius cogens norms have had international legal effect since the entry into force of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in January 1980, there remains something 
about the concept of ius cogens which seems to defy satisfactory definition.  Two routes are 
commonly used by scholars attempting this task:  they may, first, ground the concept entirely 
in the text of the VCLT and in its antecedents, and define the concept according to its effects:5 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law.  For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.6 
Under this approach, ius cogens norms are defined as those norms from which no derogation 
is permitted, together with the restriction that alteration of the cannon of ius cogens norms 
make take place only by means of a subsequent ius cogens norm.7  But as Jiménez de Aréchaga 
has observed: 
This description of jus cogens fails to apprehend its real essence, since the 
definition is based on the legal effects of a rule and not on its intrinsic nature; it is 
not that certain rules are rules of jus cogens because no derogation from them is 
permitted; rather, no derogation is allowed because they possess the nature of 
rules of jus cogens.8 
                                                     
5 See e.g. Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law:  Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status (Finnish Lawyers Publishing Company 1988) 2–3 et seq. 
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331, 
Article 53. 
7 Hannikainen (n 5) 3.  This approach has been characterised by Linderfalk as the ‘Legal-Consequences-as-
Criterion Theory’: Ulf Linderfalk, ‘What is So Special about Jus Cogens? – On the Difference between the 
Ordinary and the Peremptory International Law’ (2012) 14 International Community Law Review 3, 4.  
[Emphasis omitted]. 
8 Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’ (1978) 159 Collected Courses 
of the Hague Academy of International Law 1, 64.  Indeed, Simma describes this definition as ‘tautological’:  
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It is, perhaps, this dissatisfaction with an effect-definition that leads Orakhelashvili and others 
to focus instead on a purposive examination of ius cogens.  Orakhelashvili argues that ius 
cogens norms should be seen as a form of ‘international public order’,9 which ‘resembles 
conceptually […] constitutional limitations in terms of on what the law-makers can freely 
enact.’10  He continues, ‘peremptory norms operate as a public order protecting the legal 
system from incompatible laws, acts and transactions.  As with every legal system, 
international law can be vulnerable to infiltration of the effect of certain norms and 
transactions which are fundamentally repugnant to it.’11  In other words, on this argument ius 
cogens norms have a system-building function.12 
Although Orakhelashvili’s characterisation of ius cogens as international public order has by 
no means been universally accepted,13 this view suggests that the most significant feature of 
such norms is not their non-derogable or compulsory character per se, but rather their 
uniformity.  The common, coalescing, and convergent functions of ius cogens norms require 
States—despite the multi-speed nature of international rule-making—to share a common core 
                                                     
Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250 Collected Courses 
of the Hague Academy of International Law 217, 286–87; see also Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 262, but see contra Linderfalk, who challenges the 
characterisation of Article 53 as circular:  Ulf Linderfalk, ‘The Creation of Jus Cogens – Making Sense of Article 
53 of the Vienna Convention’ (2011) 71 Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Öffenliches Recht und Völkerrecht 359. 
9 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 7 et seq. 
10 ibid 10; see also Andrea Bianchi, ‘Individual Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity:  Reckoning with the 
Past, Thinking of the Future’ (1999) 19 SAIS Review 97, 116–17. 
11 Orakhelashvili (n 9) 10. 
12 Christopher A Ford, ‘Adjudicating Jus Cogens’ (1994–95) 13 Wisconsin Journal of International Law 145, 160–
63. 
13 See e.g. Christenson, who criticises the public order idea of ius cogens as an inappropriate application of a 
municipal law analogy:  Gordon A Christenson, ‘Jus Cogens:  Guarding Interests Fundamental to International 
Society’ (1988) 28 Virginia Journal of International Law 585, 598–602.  Yarwood, too, objects to the association 
of ius cogens norms with public policy, arguing that in order to be useful to the international legal order ius 
cogens must ‘stand on its own two feet’:  Lisa Yarwood, ‘Jus Cogens:  Useful Tool or Passing Fancy?  A Modest 
Attempt at Definition’ (2006) 38 Bracton Law Journal 16, 16–17. 
244 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTRED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
of obligations out of which they cannot contract even by mutual consent.  By this means 
international rules are elevated from “mere” contracts between States to form a cohesive body 
of law.14 
The argument that peremptory norms perform a systematising function invokes a concern felt 
by some international lawyers that the transition at the beginning of the long 19th century from 
natural law to positivism resulted in an international law that lacked a legal “system”.  The 
concern seems justified:  certainly, as discussed above, the period was characterised by 
significant concerns over the “bindingness” of international law,15 and even whether 
international law should be considered “law” properly-so-called at all.16  It was at this time, 
too, that fragmentation became ‘inherent to, and a logical consequence of, the nature of 
international law itself’,17 and although the voluntarist nature of treaty relations would, 
whatever the basis of the international legal system, make a fully homogeneous legal order a 
vanishingly small probability, the Study Group of the International Law Commission on 
Fragmentation of International Law attributed the high degree of fragmentation in 
international law to the ‘spontaneous, decentralized and unhierarchical nature of international 
                                                     
14 Although see, contra, Christenson, who objects to the suggestion of a systemising function to ius cogens norms 
saying that ‘[t]he world community distrusts embracing this kind of myth as a means to legitimate action.’  
Christenson (n 13) 631. 
15 See above, chapter three. 
16 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray 1832) 171. 
17 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 
(Max Planck Society/Oxford University Press 2006) [7].  It may also be indicative that there was, as Schwelb 
describes, a growing interest in the concept of an international ordre publique during the twentieth century:  Egon 
Schwelb, ‘Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission’ 
(1967) 61 American Journal of International Law 946, 949–60. 
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law-making’ that is a particular characteristic of the post-natural law international legal 
order.18 
Whether or not the concept of ius cogens norms was conceived as an opportunity to re-
introduce a systematising element into international law—a sort-of non-natural ius naturæ for 
the 20th century19—it appears to fill something of the void left by the demise of natural law.20  
As Koskenniemi notes: 
[T]he importance of the notion [of ius cogens]—like the importance of erga 
omnes obligations—may lie less in the way the concepts are actually “applied” 
than as signals of argumentative possibilities and boundaries for institutional 
decision-making.  To that extent, the notions alleviate the extent to which 
international law’s fragmentation may seem problematic.21 
Indeed, the choice of terminology—cogens—may also imply that such a role was anticipated 
for the concept.22  Bearing the double meaning of “that body of rules which compels” and 
                                                     
18 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law’ [2006] Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN 
Doc A/CN4/L682, [486]. 
19 Yarwood characterises this as a ‘remarkable attempt at self-preservation’ by positivist international law thought:  
Yarwood (n 13) 23; see also Ford (n 12) 149; Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent, ‘A Fiduciary Theory of Jus 
Cogens’ (2009) 34 Yale Journal of International Law 331, 337–338 et seq; Andrea Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and 
the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 491, 492. 
20 Pellet comments that ‘the existence of norms of a superior value is as ancient as international law, [but] the 
conception of jus cogens is recent and tightly linked with the elaboration, then the adoption, of the Vienna 
Convention.’  Alain Pellet, ‘Comments in Response to Christine Chinkin and in Defense of Jus Cogens as the 
Best Bastion against the Execeses of Fragmentation’ (2006) 17 Finish Yearbook of International Law 83, 89.  
See also Murray and O’Donoghue, who argue that fragmentation, if not creative of ius cogens norms, has spurred 
their mainstream recognition, particularly by the ICJ:  Colin RG Murray and Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘A Path 
Already Travelled in Domestic Orders?  From Fragmentation to Constitutionalisation in the Global Legal Order’ 
(2017) 13 International Journal of Law in Context 225. 
21 Koskenniemi (n 18) [409].  [Emphasis added].  For an alternative take on the role of ius cogens in the context of 
fragmentation see Paulus, who argues that ius cogens may play a role in recognising and reinforcing the common 
values of the international community.  Nevertheless, he strikes a warning note, characterising norms ius cogens 
both as offering a means to constrain power, and as a tool for the furtherance of hegemonic forces in the system.  
Andreas L Paulus, ‘Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and Fragmentation:  An Attempt at a Re-Appraisal’ 
(2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 297. 
22 Lauterpacht (n11); Fitzmaurice (n 11). 
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“that body of rules which draws together” the phrase ius cogens hints at a more complex (and 
perhaps more significant) role played by the concept than is often appreciated.23 
Like the effect definition, such a purposive reading of ius cogens points towards significant 
features of the concept, but perhaps does not advance understanding of what ius cogens norms 
are.  It has been indicated that ius cogens norms both guarantee certain intransgressible 
principles and have a systematising function, but something more is needed.  It is in this vein 
that Weatherall characterises ius cogens as an element of a Liberal approach to international 
law, ‘a deontological, individual-oriented perspective that maintains the fundamental purpose 
of all law to be the good of the human being.’24  In other words, ius cogens norms are a 
guarantee of certain basic rights pertaining to the individual which States, for reasons of 
morality and consent, must respect.25  Weatherall characterises this as a form of supra-State 
social contract, an idea formed at the ‘confluence of an individual-oriented normative 
structure, a State-based legal order, and values common to the international community as a 
whole.’26 
Weatherall’s invocation of the social contract is not, ultimately, convincing.  Social contract 
theory in the context of national societies has received a great deal of criticism, much of which 
originates in Hume’s response to the theories of Locke and others of his mind.27  Hume argued 
                                                     
23 Charlton T Lewis and Charles Short, ‘Cōgo’, A Latin Dictionary, Founded on Andrews’ edition of Freund’s 
Latin dictionary revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten by Charlton T Lewis, PhD and Charles Short, 
LLD (Clarendon Press 1879). 
24 Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens:  International Law and the Social Contract (Cambridge University Press 2015) 
xxxix. 
25 See also Paulus (n 21) 332. 
26 Weatherall (n 24) xli. 
27 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature:  Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects (Thomas Longman 1740) vol III, Part II, §8. 
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both that the idea of the promise as the foundation of political society is incoherent, and that 
no living person has ever made such a promise.28  Individuals do not consent to society, Hume 
says: rather they are born into it.  How much more true this is of nations and States, for 
although the individual social contract may be somewhat redeemed (although not, perhaps, 
convincingly) by the argument that an individual impliedly consents to the rule of a State by 
remaining within its borders despite the opportunity to leave,29 States cannot remove 
themselves from the purported sphere of application of international law, nor avoid entirely 
interaction with States and actors in the international society more broadly. 
A similar argument is advanced by Criddle and Fox-Decent, who argue that norms ius cogens 
are an expression of what they term a State’s fiduciary duty to its subjects.30  Grounding ius 
cogens in a Kantian view of humanity,31 they argue that the ‘innate right of humanity of the 
person’,32 together with the relationship of dependence that exists between State and subject,33 
‘renders the beneficiary’s entrusted interests immune to the fiduciary’s appropriation of those 
interests.’34  This fiduciary relationship, they argue, not only results in the category ius cogens 
but also dictates its terms.35  Criddle and Fox-Decent’s theory has much to recommend it, and 
a not dissimilar argument is advanced here.  It does not appear, however, wholly satisfying as 
an explanation of ius cogens, because it is not clear whether (and if so, why) in such a case an 
                                                     
28 ibid §8:9; see also David Hume, ‘Of the Original Contract’ in Knud Haakonssen (ed), Hume:  Political Essays 
(Cambridge University Press 1994) 189–94. 
29 Harry Beran, ‘A Liberal Theory of Secession’ (1984) 32 Political Studies 21, 25; but see, contra, Hume (n 28) 
193. 
30 Criddle and Fox-Decent (n 19) 347–48. 
31 ibid 352 et seq. 
32 ibid 348. 
33 ibid 352–54. 
34 ibid 354. 
35 ibid 355 et seq. 
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individual would enjoy the protection of norms ius cogens against States other than their own.  
By cognising ius cogens as a corollary of the State-subject relationship they are particularised 
to that relationship.  It is submitted here, by contrast, that the category ius cogens only makes 
sense if the norms are general, and that a generalising step is needed to transform the logic 
Criddle and Fox-Decent employ into a more satisfying theory. 
Nevertheless, these approaches suggests an avenue for inquiry.  It has been argued that self-
determination, in its various forms, structures the international legal system, and it has been 
shown that its influence both shapes the interplay between sovereignty and obligation, and 
that it moulds international law’s approach to statehood and personality.  These observations 
speak of a legal system in which individuals—singly or grouped as communities, or 
“peoples”—play a central and defining role.  The question is naturally posed, therefore, 
whether there is a connection (as was found with sovereignty and statehood) between ius 
cogens and self-determination, and whether a connection of that kind can provide the 
generalising influence that the fiduciary theory appears to lack. 
It is submitted that it can.  Indeed, it is argued that only a connection to the structural concept 
of self-determination could explain the functions ius cogens norms serve in international law 
and justify the subjugation of the expressed will of States.  It has been concluded that 
sovereignty and obligation both find their footings in self-determination.  When it forms 
international obligations, the State exercises the competence of the self-determination unit 
which stands behind it.  The principle of self-determination itself, therefore, stands behind 
those obligations and supports the principle that, in general, the obligations entered into by 
States should not by other peoples be gainsaid.  That principle is far from unlimited, however, 
and it necessarily follows from the characterisation of self-determination as the wellspring of 
obligation that ordinary legal obligations, founded in the consent of States and in the obligation 
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of States to fulfil their commitments under international law, cannot conflict with self-
determination itself.36  In short, it is the connection between the category ius cogens and self-
determination that underpins the capacity of ius cogens norms to invalidate obligations entered 
into by States.37 
The conclusion that the category of ius cogens finds its roots in the structural concept of self-
determination in international law demands the corollary conclusion that individual ius cogens 
norms are an expression of self-determination.  The source of the principle of obligation is in 
the protection of individual and aggregated self-determination, and it is therefore incapable of 
underpinning any rule destructive of those ends.38  Phrased, then, as prohibitions on State 
action or on the boundaries of legality (“States shall not…”; “States shall not contract to…”), 
ius cogens norms express basic protections of individual and collective self-determination in 
substantive international law.  The next section will test this hypothesis in relation to those 
norms generally considered to be of the character ius cogens, in order to discover whether a 
link between the substantive ius cogens norms and self-determination can be maintained. 
 
                                                     
36 The ultimate principle Criddle and Fox-Decent apply to the determination of norms derived from the fiduciary 
relationship is that ius cogens norms will protect the agency of the individual, offering a clear parallel to the 
focus on self-determination suggested here:  ibid 365. 
37 This is an argument of the kind Christenson approvingly refers to as an argument from the fundamental interests 
of a global society, meaning ‘not the survival of the states system but the security and well-being of all people.’  
While he regards this as the appropriate position from which to approach questions of ius cogens, he rightly 
sounds the note of warning that ‘[s]tudents of international law and relations should have no illusions’ of the 
continued dominance in international affairs of sovereign States who seek primarily to protect their own interests 
(p. 648, footnotes omitted):  Christenson (n 13) passim. 
38 Bianchi comments, albeit in another context, that ‘the law cannot tolerate acts that run against its very 
foundation.’  Bianchi, ‘Individual Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity:  Reckoning with the Past, 
Thinking of the Future’ (n 10) 116. 
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3. The Identification of Norms Ius Cogens 
The identification of norms ius cogens is more problematic territory even than the elucidation 
of the nature of the category itself.39  Although a relatively stable list of oft-cited (perhaps 
even consensus) candidates has gradually emerged in the literature, justifications of the status 
accorded to the norms generally point to a weight of academic opinion,40 or to the decisions 
of Courts and Tribunals, which have famously tended to provide somewhat scant reasoning 
for these findings.41  It is perhaps this tendency to invoke somewhat mystical indications that 
lie outside of the primary sources of international law that leads Bianchi to declare that 
‘international lawyers have acted as “magicians”, administering the rites of jus cogens and 
invoking its magical power’, whether in the capacity of scholars, counsel or judges.42 
Although the lack of a robust and widely-accepted identification process for norms ius cogens 
means that it is challenging to identify these norms with confidence, certain norms of 
international law are now sufficiently widely accepted as being peremptory by States, courts 
                                                     
39 Simma notes in this regard that the ‘formalistic definition of jus cogens provided in Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention creates more problems that is solves.’  Simma (n 8) 290; see also Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the 
Magic of Jus Cogens’ (n 19) 493; Ulf Linderfalk, ‘The Source of Jus Cogens Obligations – How Legal Positivism 
Copes with Peremptory International Law’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 369, 370; Gennady 
M Danilenko, ‘International Jus Cogens:  Issues of Law-Making’ (1991) 2 European Journal of International 
Law 42, 43. 
40 See, for example, the lists of possible and putative ius cogens norms and the sources cited in support of those 
lists in Malcolm Shaw, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 89–91; M Cherif 
Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes:  Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 63, 68. 
41 Leaving aside D’Amato’s heavy sarcasm, his criticism that Courts (and others) rarely ‘give the reader the 
slightest clue as to how they came to know that their favorite norms have become jus cogens norms’ is fair.  
Anthony D’Amato, ‘It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!’ (1990) 6 Connecticut Journal of International Law 
1, 3; Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 42.  However, see 
contra Ford, who argues that it is appropriate that the primary means of determining ius cogens rules should be 
decisions on the subject by the ICJ:  Ford (n 12) 168 et seq. 
42 Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (n 19) 494; see also D’Amato (n 41); Alfred P Rubin, 
‘Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offences Erga Omnes?’ (2001) 35 New England Law Review 265.  Simma 
and Aston discuss the difficulties of identifying peremptory norms, noting that ‘rules of jus cogens are prohibitive 
in structure; they are rules of abstention.  How does one marshal conclusive evidence of abstentions?  Abstentions 
per se mean nothing; they become meaningful only when considered in the light of the intention motivating 
them’:  Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law:  Custom, Jus Cogens, and General 
Principles’ (1988–89) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 82, 103–04. 
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and commentators that, even if it is not indisputable, their status as such is at least rarely 
disputed.  This chapter will treat the ius cogens status of certain norms as established:43  the 
prohibitions on aggressive force,44 genocide,45 slavery,46 torture,47 war crimes,48 crimes 
against humanity,49 and apartheid.50  The status of two further groups of norms, though, 
                                                     
43 Shaw (n 40) 89–91; Jan Klabbers, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 24; Antonio Cassese, 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 202; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of 
Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 595; Hannikainen (n 5) 717–23; Bassiouni (n 
40) 68; Marjorie M Whiteman, ‘Jus Cogens in International Law, with a Projected List’ (1977) 7 Georgia Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 609, 625–26; Grigory I Tunkin, ‘Jus Cogens in Contemporary 
International Law’ (1971) 3 University of Toledo Law Review 107, 117; Yarwood (n 13) 31–34; International 
Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission (1966, vol.II), Article 50, [3]. 
44 See ibid, and further:  Koskenniemi (n 18) [374]; Klabbers (n 43) 24; Whiteman (n 43) 625–26; Hannikainen (n 
5) 323–56. 
45 See above (n 43), and further:  Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, (1993) 
ICJ Reports 407, [100-104]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, (2006) ICJ Reports 6, 
[64]; Prosecutor v Kambanda (Case No. ICTR-97-23-S), Judgment and Sentence, 4 September 1998, [16]; 
Bianchi, ‘Individual Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity:  Reckoning with the Past, Thinking of the 
Future’ (n 10) 116. 
46 See above (n 43), and further:  Slavery Convention, signed 25 September 1926, in force 9 March 1927, Article 
2(a-b); Jochen A Frowein, ‘Ius Cogens’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Max Planck 
Society/Oxford University Press 2013) [C.6]; Bianchi, ‘Individual Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity:  
Reckoning with the Past, Thinking of the Future’ (n 10) 116; David Weissbrodt and Michael Dottridge, 
Abolishing Slavery and its Contemporary Forms, Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2002, UN Doc HR/PUB/02/4, [6]; Stefan Kirchner and Vanessa M Frese, ‘Slavery under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Jus Cogens Prohibition of Human Trafficking’ (2015) 27 Denning Law 
Journal 130, 132–33. 
47 See above (n 43), and further:  Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Bengium v 
Senegal), Judgment, (2012) ICJ Reports 422, [99]; Furundžija v Prosecutor, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, 10 
December 1998, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, [144, 147-157]; R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate 
Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (no. 3), [2001] 1 AC 147; [1999] 2 WLR 827, 198; Georgopoulous v Greece, HRC 
Communication, 14 September 2010, UN Doc. CCPR/C/99/D/1799/2008, [5]; Erika de Wet, ‘The Prohibition 
of Torture as a Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law’ (2004) 15 European 
Journal of International Law 97; Bianchi, ‘Individual Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity:  Reckoning 
with the Past, Thinking of the Future’ (n 10) 116. 
48 See above (n 5), and further: Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), 
Judgment, (2012) ICJ Reports 99, [95], citing Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v Belgium), Judgment, (2002) ICJ Reports 3, [56 et seq.].  There the Court held that its 
references to war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Arrest Warrant case were to rules which 
‘undoubtedly possess the character of jus cogens’.  See also discussion of the background to the case in Andrea 
Bianchi, ‘Serious Violations of Human Rights and Foreign States’ Accountability before Municipal Courts’ in 
Lal Chand Vohrah and others (eds), Man’s Inhumanity to Man:  Essays on International Law in Honour of 
Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law International 2003). 
49 ibid. 
50 See above (n 43), and further:  International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, signed 30 November 1973, in force 18 July 1976, 1015 UNTS 243; Oren Ben-Dor, ‘The One-State 
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requires further examination.  In the first category there are certain norms which, although 
there is no consensus as yet, are mentioned by some accounts—notably the prohibitions on 
ethnic cleansing51 and enforced disappearances52—and which will be argued to have a credible 
claim to peremptory status.  The second category contains norms which, it will be argued, are 
incorrectly categorised as having ius cogens status:  the rule pacta sunt servanda,53 and the 
prohibition of piracy.54 
This section will briefly consider these proposed norms ius cogens, and section 4 will then 
argue that each of the norms correctly categorised as having ius cogens status also have a 
powerful relationship to the protection of self-determination.55  Finally, section 5 will consider 
whether the relationship is causal or casual.  It will use as a test case poverty—arguably the 
single greatest threat to meaningful individual and collective self-determination—and will 
                                                     
as a Demand of International Law:  Jus Cogens, Challenging Apartheid and the Legal Validity of Israel’ (2013) 
12 Holy Land Studies 181, 196. 
51 Robin Geiß, ‘Ethnic Cleansing’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Max Planck 
Society/Oxford University Press 2013). 
52 Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, ‘Enforced Disappearances of Persons as a Violation of Jus Cogens:  The 
Contribution of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 507; Sarkin (n 2); Criddle and Fox-Decent (n 19) 396–370; Hannikainen (n 5) 511. 
53 W Paul Gormley, ‘The Codification of Pacta Sunt Servanda by the International Law Commission:  The 
Preservation of Classical Norms of Moral Force and Good Faith’ (1969–70) 14 St Louis University Law Journal 
367, 386; Mark Weston Janis, ‘The Nature of Jus Cogens’ (1978–88) 3 Connecticut Journal of International Law 
359, 362; Mark Weston Janis, ‘The Nature of Jus Cogens’ in Larry May and Jeff Brown (eds), Philosophy of 
Law:  Classic and Contemporary Readings (John Wiley & Sons 2009) 186; James Crawford, The Creation of 
States in International Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2006) 99–100; see below, p.256-257. 
54 Manfred Lachs, ‘The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time’ (1980) 169 Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 9, 206; Jiménez de Aréchaga (n 8) 64; Bassiouni (n 40) 68; 
Whiteman (n 43) 625; Hannikainen (n 5) 67–75, 541–43.; ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties’ (n 43) 
Article 50 [3]; see below, p.258-260. 
55 This correlation has also been observed, albeit in slightly different terms, by Bianchi, who comments rhetorically 
that ‘[i]t is as if human rights were a quintessential part of jus cogens.’ Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic 
of Jus Cogens’ (n 19) 495. 
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conclude that poverty’s close connection to the protection of self-determination is insufficient 
to produce an ius cogens norm. 
3.1 Ethnic Cleansing 
In its judgment in the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro) case, the ICJ held that ethnic cleansing means ‘rendering an area ethnically 
homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the 
area’.56  Although the Court made no finding on the status of the norm (either in that case or 
subsequently), there are a number of indications that ethnic cleansing is prohibited, and that it 
is so regardless of circumstances.  The Commission of Experts declared the existence of the 
prohibition in their First Interim Report,57 and the practice has been universally condemned, 
not least by the UN General Assembly,58 the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights,59 
and the Security Council.60  Indeed, During the Security Council debate on resolution 941 
(adopted unanimously), the representatives of the States Members of the Council condemned 
ethnic cleansing in strong and absolute terms.61  This was the case, for example, in the 
statement made by the representative of Germany, who referred to ethnic cleansing as 
‘abhorrent’,62 and similar statements were made by the representatives of the Czech 
                                                     
56 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, (2007) ICJ Reports 43, [190]; citing Interim Report of the 
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc. S/25274, 
[55]. 
57 Interim Report (n 56) [55]. 
58 See, e.g. UNGA Res 47/80 (1992). 
59 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 
25 June 1993, [I.28, II.23-24]. 
60 UNSC Res 941 (1994). 
61 Security Council, Official Record of the 3428th Meeting, 23 September 1994, UN Doc. S/PV.3428. 
62 ibid 11. 
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Republic,63 Argentina,64 the United Kingdom,65 the Unites States,66 New Zealand,67 and 
Russia, who demanded the ‘immediate cessation’ of the ‘repugnant’ practice of ethnic 
cleansing, which he regarded as a ‘gross, heinous violation[]’.68  If the prohibition on ethnic 
cleansing has not yet emerged as a norm ius cogens, then, it would appear to be a prime 
candidate for recognition as such. 
3.2 Enforced Disappearances 
Like the prohibition on ethnic cleansing, the prohibition on enforced disappearances does not 
typically feature among the norms enumerated as possessing ius cogens status.  In recent years, 
however, a number of academic commentators and certain international institutions have 
suggested that the prohibition on enforced or involuntary disappearances is a norm ius cogens.  
Cançado Trindade argues that the IACtHR has recognised enforced disappearances as a 
prohibition ius cogens, and that its status as such should be more generally acknowledged.69  
In particular, he refers to the IACtHR’s innovative approach in treating the next of kin of the 
disappeared as victims of the offence on par with the disappeared individual themselves as 
having expanded the scope of the Court’s investigations of allegations of disappearances, and 
its ability to hold States to account for what has (rightly) been regarded as a very serious denial 
of human rights and human dignity.70  However, it is clear that the IACtHR considered that 
enforced disappearances are a prohibition of ius cogens status as a sub-set of a larger, and 
                                                     
63 ibid 24-25. 
64 ibid 29. 
65 ibid 32. 
66 ibid 34. 
67 ibid 36. 
68 ibid 30. 
69 Cançado Trindade (n 52). 
70 ibid 510. 
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more controversial, purported norm ius cogens—the prohibition of grave violations of human 
rights—and not as a norm in itself.71 
Sarkin also argues that enforced disappearances have attained the status of ius cogens 
prohibitions.  He cites a number of factors in support of his contention, notably that the 
prohibition is indicated by its absolute prohibition in a number of international instruments; 
the common practice of excluding enforced disappearances from amnesty laws; the character 
of enforced disappearances as a denial of the application of law to the individual; and that no 
State argues that it has the right to conduct disappearances, coupled with near universal 
condemnation of the practice.72  While no element is in itself probative, Sarkin demonstrates 
that each of the elements he identifies as indicative is favourable to a finding of ius cogens 
status.  Perhaps most convincing, Sarkin identifies that ‘it is unheard of for a state to claim 
that they have the right to commit enforced disappearances’,73 and ‘no countries have laws 
that permit enforce disappearances to occur, at least in theory.’74  Similarly, the UN General 
Assembly’s Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances—
which included the injunction that ‘[n]o State shall practice, permit or tolerate enforced 
disappearances’75—was passed by consensus, as was its resolution 61/177 which adopted the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and 
                                                     
71 ibid. 
72 Sarkin (n 2). 
73 ibid 570. 
74 ibid 571. 
75 Declaration on Enforced Disappearances, UNGA Res 47/133 (1993), Article 2(1). 
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opened it for signature.76  It seems to be at least arguable, therefore, that the prohibition on 
enforced disappearances has attained ius cogens status. 
3.3 Pacta Sunt Servanda 
The rule pacta sunt servanda is commonly claimed to be a norm ius cogens.77  Such a claim, 
however, misunderstands the nature of both the norm, and the concept of peremptory 
normativity.  There is no doubt that pacta sunt servanda is an essential component of 
international law, but there are two reasons why it should not be regarded as having ius cogens 
character. 
First, pacta sunt servanda is not an absolute norm from which no derogation is permitted.  The 
ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility note a number of ‘circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness’ or, in other words, conditions under which a State may acceptably fail to fulfil 
its obligations.78  These are consent, self-defence, countermeasures, force majeure, distress, 
necessity and compliance with a peremptory norm.79  Similarly, that it is not absolute may be 
indicated by the circumstances, listed in Articles 61 and 62 of the VCLT (such as supervening 
impossibility of performance and fundamental change of circumstances), in which it is 
acceptable for a State unilaterally to terminate its treaty relationships.80  The point is not 
probative, however, and it would be possible to cast these as exceptions to the rule rather than 
                                                     
76 UNGA Res 61/177 (2006); International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, signed 20 December 2006, in force 23 December 2010, 2716 UNTS 3. 
77 See, e.g. Gormley (n 53); Janis, ‘The Nature of Jus Cogens’ (n 53) 362; Janis, ‘The Nature of Jus Cogens’ (n 53) 
186; Crawford (n 53) 99–100. 
78 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
with Commentaries’ Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001, vol.II), Chapter V. 
79 ibid Article 20-26. 
80 Vienna Convention (n 6) Article 61-62; Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2014) 32. 
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derogations from it.  Nevertheless, and despite the importance of the idea to the international 
legal system, these factors tend to cast doubt on the peremptory status of the norm. 
It may be that some resolution to this apparent conflict is offered by the second factor, that of 
the proper characterisation of the rule pacta sunt servanda.  This idea—or its close counterpart 
of obligation to law—was discussed in chapter three, where it was characterised as a structural 
property of the international legal system which, like sovereignty, statehood and ius cogens 
itself,81 is derived from the structural principle of self-determination.82  Rather than being a 
substantive rule of law to which the idea of peremptory normativity would apply, therefore, 
pacta sunt servanda would be more appropriately categorised as one of the second-order 
concepts of the international legal system – a concept on the same plane as the ius cogens idea, 
and more basic than that of individual ius cogens norms.  It would, therefore, not only be 
ideationally anachronic to characterise pacta sunt servanda as ius cogens, it would also be 
unnecessary:  as has been argued above, the idea of obligation is derived from the self-
determination of communities of individuals, and is thus embedded in the legal order.  As 
Orakashvili comments; the norm does ‘not need to be qualified as peremptory in order to fulfil 
[its] functions’.83 
Taken together, these observations indicate that there are reasons to be sceptical of the claim 
that pacta sunt servanda is a peremptory norm. 
                                                     
81 See above, p.248-249. 
82 See above, p.180-182, and further, Introduction at p.23-25. 
83 Orakhelashvili (n 9) 45. 
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3.4 Piracy 
Piracy is sometimes said to be a prohibition ius cogens – indeed, it is often considered to be a 
very early example of a norm of such character.84  In this contention there is, however, an 
unwarranted conflation between norms ius cogens and norms of international criminal law.  
Certainly piracy may be regarded as the first international crime, and perhaps the first example 
of universal jurisdiction.85  Nevertheless, there are good reasons for doubting that the 
prohibition is a norm ius cogens, primarily related to the question of who ius cogens norms 
bind.  Piracy is an individual act, and one that is incapable of being committed by a State.  
This makes it unsuitable for recognition as a norm of ius cogens status. 
First, that piracy is an individual act incapable of being committed by a State may be seen in 
the historical distinction between piracy and privateering.  In the years before the Paris 
Declaration of 1856 it was generally accepted that a privateer—an individual under the 
commission of a Government and bearing a letter of marque—acted lawfully in the taking of 
ships at sea, falling within the right of the State so to do.86  Thus although it was not always 
clear in practice whether an individual was pirate or privateer,87 a clear divide was drawn 
between the two actions as a matter of law.88  In modern international law, by contrast, both 
actions would be seen as illegal.  Nevertheless, the distinction between piracy—as the action 
                                                     
84 Hannikainen (n 5) 67–75. 
85 Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, Arrest Warrant (Belgium v Democratic Republic of Congo), Judgment 
(2002) ICJ Reports 35, [5]; Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Koijmans and Buergenthal, Arrest 
Warrant (Belgium v Democratic Republic of Congo), Judgment (2002) ICJ Reports 63, [61]; Kenneth C Randall, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’ (1987–88) 66 Texas Law Review 785, 791. 
86 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (Paris Declaration), concluded 30 March 1856; see Henry Jones, ‘Lines 
in the Ocean:  Thinking with the Sea about Territory and International Law’ (2016) 4 London Review of 
International Law 307, 328–33; Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order:  The British Empire and the 
Origins of International Law 1800-1850 (Harvard University Press 2016) 117–22, 134; Hannikainen (n 5) 69–
72. 
87 Jones (n 86) 330–31; Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press 2010) 112; Benton 
and Ford (n 86) 135–37. 
88 Jones (n 86) 332; Paris Declaration (n 86). 
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of an individual89—and equivalent State conduct is still meaningful.  In modern legal terms, 
an attack upon a vessel at sea by a ship and crew whose actions are attributable to a State 
would be best considered not as an act of piracy, but rather as an illegal use of force and an 
illegal act of aggression against the flag State.  Given that aggression is already an ius cogens 
prohibition under international law, it would be superfluous to recognise a separate norm 
forbidding States to attack ships on the high seas. 
Nor, it is submitted, would it be possible for individuals or other non-State actors to be subject 
to a prohibition on piracy qua a prohibition ius cogens.90  Ius cogens norms are defined in 
international law primarily by their character as norms out of which States cannot contract.91  
To the extent, therefore, that they represent substantive rules of international law they may 
bind individuals, non-State actors and others, but in their capacity as norms ius cogens their 
distinctive feature—that any agreement which conflicts with them is void—can apply only to 
those entities which can make international law.92  Of course, that a procedural obligation 
prohibiting the derogation from a norm exists implies, at the very least, the existence of the 
equivalent norm,93 and it may be said therefore that this point represents an unduly fine 
                                                     
89 UNCLOS defines piracy as an action ‘committed for private ends’:  United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, signed 10 December 1982, in force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3, Article 101(a). 
90 This statement is admittedly controversial.  It directly conflicts with the Opinion of the ICJ in the Advisory 
Proceedings on the Accordance with International Law of the Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo 
(2010) ICJ Reports 403 [81]; see also discussion above, p.113-131.  A number of authors also conclude that ius 
cogens norms are capable of binding individuals.  Peters, for example, notes that ‘[b]ecause jus cogens applies 
unconditionally, it also binds non-State actors such as individual and collective actors, including armed groups 
and business enterprises.’  See Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights:  The Legal Status of the Individual in 
International Law (Jonathan Huston tr, Cambridge University Press 2016) 101.  [Footnotes omitted]. 
91 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, UN Doc no. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, [11]; Theo van 
Boven, ‘Categories of Rights’ in Daniel Moeckli and others (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 182. 
92 See Orakhelashvili (n 9) 9–11, 67–82 et seq; see also Jordan Paust, ‘The Reality of Jus Cogens’ (1991) 7 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 81, 83–84. 
93 Hannikainen (n 5) 6; Linderfalk, ‘The Source of Jus Cogens Obligations – How Legal Positivism Copes with 
Peremptory International Law’ (n 39) 374–75; Ford (n 12) 153–54; Giorgio Gaja, ‘Jus Cogens Beyond the 
Vienna Convention’ (1981) 172 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 271, 288–89. 
260 TOWARDS A HUMAN-CENTRED INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
 
distinction between the substance of a prohibition and its status.94  As Bianchi argues, ‘the 
river bank of the law of treaties having been carried away by the force of the flood, jus cogens 
has inundated the plain of international law’:  if ius cogens norms ever were confined in their 
application to the law of treaties, it would now be difficult to maintain that they remain so 
limited in scope.95  Nevertheless, it is submitted that there is a relevant difference in kind 
between the actions of a State and the actions of individuals, non-State groups and other actors:  
the actions of States directly shape the contours of international legality.  For a non-State actor 
or an individual, then, save for a purely rhetorical effect,96 that an action is subject to a 
prohibition ius cogens means at most that States could not contract to render the action legal 
for that individual or group to perform.97  That a prohibition exists ius cogens does not make 
it more illegal for an individual to breach.98  In light of this conclusion, and given that Piracy 
is not an action of States, it seems highly unlikely that Piracy is a norm of ius cogens character. 
4. Norms Ius Cogens and Self-Determination 
For the purpose of this analysis it will be presumed that the norms international law recognised 
as having ius cogens character are the prohibitions on aggression, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, torture, slavery, apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and enforced 
disappearances.  Although the lack of a robust criteria for the identification of peremptory 
norms means that it is challenging to arrive at such a conclusion with confidence—it may be 
                                                     
94 See, contra, Markus Petsche, ‘Jus Cogens as a Vision of the International Legal Order’ (2010) 29 Penn State 
International Law Review 233, 238, 249–57; Alfred Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International 
Law’ (1966) 60 American Journal of International Law 55. 
95 Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (n 19) 496. 
96 ibid. 
97 Paust (n 92) 83–84. 
98 Linderfalk’s disaggregation of norms ius cogens into first and second order norms supports this contention:  
Linderfalk, ‘The Source of Jus Cogens Obligations – How Legal Positivism Copes with Peremptory International 
Law’ (n 39) 377. 
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argued both that this list is under- and over-inclusive—a convincing case can be made in 
favour of the inclusion of each of these provisions. 
This section will argue that the peremptory status of these prohibitions is not, though, their 
only point of commonality.  Rather, each is concerned with the protection of individuals and 
communities from certain extreme actions of States and, or so it will be argued, it is the 
protection of individual or collective self-determination that is central in each case.  This 
section will examine the connection between the norms ius cogens given above and self-
determination under the headings of those norms which protect individual self-determination, 
those which protect political self-determination, and those which have relevance to both 
forms.  Significantly, it will conclude that each prohibition has the same ultimate aim—the 
protection and the realisation of the dignity of the individual human person—and this 
conclusion, taken together with the characterisation given above of the category ius cogens as 
a corollary of the root of obligation in self-determination, strongly suggests a role for self-
determination in the identification and creation of norms ius cogens.  That conclusion will 
then be further examined in section 5, where it will be tested against a hypothetical norm 
against poverty. 
4.1 Individual Self-Determination 
Personal self-determination was defined above as the contention that all individual human 
agents should have the opportunity to decide upon and to pursue their individual conception 
of the good.99  Put more prosaically, individuals claim for themselves a certain level of 
freedom and well-being, such that they can make choices concerning their own lives.100  That 
                                                     
99 See above, p.8-9. 
100 In Korsgaard’s terms, they make choices in accordance with their practical identities:  Christine M Korsgaard, 
The Sources of Normativity (Onora O’Neill ed, Cambridge University Press 1996) 136 et seq.; see also Christine 
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principle—often treated as a premise in liberal politico-legal theory101—was characterised 
here as a social claim that is made meaningful by the presence of the individual in society, but 
which is also imperilled as a result.  Social regulation—the existence of law and of socio-
political institutions—was therefore posited as a necessary corollary of individual self-
determination, offering the individual protection against the actions of others.102 
As history has amply demonstrated, however, the establishment of political power over 
individuals and societies rarely produces the egalitarian, utopian Rechtstaat envisioned by 
theory.  On the contrary, the concentration of authority and power in the hands of individuals 
or groups creates a new kind of threat to the self-determination of the individual, and one of 
extraordinary gravity.  One need not resort to Baron Acton’s truism that ‘[p]ower tends to 
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.  Great men are almost always bad men’ to 
arrive at this conclusion;103 it is sufficient to note that, should such a situational actualise, the 
vast imbalance between the institutionalised power of the State and the human person renders 
the individual uniquely vulnerable.  There is, therefore, an imperative to constrain the power 
of the State to impede or destroy the self-determination of the individual, and it was argued 
above that such a limit is implied by the characterisation of the State given in this thesis as a 
product of the aggregated self-determination of the individuals who comprise it.104  That 
contention is supported by the manifestation of the protection of individual self-determination 
                                                     
M Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency:  Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (Oxford 
University Press 2008). 
101 See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd 2005) 272–73; Robert Nozick, 
Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basil Blackwell 1974) ix; Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’ in The 
Authority of Law:  Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979) 220. 
102 See above, p.9-11, 180-182. 
103 Letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, ‘Letter to Archbishop Mandell Creighton’ (5 April 1887). 
104 See above, p.9-11, 180-182, 224-227. 
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in a number of norms ius cogens, most particularly the prohibitions on torture, slavery, 
enforced disappearances and apartheid. 
The denial of self-determination is, first, an intrinsic part of the definition of an act of torture.  
Torture differs from other instances of the infliction of pain on one person by another because 
it is purposive.  The infliction of physical or mental suffering becomes an act of torture when 
it is done for the purpose of punishment, intimidation, coercion, or the extraction of 
information.105  In other words, suffering becomes torture when it is designed to substitute the 
will of the individual concerned for that of the torturer.  By means of the pain and suffering 
inflicted the torturer forces the individual to reveal information, to make a confession, or to 
shape their future conduct, and in so doing it reduces the person to the status of an object, 
‘negates her autonomy, and deprives her of human dignity.’106  The link is inescapable, and 
significant:  the repugnant act of intentionally causing the severe suffering of a person 
becomes the act subject to a universal and non-derogable prohibition under international law 
when it is committed for the purpose of subjugating the individual’s self-determination. 
There can, similarly, be no doubt whatsoever of the link between the prohibition on slavery 
and self-determination.  Like torture, the essence of slavery is the subjugation of the will of 
one individual to another, and it necessarily entails a de-humanisation of the individual in 
which personhood is destroyed to make way for objectifiable property.  Similar, too, is the 
prohibition of enforced disappearance.  Although the means differ, here too the effect and 
intention is to entirely subsume the individual will and prevent any manifestation of individual 
identity, rights, direction or determination.  As McDermot puts it:  enforced disappearance is 
                                                     
105 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, signed 10 
December 1984, in force 26 June 1987, Article 1(1). 
106 Oren Gross, ‘Are Torture Warrants Warranted - Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience’ (2004) 88 
Minnesota Law Review 1481, 1492. 
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‘the negation of the right of a human being to exist, to have an identity.  Forced disappearance 
transforms the being into a non-being.’107  ‘States that engage in these practices’, Christiano 
says, ‘cannot be said to be representing the interests of their members’; a factor which he 
argues defeats the voluntary association of individuals to the State.108  Recast to accord with 
the vocabulary of this thesis, it can be argued that States which permit, facilitate or carry out 
such extreme denials of self-determination negate their own foundations, and forfeit their 
legitimate authority over the individuals within their borders. 
These individual threats to self-determination, and particularly torture and enforced 
disappearances, also imply a collective effect.  Used to defeat the self-determination of the 
individual, the use of torture and enforced disappearance to suppress dissenting voices has a 
chilling effect on the self-determination of individuals and groups in a State, preventing the 
social and political realisation of individuals and entrenching power imbalances between 
individuals and populations.  This dual individual and collective character is seen even to a 
greater extent in the prohibition on apartheid.  Systematic racial discrimination of this kind 
profoundly compromises the self-determination of individuals in the relevant groups, reducing 
their living conditions and life chances, and restricting or removing their ability to participate 
in the governance of the State.  Its individual consequences cannot be disentangled from its 
collective effects, though:  apartheid is an attack on a community defined by race, and entails 
a subjugation of the rights and will of that community to the will of another, removing from 
those individuals their political self-determination right to take part, on conditions of equality 
with others, in the choice of the political and social structures and norms which govern their 
shared social life.  An equally pernicious effect straddles the two kinds, in that apartheid 
prevents the individual from determining their own identity.  Instead, the individual is defined 
                                                     
107 Niall McDermot, International Commission of Jurists Review, 2001, 73. 
108 Thomas Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’ in Samantha Besson and John 
Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 124. 
  PEREMPTORY NORMATIVITY 265 
 
 
by their race, the racial group is required by the system to understand itself as a collective, and 
a collective identity is thus imposed from outside rather than being generated from within the 
community as a result of the self-determination of its members. 
4.2 Collective Self-Determination 
In parallel to those peremptory prohibitions which protect individual self-determination, a 
number of the norms recognised by international law as ius cogens have a close connection to 
collective expressions of self-determination, in particular the political form. 
The political form of self-determination was defined above as a manifestation of the 
aggregated self-determination rights of the individuals in a particular society, and it was 
argued that it stands for two propositions.  In its internal aspect, sometimes referred to as 
popular sovereignty, political self-determination acknowledges individuals as the source of 
legitimacy in a political constitution, and requires that the individuals who compose a society 
determine the forms and structures according to which it is governed.  In its external aspect it 
stands for the principle of non-interference, or the contention that the choice of those forms 
and structures is an act of self-determination by the members of a society, and that the 
imposition of a different choice from outwith the society therefore severs the link between the 
society and the self-determination of its members.109  It was argued in Part 1 that this principle 
has become deeply embedded in the international legal order;110 and the need to protect 
political self-determination can be seen in the ius cogens prohibitions on aggression, genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
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The prohibition on aggression is the clearest example of the protection of the external facet of 
political self-determination.  The prohibition on any international use of force that is not either 
self-defensive or authorised by the UN Security Council stems from the UN Charter.  In order, 
it said, ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’,111 ‘[a]ll Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state’.112  As argued above, that provision—already 
of huge significance in itself—was notable, too, because it mirrored the Article 1(2) 
proclamation of ‘the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’.113  It was 
argued that the prohibition safeguards the integrity of national (political) self-determination 
and protects the national “self” against this most extreme form of external interference, in 
which the collective will of the State is forcibly suppressed.114 
Genocide and ethnic cleansing, too, have strong links to self-determination, although here it 
is the internal form of political self-determination that is primarily engaged.  As the Court 
observed in the Reservations case, genocide is a crime against “communities”, “peoples”, or 
“selves”: 
The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations 
to condemn and punish genocide as “a crime under international law” involving 
a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups’.115 
A group persecuted to the point of extinction (whether through mass killings or the many 
indirect methods recognised as capable of amounting to the act) is the most profound and 
extreme method of preventing the self-determination of the group.  That “genocide” rather 
                                                     
111 Charter of the United Nations, signed 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945, preamble. 
112 ibid. Article 2(4). 
113 ibid. Article 1(2). 
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than “mass-killings” is recognised as the ius cogens prohibition is significant:  it suggests that 
the crime of genocide is seen as being qualitatively different—perhaps more serious—than 
“mere” mass killings.  The differentiating factor is that while mass killings and genocide both 
involve the slaughter of many people, genocide involves also an attempt to destroy “the 
People” (the Self) as well as the individuals.  It is this purposive element, this direct assault 
upon the Self, that results in the “crime of crimes”.116  The same assault on the self is a 
prerequisite for ethnic cleansing, which involves the removal of a population identifiable 
through a distinct group identity and through objective factors (race, religion, ethnicity, 
history, custom, language, etc.) from a territory.  Insofar as that group constitutes a “self” 
forcible or coercive measures to remove it from its home not only interfere with the direct 
application of its self-determination, but are likely to lead to disruptions in its ability to 
function as a self at all. 
In parallel to the observation above that threats to individual self-determination also imply 
collective effects, it is self-evident that the threats to political self-determination discussed 
here can also entail devastating consequences for the individual.  Like apartheid, however, the 
category of crimes against humanity is one which straddles the border between collective and 
individual self-determination.  These are mass crimes committed against population groups 
(in particular the crime of persecution), and thus link to collective self-determination.  
However, there is also a clear link to individual self-determination:  although the campaign 
against the civilian population must be ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ for an act to amount to a 
crime against humanity, the individual act (murder, rape, etc.) need not be of a kind with the 
other acts which comprise the campaign.  Rather, a single act of murder (or rape, kidnapping, 
                                                     
116 This phrase is often attributed to Raphael Lemkin:  Raphael Lemkin, ‘Broadcast on Genocide’ (23 December 
1947).  It was also used to refer to genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in imposing its 
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and so on) is capable of amounting to a crime against humanity, where it is conducted as a 
contributory part of a campaign against a population. 
The scope of the prohibition on war crimes is similar, although here the relationship with self-
determination is more complex.  This is a portmanteau provision whereby any one of a large 
number of acts may amount to a war crime where they are committed on a ‘large scale’ against 
‘protected persons’.117  Many of these acts have a self-evident connection to the protection of 
the self-determination and dignity of individuals and groups, but the category also includes a 
number of acts where the connection to self-determination is more ambiguous, or which do 
not have a clear connection to the principle.  For example, although there is a clear connection 
to self-determination in the prohibition of the targeting of hospitals, scorched earth tactics, 
rape, and the use of indiscriminate weaponry; and a connection to the protection of individuals 
in a position of unusual vulnerability can be seen, too, in the provisions which mandate a 
minimum standard of treatment of prisoners of war; the prohibitions on the improper use of a 
flag of truce, and the improper use of the insignia of the enemy, the UN or the Red Cross do 
not appear to have a meaningful connection to the protection of self-determination.  
Nevertheless, a connection to self-determination can be observed in the majority of the acts 
which fall under the heading of war crimes, and it is submitted that the lack of a connection 
to self-determination of a limited number of provisions (some of which are primarily of 
historical interest) should not therefore be taken to deny the connection of the category as a 
whole.  The centre of gravity of the category lies in the protection of civilians and other 
particularly vulnerable groups from the worst effects in times of war, and as such seeks to 
protect the dignity of the individual and of individuals in populations. 
                                                     
117 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and 
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4.3 Conclusion 
This section has examined the connection between norms ius cogens and self-determination.  
It was theorised that, following the conclusion of Section 2 that ius cogens is a concept which 
arises as a necessary corollary of the foundation of the State and of international obligation in 
self-determination, a connection to the protection of self-determination would be discernible 
in the substantive norms of ius cogens.  An examination of the norms substantiated that claim, 
and it was found that each of the norms taken here to be of ius cogens status was characterised 
also by a deep and necessary connection to the protection of individual or group self-
determination – the forms here referred to as personal and political self-determination.  It is 
this which, it is submitted, is the ‘widely shared moral intuition’ of the international society 
which ‘sanctions [the] social authority and evocative power’ of ius cogens norms.118  It is not 
yet clear, however, whether this link is causal (or, in other words, whether the link with self-
determination has as its corollary ius cogens status); contributory (whether the link with self-
determination contributes to the formation of an ius cogens norm); or is merely incidental.  In 
the third section, this relationship will be examined further.  There the possibility of an ius 
cogens norm of poverty will be discussed.  As will be argued, few ills have a more destructive 
effect on self-determination than poverty, and no legal order can truly claim to protect self-
determination while tolerating the poverty of individuals within it.  If, therefore, the link 
between self-determination and ius cogens is causal or contributory, poverty should be 
revealed as either a norm ius cogens de lege lata, or as an emerging norm de lege feranda 
which is a prime candidate for recognition as a peremptory norm of international law. 
5. Ius Cogens as Self-Determination?  Testing the Connection 
It was argued above that the norms recognised as ius cogens each have a connection to self-
determination, and that in most cases that connection was both deep and intrinsic.  That finding 
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corroborates the earlier conclusion that the category ius cogens is a corollary of the source of 
the State and of international obligation in the structural principle of self-determination, but 
the relationship between the protection of self-determination and the peremptory status of 
individual norms is still unclear.  In particular, it remains to be seen whether a sufficiently 
deep connection to the protection of self-determination is enough in itself to confer ius cogens 
status on a norm (or, in other words, whether ius cogens norms are an expression of an 
objective morality in international law), or whether a connection to self-determination is 
merely contributory to the recognition of a norm as peremptory (in other words, that ius 
cogens norms serve as a system morality). 
In order to examine that question, this section will consider a hypothetical ius cogens norm 
concerning poverty.  If one is meaningfully to envision a system of ius cogens norms which 
exist to protect and to strengthen the individual and collective right to self-determination of 
people and peoples, one must include amongst its priorities the pernicious impact of poverty 
on the ability of individuals and groups to shape their own destinies in any meaningful sense.  
It seems clear, however, that there is no prohibition on poverty of ius cogens status in 
international law as it currently stands, and it will therefore be concluded that ius cogens norms 
are better characterised as a system than an objective morality. 
5.1 Poverty and Self-Determination 
There can be no doubt of the scale and intensity of the challenge poverty poses to the 
realisation of self-determination.  Shue has described the right to subsistence as a ‘basic right’; 
a right without which one is not able to enjoy any other right.119  Gorovitz states the importance 
yet more starkly.  The denial of subsistence, he says, is the ‘ultimate deprivation of rights, for 
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without food life ends, and rights are of value only for the living’.120  Indeed, even where 
survival is not threatened, a partial lack of a basic requirement for subsistence (such as food) 
will have a devastating effect on individual capacity: 
[W]ithout adequate nutrition, the value of rights is greatly diminished, for the 
rights that are most often claimed as human rights are those that facilitate growth, 
the development of personal capabilities, and the identification and pursuit of 
rational life plans.  But malnutrition curtails growth, constrains physical and 
mental development, and limits the possibilities of action.121 
Alston notes that it is ‘hardly surprising’ that ‘the right to food has been endorsed more often 
and with greater unanimity and urgency that most other human rights’, although he also notes 
the ‘paradox[]’ that it has ‘at the same time [been] violated more comprehensively and 
systematically than probably any other right.’122  Shue notes that ‘well over 1,000,000,000 
human beings’ fall below the bare minimum threshold he defines as ‘basic’,123 ‘everyone’s 
minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity’,124 ‘the morality of the depths’.125 
Beyond this, however, it can be seen that extreme hunger (or profound lack of shelter, health 
care, or any other facet of poverty) is not merely an obstacle to the realisation of an 
individual’s self-determination, but makes its actualisation impossible.  Even at lower levels, 
where the lack of food, shelter, healthcare, or other want associated with poverty does not 
immediately threaten life, the imperative to continue to meet the basic survival needs of the 
individual and any family members or dependants constrains choice in action almost entirely, 
                                                     
120 Samuel Gorovitz, ‘Bigotry, Loyalty, and Malnutrition’ in Peter G Brown and Henry Shue (eds), Food Policy:  
The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices (Free Press 1977) 131–32. 
121 ibid 132. 
122 Philip Alston, ‘International Law and the Human Right to Food’ in Philip Alston and Katarina Tomas̆evski 
(eds), The Right to Food (Martinus Nijhoff 1984) 9. 
123 Shue (n 119) ix. 
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even leaving aside the debilitating effects on the body and mind of hunger, exposure, and 
illness. 
The evils of this situation have been recognised by the international community on numerous 
occasions, and efforts to ameliorate it have been enacted in international law.  The first 
reference to an international right to be free from poverty appeared in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (adopted without opposition by the UN General 
Assembly), which proclaimed at article 25(1): 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.126 
This was further elaborated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), which transformed the Article 25(1) UDHR statement of uncertain legal 
status into a definite legal obligation on States Parties to the Covenant.  Article 11(1) declares: 
The States Parties to the Present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.  
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation 
based on free consent.127 
The right to an adequate standard of living also appears or finds echoes in the Convention for 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,128 the Convention for the Elimination of 
                                                     
126 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217(III) (1948). 
127 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, signed 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 
1976, 993 UNTS 3, Article 11(1). 
128 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, signed 18 December 1979, in 
force 3 September 1981, 1249 UNTS 13, Article 12, 14(2). 
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Racial Discrimination,129 the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,130 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.131  These are usually interpreted as programmatic rather 
than absolute requirements, and although it would not be accurate to construe them as 
therefore non- or less-legal,132 it does indicate that no peremptory norm requiring States to 
tackle poverty is currently recognised in international law.  That conclusion is corroborated 
by the conspicuous absence either of a positive or negative norm133 concerning poverty in 
academic attempts to enumerate the category,134 and nor can an opinio iuris be readily found 
in support of a norm of this status.135 
5.2 Systemic and Objective Morality 
                                                     
129 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, signed 7 March 1966, in 
force 4 January 1969, 660 UNTS 195, Article 5(e). 
130 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, signed 13 December 2006, in force 3 May 2008, 2515 
UNTS 3, Article 25, 28. 
131 Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed 20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990, 1577 UNTS 3, 
Articles 24, 27. 
132 Asbjørn Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Asbjørn Eide and others (eds), 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2001) 24; Commission on Human Rights, 
‘The New International Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights: Report on the Right to Adequate 
Food as a Human Right Submitted by Mr. Asbjørn Eide, Special Rapporteur’, 7 July 1987, UN Doc. 
E/Cn.4/Sub.2/1987/23, [66-69]; Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights:  Collected Papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge 
University Press 1993) 25, see further 212-213; Henry Shue, Basic Rights:  Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Princeton University Press 1996) 159; Martin Scheinin, ‘Economic and Social Rights 
as Legal Rights’ in Asbjørn Eide and others (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2nd edn, Martinus 
Nijhoff 2001) 29; GLH van Hoof, ‘The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:  A Rebuttal of 
Some Traditional Views’ in Philip Alston and Katarina Tomas̆evski (eds), The Right to Food (Martinus Nijhoff 
1984). 
133 The ius cogens norms listed above are negative prohibitions; limitations on State conduct vis-à-vis individuals 
and groups.  An equivalent negative norm in relation to poverty might be, for example, a prohibition on 
impoverishment. 
134 Hannikainen (n 5); Whiteman (n 43); see also ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties’ (n 43), commentary 
to Article 50. 
135 Rather, State pronouncements on poverty cast the tackling of poverty as a political goal (even a moral 
imperative), but not as a legal requirement.  See, for example, the remarks of States on the occasion of the 
conclusion of the UN Millennium Development Goals:  General Assembly, Official record, 55th Session, 7th 
Plenary Meeting, 8 September 2000, UN Doc no. A/55/PV.7; General Assembly, Official record, 55th Session, 
8th Plenary Meeting, 8 September 2000, UN Doc no. A/55/PV.8; UNGA Res 55/2 (8 September 2000). 
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It seems likely, therefore, that no ius cogens norm concerning poverty has emerged.  That 
conclusion excludes the possibility mooted above, that an imperative to protect self-
determination is sufficient in itself to produce a norm of ius cogens status, and suggests instead 
that there must be a positive process of norm creation through recognition, ratification or 
acceptance of the putative provision by States.  That contention is supported, too, by the 
formulation of ius cogens norms given in the Vienna Convention.136  There is, though, 
something unsatisfying about such a process of norm creation, if the connection between the 
category ius cogens and self-determination is accepted.  After all, the goal of protecting the 
self-determination of individuals and communities from the actions of States is vulnerable to 
severe retardation if States define the limits of the category.  Nevertheless, it must be 
concluded that the Vienna Convention definition is likely to give an accurate account of the 
acquisition of ius cogens status, at least in practical terms.  Although it is theoretically possible 
that a future Court or tribunal asked to consider the prohibition on impoverishment, for 
example, might choose to recognise it as having ius cogens status even absent recognition,137 
the primary means of enforcing peremptory norms, as with all other norms of international 
law, is the self and intra-community regulatory practices of States.  For that reason, an 
unrecognised norm of ius cogens status is likely to be functionally equivalent to a non-existent 
norm. 
It is clear, therefore, that a purely causal connection between self-determination and ius cogens 
status must be rejected, to the extent that it speaks of a new doctrine of naturalism, where the 
protection of self-determination is in and of itself sufficient to constitute a new norm of ius 
cogens.  Rather, it seems that norms require some form of recognition by States before they 
                                                     
136 Vienna Convention (n 6) Article 53. 
137 In which case it would be necessary to ask whether that tribunal was correct in its holding. 
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are capable of being actualised as having peremptory status.138  It is thus more appropriate to 
characterise norms ius cogens as a system morality—a morality arbitrated by States—than as 
the manifestation in international law of an external or objective moral code.  That conclusion 
is, however, somewhat unpalatable: 
It is inherently difficult to accept the notion that states are legally bound not to 
engage in genocide, for example, only if they have ratified and not formally 
denounced the 1948 Genocide Convention.  Some norms seem so basic, so 
important, that it is more than slightly artificial to argue that states are legally 
bound to comply with them simply because there exists an agreement between 
them to that effect rather than because, in the worlds of the [ICJ], non-compliance 
would “shock[] the conscience of mankind” and be contrary to “elementary 
considerations of humanity.”139 
That the connection is not necessary or automatic, however, does not indicate that no 
connection exists:  it seems likely that self-determination is contributory to the formation of 
ius cogens status.  The powerful connection to self-determination inherent in the prohibitions 
recognised as having peremptory status indicates a relationship between the two concepts, and 
that relationship seems significant given that it was concluded above that the concept of ius 
cogens itself is rooted in the structural concept of self-determination which runs through 
international law.  Ius cogens, therefore, has both an intimate structural connection to self-
determination, and a slightly weaker substantive connection.  While that substantive 
connection guides the formation and selection of ius cogens norms, their peremptory status is 
constituted by the recognition, acquiescence or other endorsement of States.  To that extent, 
ius cogens serves a similar function in the modern (still largely positivist) legal order to that 
of natural law in previous epochs; both constraining the actions and the legislative capacities 
of States to fit with the limits of acceptable conduct toward individuals and communities as 
                                                     
138 A not dissimilar point is made by Bianchi, who refers to the constitutive function of the ‘conscience of the 
community’ that allows ‘human rights peremptory norms [to] form the social identity of the group as well as one 
of the main ordering functions of social relations’:  Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (n 
19) 497. 
139 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Pull of the Mainstream’ (1990) 88 Michigan Law Review 1946, 1946–47.  [Footnotes 
omitted].  To turn this sentiment on its head, D’Amato levels the charge at norms ius cogens that ‘when a putative 
treaty provision becomes so senseless that it is unimaginable that states would actually include it in a treaty 
(other examples being an agreement to exchange slaves or the right to torture each other’s diplomats), then jus 
cogens theory snaps into action to make sure that such senselessness, should it occur, would have no legal effect’:  
D’Amato (n 41) 4. 
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defined by the international community itself, and in parallel serving a system-building 
function that brings the international community in reality into being.140  Ius cogens norms are 
the manifestations in positive legality of these ‘fundamental values’ of the international legal 
system.141 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the nature and foundations of ius cogens, and has argued that the 
category derives its high status from the structural importance in international law of self-
determination.  It reviewed the norms recognised as possessing peremptory status, and 
demonstrated that each has a connection to the protection of individual self-determination, 
collective self-determination, or of both, and that (with the exception of a scant few acts which 
can amount to war crimes, some of which are primarily of historical interest) those connections 
were in most cases deep and intrinsic. 
That finding buttressed the conclusion that the concept of ius cogens itself is dependent on 
self-determination.  It is a manifestation of the limits on the legitimate actions of States that is 
inherent in their natures as self-determining communities.  It was argued in Chapters three and 
four that States are phenomena produced by self-determination, and that the sovereignty of 
States and their subjection to international law result from that nature.142  Obligation in 
                                                     
140 This conception is consistent with Portamann’s observation that ‘although states play an important role in the 
process of creation of peremptory norms, their practice and individual wills cannot have the same weight as is 
the case with ordinary customary law’:  Portmann (n 8) 262–63.  [Footnotes omitted].  Janis, too, may be 
interpreted as offering some support for this proposition when he declares that the presumption that norms ius 
cogens are a subset of customary law rules is incorrect:  Janis, ‘The Nature of Jus Cogens’ (n 53) 360.  However, 
see contra Linderfalk, who consciously seeks to reclaim norms ius cogens for positivism by showing that they 
derive from customary law:  Linderfalk, ‘The Source of Jus Cogens Obligations – How Legal Positivism Copes 
with Peremptory International Law’ (n 39) 372 et seq; see also Paust (n 92) 82. 
141 Petsche (n 94) 258 et seq. 
142 See above, p.141 et seq; p.196 et seq. 
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international law, it was concluded, is a direct result of the imperative need to protect the 
collective (political) self-determination of societies, and in particular of the generalisable 
claim each self-determination unit makes to the protection of its independence, integrity, and 
freedom from interference.143  The same considerations—although here applied both to the 
accreted (collective) expression of self-determination and its root, the individual form—
motivate the demarcation of certain limits to the acceptable conduct of States both in their 
external and in their internal affairs.  It is these limits that are referred to as norms ius cogens. 
It might be objected that this conclusion, if correct, would inevitably dictate the content of ius 
cogens norms, as well as providing the category,144 but it was found that this is not the case.  
The example of poverty—an occurrence deeply destructive of self-determination but not 
subject to a norm of ius cogens status—was discussed, and it was concluded that although the 
category of ius cogens is derived from self-determination, the norms which populate it are 
positive rules of law created by States.  Although the protection of self-determination appears 
to provide strong moral impetus towards the identification of a relevant norm as having 
peremptory character, the intervention (or, at a minimum, the acquiescence) of States still 
seems to be required in order to confer that high status upon it.   
That conclusion may be seen as calling the connection between self-determination and ius 
cogens into question—why should the protection of self-determination be satisfied with the 
provision of an ‘empty box’?145—but it is submitted that it does not invalidate the argument.  
                                                     
143 See above, p.175-180. 
144 This is similar to an argument made by Weisburd, who argues that the lack of a meaningful way of determining 
what ius cogens norms are and ascertaining their content renders the category as a whole incoherent:  A Mark 
Weisburd, ‘The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina’ 
(1995) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 1, esp. 25-27. 
145 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Uses of Article 19’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 339, 341; Bianchi, 
‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (n 19) 491. 
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The idea of ius cogens is an expression of the self-determination structural principle, and it is 
that which places it above the revocable consent of States.  It is, however, as yet imperfect.  
As has been commented at various points throughout this discussion, the international legal 
order is not immutable, and nor is the process of its humanisation complete.  This thesis has 
argued that the evolving concepts and conceptions of sovereignty, obligation, statehood, 
personality and relative normativity support the hypothesis that self-determination has been 
embedded at the deepest level of international law—as a structural principle—both by this 
process and as its driver.  Only time will tell whether self-determination’s connection to ius 
cogens will be expressed in a causal or consequent relationship between the protection of the 
former and the status of the latter, but the emergence of such a connection would be a powerful 
additional indicator both of the humanisation process and of the centrality of self-
determination to it.  Rather than viewing the imperfection of the connection as a fault or defect, 
it is submitted that it is better viewed as an indicator of a process yet incomplete, and as a site 
for possible, exciting future developments. 
In the meanwhile, need we be content with Abi-Saab’s optimistic, if minimal, thought that ‘be 
it an empty box, the category [is] still useful; for without the box, it cannot be filled’?146  
Bianchi provides a beautiful and evocative answer:  hope is in there.147  Hope certainly does 
dwell in the box, but it is not alone.  It has been joined by a notion which, ever since 1776 and 
before, has again and again been shown to be one of the most compelling, enduring and 
profoundly human ideas of political thought.  It has been shown to be an idea with a huge 
dialectical potential, and that is transforming the international legal system.  In the field of ius 
cogens, the dialectical potential of self-determination has only just begun to be explored. 
                                                     
146 Abi-Saab (n 145) 341. 
147 Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (n 19) 493. 
 279 
 
Conclusion 
The Earth is a very small stage in a vast cosmic arena.  Think of the 
endless cruelties visited by the inhabitants of one corner of this pixel on 
the scarcely distinguishable inhabitants of some other corner, how 
frequent their misunderstandings, how eager they are to kill one another, 
how fervent their hatreds.  Think of the rivers of blood spilled by all those 
generals and emperors so that, in glory and triumph, they could become 
the momentary masters of a fraction of a dot.1 
The human person is the primary goal and end of the international legal system.  That 
statement, in and of itself not apparently outlandish or surprising, is the conclusion of a number 
of scholars of international law who argue that the structure of the international legal system 
is changing.  They identify an ongoing process of humanisation, a recognition or realisation 
of the individual as having interests which must be taken into account by the international 
legal order, and the consequent changes in that system of law.  In the last years and decades 
Peters argues there has been a ‘massive increase of simple legal rights of the individual’ and 
a concurrent ‘operationalization of the individual’s duties’ which 
[N]ot only have quantitative significance but are also an indicator of a qualitative 
leap.  This qualitative leap lies in the fact that the practice and opinio iuris of 
acknowledging rights and duties on a large scale has at the same time crystallised 
– it is submitted here – an original (primary) international legal personality of the 
human being.2 
                                                     
1 Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan, Pale Blue Dot:  A Vision of the Human Future in Space (Random House Publishing 
Group 2011) 1. 
2 Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights:  The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (Jonathan Huston 
tr, Cambridge University Press 2016) 551. 
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Simma argues, along similar lines, that ‘a rising awareness of the common interests of the 
international community, a community that comprises not only States, but in the last instance 
all human beings, has begun to change the nature of international law profoundly.’3 
Odd though it may seem that the observation in the context of law—a human institution,4 a 
‘social technique’5—created primarily by States—social facts,6 ‘metaphysical’ fictions,7—
that individual human beings are the ultimate objects and beneficiaries of the system and its 
activities should be seen as unconventional or peculiar, it represents a fundamental challenge 
to the historical (or, at least, post-19th century) understanding of international law as an order 
comprised of and for States.  Vividly metaphorised by Wolfers as billiard balls, the 19th 
century artificially conceived of States as opaque spheres the collisions and interactions of 
which were the proper subject of international law, and whose internal lives and the processes 
and individuals who composed them were dark to the external world.8  But the idea of 
international law’s humanisation goes further simply than acknowledging the indisputable 
                                                     
3 Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250 Collected Courses of 
the Hague Academy of International Law 217, 234; see also Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Law:  Ensuring 
the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’ (1999) 281 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 9; Theodor Meron, ‘International Law in the Age of Human Rights’ (2003) 301 Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 1; PK Menon, ‘The Legal Personality of Individuals’ (1994) 
6 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 127; Antonio Cassese, The Human Dimension of International Law:  
Selected Papers (Oxford University Press 2008); John King Gamble and others, ‘Human-Centric International 
Law:  A Model and a Search for Empirical Indicators’ (2005–06) 14 Tulane Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 61; Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
4 Nigel Warburton, Interview with Roberto Mangabeira Unger, ‘Roberto Mangaberia Unger on What is Wrong 
with the Social Sciences Today - SocialScienceBites’ (January 2014); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, ‘The Critical 
Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561, 665 et seq. 
5 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State (Anders Wedberg tr, Lawbook Exchange 1999) 19. 
6 John Searle, ‘Social Ontology and Political Power’ in Frederick F Schmitt (ed), Socializing Metaphysics:  The 
Nature of Social Reality (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers inc 2003) 196. 
7 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International 
Law 1, 27. 
8 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration:  Essays on International Politics (Johns Hopkins University Press 
1965) 19 et seq; for further discussion of the analogy see Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the 
Universe:  Self-Contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483. 
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sociological fact that States are comprised of individuals, that law is a product of human 
society, and that absent human beings these social institutions would cease instantly to be.9  It 
is not merely a descriptive claim, but one with normative force:  it argues that individuals are, 
to a significant (and perhaps growing) extent the proper units of concern for international law, 
that they are subjects of the system, and that international law is (and should be) being 
reoriented to take account of their needs. 
It is a change of that kind that is identified by Peters, Simma, Tomuschat and others as 
currently taking place in international law.  Although their assessments of the scope and extent 
of the process differ (Peters’s is perhaps the broadest), they each appear to regard that the 
change as fundamental—as occurring on a structural level and as deeply modifying the 
international legal system—and not simply as a skin-deep change in certain substantive rules.  
On the contrary:  Tomuschat argues that the change can be characterised as a conflict between 
‘two rivalling Grundnorms’—sovereignty and humanity—the latter of which is striving to 
create a ‘definitive new equilibrium’ in which international law is individual- and not State-
centred;10 while Teitel argues that there is a shift in the ‘normative foundations’11 of the system 
which has displaced sovereignty as the ‘self-evident foundation for international law’;12 and 
Peters identifies a ‘qualitative leap’13, arguing that ‘this orientation towards the individual in 
(different, overlapping, changing) communities justifies international law as a whole.’14  This 
                                                     
9 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society:  Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Polity Press 1984) 24. 
10 Tomuschat (n 3) 162. 
11 Teitel (n 3) 4. 
12 ibid 9. 
13 Peters (n 2) 551. 
14 ibid 553. 
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thesis has sought to contribute to and to advance this line of thought by offering an account of 
the ongoing process of humanisation at the theoretical level. 
1. The Hypothesis 
In its introduction, this thesis posited and defended two central claims, which served as axioms 
for the discussion that was to follow.  With Giddens and others it was first argued that 
international law is a social order—an ‘observer dependent feature’,15 to use Searle’s 
terminology, which is created recursively through social action which recreates and 
reproduces the very ‘conditions that made these actions possible’16—which, as such, exhibits 
modes of structuring, or ‘structuring properties [which] allow[] the “binding” of time-space 
in social systems, the properties of which make it possible for discernibly similar social 
practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them “systemic” 
form.’17  The ‘most deeply embedded’ of these structural properties, Giddens calls structural 
principles.18 
In the second place, the introduction to this thesis discussed the concept of self-determination.  
In its individual form self-determination was defined as the contention that all individuals 
should have the opportunity to decide upon and to pursue their own conception of the good, 
and it was argued that when individuals come together to form societies their individual rights 
to pursue the good accrete to produce an aggregated self-determination right of the society.  
That collective right was termed political self-determination, which represents in its internal 
aspect the right of the individuals in a political society to determine the form of the political 
                                                     
15 Searle (n 6) 196. 
16 Giddens (n 9) 2. 
17 ibid 17. 
18 ibid. 
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system which applies to them, and in its external aspect claims that it is only the individuals 
within the society that can make that choice, and thus stands for the principle of non-
interference. 
Taken together, these form the starting hypothesis for the thesis as a whole:  that self-
determination, both in its individual and its collectivised forms, has become a structural 
principle of the international legal system, and its influence on the second order concepts of 
that system (the structural properties) produces effects which reorient them towards self-
determination, and towards the human.  It is here that the source of the humanising tendency 
in international law may be found. 
This hypothesis was examined in two parts.  Part one sought corroboration of the centrality of 
self-determination to the modern international legal system in the substantive law, and it 
analysed the history of self-determination and its manifestations in judicial decisions in order 
to demonstrate that the political form of the idea is treated as holding a privileged position in 
international law.  Part two then considered the influence of self-determination on the 
structural properties of the modern legal system—sovereignty, obligation, statehood, 
personality, and ius cogens—finding that each has an intimate connection to self-
determination in its personal or political form.  The conclusions of these investigations are set 
out in more detail below.  
2. Part One 
Chapter one argued that self-determination, rather than being understood as a unitary or two-
sided concept, should be cognised as a genus comprising four distinct “species” of self-
determination ideas.  These were identified as political, remedial, colonial and secessionary 
self-determination.  Although these are connected ideas, an historical analysis indicates not 
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only that the legitimacy claims made by each form are distinct, but also that they should be 
given different statuses and treatment as a matter of international law.  The chapter examined 
the development of self-determination through the major invocations of its various forms, and 
concluded that the long-standing uncertainties and apparent dissonances in the legal regulation 
of the norm can be explained by disaggregating the kinds of claims each makes.  Thus, 
although the status of remedial self-determination is somewhat unclear, and although the 
secessionary form remains widely reviled, it is clear that self-determination of non-self-
governing peoples in the colonial context has been established as a legal right under customary 
law. 
Of most significance to the wider concerns of this thesis, however, is the position of political 
self-determination.  That idea, it was shown, has long been invoked as a powerful source of 
legitimacy, appearing in the American and French declarations of 1776 and 1789; and in the 
modern day has been enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in UN practice as a 
deeply embedded principle of the post-Charter international legal order.  Chapter two 
progressed this investigation further by examining the post-Charter development of self-
determination in curial processes, finding that here too political self-determination has been 
treated as having a high status—it has been treated as a norm of erga omnes character19—
notwithstanding that judicial processes have tended to treat remedial self-determination with 
a sceptical ambivalence and the secessionary form with outright suspicion. 
These investigations of the substantive status of self-determination confirmed the hypothesis 
that the political form of the idea holds a central position in modern international law, but do 
not suffice in themselves to show that it has become the system’s structural principle, or that 
                                                     
19 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
(2004) ICJ Reports 136; and above, p.110-113. 
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it is the source of the humanising tendency that Peters and others have identified.  In order to 
examine these aspects of the hypothesis further, part two considered the structural properties 
of the international legal system. 
3. Part Two 
In its introduction, this thesis argued that many or most of the structural features of the modern 
international legal system could be explained by reference to the influence and interaction of 
five key concepts, which it termed (following Giddens) the system’s structural properties:  
sovereignty, obligation, statehood, personality, and ius cogens.  Part two of the thesis 
examined these concepts in order to determine whether they exhibit a link to a sixth, self-
determination, and in particular whether self-determination plays a part in their constitution 
and evolution.  It was argued that such a link, if it was found to obtain generally across the 
five structural properties, would strongly indicate that self-determination is a deeper level 
concept of the international legal system, and is now a structural principle of the system. 
Chapter three demonstrated that the doctrines of sovereignty and obligation often taken to be 
representative of the modern content of those concepts are not an inherent or immutable part 
of international law.  Rather, these are concepts the meaning of which have shifted over time, 
and which have changed in particular in response to alterations in the foundations of the legal 
system.  A significant shift was identified in the transition from the natural law of the 18th 
century to the positivism of the 19th, and it was here that the problem of sovereignty—or the 
apparent irreconcilability of the 19th century’s expansive conception of sovereignty with 
international law properly-so-called—came into being.  That 19th century concept of 
sovereignty was shown to be philosophically incoherent, and to perpetuate a normative 
conflict which reduces the practical and theoretical authority of international law. 
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By contrast, the chapter presented a conception of sovereignty and obligation as parallel and 
mutually supportive concepts which find their roots in the idea of self-determination.  It was 
found that not only is a self-determination-based conception of sovereignty and obligation 
more internally coherent and better grounded, but that these are mutually reinforcing ideas 
and not, as the 19th century’s conception is, in an irresolvable utopian/apologetic conflict.  
Furthermore, the polity-focused understanding of sovereignty and effective concept of 
obligation are consonant with a number of developments in the understanding of sovereignty 
discernible in the practice of courts, States and international organisations in recent years.  
Although this is not a homogenous picture, it seems eminently plausible that the ongoing 
humanisation of international law (which most authors describe as a gradual process) will 
produce an increasing number of instances in which this is so.  It therefore appears that the 
concepts of sovereignty and obligation as they are now developing in international practice 
are more accurately described by a self-determination-based understanding, than by the 19th 
century’s incoherent idea of illimitable State power, and it was concluded that in this area, in 
relation to a concept traditionally seen as the apogee of the State, it is not the State but rather 
the human which appears to be at the centre of the international law world. 
Chapter four also emphasised the centrality of self-determination and of human individuals 
and communities to the ideas of statehood and personality.  The chapter argued that the term 
“State” can refer to at least three distinct entities—the State(Polity), the State(Person) and the 
State-like functional subject of law—each of which has an intimate connection to self-
determination.  The State(Polity) is a social structure within which individuals conduct a 
shared socio-political life within a bounded space.  It is a social fact, recursively created by 
the declarative actions of the individuals who live within it, and it engages both the internal 
and the external facets of the political self-determination of that community.  Most 
significantly, it is a political self-determination unit for the purposes of the self-determination 
based conception of sovereignty discussed in chapter three, providing the necessary 
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understanding of membership for the proposition that interference with the internal processes 
of the polity by external actors (individuals and groups) is illegitimate.  The State(Polity), too, 
is the basic societal unity within which a State(Person) may emerge.  This second—co-
extensive but non-equivalent—idea of “State” emerges where the necessary institutional 
structures exist to permit the collective entity (“the community” or “the group”) to act on its 
own behalf, in ways that are not mereologically attributable to the individuals who comprise 
it.  In contrast to the State(Polity), which is passive, the State(Person) is an actor on the 
international plane which is appropriately a legal person in its own right.  The creation of such 
a personhood was characterised as a self-determination process:  a choice by the individuals 
inhabiting a State(Polity) to develop a plenipotentiary rule, or the institutional structures 
necessary to allow designated individuals to represent the community as a single entity. 
Finally, it was argued that collective entities which lack a “true” personhood may nevertheless 
be subjected to international law as functional subjects.  Like full personhood, that conclusion 
echoed the analysis of sovereignty and obligation conducted chapter three.20  There it was 
concluded that the question of whether an entity is sovereign—defined as being entitled to 
independence and protection from external interference—is a factual question, based on 
whether a socio-political community exists such that the personal self-determination rights of 
the individuals who comprise it form an accreted, aggregated right to political self-
determination.  A political self-determination unit of that kind has a right to determine without 
external interference the principles on which its social and political life will be conducted, and 
the concept of obligation to law is therefore necessarily implied.  Significantly, however, this 
analysis decouples sovereignty and international personality:  it would be perfectly possible 
for an entity entitled to the protection of its sovereignty of the kind described here to be a 
State(Polity) which lacked a plenipotentiary rule, and therefore to be capable of being only an 
                                                     
20 See above, p.141 et seq. 
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imperfect or functional legal subject.  That it lacked full personhood would, however, neither 
justify withholding from it the protection of its sovereignty and its self-determination, nor of 
leaving unregulated whatever action-power it possesses, potentially to the detriment of other 
individuals and communities. 
As with the concepts of sovereignty and obligation, the analysis presented in chapter four 
supports the proposition that self-determination is deeply embedded in the ideas of statehood, 
personality and subjecthood.  That the concept plays such a vital role in shaping and 
conditioning these structural properties of the international legal system supports the 
hypothesis of this thesis, that self-determination should now be understood as the system’s 
structural principle, and indicates that States are more correctly defined as and for the 
protection of self-determining communities rather than—as does, for example, Montevideo—
simply as containing individuals.  In reaching that conclusion, the chapter begins to break 
down the distinctions between the idea of “the State” and the individuals and communities 
which compose it. 
Chapter five, finally, reviewed the nature and foundations of ius cogens, and argued that the 
category derives its high status from the structural importance in international law of self-
determination.  It reviewed the norms recognised as possessing peremptory status, and 
demonstrated that each has a connection to the protection of individual self-determination, 
collective self-determination, or of both, and that (with the exception of a scant few acts which 
may amount to war crimes, some of which are primarily of historical interest) those 
connections were in most cases deep and intrinsic.   
That finding buttressed the conclusion that the concept of ius cogens itself is dependent on 
self-determination.  It is a manifestation of the limits on the legitimate actions of States that is 
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inherent in their natures as self-determining communities.  The chapter referred to the 
conclusion of chapters three and four that States are themselves phenomena produced by self-
determination, and that the sovereignty of States and their subjection to international law result 
from that nature.21  Obligation in international law, chapter three concluded, is a direct result 
of the imperative need to protect the collective (political) self-determination of societies, and 
in particular of the generalisable claim each self-determination unit makes to the protection of 
its independence, integrity, and freedom from interference.22  The same considerations—
although here applied both to the accreted (collective) expression of self-determination and its 
root, the individual form—motivate the demarcation of certain limits to the acceptable conduct 
of States both in their external and in their internal affairs.  It is these limits that are referred 
to as norms ius cogens. 
Chapter five then discussed the influence of self-determination on the substantive content of 
ius cogens norms, and it was concluded that here self-determination’s influence operates at 
one remove.  Although the category of ius cogens is derived from self-determination, and 
although the protection of self-determination appears to provide strong moral impetus towards 
the identification of a relevant norm as having peremptory character, the intervention (or, at a 
minimum, the acquiescence) of States still seems to be required in order to confer that high 
status upon it.  Ius cogens norms are better characterised, therefore, as a system morality than 
as an objective morality. 
The conclusions reached in chapters three, four and five support the hypothesis presented; that 
were self-determination now established as a structural principle of the international legal 
system, its influence would be discernible on the modern forms of the system’s structural 
                                                     
21 See above, p.248-249. 
22 See above, p.175-182. 
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properties – sovereignty, obligation, statehood, personality, and ius cogens.  In each case, self-
determination was found to be either the source of the structural property concerned—whether 
that be the manifestation of the community’s right to freedom from external interference in its 
status as a political self-determination unit, or the essential limits on the contours of 
international legality that arise from the character of law as a social technique to protect the 
self-determination of individuals and communities—or a vital element of the concept’s 
operation – for example in the self-determination process that creates the personality of the 
otherwise passive State(Polity).  Two defects only were identified, neither of which is fatal to 
the argument presented. 
First, it was found in chapter three that the progress of the self-determination-based concept 
of sovereignty has been questioned, and perhaps checked, by the resurrection of the Lotus 
doctrine by the ICJ in its Kosovo Advisory Opinion.23  It was concluded, however, that a single 
event of this kind does not indicate a reversal of the direction of travel, nor that predictions of 
the demise of the 19th century’s concept of sovereignty were premature.  Rather, backward 
steps of this kind are to be expected in an ongoing process of conceptual change, and 
particularly so in a decentralised system such as international law.  Indeed, that the opinion’s 
revival of Lotus was so vociferously condemned as anachronistic—most notably by Judge 
Simma in his separate opinion—may on the contrary corroborate the contention that 19th 
century sovereignty is waning, and thus offer tangential support to the self-determination-
based reading.  Similarly, chapter five’s conclusion that substantive ius cogens norms are not 
formed as a direct result of self-determination but rather are mediated by States may be seen 
as calling the connection between self-determination and ius cogens into question—why 
                                                     
23 See above, p.187-192. 
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should the protection of self-determination be satisfied with the provision of an ‘empty box’?24  
Rather than viewing the imperfection of the connection as a fault or defect, however, it was 
argued that it is better viewed as an indication of a process of structural change that is yet 
incomplete, and as a site for possible future developments. 
It may therefore be concluded that the examination of sovereignty, obligation, statehood, 
personality and ius cogens—the structural properties of international law—supports the 
hypothesis of this thesis; that self-determination now sits at the heart of international law, and 
is a structural principle of the international legal system.  That conclusion has important 
indications for the understanding of international law, and in particular supports the contention 
that international law is undergoing a process of humanisation. 
4. Self-Determination and the Humanisation of International 
Law? 
The analysis here suggests that self-determination has come to occupy a central position within 
the international legal system, and that its influence is altering the system in deep and 
important ways.  The conclusion that the influence of self-determination is reorienting the 
basic concepts of the international legal system around the human individual and the right of 
the individual to self-determine, both personally and as part of a community, requires a shift 
in thinking about what international law is and how it works. 
It indicates first, and most profoundly, that the individual is the true and ultimate subject of 
international law.  States are rendered transparent, and the billiard ball fiction of the 19th 
                                                     
24 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Uses of Article 19’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 339, 341; Andrea 
Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 491, 
491. 
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century will no longer serve:  they are revealed to be fictional constructs composed of 
individuals in order to realise the purposes of individuals and individuals in community.  They 
are not, however, diminished or rendered irrelevant:  on the contrary, States are themselves 
expressions of individual and community self-determination and the interests and the purposes 
they serve are both necessary and important.  Nevertheless, there are structural and necessary 
limitations on their action-competence and on the legalities they can define as a result of their 
intrinsic connection to self-determination, and they are axiomatically and ineluctably subjects 
of law, which coevolves with them in a process of mutual constitution. 
Many or most of these conclusions will be familiar:  they are the conclusions of the scholars 
who have observed and endeavoured to describe the process of humanisation of international 
law, and the similarities between them may be taken as some corroboration of the reality of 
the trend that they have chronicled.  By providing a theoretical account of the changes to the 
deep structure of international law which both drive and are driven by these changes to the 
positive law in a recursive, fluvial process of social form- and reformation, it is hoped that it 
will contribute to the study of this important development in international law. 
In so doing it has sought to follow Roberto Unger’s injunction that study of the law (and other 
social sciences) must avoid ‘a kind of retrospective rationalisation of what exists’: a denial of 
‘the contingency of the arrangements […] as well [as] our ability to change the quality of 
character of the structure’ that means ‘we produce superstition in the service of servility.’25  
Rather, he argues, the task of social science is 
To radicalise the revolutionary insight; to explain the ascendency of the present 
arrangements and the present assumptions in a way that dissociates explaining 
                                                     
25 Unger interview (n 4). 
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them from vindicating their necessity or authority.  And, in this way, insight 
becomes the ally of transformative ambition.’26 
In so doing it is likely to be able to claim only limited success.  The process of reimagining 
the structure of international law will inevitably appear as tending towards the utopian, while 
the acceptance of certain structures (such as States) as the basic units of the system can very 
reasonably be criticised as implying their necessity, and reproducing ‘superstition in the 
service of servility.’  Where a choice has had to be made, however, it has tried to tend towards 
the actual rather than to the aspirational, and particularly so in its decision (discussed in the 
introduction) to examine those structures which can be discerned as pillars of the international 
legal system that currently exists, rather than to take as its task their re-evaluation or re-
imagination.  That choice could be criticised for its conservatism, just as the project as a whole 
(both of this thesis and of the wider study of humanisation) may be dismissed as utopian.  
Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to explain the real and in so doing to imply the 
‘adjacent possible’:  ‘[n]ot some horizon of ultimate possibles but the real possible which is 
[…] a penumbra of transformative opportunity’.27  In so doing it has attempted to build a 
bridge between apology and utopia, and to offer a ‘utopian realism’.28  International lawyers 
should not forget that our system is not merely what happens.  International laws are not 
dispassionate occurrences after the manner of planets orbiting through galaxies of exploding 
stars:  the system is made and imagined.29  It can—and will—be remade and reimagined 
quickly, slowly, recursively, consciously, minimally and grandly, with ebb and flow and ebb 
                                                     
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Polity Press 1995) 154. 
29 This conclusion, reached from a different starting point, aligns closely with Koskenniemi’s characterisation of 
law as a socio-linguistic enterprise in which ‘human agents appear as conscious builders of the world’, albeit 
‘within the possibilities offered by a historically given code’:  Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia 
(Cambridge University Press 2005) 11 et seq.  There are echoes, too, in d’Aspremont’s work examining the role 
of the lawyer in the construction of international law:  see Jean d’Aspremont, Epistemic Forces in International 
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015); and further Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (eds), Fundamental 
Concepts of International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming). 
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again, with good intentions and with ill.  And it is humans who will stand at the heart of that 
process. 
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